The recent damage inflicted by Ukrainian drones and missiles on Russia has made Belarus aware of its own vulnerabilities—and surprisingly amenable to Kyiv’s demands.
Artyom Shraibman
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As China and India develop strategic interests beyond their territorial and regional waters, their naval footprints will grow, overlap, and generate the basis for potential conflict.
As China and India globalize their economies and develop strategic interests beyond their territorial and regional waters, their naval footprints will grow, overlap, and generate the basis for potential conflict. While neither country is ready to supplant the United States as the dominant naval power in the Indo-Pacific, their growing rivalry promises to deepen security dilemmas in the region and alter the world’s maritime space.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR: C. Raja Mohan heads the strategic studies program at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi. He is a columnist on foreign affairs for one of India’s leading English dailies, Indian Express. Mohan is also a nonresident senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
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