Ulrich Kühn
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}Source: Getty
Institutional Resilience, Deterrence and the Transition to Zero Nuclear Weapons
The question of the resilience of arms control and disarmament institutions to different political or other pressures rests mainly on their continued ability to function effectively.
Source: Security and Human Rights
The goal of a world free from nuclear weapons is directly related to the issues of international institutions and deterrence. Assuming that it would be possible, first, to move to significantly lower numbers of nuclear weapons and then to zero nuclear weapons, governing institutions would have to be resilient enough to respond in a timely manner and to uphold the bargain. But what factors determine and influence institutional resilience? And what would be the likely role of deterrence? This article first assesses what the general IR narratives tell us about determining factors. It then examines two empirical cases from the realm of arms control institutions (the CFE and the NPT treaties) and asks why these agreements are not as effective as intended. The next section discusses three additional factors of influence and identifies a shared interest in overcoming the deterrence principle as a key variable for institutional cooperation and as a factor that continues to influence resilience and effectiveness. The last section presents the conclusions.
This article was originally published in Security and Human Rights.
About the Author
Former Nonresident Scholar, Nuclear Policy Program
Ulrich Kühn was a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the head of the arms control and emerging technologies program at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg.
- Why Arms Control Is (Almost) DeadCommentary
- Preventing Escalation in the Baltics: A NATO PlaybookReport
Ulrich Kühn
Recent Work
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
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