Five problems—and solutions—to make it actually work as a tool of great power competition.
Afreen Akhter
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By contrast, if Ukraine can regain military momentum before the end of 2022, it will be much easier for leaders of Western democracies to argue that their people should tighten their belts over the coming winter.
Nonresident Scholar, Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Program
Francis Fukuyama is a nonresident scholar in Carnegie’s Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Program, where his research focuses on democratization and international political economy.
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
Five problems—and solutions—to make it actually work as a tool of great power competition.
Afreen Akhter
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