• Research
  • Emissary
  • About
  • Experts
Carnegie Global logoCarnegie lettermark logo
DemocracyIran
  • Donate
REQUIRED IMAGE

REQUIRED IMAGE

Article

Victory on the Peninsula, September, 19, 2005

The crisis is not over and there are important verification and implementation details to negotiate. But we have turned an important nuclear corner on the Korean Penninsula.

Link Copied
By Joseph Cirincione
Published on Sep 19, 2005
Program mobile hero image

Program

Nuclear Policy

The Nuclear Policy Program aims to reduce the risk of nuclear war. Our experts diagnose acute risks stemming from technical and geopolitical developments, generate pragmatic solutions, and use our global network to advance risk-reduction policies. Our work covers deterrence, disarmament, arms control, nonproliferation, and nuclear energy.

Learn More

The crisis is not over and there are important verification and implementation details to negotiate.  But we have turned an important nuclear corner on the Korean Penninsula.  The new agreement by North Korea to give up all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and return to the Non-Proliferation Treaty is a major success for all the nations in the Six-Party talks.  It is a victory for the United States who insisted on the complete end of these programs.  It is a victory for North Korea, which has won a non-aggression pledge from the US and economic and energy aid.  It is a victory for China, which patiently insisted on solving the stand-off through negotiations and played the key role in reaching the agreement.  Finally, it is a victory for the “Libya model” over the “Iraq model”:  end threats by changing a regime’s behavior, not by eliminating the regime.

The chief US negotiator at the talks, Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill, praised the agreement as a “win-win situation.”  Indeed, all successful negotiations have to be so.  The parties must be able to leave the table declaring victory and returning to their countries and peoples with tangible achievements.

To be sure, tough negotiations lie ahead and the agreement is by no means secure.   The most important hour in negotiations is the last hour, and that is still a ways off.  But the agreement shows the wisdom of strong, persistent diplomacy and the value of multilateral cooperation.

The 2005 Carnegie study, Universal Compliance recommended such a change in US policy:

“It may prove more feasible for the United States to test the will of North Korea to fully, verifiably, and irreversibly dismantle all its nuclear weapon capabilities in exchange for a fundamentally different relationship with the United States, including diplomatic relations and peaceful reconstruction assistance. This will involve real negotiations with North Korea, although these could take place in the broad context of the six-party talks.”

This is what the agreement has achieved.  If implemented, it opens the way for concluding a final peace agreement to end the Korean War and the establishment of diplomatic relations between North Korea and the United States.  It will also achieve President Bush’s goal of a complete, verifiable dismantlement of the nuclear weapons program.  Presumably, this can be extended to include the North Korean long-range missile programs as well.

Finally, this is a significant victory for Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who recognized that the U.S. policy of the past four years was not working, slowly changed that policy to allow real negotiations with North Korea, and skillfully denied that any change had taken place.  She thus preserved the confidence of the president while morphing his policy from confrontational posture to constructive engagement.  She and Christopher Hill have done a masterful job.

Joseph Cirincione is the Director for Non-Proliferation at the Carnegie Endowment.

For the latest proliferation news and resources, visit the Carnegie Proliferation News website, www.ProliferationNews.org.


Related Links:

"Joint Statement from North Korea Nuclear Talks," 19 September 2005

Universal Compliance, March 2005

About the Author

Joseph Cirincione

Former Senior Associate, Director for NonProliferation

    Recent Work

  • Report
    Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security<br>With 2007 Report Card on Progress
      • +2

      George Perkovich, Jessica Tuchman Mathews, Joseph Cirincione, …

  • Article
    The End of Neoconservatism

      Joseph Cirincione

Joseph Cirincione
Former Senior Associate, Director for NonProliferation
Joseph Cirincione
South KoreaNuclear Policy

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

More Work from Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

  • Commentary
    Strategic Europe
    Macron Makes France a Great Middle Power

    France has stopped clinging to notions of being a great power and is embracing the middle power moment. But Emmanuel Macron has his work cut out if he is to secure his country’s global standing before his term in office ends.

      • Rym Momtaz

      Rym Momtaz

  • Source: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
    Paper
    Are Long-Term NATO–South Korea Defense Ties Possible? Transitioning From an Arms Exporter to a Trusted Defense Partner

    South Korea has emerged as a major weapon exporter. But its relationship with Europe will depend on more than that.

      Chung Min Lee

  • People yelling and holding Yoon Again banners
    Commentary
    Emissary
    What Happens When a Conservative Movement Continues on Without a Leader?

    Lessons from Korea’s political right.

      Darcie Draudt-Véjares

  • Escalation Dynamics Under the Nuclear Shadow—India’s Approach
    Paper
    Escalation Dynamics Under the Nuclear Shadow—India’s Approach

    An exploration into how India and Pakistan have perceived each other’s manipulations, or lack thereof, of their nuclear arsenals.

      • Rakesh Sood

      Rakesh Sood

  • Commentary
    Carnegie Politika
    For Putin, Increasing Russia’s Nuclear Threat Matters More Than the Triad’s Modernization

    For Putin, upgrading Russia’s nuclear forces was a secondary goal. The main aim was to gain an advantage over the West, including by strengthening the nuclear threat on all fronts. That made growth in missile arsenals and a new arms race inevitable.

      Maxim Starchak

Get more news and analysis from
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Carnegie global logo, stacked
1779 Massachusetts Avenue NWWashington, DC, 20036-2103Phone: 202 483 7600Fax: 202 483 1840
  • Research
  • Emissary
  • About
  • Experts
  • Donate
  • Programs
  • Events
  • Blogs
  • Podcasts
  • Contact
  • Annual Reports
  • Careers
  • Privacy
  • For Media
  • Government Resources
Get more news and analysis from
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
© 2026 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. All rights reserved.