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{
  "authors": [
    "James L. Schoff"
  ],
  "type": "other",
  "centerAffiliationAll": "dc",
  "centers": [
    "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace"
  ],
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  "englishNewsletterAll": "asia",
  "nonEnglishNewsletterAll": "",
  "primaryCenter": "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
  "programAffiliation": "AP",
  "programs": [
    "Asia"
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  "regions": [
    "East Asia",
    "Japan"
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  "topics": [
    "Nuclear Policy"
  ]
}

Source: Getty

Other

Changing Perceptions of Extended Deterrence in Japan

The U.S. nuclear umbrella is only one component of America’s security commitment to Japan. Forward defense deployments, cooperative missile defense development, stepped-up intelligence sharing, and diplomatic and political visits are all components of extended deterrence.

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By James L. Schoff
Published on Nov 20, 2012
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Asia

The Asia Program in Washington studies disruptive security, governance, and technological risks that threaten peace, growth, and opportunity in the Asia-Pacific region, including a focus on China, Japan, and the Korean peninsula.

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Source: Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age

Writing in Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age, Carnegie's James Schoff offers a fresh assessment of thinking in Japan about nuclear weapons and extended deterrence following North Korea’s nuclear tests, with emphasis on the circumstances under which Japan would seriously consider or actually acquire a nuclear capability.  He also explores recent nuclear deterrence debates in Japan from a historical context, and it recommends ways that U.S. policy makers can reassure their Japanese counterparts as to the durability and viability of America’s security commitments.

The chapter looks beyond just the nuclear component of extended deterrence with regard to Japan. Indeed, U.S. reassurance of its nuclear umbrella over Japan is only one (albeit important) component of America’s security commitment to Japan. U.S. forward deployments in East Asia, missile defense development with Japan, stepped-up intelligence sharing with Japan, U.S. preemptive strike policies vis-à-vis North Korean missile launch pads, and diplomatic/political visits and signaling are all components of extended deterrence, among others.

A detailed understanding of how Japan can and might approach the nuclear question in response to current and future events is critical for the proper orientation of America’s security policies in East Asia and for a well-functioning U.S.-Japan alliance.

Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age is available for purchase through the Georgetown University Press.

About the Author

James L. Schoff

Former Senior Fellow, Asia Program

James L. Schoff was a senior fellow in the Carnegie Asia Program. His research focuses on U.S.-Japan relations and regional engagement, Japanese technology innovation, and regional trade and security dynamics.

    Recent Work

  • Paper
    A High-Tech Alliance: Challenges and Opportunities for U.S.-Japan Science and Technology Collaboration

      James L. Schoff, Douglas E. Rake, Joshua Levy

  • Commentary
    What’s the U.S. Take on Russia-Japan Relations?

      James L. Schoff

James L. Schoff
Former Senior Fellow, Asia Program
James L. Schoff
Nuclear PolicyEast AsiaJapan

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

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