Changing Perceptions of Extended Deterrence in Japan

{
  "authors": [
    "James L. Schoff"
  ],
  "type": "other",
  "centerAffiliationAll": "dc",
  "centers": [
    "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace"
  ],
  "collections": [],
  "englishNewsletterAll": "asia",
  "nonEnglishNewsletterAll": "",
  "primaryCenter": "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
  "programAffiliation": "AP",
  "programs": [
    "Asia"
  ],
  "projects": [],
  "regions": [
    "East Asia",
    "Japan"
  ],
  "topics": [
    "Nuclear Policy"
  ]
}

Other

Changing Perceptions of Extended Deterrence in Japan

The U.S. nuclear umbrella is only one component of America’s security commitment to Japan. Forward defense deployments, cooperative missile defense development, stepped-up intelligence sharing, and diplomatic and political visits are all components of extended deterrence.

By James L. Schoff

Published on Nov 20, 2012

Source: Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age

Writing in Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age, Carnegie's James Schoff offers a fresh assessment of thinking in Japan about nuclear weapons and extended deterrence following North Korea’s nuclear tests, with emphasis on the circumstances under which Japan would seriously consider or actually acquire a nuclear capability. He also explores recent nuclear deterrence debates in Japan from a historical context, and it recommends ways that U.S. policy makers can reassure their Japanese counterparts as to the durability and viability of America’s security commitments.

The chapter looks beyond just the nuclear component of extended deterrence with regard to Japan. Indeed, U.S. reassurance of its nuclear umbrella over Japan is only one (albeit important) component of America’s security commitment to Japan. U.S. forward deployments in East Asia, missile defense development with Japan, stepped-up intelligence sharing with Japan, U.S. preemptive strike policies vis-à-vis North Korean missile launch pads, and diplomatic/political visits and signaling are all components of extended deterrence, among others.

A detailed understanding of how Japan can and might approach the nuclear question in response to current and future events is critical for the proper orientation of America’s security policies in East Asia and for a well-functioning U.S.-Japan alliance.

Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age is available for purchase through the Georgetown University Press.

Nuclear Policy East Asia Japan

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

More Work from Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Commentary
Carnegie Politika
For Putin, Increasing Russia’s Nuclear Threat Matters More Than the Triad’s Modernization
For Putin, upgrading Russia’s nuclear forces was a secondary goal. The main aim was to gain an advantage over the West, including by strengthening the nuclear threat on all fronts. That made growth in missile arsenals and a new arms race inevitable.
Maxim Starchak
Commentary
Carnegie Politika
Japan’s “Militarist Turn” and What It Means for Russia
For a real example of political forces engaged in the militarization of society, the Russian leadership might consider looking closer to home.
James D.J. Brown
Paper
A Quarter Century of Nuclear South Asia: Nuclear Noise, Signalling, and the Risk of Escalation in India-Pakistan Crises
A close study of five crises makes clear that Cold War logic doesn’t apply to the South Asia nuclear powers.
Moeed Yusuf, Rizwan Zeb
Research
A New Era of Nuclear-Powered Submarines Is Making Waves in Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones
As states without nuclear weapons develop nuclear-powered submarines, can NWFZ regimes adapt to manage new technical, legal, procedural, and normative challenges?
Jamie Kwong, ed., Toby Dalton, ed., Celia McDowall, ed.
Research
Navigating Responsible Stewardship of Nuclear-Powered Submarines
As the first states without nuclear weapons set to acquire nuclear-powered attack submarines, Australia and Brazil face new questions and challenges as they seek to responsibly manage the risks of naval nuclear propulsion.
Jamie Kwong, ed., Toby Dalton, ed.

More Work from Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Commentary

Carnegie Politika

For Putin, Increasing Russia’s Nuclear Threat Matters More Than the Triad’s Modernization

For Putin, upgrading Russia’s nuclear forces was a secondary goal. The main aim was to gain an advantage over the West, including by strengthening the nuclear threat on all fronts. That made growth in missile arsenals and a new arms race inevitable.

Maxim Starchak

Commentary

Carnegie Politika

Japan’s “Militarist Turn” and What It Means for Russia

For a real example of political forces engaged in the militarization of society, the Russian leadership might consider looking closer to home.

James D.J. Brown

Paper

A Quarter Century of Nuclear South Asia: Nuclear Noise, Signalling, and the Risk of Escalation in India-Pakistan Crises

A close study of five crises makes clear that Cold War logic doesn’t apply to the South Asia nuclear powers.

Moeed Yusuf, Rizwan Zeb

Research

A New Era of Nuclear-Powered Submarines Is Making Waves in Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones

As states without nuclear weapons develop nuclear-powered submarines, can NWFZ regimes adapt to manage new technical, legal, procedural, and normative challenges?

Jamie Kwong, ed., Toby Dalton, ed., Celia McDowall, ed.

Research

Navigating Responsible Stewardship of Nuclear-Powered Submarines

As the first states without nuclear weapons set to acquire nuclear-powered attack submarines, Australia and Brazil face new questions and challenges as they seek to responsibly manage the risks of naval nuclear propulsion.

Jamie Kwong, ed., Toby Dalton, ed.