Browse Titles
  • Iran Nuclear Crisis: The Right Approach

    • Bruno Dupré
    • February 01, 2007

    <P><SPAN class=msoins0><SPAN lang=EN-GB style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: black; FONT-FAMILY: Arial; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB">(Guest analysis by Bruno Dupré) </SPAN></SPAN></P> <P><SPAN class=msoins0><SPAN lang=EN-GB style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: black; FONT-FAMILY: Arial; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB">One of the most useful things I learned at the Kennedy School of Government several years ago was about leadership and negotiation. Charisma, persuasiveness, and a high tolerance for ambiguity are certainly helpful for a successful negotiation, but by no means sufficient. It is also necessary to diagnose parties’ motivations, zones of potential agreement, possible alternatives, coalitions that could shift power in desired directions, and the best possible process for managing difficult negotiations. Without this methodology one can only hope for the best. But planning each element of a negotiation process increases the odds of success.</SPAN></SPAN></P> <P><SPAN class=msoins0><SPAN lang=EN-GB style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: black; FONT-FAMILY: Arial; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB">I left Harvard just as the EU-3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) entered negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program. Three years later, the world is still looking for the best way to get out of this crisis. Tehran keeps refusing to comply with IAEA and UN demands, using all kinds of pressure, from denying access to UN inspectors (January 27, 2007) to threatening the very existence of Israel. Many fear uncontrolled escalation in the region and beyond. The consensus maintained so far seems to be deteriorating suddenly. It is useful, at this critical moment, to recall the rationale of the EU approach. Even if success is far from being guaranteed, there is, for the time being, no better alternative. </SPAN></SPAN><SPAN class=msoins0><SPAN lang=EN-GB style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: black; FONT-FAMILY: Arial; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB"><A href=";id=19002">(Read More)</A></SPAN></SPAN> </P>

  • Has Iran Decided to Build the Bomb? Lessons from the French Experience

    • Bruno Tertrais
    • January 30, 2007

    One of the most vexing questions regarding the Iranian nuclear crisis is that analysts are unable to determine whether or not Iran has actually decided to build nuclear weapons or whether it just wants a “hedging” option at this point.

  • Assessing Iran's Nuclear Power Claim

    • Peter Bradford
    • January 09, 2007

    A recent article by Roger Stern suggests that because of a likely decline in Iranian oil exports and the attendant revenues, "Iran's claim to need nuclear power could be genuine". However, the suggestion that the Iranian nuclear power program is a response to an impending decline in Iranian oil exports is surely mistaken.

  • Nuclear Lessons from Hanoi

    <P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt"><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">(Commentary by Rose Gottemoeller, Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center) </SPAN></P> <P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt"><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial"></SPAN>&nbsp;</P> <P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt"><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">Two images caught my eye in the media coverage of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in <?xml:namespace prefix = st1 ns = "urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags" /><st1:City w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Hanoi</st1:place></st1:City>.<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>The first was the TV picture of President Bush and President Putin, wearing blue Vietnamese clothes that looked a bit like surgeon’s robes, a bit like nightgowns.<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>(Note to APEC leaders: It’s time to stop dressing up your colleagues in the national outfit for a photo-op.<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>Those clothes only look good on you.)<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN><?xml:namespace prefix = o ns = "urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" /><o:p></o:p></SPAN></P> <P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt"><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></P> <P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt"><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">The photo stuck with me though, for the matching blue that Bush and Putin were issued.<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>We might not like each other, but the rest of the world still pairs us together.<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>We are still expected to work on problems, find solutions, and hammer out compromises when they are needed. <SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp;</SPAN>That effect was clear this weekend, when the <st1:country-region w:st="on">United States</st1:country-region> and <st1:country-region w:st="on">Russia</st1:country-region> were at the pivot point of efforts to develop a way forward in the nuclear crises with <st1:country-region w:st="on">Iran</st1:country-region> and <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">North Korea</st1:place></st1:country-region>. </SPAN><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial"><SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes"><A href=";id=18904">(Read More)</A></SPAN></SPAN></P>

  • Gates on Iran

    • December 07, 2006

    In the recent Senate hearings for the newly confirmed Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Senators Robert Byrd (D-WV) and Lindsey Graham (R-SC) questioned Gates on his perspective on the Iran crisis.

  • Britain: Nuclear Business As Usual, or Catalyst for Change?

    • Caterina Dutto
    • November 28, 2006

    <P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt"><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">The Acronym Institute published a <A href=""><SPAN style="COLOR: black">report</SPAN></A>, <EM><SPAN style="FONT-FAMILY: Arial">Worse than Irrelevant?</SPAN></EM><STRONG><I><SPAN style="FONT-FAMILY: Arial"> </SPAN></I></STRONG><EM><SPAN style="FONT-FAMILY: Arial">British Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century,</SPAN></EM>&nbsp;addressing the future of <?xml:namespace prefix = st1 ns = "urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags" /><st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Britain</st1:place></st1:country-region>’s nuclear weapons system and outlining potential replacement options for the existing stockpile. <?xml:namespace prefix = o ns = "urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" /><o:p></o:p></SPAN></P> <P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt"><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></P> <P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt"><st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on"><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">Britain</SPAN></st1:place></st1:country-region><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">’s decision will have important ramifications for the nonproliferation regime and the commitment of nuclear weapons states towards their disarmament obligations under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. <o:p></o:p></SPAN></P> <P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt"><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></P> <P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt"><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">The report calls for a comprehensive review of <st1:country-region w:st="on">Britain</st1:country-region>’s security and defense strategies, taking into account <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Britain</st1:place></st1:country-region>’s commitment to nonproliferation and the efficacy of nuclear deterrence in the changing security environment of the 21<SUP>st</SUP> century. The report contrasts the nuclear threats of the Cold War with the predominant security challenges in today’s post-Cold War environment such as climate change and environmental degradation, terrorism, poverty, transnational illicit trade, and failing states. The authors conclude that nuclear weapons have no useful role in protecting against today’s security challenges, adding that nuclear weapons are “not merely irrelevant,” but that they “have the potential to add greatly to other threats, notably terrorism, organised crime and trafficking.” <A href=";id=18888">(Read More)<o:p></o:p></A></SPAN></P>

  • North Korea's Test and Congressional Delay: Implications for India-US Nuclear Deal

    • Anirudh Suri
    • October 24, 2006

    <P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt"><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">The India-U.S. civilian nuclear deal, under which the <?xml:namespace prefix = st1 ns = "urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags" /><st1:country-region w:st="on">U.S.</st1:country-region> would provide civilian nuclear technology to <st1:country-region w:st="on">India</st1:country-region>, overturning decades of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">U.S.</st1:place></st1:country-region> policy and marking a turning point in the evolution of the U.S.-India relationship, has faltered close to fruition. Even as a new counter-offensive has been launched to push through the deal during the lame duck session of the Senate in November, proponents of the deal are disappointed, and even slightly frustrated, that the Senate did not take up the bill in its recently concluded session.<BR><BR></SPAN><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">Adding to their discomfort is <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">North Korea</st1:place></st1:country-region>’s recent nuclear test. <st1:country-region w:st="on">North Korea</st1:country-region>’s test is likely to place the India-U.S. nuclear deal debate more firmly within the context of increasing proliferation in the world, instead of in the narrative about strengthening the bilateral relationship between the <st1:country-region w:st="on">U.S.</st1:country-region> and <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>. The test has strengthened the voice of the critics of the India-U.S. nuclear deal. <A href=";id=18813">(Read More)<?xml:namespace prefix = o ns = "urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" /><o:p></o:p></A></SPAN></P>

  • ElBaradei Remarks at Georgetown University

    • Caterina Dutto
    • October 24, 2006

    IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei addressed a wide range of nonproliferation challenges yesterday in a conversation with Robert Gallucci at Georgetown University.

  • U.S. Leadership with China, South Korea and Japan Key to Containing Nuclear Chain Reaction

    North Korea recently tested a nuclear weapon. The United States must now take the lead in intense diplomacy to prevent a chain reaction in the nuclear arena.

  • Defining Iran's Nuclear Rights

    Iranian officials and commentators have masterfully and incorrectly defined the crisis over Iran’s nuclear activities.&nbsp; Instead of being about Iran’s non-compliance with its safeguards obligations and subsequent refusal to answer key questions needed for the International Atomic Energy Agency to verify that Iran’s nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes, the story has become the United States’ bloody minded crusade to deny Iran its nuclear rights.&nbsp; This story needs to be corrected.<BR><BR>Iran, like all countries, has a right to “develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes…in conformity with Articles I and II of the Treaty”&nbsp; Under Article IV of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, Iran can expect international cooperation in exercising such rights.<BR><BR>However, there is no explicit right to possess uranium enrichment or plutonium separation technology, just as there is not a specific prohibition on possessing such technology.&nbsp; The rules to guide the international management of nuclear technology have evolved through negotiation and custom.&nbsp; In all cases,&nbsp; rights under the NPT are conditioned on the obligation “not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons…; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons.” (Article II) <BR><BR><A href=";id=18687">(Read More)</A>

  • All Eyes on the Senate as India Plays Hardball

    • Anirudh Suri
    • August 29, 2006

    Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh recently made speeches in the Rajya Sabha (August 17th) and the Lok Sabha (August 23rd), the two Houses of India’s Parliament, forcefully defending the merits of the India-US nuclear deal and clearly outlining the Indian Government’s position on various aspects of the deal. Facing criticism from opposition parties as well as the Left, Singh addressed all the concerns in turn and claimed that he had the assurance of President Bush that the final India-US nuclear deal would not represent any shifts away from the goalposts established in the agreement of July 18, 2005. <BR><BR>In his speeches, Singh emphatically stated that India would not bend in the face of US pressure and would not accept any conditions that would go beyond the July 18th Joint Statement and the March 2, 2006 Separation Plan. Strongly refuting the claim that the proposed US Bill, as passed by the House of Representatives, could become an instrument to influence or even dictate Indian foreign policy, Singh asserted that “the thrust of our foreign policy remains the promotion of our national interest.” <BR><BR>In unequivocal terms, Singh further declared that India was “not willing to accept a moratorium on the production of fissile material” and that India was not “prepared to go beyond a unilateral voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing as indicated in the July statement.” Singh made it clear that the Indian Government would not accept any “dilution that would prevent us from securing the benefits of full civil nuclear cooperation.” He also rejected the Senate proposal that requires the US President to report on India’s compliance with non-proliferation and other commitments on an annual basis, saying that the “element of uncertainty regarding future cooperation” was not acceptable to India. Addressing the issue of India’s nuclear weapons program being subject to international safeguards, Singh further clarified that the Indian government has registered strong opposition to “any legislative provisions that mandate scrutiny of either our nuclear weapons programme or our unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.” As a sovereign nation, India was in no way bound by the legislation of any other country, Singh declared. <A href=";id=18661">(Read More)</A>

  • Iran after the Lebanon War: Same Nuclear Ambitions, Different Regional Context

    • Emily B. Landau
    • August 24, 2006

    As the August 31 deadline for Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment activities approaches, Iran remains defiant and determined to not give up its right to engage in these activities. While the war in Lebanon was raging and the UN Security Council took a firmer stance on the nuclear issue, statements from Iran clarified that, far from suspension, Iran plans to expand its enrichment activities.

  • UN Resolution 1696 Moots Iranian Legal Claims

    • Amy Reed
    • August 21, 2006

    On July 31, 2006 the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1696, demanding that Iran “suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities.” The resolution came after Iran had ignored a series of requests from the IAEA, the EU-3, and the United States for Iran to cease its enrichment program until its peaceful nature could be confirmed by the IAEA. Iran claimed that neither the IAEA nor any member of the international community had the right to prevent Iran from pursuing a domestic nuclear energy program. Resolution 1696 undermines the legal basis on which Iran has resisted suspension. As the international community awaits Iran’s response to the Security Council’s demands, it is important to understand this new legal context. <BR><BR>1696 was adopted after three years of negotiations between Iran and France, Germany and the United Kingdom failed to resolve outstanding questions regarding Iran’s compliance with its IAEA safeguard obligations and its Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons obligation under Article II “not to seek or receive assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” Throughout these negotiations, Iran has been pressed to suspend uranium enrichment activities, as a confidence-building measure to facilitate negotiations over longer-term parameters to objectively guarantee that Iran’s nuclear activities are exclusively for peaceful purposes. Iran agreed as a voluntary, unilateral measure in November 2003 to suspend all enrichment and reprocessing activities as defined by the IAEA. It then intermittently broke the terms of the suspension until November 2004, when a more specific agreement was made with the EU-3. Iran then breached that agreement on August 10, 2005 when it removed the IAEA seals from its conversion plant in Esfahan in preparation for manufacturing UF6 gas to be enriched. <A href=";id=18636">(Read More) </A>

  • Update: Indian Questioning of US-India Nuclear Deal

    • Anirudh Suri
    • August 17, 2006

    On July 26, the US House of Representatives passed the “<?xml:namespace prefix = st1 /><st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">United States</st1:place></st1:country-region> and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006” by a clear majority. The Senate version of the Bill will be voted upon, most likely, in September. The House of Representatives adopted the Bill only after ensuring that even after being passed by the Senate and the enactment of the Act into law, the nuclear cooperation agreement would still need the approval of the Congress, thus maintaining its full oversight authority. <?xml:namespace prefix = o /><o:p></o:p></SPAN><BR><BR>The House also demanded periodic reporting from the President on <st1:country-region w:st="on">India</st1:country-region>’s compliance with key <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">U.S.</st1:place></st1:country-region> objectives in the region as well as on issues of non-proliferation. In two non-binding sections included in the Bill, the “Sense of the House” and “Statements of Policy,” the House outlined key U.S. interests including, but not limited to : (i) the achievement of a moratorium on the production of fissile material for production of nuclear weapons; (ii) securing India’s full support of and participation in U.S.<SPAN style="COLOR: #333333"> efforts to deter and possibly isolate and sanction Iran for its attempts to acquire nuclear weapons; and (iii) a complete declaration of India’s civil nuclear facilities to the IAEA as well as a safeguards regime in perpetuity in conformity with IAEA’s practices, standards and principles,<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>rather than an India-specific safeguards regime.</SPAN><BR><BR>These modifications have generated apprehension on the Indian side. Among the political parties, the CPI (M), a key leftist ally of the ruling Congress government with a traditionally anti-US stance, has expressed a heightened sense of concern about the deal’s impact on <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>’s ability to continue to pursue an independent foreign policy. The Hindu nationalist party, the BJP, has also voiced similar concerns. On August 10th, the BJP announced that former Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee would lead a delegation of Parliamentarians to President Abdul Kalam to seek his intervention to prevent the passage of a deal that they believed would compromise <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>’s ability to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent. Sensing an opportunity to rally all the parties in opposition to the deal against the ruling Congress, the BJP also invited the Left, including CPI (M) to support this move. <A href=";id=18627">(Read More)</A>

  • Why Iran Should Suspend First

    <FONT face=Arial>In the latest move in the wrestling match with the international community, Iran is being pushed back to the UN Security Council.&nbsp; Iran’s unwillingness to negotiate over the recent international incentive package was too much for France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and even Russia and China to take.&nbsp; This is not the last move, however, and it is important that the international community not waver on the need for Iran to&nbsp; resume without further delay suspension of uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities.</FONT> <BR><BR><FONT face=Arial>We say this because in Washington and elsewhere, the erroneous and unhelpful impression was being promoted that the United States is the actor holding up negotiations with Iran.&nbsp; Seymour Hersh’s insightful article in the July 10 &amp; 17 issue of The New Yorker begins by reporting that the Bush Administration’s offer to join talks with Iran was conditioned on the President’s demand that “‘the Iranian regime fully and verifiably suspends its uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities.’”&nbsp; Hersh continues that in essence “Iran, which has insisted on the right to enrich uranium, was being asked to concede the main point of negotiations before they started.”&nbsp; Herein lies a damaging fallacy.</FONT> <P><FONT face=Arial>The facts are that the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors has called for Iranian suspension nine times in resolutions between September 2003 and February 2006, and the UN Security Council Presidential Statement of March 29, 2006 also calls for Iran to re-establish “full and sustained suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development”.&nbsp; In each case, the demand is for immediate Iranian suspension.&nbsp; The logic follows the November 15, 2004 Paris Agreement between the EU-3 (France, Germany and the United Kingdom) and Iran, whereby Iran agreed that “the suspension will be sustained while negotiations proceed on a mutually acceptable agreement on long-term arrangements”. The aim of the agreement was to provide objective guarantees that Iran’s nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes, while meeting Iran’s interests in developing peaceful nuclear technology and gaining the economic benefits of ties with Europe and the security benefits of broader rapprochement in the Middle East.&nbsp; Iran broke that suspension last August before it bothered to consider an offer of incentives by the EU-3.&nbsp; It is risible that Iran now says it needs months to analyze and respond to the more ambitious incentive package offered by the EU-3 and supported by the US, Russia and China.&nbsp; </FONT></P> <P><FONT face=Arial>In other words, the call for Iran to suspend enrichment now is an international demand, not an exceptional American one, and it does not prejudge the outcome of subsequent negotiations.&nbsp; <A href=";id=18529">(Read More)</A></FONT></P>

  • New Report Addresses Critiques of U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation

    • Caterina Dutto
    • June 27, 2006

    <P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt"><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">In a new report, <B style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal"><I style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal">Atoms for War?: U.S.-Indian Civilian Nuclear Cooperation and India’s Nuclear Arsenal</I></B>, Carnegie Senior Associate Ashley J. Tellis argues empirically that natural uranium resources do not limit <?xml:namespace prefix = st1 ns = "urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags" /><st1:country-region w:st="on">India</st1:country-region>'s potential nuclear arsenal and that any limitations in <st1:country-region w:st="on">India</st1:country-region>'s nuclear fuel stockpile stem from short-term problems that, in fact, give the <st1:country-region w:st="on">U.S.</st1:country-region> little leverage over <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:country-region w:st="on">India</st1:country-region></st1:place>.<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>Tellis argues that Indian policy-makers display no intention nor practice of dramatically building up their nuclear weapon arsenal and that the proposed U.S.-India deal will not cause <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> to do so or augment its capacity to do so in significant ways.<?xml:namespace prefix = o ns = "urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" /><o:p></o:p></SPAN></P> <P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt"><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></P> <P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt"><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">The report states that <st1:country-region w:st="on">India</st1:country-region> is not seeking to maximize its nuclear arsenal as demonstrated by <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>’s decision to produce far less fissile material than its capacity allows given its natural uranium reserves. Tellis argues that <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region>’s short-term deficiency of uranium fuel is due to technical hindrances in its uranium mining and milling practices. He maintains that <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country-region> has the capability to rectify this shortcoming independently. <o:p></o:p></SPAN></P> <P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt"><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></P> <P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt"><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">Tellis also addresses the contentious issue of whether the deal violates Article I of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. He states that the NPT legally allows for nuclear cooperation between nuclear-weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states on safeguarded facilities, even if the country has not committed to full-scope safeguards. Tellis asserts that critiques that the U.S.-India nuclear deal violates Article I lead “inexorably to the conclusion that no party to the NPT should have any economic intercourse with <st1:country-region w:st="on">India</st1:country-region> whatsoever, because the resulting gains from trade would inevitably free up some domestic Indian resources that would be of use to <st1:City w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">New Delhi</st1:place></st1:City>’s weapons program.” <o:p></o:p></SPAN></P> <P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt"><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></P><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial"> <P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt"><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">To access the full report, <A href=";id=18443&amp;prog=zgp&amp;proj=zsa"><STRONG>click here</STRONG></A>.&nbsp; </SPAN></SPAN></P>

  • Israel Urges U.S. Diplomacy on Iran

    • Ze'ev Schiff
    • May 30, 2006

    <EM>Many observers believe that Israel is pushing the U.S. to take military action against Iran's nuclear program. We asked Israel's senior defense journalist, Ze'ev Schiff, a man with outstanding contacts, to describe Israeli establishment thinking today on the Iran challenge. <BR><BR></EM>When in Washington, I was amazed to hear on a number of occasions that Israel was urging the United States to go to war with Iran and that its strategic objective was to induce the United States to attack Iran, thus putting an end to that country's nuclear program. To the best of my knowledge and understanding this claim is totally false. It is an error based on ignorance or on disregard for important details in Israeli strategic thinking. It may even be founded on a deliberate lie. <BR><BR>To the best of my knowledge, Israel does not believe war against Iran to be the best way to eliminate the Iranian nuclear project. There is a common tendency to forget that Israel lies on the frontline of such a war. Israel stands to suffer more than anyone else, including the United States, should such a war break out. It would certainly be the prime target of Iranian retaliation should the United States decide to use force against Iran. It is a known fact that the attack on the Israeli consulate in Buenos Aires some years ago was the work of Iranian agents. Also in Buenos Aires, Iranian agents were responsible for the destruction of the Jewish community offices, causing many casualties. In fact, the Iranian government aims its violence against Jewish institutions in countries outside the Middle East. <A href=";id=18378">(Read More)</A> <BR>

  • Testimony by Patrick Clawson: More Subtle Pressure and Inducements Needed for Iran

    • Patrick Clawson
    • May 30, 2006

    The following are excerpts from the prepared remarks by Patrick Clawson, deputy director at <EM>The Washington Institute</EM>, on "Iran's Motives and Strategies: The Role of the Economy" delivered at a Senate Committee on Foreign Relations hearing on May 17, 2006. <STRONG><A href="" target=_blank>Click here</A></STRONG> to access his full testimony. <P> <HR> <P></P> <P><STRONG>The Limitations of Economic Instruments</STRONG></P> <P>Economic instruments alone are unlikely to be sufficient to persuade Iran to freeze its nuclear program. The principal levers of power in Iran are in the hands of revolutionaries who are not motivated primarily by economic concerns, while those who care about the state of the economy do not have sufficient influence on their own to persuade the real power-holders to change policies. Success at influencing Iranian policy is much more likely if action on the economic front is combined with action on other fronts... </P> <P>Much as pressure should be applied on several fronts rather than just on the economy, so inducements offered Iran should take multiple forms rather than only being trade and investment incentives. Indeed, economic inducements look suspiciously like bribes paid for bad behavior. Besides being odious, such bribes give the impression that bad behavior is more profitable than good behavior...</P> <P>A much more appropriate form of inducement would be security inducements. Such security inducements should be designed to counter the argument that Iran needs nuclear weapons for its defense. There are many confidence- and security-building measures and arms control measures that would provide gains for both Iran and the West, similar to the way such steps reduced tensions between the old Warsaw Pact and NATO during the Cold War. One example would be an agreement to reduce the risk of incidents at sea between the U.S. and Iranian navies. </P> <P>A further security inducement which the United States could offer would be to address the reported concern that the Bush administration's real goal is regime change in Iran and that the Bush administration will use force to that end. Such complaints sound peculiar coming from an Iranian government whose president lectures President Bush on why the United States should abandon its liberal democracy and who sponsored a conference last fall on theme "The World Without Zionism and America"...</P> <P>It would of course be inappropriate for the U.S. government to offer any security guarantees to the Iranian or any other government; what government is in power in another country is up to the people of that country to decide. But what Washington could offer Tehran would be a "conditional security assurance" -- jargon for the simple proposition, "We will not attack you if you do not attack us." <A href=";id=18380">(Read More)</A></P>

  • Russia and the Iranian Nuclear Crisis

    At first glance, Russia's current position on the Iranian nuclear crisis is quite controversial.

  • The U.S.-India Deal: Can An Asian Nuclear Build Up Be Avoided?

    The debate over the nuclear deal negotiated by the Bush Administration and the government of India is too narrow. If other alternatives are not explored, there is a risk that Asia will experience a dangerous and costly build up of nuclear arsenals – a nuclear bubble much more dangerous than housing or stock market bubbles.

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