• Research
  • Emissary
  • About
  • Experts
Carnegie Global logoCarnegie lettermark logo
DemocracyIran
  • Donate
{
  "authors": [
    "Dan Baer"
  ],
  "type": "legacyinthemedia",
  "centerAffiliationAll": "dc",
  "centers": [
    "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace"
  ],
  "collections": [],
  "englishNewsletterAll": "ctw",
  "nonEnglishNewsletterAll": "",
  "primaryCenter": "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
  "programAffiliation": "EP",
  "programs": [
    "Europe"
  ],
  "projects": [],
  "regions": [
    "East Asia",
    "China",
    "Western Europe",
    "Iran"
  ],
  "topics": [
    "Political Reform",
    "Foreign Policy"
  ]
}

Source: Getty

In The Media

How Will China Shape Global Governance?

China’s policies do not evidence a commitment to global governance as such, only an effort to advance China’s objectives through multilateral organizations.

Link Copied
By Dan Baer
Published on May 9, 2020
Program mobile hero image

Program

Europe

The Europe Program in Washington explores the political and security developments within Europe, transatlantic relations, and Europe’s global role. Working in coordination with Carnegie Europe in Brussels, the program brings together U.S. and European policymakers and experts on strategic issues facing Europe.

Learn More

Source: China File

While democratic intuitions lead some to embrace the idea of according China a growing voice and representation in the formal mechanisms of global governance that make up the multilateral system, China’s voice is a decidedly non-democratic one. China’s policies do not evidence a commitment to global governance as such, only an effort to advance China’s objectives through multilateral organizations.

There are plenty of examples of China’s successfully advancing its national policies through multilateral organizations, but the more consequential question is whether China’s engagement will change what multilateral governance is: Is it just a reconciliation mechanism for state interests? Or is it a collaborative effort—messy, imperfect, unreliable, but capable of incremental progress—to advance the principles and practice of a fairer and more predictable mode of international politics, one that is not just a nexus of negotiations but also a platform for addressing collective action problems?

When one considers the kinds of challenges the world must address successfully in the coming decades—climate change, migration, pandemics—it’s clear multilateral organizations must be more than a clearinghouse for state policies. So the question of what we can expect from China’s growing presence in multilateral organizations is only half a question. Its requisite other half is whether the U.S. and other democratic states reduce their involvement or even withdraw.

A stated ambition of U.S. China policy for a generation was to “knit” China into the international system, implicitly to exchange U.S. recognition of China’s growing global role for China’s acceptance of the system’s rules of the road. It’s easy to identify areas where this has not delivered the desired results: China is a member of the Human Rights Council despite, inter alia, its imprisonment of over a million Uighurs in concentration camps; the WTO fails to sufficiently curb China’s unfair trading practices; the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea has not stopped China’s creeping expansion in the South China Sea.

Do such failures mean that we should abandon hopes of mediating state behavior through multilateralism and international law and rely on coercive measures and “great power competition”? Or should we invest, including through coercive measures, in bolstering the international system to make it more effective? At least in the near term, the right answer is probably a mixture of both. The U.S. withdrawal from the U.N. Human Rights Council can’t be blamed for China’s presence on it, but U.S. absence certainly creates a more permissive environment for China and other authoritarian regimes to make a mockery of its work. And the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea could potentially be more of a constraint on state action if the U.S. were to ratify it. The point is, if the U.S. and others abandon positions of co-stewardship of the international system, they can hardly expect the system to fulfill its potential as a meaningful constraint on China’s behavior.

China, too, faces a paradox of sorts: The more it exerts power and control in multilateral organizations, the less useful those organizations are at legitimating its actions. Many states seek the “blessing” of state objectives by a relevant multilateral organization. While democratic states that participate and lead within the U.N. system and other multilateral forums lend their political legitimacy to those organizations, China—like other authoritarian regimes—borrows legitimacy from multilateral organizations. If China uses the U.N. to advance its own objectives without an eye toward sustainable global governance, eventually the U.N. will have less legitimacy to lend China.

This article was originally published by China File.

About the Author

Dan Baer

Senior Vice President; Director, Europe Program

Dan Baer is a senior vice president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and director of the Europe Program. Under President Obama, he was U.S. ambassador to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)  and he also served deputy assistant secretary of state for the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor.

    Recent Work

  • Commentary
    What the New Democratic Congress Can (and Can’t) Do on Foreign Policy
      • +10

      James M. Acton, Dan Baer, Mark Baldassare, …

  • Article
    Mission over Model: What Might AI Mean for an Organization Like Carnegie?

      Dan Baer

Dan Baer
Senior Vice President; Director, Europe Program
Dan Baer
Political ReformForeign PolicyEast AsiaChinaWestern EuropeIran

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

More Work from Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

  • Commentary
    Carnegie Politika
    What’s Behind South Korea’s Rift With Ukraine and Turn Toward Russia?

    There are limits as to how far the shift in South Korea’s foreign policy will go.

      James D.J. Brown

  • Commentary
    A New Age of Nuclear Policy: Perspectives from Gen Z

    As the nuclear order rapidly evolves, what can Europeans and other key players do to strengthen deterrence and reduce risks?

      • Jamie Kwong

      Jamie Kwong, ed.

  • Commentary
    Strategic Europe
    Taking the Pulse: Can Europe Fund Ukraine Without Russian Assets?

    A sizeable funding shortfall looks increasingly likely to hit Ukraine in 2027. Can the Europeans, with their strained budgets and economies, come up with the cash without seizing frozen Russian assets?

      • Rym Momtaz

      Rym Momtaz, ed.

  • Commentary
    Carnegie Politika
    How Realistic Is a U.S.-Brokered Gas Deal Between Russia and the EU?

    A gas deal would create palpable economic value, but it wouldn’t fundamentally change the position of either Russia or the EU.

      • Sergey Vakulenko

      Sergey Vakulenko

  • Commentary
    Strategic Europe
    No, A Democratic Congress Won’t Save Europe

    A blue wave has swept over the U.S. midterms, with Democrats regaining control of both houses of Congress. But Europeans hoping for a return to business as usual should think again.

      • Rym Momtaz

      Rym Momtaz

Get more news and analysis from
Carnegie This Week
Carnegie global logo, stacked
1779 Massachusetts Avenue NWWashington, DC, 20036-2103Phone: 202 483 7600
  • Research
  • Emissary
  • About
  • Experts
  • Donate
  • Programs
  • Events
  • Blogs
  • Podcasts
  • Contact
  • Annual Reports
  • Careers
  • Privacy
  • For Media
  • Government Resources
Get more news and analysis from
Carnegie This Week
© 2026 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. All rights reserved.