On the one year anniversary of secretary of State Colin Powell's presentation
to the UN Security Council, we are re-posting Project Director Joseph Cirincione's
analysis of the secretary's remarks at that time.
(Originally posted February 5, 2003) Secretary of State Colin Powell calmly
detailed before the United Nations Security Council US evidence of Iraq's failure
to comply fully with UN disarmament orders. While the secretary focused on Iraqi
deception, most nations remained fixed on the threat. They did not hear any
new evidence that the danger from Iraq was urgent or severe enough to justify
the extreme step of authorizing an invasion and occupation of an Arab state.Within
the Arab world, the editorial opinion of the Jordan Times was typical:
the speech "did not amount to convincing evidence…that Iraq presents
any real or imminent danger." The Times argues that the US charges "can
only be answered by allowing the UN inspectors the time, resources and support
neede to carry out their mandate." (Jordan Times, "Unconvincing
Evidence," 6 February 2003)
Secretry Powell's case was powerful, but partial and incomplete. He presented the Security Council with evidence that Iraqi officials have on at least several occasions swept facilities of any prohibited materials before inspectors arrived. He criticized Iraq's refusal to allow unimpeded access to scientists and said that Saddam personally had warned the scientists not to cooperate or agree to interviews outside the country. This was an "active and systematic effort on the part of the Iraqi regime…to prevent any meaningful inspection work."
Security Council members need little convincing that Saddam is a liar or that Iraq is not in full compliance with UN resolutions. What they need, however, is proof that Iraq actually has chemical or biological weapons. The evidence seems to point to further material breaches of UN resolution 1441. However, the secretary did not, or could not, provide hard evidence that Iraq still had chemical, biological or nuclear weapons
Shuffling Biological and Chemical Weapons
Powell said that the US knew that Saddam had recently moved rockets with biological
agents in their warheads and sanitized bunkers for chemical weapons, prior to
inspections. He provided satellite photos of trucks said to be moving materials
from missile sites and a suspected biological laboratory days before inspections,
claiming similar activity at close to 30 sites. These seemed to be new evidence
that could be handed over to the inspectors, to investigate the secret facilities.
If verified, this could, indeed, increase UN willingness to back the use of
force.
On the biological weapons program, Powell reiterated UN inspectors' findings that Iraq has never fully accounted for the destruction of all suspected biological weapon agents and growth media for cultivating new agents and repeated information on Iraq weapons programs unearthed by inspectors in the 1990s. He offered new defector claims and artists' drawings of Iraqi biological research laboratories on trucks and trains. Inspectors could never find these mobile units, he asserted. These claims could well be true, but might also be exaggerations from defectors eager to prove their worth.
On chemical weapons, Powell cited UNSCOM's 1999 report and the failure of Iraq to certify the destruction of thousands of munitions. He provided photos from May and June 2002 of the Al-Musayyib Chemical Complex, showing what he said was the movement of chemical weapons from the site, then the bulldozing of the facilities to hide the evidence. While most experts assume that Iraq still has some chemical weapons, the range of uncertainty is large, from a few to many weapons. Powell said that Iraq had 100 and 500 tons of chemical agents, but failed to provide any hard evidence that these actually exist or exist in these numbers. The US had previously asserted (in the October 2002 CIA assessment) that Iraq had resumed large-scale production of chemical weapons, but inspections to-date have failed to turn up any evidence of this industrial activity and Powell did not repeat the charge in his speech.
No Nukes, But Maybe UAVs
The only new weapons capability clearly demonstrated in the presentation was
provided by evidence of Iraqi test of an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) that
circumvented flight restrictions by looping for 500 kilometers inside a much
smaller test range. This is a serious threat to Iraq's neighbors. In particular,
a drone of slightly longer range could strike Israel from central Iraq. While
Powell repeated past charges that Iraq was working on missile with ranges above
1000 kilometers, Iraq has never been able to build such systems, even in the
1980s when such work proceeded without any external limitations. The drones
seem a real and current threat and a clear violation of the 150-kilometer limit
on Iraq's missile systems.
On the critical issue of nuclear weapons--the only weapons that can change the strategic balance in the region--Powell recounted past Iraqi lies about their program and repeated US assertions that Saddam tried to import aluminum tubes for centrifuges to enrich uranium. He acknowledged that the tubes were suited for rockets, as Iraq claims, but says they could be adapted to serve in centrifuges, as some experts believe. He noted other efforts to import equipment that could be used in an enrichment program.
However, on this key issue, UN sanction actually blocked the imports. Despite Iraqi efforts, Saddam has been unable to reconstitute the nuclear weapons program dismantled by UN inspectors after the Gulf war. Powell does not claim that Iraq now has a nuclear weapon, nor that it soon could. He pointed to attempts and desires, but failed to demonstrate capability.
The Council Divide
This is the crucial divide on the Security Council. Few support or trust Saddam,
but most believe that he is successful caged and his programs throttled. Most
nations fear that the invasion and occupation of Iraq entails far more political,
economic and military risks to the region and to the world than continued inspections.
They believe the inspections have barely begun and must be given time to work.
Powell tried to overcome this reluctance and demonstrate the urgent threat by linking Iraq to Al Qaeda. With Saddam contained by tens of thousands of troops outside his borders, and large-scale production of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons thwarted by hundreds of inspectors inside the country, this link is critical to the US argument that war is needed now. Saddam must be removed now, officials say, before he can transfer a weapon to terrorists for delivery to the US. Powell repeated in greater detail alleged links between Baghdad and Al Qaeda, relying on the stay in a Baghdad hospital of terrorist Al-Zarqawi and statements from detained Al Qaeda members. Despite his best efforts, the evidence remains exceptionally vague and circumstantial.
In the end, even with the secretary's skill and credibility, he failed to win many new converts to war. His presentation may represent the high-water mark of the administration's efforts to recruit allies for invasion. Many of the dozen or so countries that now back the US effort do so reluctantly and often against the popular opinion of their citizens. The ranks are unlikely to grow much based on Powell's presentation (though private arm-twisting still has time to work).
The president will soon confront the dangerous decision of whether to invade Iraq without the support of the United Nations.
Additional Resources:
- "Powell's Remarks to U.N." White House, February 5, 2003
- "WMD in Iraq: Evidence and Implications," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 2004
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