Over the past two weeks, Iran has witnessed the most widespread mass protests in the country since the Green Movement in 2009. Significantly, these protests seem to have emerged spontaneously and without organization by any particular group, reflecting instead a range of popular grievances, in particular with the state of the economy and corruption among the country’s political elite.
Four experts examine the causes of the protests and what implications they may have for Iran’s regional ambitions, domestic political rivalries, and future for human rights.
Socioeconomic Drivers of the Protests
Tamer Badawi
Tamer Badawi, a research fellow at the Istanbul-based Al-Sharq Forum. Follow him on Twitter @TamerBadawi1.
Socioeconomic changes, largely stemming from President Hassan Rouhani’s economic policies since he took office, have had the biggest impact (among several factors) on driving and shaping the recent protests in Iran. The initial protests that erupted on December 28 in the city of Mashhad, a conservative Principalist stronghold in northeastern Iran, came after President Rouhani presented his government’s draft budget for the 2018–2019 financial year on December 10. Significantly, the presented budget plans to increase fuel prices by 50 percent. Cash handouts are currently provided to about 75 million Iranians, but next year the government plans to remove 35 million of the recipients. One report released by the Islamic Parliament Research Center warned that an economic shock caused by slashing fuel subsidies can risk eradicating 360,000 to 480,000 jobs, while one Iranian economic analyst estimates that around 800,000 jobs will be lost. In April 2017, the conservatives’ presidential candidate, Ebrahim Raisi, had promised to triple the cash handouts. The government’s decision to remove recipients of the cash handouts, opposite to Raisi’s promises, might have caused a shock and set the stage for disenchanted conservative citizens to protest in Mashhad against Rouhani’s economic policies and gradually rising inflation.
Some analysts speculate that the bulk of protesters come from lower-middle-class or poor backgrounds. Despite the conclusion of the nuclear accord in 2015 and the subsequent lift of sanctions, quality of life in Iran has seen little improvement, even deteriorating in several aspects, despite government efforts to curb skyrocketing inflation. Iran’s Gini coefficient, an index that measures inequality, increased from 0.35 in year 1392 (March 21, 2013–March 20, 2014), Rouhani’s first year in power, to 0.37 in Persian year 1395 (March 20, 2016–March 20, 2017), the last financial year, showing increased inequality in the country. The Iranian Central Bank’s statistics indicate that real wage growth was at 2.3 percent in Persian year 1395 , which is higher than the 1.2 percent realized in the previous year. However, this increase did not enhance household purchasing power. The average household budget deficit increased by almost 19 percent in year 1395 compared to the previous year. In terms of weight (in kilograms), the average household consumption of food, beverages, and tobacco decreased by around 6 percent in year 1395 compared to year 1392, Rouhani’s first year in power.
The protests quickly spread to Tehran and other major provinces, but they notably also spread extensively to the economically fragile northwestern provinces of Iran that are densely inhabited by ethnic minorities. While Razavi Khorasan province, where Mashhad is located, had voted in favor of Raisi, Kurdish provinces, for example, were among the top provinces that voted in favor of Rouhani.
In November, the province of Kermanshah was badly hit by an earthquake that killed around 400 and injured almost 7,000, crippling the already poorly performing local economy. In the financial year 1395 (March 20, 2016–March 20, 2017), official statistics indicate that unemployment in Kermanshah was the highest in the country at 22 percent, and Kurdistan was third with an unemployment rate of 15.2 percent—compared to a nationwide average of 12.4 percent. Those two provinces and their neighbors, which similarly saw many demonstrations, also suffer the highest rates of employment in the country among people between 15 and 29 years old. While unemployment in Iran for this demographic reached 25.9 percent in year 1395, Kermanshah’s and Kurdistan’s youth unemployment rates amount to 38.9 and 33.4 percent, respectively. Extreme water shortages over the last few years in northwestern provinces have had devastating impacts on agriculture and are probably one of the main reasons behind these high rates of unemployment. According to official statistics, the growth of private household income generated by the agricultural sector dropped from an average of 50.5 percent in 1392 (March 21, 2013–March 20, 2014) to 4.2 percent in 1395.
Regional economic inequalities in Iran considerably explain the geography of the protests’ intensity and diffusion, but the direct triggers of the protests probably remain tied to the political and security dynamics of the country and within each province. With Iran’s population aging—and consequently public interest in economic issues increasing—regional inequalities will gain more importance in understanding social mobilization in Iran.
Iran Outsmarted Itself in Silencing Activists
Tara Sepehri Far
Tara Sepehri Far, an Iran researcher at Human Rights Watch. Follow her on Twitter @sepehrifar.
When protests broke out in Mashhad on December 28 and quickly spread to dozens of other cities across Iran, very few seemed to be able to say who the protesters actually were and what specific grievances sent them to into the streets. Even in online Telegram groups encompassing hundreds of political and social activists inside and outside the country, few could offer a first-hand narrative of what was happening.
But by piecing together video footage and witness narratives to document likely government abuses, it is becoming clear that regardless of what ignited the protests, protesters are raising a wide range of longstanding political, social, and economic grievances. The concerns are compelling tens of thousands of Iranians without any clear previous political or activist affiliations to show how fed up they are and to demand to be heard—now.
There might be a reason why these protests have no identifiable leaders or groups. Since the student demonstrations in 1999, Iran’s security apparatus has sought to silence any organized mobilization and activism. Students, human rights defenders, women’s rights promoters, labor leaders, and ethnic minority rights activists immediately become targets and walk into a minefield of legal and extra-legal restrictions on their rights to free expression and assembly.
In 2009, the security forces went so far as to arrest members of legal political parties. Hundreds of activists left the country, and dozens served harsh prison sentences. Journalists and activists have since resumed their efforts to rebuild civil society only to face similar obstructions. Narges Mohmmadi, vice president of the banned Defenders of Human Rights Center, stayed behind when her family left Iran to continue her activism, including against Iran’s extremely high number of executions. She is now serving a ten-year prison sentence. Reza Shahabi, a prominent labor rights activist, was sent to prison for the “crime” of attempting to organize independent labor unions. Even those who simply shine a spotlight on endemic corruption pay a price: Yashar Soltani, a journalist who exposed officials’ financial misconduct in the Tehran municipality, is on trial for his efforts.
Due to the stranglehold Iran’s repressive system has on organized civil society, it is business as usual for the authorities to cancel meetings and deny requests for independent groups to peacefully assemble for events such as Labor Day or National Student’s Day. Many political activists cannot remember ever considering seeking a license for peaceful assembly as a practical option.
Iran in large part considers peaceful activism a “threat to national security,” and those who warn about festering popular grievances and rampant corruption are treated as seditionists. Without the safety valve of civil society and political activism, it is not surprising that many people are taking to the streets in pure frustration and anger.
Will the authorities learn from these events that the right to association and peaceful assembly is a healthy and necessary part of a functioning society? The government response so far has been disappointing—dusting off the well-worn playbook of claiming a foreign conspiracy while immediately detaining known student activists, the very people who are best placed to voice the demands through organized peaceful channels.
Mashhad’s Rebuke to Rouhani
Mohammad Ali Shabani
Mohammad Ali Shabani, a PhD candidate at SOAS, University of London and Iran Pulse editor at Al-Monitor. Follow him on Twitter @mashabani.
It is significant that the recent protests began in Mashhad, a city far from Tehran and home to the mausoleum of Ali al-Ridha, the eighth Shia Imam, which attracts millions of pilgrims each year. Astan-e Quds Razavi, the charitable foundation that controls the shrine, is incredibly wealthy; it controls over half of the land in town, and over the years has morphed into a powerful conglomerate that employs thousands of people.
Mashhad is also home to Ahmad Alamolhoda, a hardline cleric hand-picked by the Supreme Leader to preside over the Friday prayers in the city. When the longstanding custodian of al-Ridha’s shrine passed away in March 2016, the conservative camp—still soul searching with only one year until Hassan Rouhani’s expected bid for reelection—saw an opportunity to appoint as its head Ebrahim Raisi, a conservative cleric largely unknown to the public, and who just so happens to be Alamolhoda’s son-in-law. Showered with coverage from conservative outlets, he suddenly shot to fame. Just over a year later, having coopted fellow Mashhad-born Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, the longtime mayor of Tehran, Raisi presented a serious challenge to Hassan Rouhani. Though he lost the election, Raisi did get close to 16 million votes, a real feat considering the deep divisions among the conservatives.
Entering his second term, Rouhani had no intentions of giving his rivals a free pass. When he addressed parliament about next year’s budget bill on December 10, he pulled no punches. He spoke openly of unaccountable centers of power in an animated tone, attacking their grip on everything from real estate to the foreign currency market. This seems to have been the straw that broke the (conservative) camel’s back.
With U.S. President Donald Trump decertifying the nuclear deal in October and threatening to refuse to issue sanctions waivers, the duo from Mashhad and some of their conservative allies are said to have smelled an opportunity. Although there is no concrete evidence, in Tehran, everyone seems to “know” that Alamolhoda, his son-in-law and some of their associates plotted to undermine and embarrass Rouhani by instigating protests planned to build up to Dey 9 (December 30), the official anniversary of the “defeat” of the 2009 Green Movement.
The initial protests in Mashhad on December 28 have since metamorphosed into nationwide unrest. Over a thousand protesters have reportedly been detained; almost two dozen are dead. Yet it appears as only a matter of time before the seemingly leaderless protests are stamped out. In their wake, many questions remain. But one thing is clear: Rouhani is at a crossroads. His administration has exerted great pressure to minimize violence, partly in order to deflect the foreign pressure his domestic foes seem to crave. What now lies before him is a unique opportunity to turn the tables on his opponents: to leverage an embarrassment into a tool for more concessions from the Supreme Leader, such as a greater mandate to tackle unaccountable institutions. If he fails, he may not only lose the chance to undermine these unaccountable powers, who generate grievances but assume none of the responsibility, but also any political standing he has gained from attacking them.
Questioning Iran’s Regional Ambitions
Holly Dagres
Holly Dagres, an Iranian-American Middle East analyst and curator of The Iranist newsletter. Follow her on Twitter @hdagres.
“Not Gaza, not Lebanon, our lives for Iran” and “Leave Syria, think about us” were among the chants heard in videos widely circulated on social media from the past week’s protests in Iran. Not only did the protests voice the anger and frustration Iranians hold against the state of their economy, corruption, and the theocratic government, they drew attention to the blood and treasure spent by Iran backing Bashar Al-Assad’s government in Syria, Shia militias in Iraq, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and militant factions in the Gaza Strip, in addition to limited ties to Houthi rebels in Yemen. Similar sentiment has occasionally popped up in the past—in November, a video circulated of a woman in Tehran opposing Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei spending money abroad when it was needed at home—but not nearly on the scale of this past week.
Despite the Iran protests dominating the international news cycle, these slogans do not necessarily reflect the sentiments of Iranian society as a whole. According to a poll conducted by the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM) in July, only 18 percent of Iranians believe Iran should stop providing help to groups such as Hezbollah and the Assad government. And only 31 percent believe Iran should not send military personnel to Syria to aid Assad in fighting the Syrian rebels and groups such as the Islamic State (IS).
Since the Syrian civil war erupted in 2011, Iran has provided billions in funding, weaponry, and manpower to reinforce the Assad government. Iran’s involvement in Syria has not been without its losses: over 2,100 Iranian and Iran-backed fighters have died, about half of whom were “volunteer” troops from Afghanistan and Pakistan. Numerous high-profile generals of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) have also been killed, and in September, thousands of Iranians attended the funeral of Mohsen Hojaji, an IRGC solider beheaded by IS. Yet by supporting Assad, Tehran maintains a staunch ally in Damascus and its smuggling routes into Lebanon.
The rise of IS in Iraq and Syria provided the Iranian government an opportunity to increase its influence in those countries. The belief, or at least the message from government officials, was that if they did not fight Sunni extremists abroad then they would eventually fight them at home. This was partially evident in June 2017, when IS killed at least 12 people and injured 46 in an attack on critical and symbolic locations in Tehran: the parliament building and the mausoleum of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic.
Now that IS has all but been defeated in Iraq and Syria, and the Syrian rebels are increasingly losing territory, some Iranians are starting to wonder what they will receive in return for their steadfast friendship—especially against the rise of a Saudi-led, Sunni bloc encouraged by the Trump administration. Yet these concerns are only secondary to most Iranians. Even while the protests wane and the government succeeds in its crackdown, the core grievances—inflation, unemployment, and corruption—remain.
