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Fissile Facts

A compilation of information on fissile material around the world.

by Ben Bain
Published on December 15, 2005

Number of kilograms of highly-enriched uranium (HEU)

needed for a nuclear weapon                                                                        15-25[i]

Number of kilograms in global HEU stockpiles                                         1,900,000

Number of countries with at least 1 kg of HEU                                                    53

Number of countries with at least one bomb’s worth (25kg) of HEU                       24

Number of countries with at least twenty bombs' worth (500kg) of HEU                 12

Number of kilograms of HEU in civil power and research programs                  50,000

Number of civil research facilities that still have 20kg or more of HEU                  128

 

Number of kilograms of plutonium needed for a nuclear weapon                          4-8

Number of kilograms of plutonium in global stockpiles                              1,830,000

Number of kilograms of weapons usable (separated) plutonium in

the global stockpile                                                                                  238,000

Number of countries with at least one bomb’s worth (8kg) of plutonium                 35   

Number of countries with at least 5,000 kg of plutonium                                      25

Percentage of civil fissile material stocks that is plutonium                                  91

Number of kilograms by which civil plutonium increases every year                70,000

Number of kilograms of plutonium released on Earth from

nuclear explosions                                                                                     10,000

 

Number of nuclear weapons that could be made
from existing fissile materials                                                                    300,000

 

Number of countries with uranium enrichment facilities                                         9

Number of countries with new enrichment or reprocessing projects                      11

 

Number of illicit trafficking and other unauthorized activities involving
nuclear and radiological materials in 2004                                                       121

Number of confirmed incidents involving trafficking of HEU or plutonium
between 1993-2004                                                                                                        18

 

 

The Facts in This Analysis Are From: 

 

"Global Stocks of Nuclear Explosive Materials," ISIS, September 7, 2005< FONT>

 

“Global Cleanout of Civil Nuclear Material: Toward a Comprehensive, Threat-Driven Response,” Strengthening the Global Partnership Issue Brief #4, Philipp Bleek, September 2005

 

IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB) 

 

“World Nuclear Fuel Facilities,” WISE Uranium Project  

 

“Highly Enriched Uranium Transferred to Russia from Czech Republic,” U.S. Department of State, 27 September 2005  

 

<>Fissile Materials Page, Proliferation News and Resources Website, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

[1]Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats, Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal, and Miriam Rajkumar, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 2005, “The significant quantities that the IAEA specifies are 25 kilograms of highly enriched uranium and 8 kilograms of plutonium.  The minimum or exact amount of nuclear material needed to produce nuclear weapons is classified information in all nuclear weapon states.  The U.S. classification regulation permits cleared individuals to state that a nuclear weapon can be made with as little as 4 kilograms of plutonium.  Nongovernment experts claim that a 1-kiloton-yield nuclear device can be achieved using sophisticated designs with as little as 1 to 2 kilograms of plutonium, or approximately 8 to 10 kilograms of highly enriched uranium.” 

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