As background for the Senate Intelligence Committee's new report, we present below excerpts from the January 2004 Carnegie report, WMD in Iraq: Evidence and Implications. The report compared the intelligence assessments on Iraq with the UN inspectors' findings and what is now known. Why were the intelligence assessments so flawed? Were they based on faulty collection or analysis, undue politicization, or other factors? What steps could be taken to prevent a repetition?
These questions can only be answered after a detailed review of the complete classified record. From the currently available material, it appears that two distinct periods will emerge-before 2002, and from then until the outbreak of the war.
In the earlier period, the intelligence community appears to have had a generally accurate picture of the nuclear and missile programs but to have overestimated the chemical and biological weapons in Iraq. Access to and within Iraq was, of course, limited. Other possible sources of error suggest a failure to track the degradation of what was known to have been in Iraq after the 1991 war, including quantities of weapons and agent and their lethality. These errors may have been due to an incorrect extrapolation that production and capabilities would continue to grow regardless of inspections and sanctions, and/or to the assumption that anything for which there was not absolute proof of destruction remained and remained active. It is also possible that views of Saddam Hussein's character were allowed to drive technical assessments.
In the second period, the shift between prior intelligence assessments and the October 2002 NIE suggests, but does not prove, that the intelligence community began to be unduly influenced by policymakers' views sometime in 2002. Although such situations are not unusual, in this case, the pressure appears to have been unusually intense. This is indicated by the Vice President's repeated visits to CIA headquarters and demands by officials for access to the raw intelligence from which analysts were working. Also notable is the unusual speed with which the NIE was written and the high number of dissents in what is designed to be a consensus document. Finally, there is the fact that political appointees in the Department of Defense set up their own intelligence operation reportedly out of dissatisfaction with the caveated judgments being reached by intelligence professionals. Although some of those who were involved have claimed that analysts did not feel pressured, it strains credulity to believe that together these five aspects of the process did not create an environment in which individuals and agencies felt pressured to reach more threatening judgments of Saddam Hussein's weapon programs than many analysts felt were warranted.
A Possible Fix
Politicization of intelligence is an old story. If, as appears likely in the Iraq case, intelligence reporting was degraded by the desire to preserve technical accuracy while writing judgments that were at the same time highly misleading, or if highly uncertain material was routinely slanted in one direction, it will not be the first time.
While it is impossible to completely eradicate the pressure to provide policymakers what they want to hear, there is one step that would give the DCI a strong measure of independence and thereby erect a defensive barrier against political influence. The DCI could be given a fixed term, not co-terminus with the president's - for example, for six years. A "professionalized" DCI, nominated by the president and confirmed by the Senate, could be removed for illegal acts and gross dereliction, but not for failure to advance the president's agenda. A model for such a system is the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board.
Red Flags
Decision-makers have been hearing what they want to hear throughout history. It is also true that any community - particularly one that must operate in a secret, closed environment - is vulnerable to "group think" and that policymakers may feel a perfectly valid need for a fresh look at the data. No rules or regulations are likely to be able to solve both ends of this puzzle. Certain outcomes in government must unavoidably rest on the wisdom and judgment of those in office.
However, some practices sound alarm bells that should, when much is at stake, bring Congress and the public to full alert. Chief among them are signs that policymakers are sidestepping sound analytic procedures by using raw intelligence or by setting up their own intelligence operations. Congress has oversight duties it may be appropriate to exercise at such a juncture. The public should learn to recognize that dubious policy choices may be in the offing.
Additional Resources:
- "WMD in Iraq: Evidence and Implications," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 2004
- Intelligence Resources on Iraq
- Iraq Country Resources
