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Report

Taiwan's Management of Relations with the United States During the First Chen Shui-bian Administration

This report was prepared for a conference on the first Chen Shui-bian Administration, held in Annapolis Maryland in May 2005, and sponsored by Harvard University and the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.

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By Michael D. Swaine
Published on May 5, 2005

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Asia

The Asia Program in Washington studies disruptive security, governance, and technological risks that threaten peace, growth, and opportunity in the Asia-Pacific region, including a focus on China, Japan, and the Korean peninsula.

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During his first administration, Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian traversed the full spectrum of relations with the United States: from trusted democratic friend and quasi-ally with increasingly convergent views, to highly distrusted and disliked leader, viewed by Washington as potentially disruptive of some vital U.S. interests.  Shortly after entering office, President Chen received an unprecedented level of political---and military---support from the recently elected President George W. Bush.  At that time (2001-2002), Chen was regarded by Washington as an energetic democrat with strong support from the Taiwan public and a close, consultative and cooperative relationship with the White House (the last point was in contrast to his predecessor, Lee Teng-hui).  However, by the end of his first term in office, Chen was regarded by Bush as extremely untrustworthy and a potential source of significant new problems for a U.S. president preoccupied with Iraq, his reelection campaign, and the agenda for a prospective second term.

Such a radical reversal came about as a result of a combination of broad shifts in U.S. foreign policy priorities, domestic political forces in Taiwan, the inexperience and immaturity of the Chen Administration, and perhaps most importantly, a series of personal blunders by President Chen in respect to his management of relations with the White House, and with President Bush in particular.  Fundamentally, the mistakes of the first Chen Administration derived to a large extent from a misreading of the U.S. policy dynamic involving Taiwan.  Chen placed narrower, short-term domestic political calculations above those fundamental, enduring strategic imperatives that confront every Taiwan government---especially the imperative of maintaining reasonably close and cooperative relations with the U.S.

About the Author

Michael D. Swaine

Former Senior Fellow, Asia Program

Swaine was a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and one of the most prominent American analysts in Chinese security studies.

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North AmericaUnited StatesEast AsiaChinaTaiwanSecurityMilitaryForeign Policy

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

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