After more than a year and a half of fighting, UN-sponsored negotiations in Kuwait were adjourned in early August without resolution. As the international community continues its search for a solution, understanding Saudi Arabia’s end goal in Yemen and the practical effects of its military campaign is essential. However, Saudi and Yemeni perspectives on both of these issues often diverge considerably, and the interpretation of what is at stake—regional geopolitics, Yemeni stability, and factional dynamics—remain contested. Four experts give their assessments on the Saudi intervention.
The Political Reality of a Re-Divided Yemen
Neil Partrick
Neil Partrick, editor and lead contributor to Saudi Arabian Foreign Policy: Conflict and Cooperation (IB Tauris, 2016). Follow him on Twitter @neilpartrick.
Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen vowed to return the Houthis to their northern Saada heartland and to restore the Saudis’ ally, President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi, to power in Sanaa—even though the Saudis had long worked with current Houthi ally Ali Abdullah Saleh and previously sought amicable border security arrangements with the Houthis after failing to defeat them in a land war in 2009–10.
Unsurprisingly, the Saudis’ second war against the Houthis soon reached a dead end. In September 2015 Hadi returned to the country he was apparently the legitimate ruler of, albeit only to Aden, but then fled again. Since returning to Aden in November, Hadi has struggled to retain a foothold there, despite the efforts of supposedly loyal “official” Yemeni troops and some Emirati special forces. Southern secessionists are reasserting themselves in their old southern capital. After a year of more or less constant aerial bombardment, the Saudis’ de facto commander-in-chief, Prince Mohammed bin Salman, seemingly concluded that the conflict was irresolvable. There were not enough Yemeni Sunni tribal fighters willing to take the riyal, and he was not prepared to make the mistake Prince Khaled had five years earlier and put Saudi skin in the game, nor would the Sudanese or Eritrean governments send enough fighters to do the dirty work. Consequently, Saudi Arabia decided to talk to the Houthis again.
In March 2016, a Houthi delegation visited Jeddah for exploratory talks on what an internal Yemeni compromise would look like. The Houthi-Saleh forces had the upper hand and were not interested in disarming and handing power back to Hadi. In Kuwait, a formal talks process still involves all key Yemeni elements except al-Qaeda and similarly offers the Houthis a negotiated exit from key cities they control, including Sanaa. The Houthis do not need the Iranians, their distant allies, to persuade them that the previous status quo is hardly a prize worth capitulating over.
The United States is now proposing that the Houthis and Saleh forces each have a third of the seats in a Sanaa-based government and Hadi loyalists the balance—something the Saudis will struggle to stomach. Why would the Houthis or Saleh give up the control of arms that allowed them to force this concession? Saleh never lost control of many of the armed forces anyway. A Zaidi Shia like the Houthis, Saleh is part of this Yemeni plurality, but more importantly he uses largesse and tribal nous to keep himself in the game. The Saudi realignment with the Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood (the Islah Party) after the beginning of its air war was too late for Islah’s leadership to reliably recommission its old tribal fighters. Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, Saleh’s former comrade-in-arms, took the Saudi riyal and made some gains at the Houthis’ expense, but even he cannot crack Sanaa.
The de facto autonomous southern Yemeni entity is once again susceptible to Saudi and Gulf influence, including the Hadramaut province with which the kingdom has strong links, while the rest of the south is also replete with al-Qaeda fighters that the Saudis only belatedly took an interest in battling. However, the outlines of an informal Yemeni territorial arrangement are in place. The North is likely to remain an awkward fiefdom of the Houthis and Saleh. The Saudis’ old northern Salafi friends helped motivate the Houthis to expand in the first place and make unreliable Yemeni-Saudi border police. The Saudis would therefore be well advised to seek a modus vivendi with the new northern Yemeni entity, just as they and the Emiratis have in the south. After all, the Saudis used to enjoy playing southern Yemen off against its northern counterpart via allies in both countries. However, anything like a formal acceptance of the political reality of a re-divided Yemen would be a difficult loss of public face, and, sadly, not yet a price that the de facto Saudi leader is prepared to pay. We can expect more “war, war” to accompany yet more “jaw, jaw,” as the Saudis will in practice only accept Yemeni power sharing if their local allies control most of the guns.
A More Assertive Regional Role
Fahad Nazer
Fahad Nazer, non-resident fellow at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington and political analyst with intelligence consultants JTG, Inc. Follow him on Twitter @fanazer.
Saudi Arabia has a long and mixed track record of involvement in Yemen’s numerous political conflicts, dating back to the early 1960s. Until last year, the kingdom’s inclination was to either use its extensive contacts with political and tribal elements to forge negotiated settlements or to choose a side in the conflict, assist it financially—occasionally provide it with weapons—but not involve its own troops in the fighting. That all changed last year. The prospect of Yemen being in the throes of yet another civil war, in which two equally hostile militant groups—the Iran-supported Houthi rebels in the North and the terrorist group al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in the South—would try to impose their will on the rest of the country, was deemed a serious threat to the kingdom’s security.
The Saudis had spent millions trying to contain the violence in Yemen by building a sophisticated security fence along their southern border. However, in addition to the Iran-supported Houthis, with whom Saudi Arabia was engaged in serious border clashes in 2009, Yemen has been further destabilized by AQAP. In fact, the terrorist group also crossed the Saudi border in June 2014 and managed to kill several Saudi security personnel. To add to the volatile mix, there are strong indications that the most ruthless terrorist group yet, the so-called Islamic State, has also established a presence in Yemen, claiming credit for several deadly bombings that targeted Shia mosques in Sanaa.
The decision to launch a military operation to drive the Houthi rebels back to their strongholds in the North and force them to the negotiating table marks a significant departure from Saudi Arabia’s characteristic behind-the-scenes, quiet diplomacy that had played a role in ending the fifteen-year Lebanese civil war and, more recently, calmed tensions between Egypt and Qatar.
The Yemen campaign appears intended to send strong messages to three different audiences. It is meant to be a warning to Iran to stop its encroachment on what is traditionally considered Saudi Arabia’s “backyard” of Yemen specifically, and what Saudi officials have repeatedly characterized as Iran’s “meddling” in Arab affairs in general. It is also a message to the kingdom’s allies, including the United States. It makes clear that while Saudi Arabia still considers the United States to be a valuable partner, going forward, it will take “whatever measures are necessary” to defend its national security, with minimal consultation if necessary, should the United States—and the wider international community—prove unable or unwilling to do so.
Just as importantly, it is a message to the Saudi public at large that the billions of dollars that have been spent on military forces, weapons, and training are paying dividends. This self-reliance, however, has also entailed an important adjustment that is reflective of the dangerous times—and neighborhood—that Saudi Arabia lives in: hundreds of Saudis have made the ultimate sacrifice during the Yemen campaign, including a few hundred civilians who have died as a result of Houthis’ cross-border shelling.
Some will maintain that this new thinking and more assertive foreign policy is the brainchild of King Salman’s thirty-year old son, the defense minister and deputy crown prince Muhammad Bin Salman. Whether or not that is the case, Saudi Arabia has opened a new chapter in its history that seems intent on not just conveying to the world how the Saudis view their own changing role in the region, but also seems equally determined to compel the international community to think of Saudi Arabia in a whole new light.
Zero Tolerance for an Iran-Dominated Yemen
Mansour Almarzoqi
Mansour Almarzoqi, researcher on Saudi politics in Sciences Po de Lyon. Follow him on Twitter @0albogami.
Most analyses of Saudi goals in Yemen miss the most essential element: Saudi Arabia (KSA) built the Arab coalition to intervene in Yemen in order to prevent something from happening, rather than to make something happen. And that is to prevent Yemen from becoming another Iraq, where sovereignty lies in Tehran, not in Baghdad. That caveat must be kept in mind when analyzing the evolution of KSA goals there. Another caveat to keep in mind is that, strategically speaking, the political question is about one word: options.
Iranian expansionism aims at gaining more options—in Iraq (where it formed 56 militias), in the GCC (where it built the Abdali cell in Kuwait), in Syria (where it sent Afghani, Pakistani, Iraqi, and Lebanese militias to help Bashar al-Assad), in Yemen (where it armed the Houthi militia), and recently across the Arab World as a whole by announcing the formation of a “liberation army.” This expansionism walks on two legs: sectarianism, which is used as a tool to build alliances, and the weakness of central governments, without which Iranian-built militias wouldn’t be effective. These options, the Iranian regime hopes, would ensure its security, advance its interests, and bequeath to it an important seat at the regional table. Hence, when talking about an eventual end of hostilities in Yemen, one question is: is KSA willing to tolerate an Iran-dominated Yemen? The answer is: there is zero tolerance.
So the best outcome of the Yemeni crisis for the Saudi-led Arab coalition is to see the Iranian-backed Houthi militia and Saleh forces withdrawing from state institutions, ending their siege of cities like Taiz, turning in heavy weapons (including ballistic missiles), and agreeing to the formation of a unity government whose composition reflects all components of Yemeni society. Yet, it is clear that this outcome will be very difficult to achieve.
Now, in a situation where there is Iranian expansionism, where there is zero tolerance for an Iran-dominated Yemen, and where the best outcome for the Arab coalition is difficult to achieve, how does KSA see the evolution of the crisis?
First, there is enough indication that KSA won’t accept returning to the situation that existed before March 2015, namely a political scene dominated by the Iran-backed Houthi-Saleh alliance. Second, KSA believes it can influence regional and international actors. After all, KSA did change the U.S. position regarding intervention in Yemen from a total objection to a fluctuating and reserved support. Being pragmatic, KSA managed to find a common ground with Russia, which got them the backing to push through UNSC resolution 2216 (imposing an arms embargo on the Houthis) in April 2015, whereupon it replaced Operation Decisive Storm with Operation Restoring Hope. Third, the Yemeni crisis is part of a regional scene, where there is a strategic vacuum created by the emerging non-polar global order and the U.S. pivot to Asia. Internally, the change of nature and structure of power resulted in the emergence of the fourth Saudi state. Seeing an existential threat, Riyadh stepped up to be the first line of defense for its security, whatever it takes. Consequently, continuing the efforts to restore the legitimate Yemeni government of Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi seems to be the most likely position for KSA, despite the cost.
Riyadh has achieved several strategic goals. It prevented Yemen from becoming another Iraq, with 80 percent of Yemen now liberated. It demonstrated its capacity to take initiatives. It demonstrated its capacity to put an end to Iranian support for militias, a message to Iran-backed militias. And it demonstrated its capacity to build and manage a large-scale military operation, a message to Iran itself.
Saudi-Backed Extremism is Fueling Yemeni Outrage
Nasser Arrabyee
Nasser Arrabyee, Sanaa-based journalist and producer. Follow him on Twitter @narrabyee.
The Saudi government wants the Houthis to implement UN Resolution 2216 by surrendering their weapons to the internationally recognized government of Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi and withdrawing from the cities they occupy, including Sanaa and Taiz. But what Riyadh wants is the Houthis’ complete surrender, and it seems unconcerned that weapons handed over to the Yemeni government could go to members of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS), some of whom pose as members of Hadi’s internationally recognized government. The U.S. Department of the Treasury designated three members of the Riyadh-based Hadi government as global terrorists: Abdul Majid al-Zindani, Abdul Wahhab Humayqani (who represented Hadi’s government at the 2015 UN-sponsored talks in Geneva), and Nayif Salih Salim al-Qaysi (whom Hadi appointed as governor of Bayda in December 2015).
Al-Qaeda and IS are the biggest winners of the war. First, despite reports over the past few months that they were driven out of a number of southern cities, they continue to operate in Aden, Mukalla, Zinjibar, Jaar, and elsewhere—and will remain as long as Yemen lacks a strong government. About 70 people were killed on August 29 in the heart of Aden by an IS suicide bombing. That suicide bomber Ahmed Saif (also known as Abu Sufyan al-Adeni) was a Quran teacher living in Aden shows how al-Qaeda and IS are rooted in the educational and social system; this is the most dangerous aspect of the problem. Leaders in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey take money and weapons and hand them to the “resistance,” which is often al-Qaeda and IS.
As the atrocities accumulate and the humanitarian crisis worsens, Yemenis blame the U.S. administration for most of their suffering. Nationwide, huge posters in the streets proclaim, “America kills the Yemeni people,” as Yemenis are sure that the Saudis would not have dared to do all that to them without the consent of the United States. However, many Yemenis happily share media and social media, American citizens’ criticism of the Obama administration’s role in Saudi war crimes and weapons sales. They circulated tweets by Connecticut Senator Chris Murphy that criticized the Saudi campaign and portrayed him and others as heroes in big rallies, improving a little bit the image advanced by the “America kills the Yemeni people” campaign. Anti-America sentiment gets even higher when U.S.-backed Saudi jets kill whole families in their houses and commit massacres in weddings, schools, hospitals, factories, mosques, and markets, where hundreds of women and children have been killed.
Saudis are increasingly worried—not only by rising hatred, anti-Saudi sentiment, and the growing number of attacks on southern Saudi Arabia, but also by the photos and videos published almost daily showing bare-footed Yemeni fighters defeating the Saudi army and its most advanced weapons. Yemenis made and circulated a lot of jokes about Yemeni fighters seizing American M1A2 Abrams tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles (BFVs), boasting of Yemeni fighters’ bravery and making fun of Saudi fighters. Since mid-August, these scenes are shown almost daily and sometimes twice a day, leading Saudis to block or hack the Houthi-run Al Masirah TV on August 26, which reports from the Saudi provinces of Najran, Jizan, and Asir. Al Masirah shifted to a new frequency in less than 24 hours.
Still, a bigger concern for Saudis are the ballistic missiles that hit vital targets, such as military bases and oil facilities. An Aramco power plant in Najran was hit on August 26 with a ballistic missile, and Saudi Arabia retaliated by hitting electricity stations, oil facilities, and factories, including an attack on the Ras Isa sugar factory in Hodeida, cumulatively killing and injuring hundreds of civilians. Yet on September 2 Houthis fired a home-made ballistic missile named Burkan-1 on Taif, unnerving Saudis. The range of this missile is over 800 kilometers (500 miles) and it weighs nine tons. Even though Saudis said they destroyed Yemenis’ ballistic capability in the first week of war, after eighteen months they are stunned by how Yemenis moved such a huge missile and fired it on a military base hundreds of kilometers into Saudi Arabia—let alone how they made it and where.
