{
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"centers": [
"Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
"Carnegie Europe"
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"primaryCenter": "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
"programAffiliation": "russia",
"programs": [
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"regions": [
"Afghanistan",
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}
REQUIRED IMAGE
Despite its importance, Russia’s perspective has been missing from many previous analyses of coalition policy in Afghanistan. Moscow is an essential part of the Afghan equation that is often overlooked.
MOSCOW, Apr 27—Despite its importance, Russia’s perspective has been missing from many previous analyses of coalition policy in Afghanistan. Dmitri Trenin and Alexey Malashenko fill that gap with a new report that takes a fresh look at the coalition’s involvement in Afghanistan. They conclude that Moscow is an essential part of the Afghan equation that is often overlooked.
Russia remains cautious about becoming too involved in the conflict, but Moscow fears the prospect of instability in Central Asia and drug trafficking from Afghanistan. Russia wants to:
“Russia views Afghanistan today largely through the prism of security threats to itself and its Central Asian neighborhood, where Moscow aspires to soft dominance,” write Trenin and Malashenko.
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NOTES
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
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