The 18th Party Congress and Foreign Policy: The Dog that Did Not Bark?

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In The Media

The 18th Party Congress and Foreign Policy: The Dog that Did Not Bark?

The Chinese Party Congress is mainly about domestic political power and domestic policies, but it can also serve as an important indicator of future policy direction and power structure, including within the foreign policy arena.

By Michael D. Swaine

Published on Jan 14, 2013

Source: China Leadership Monitor

Foreign policy issues have never played a major role in party congresses, at least during the reform era, for understandable reasons. A party congress is mainly about domestic political power and domestic policies, and even then is primarily an exercise in tedious sloganeering, pumping up the party faithful, and presenting the new leadership lineup. Nonetheless, congresses can be important as indicators of future policy direction and power structure, including within the foreign policy arena. Future policy indicators are usually contained within the congress work report delivered by the current Chinese Communist Party (CCP) general secretary, while power structure indicators are contained in the official membership roster of the new CCP Central Committee, Politburo, and Politburo Standing Committee.

This essay examines the foreign policy aspects of both documents, as presented at the 18th Party Congress. The bulk of the analysis is devoted to the party work report delivered by Hu Jintao, which is compared with past work reports going back to the 14th Party Congress of 1992. The CCP leadership roster is at best only an indirect indicator of the future PRC foreign policy elite, since the government leadership lineup will be selected the following spring, during the National People’s Congress. However, the foreign policy team will almost certainly be selected from the new party leadership. Hence, an examination of the congress can provide a few hints of what is to come.

This is a slightly modified version of the piece originally published in the China Leadership Monitor.

About the Author

Michael D. Swaine

Former Senior Fellow, Asia Program

Swaine was a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and one of the most prominent American analysts in Chinese security studies.

Recent Work

Other
What Kind of Global Order Should Washington and Beijing Strive For?
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Commentary
A Smarter U.S. Strategy for China in Four Steps
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Political Reform East Asia China

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

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