So far, the Nuclear Security Summits have proved unable to break through India’s penchant for secrecy on what it considers to be matters of national security, so the country’s nuclear security arrangements remain somewhat opaque.
Recent testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee highlighted an interesting—and unrealistic—approach to negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program.
The security landscape in South Asia is changing radically due to the introduction of new nuclear and conventional military capabilities by both India and Pakistan.
Any shift away from no-first use is likely to be viewed by the United States and its allies—rightly or wrongly—as provocative.
So far, the promotion of nuclear security has been conducted mostly through a top-down approach, but it is best achieved through a bottom-up approach by creating nuclear security champions.
U.S. radar sites proposed for East Asia—and ostensibly directed at North Korea—underscore the need for a constructive China-U.S. dialogue on conventional military issues.
It is important that Washington and Moscow take steps toward compromising on ballistic missile defense cooperation now as a foundation for effective engagement with Beijing in the future.
The UN Security Council report published last week documents North Korea's efforts in setting up a large-scale uranium enrichment plant after sanctions were first imposed five years ago.
The Nuclear Suppliers Group should take time to consider the implications of India's possible membership before deciding.
The 2012 Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee in Vienna will be the first meeting of States Parties to assess global progress and build on the success of 2010.
One topic of discussion at the upcoming five-year treaty Review Conference meeting in Vienna will be how best to universalize the Additional Protocol for safeguards among the 185 non-nuclear-weapon states Party to the Treaty.
With the Iranian nuclear crisis nearing a watershed, the question of the Obama administration's "red lines" on Iran's nuclear program is the subject of considerable speculation and debate.
Differing views between Russia and NATO on issues such as missile defense and Georgian membership in NATO should not inhibit cooperation on steps toward further nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation.
On its twentieth anniversary, the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program remains an important tool for international cooperation to reduce nuclear dangers, but there remain some tough questions about the continued viability of the model.
When examining Beijing’s concerns about U.S. nuclear capabilities, it is important to understand the strategic challenges facing China and the ways the country’s leadership might try to resolve those challenges.
Calls for Seoul to seek deployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea have become frequent in recent months, spurred in great measure by North Korea's shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in 2010.
The latest statements made by the head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization regarding the country's willingness to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency do not bode well for the success of the recent Russian initiative to reinvigorate multilateral nuclear talks.
The question of Indian membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group is reportedly on the agenda for the Group's annual plenary. As the NSG considers adding new members, the question of conditions for membership becomes paramount.
As the Nuclear Suppliers Group convenes to agree on new Guidelines, now is no time to compromise existing principles.
The 2008 Nuclear Suppliers Group decision to permit civil nuclear trade with India, a country that never joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, undermines the credibility of the nuclear nonproliferation regime.