This commentary will analyze the current crisis in Russo-Georgian relations, which exacerbated on September 27, 2006 after the brief seizure in Georgia of four Russian military officers accused of spying, and its implications, in particular for Russian foreign policy and U.S. interests. (This, of course, is a crisis within a crisis: the bilateral relationship had been in a rather bad shape since the break-up of the Soviet Union, and the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, in both of which Russia had been implicated and remains involved, have marred the Georgian-Russian relations since 1992. From 1999, the Chechen issue has also been playing a role there).
Georgian and Russian objectives
In its present crisis with Russia, Georgia’s objectives appear decisive and ambitious. They include:
- consolidation of popular support for the Saakashvili government (short-term);
- clearing of the way to NATO membership (medium term)
- creating conditions for the eventual restoration of Georgia’s territorial integrity in its Soviet-era borders (long-term);
In responding to Georgia’s moves, Russia aimed to:
- prevent an outbreak of hostilities in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and thus avoid being directly drawn into a shooting war with Georgia (immediate);
- undermine popular support among Georgians for the Saakashvili government (medium-term);
- derail Georgia’s NATO-bound train and return Georgia to the Russian traditional sphere of influence (longer-term).
Georgian aims are “positive” and call for an active strategy; Russian objectives are both “positive” and “negative”, and lead to a mixed active-reactive strategy. Thus, in chess terms, Georgia is playing white, and Russia, black and white.
Georgian and Russian strategies
Georgia, a country of some 4 million residents, confronts the immensely bigger Russian Federation. Yet, Georgia is obviously seeking to change the status quo despite the vehement opposition of its much mightier neighbor. Key to Georgia’s success is to have the world to accept what Tbilisi has been saying all along, i.e. that there is no Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, nor a Georgian-Ossetian one. Instead, there is a conflict between Georgia and Russia, which resents Georgia’s independence and self-determination, and wants to subjugate it again.
From this perspective, provoking Russia into strong-arm moves, ideally the use of force, though also ideally on a small scale, would appear smart. Once the Russians start shooting (and, however incredibly, there are still some Russian enthusiasts around of a “small and glorious war” in the Caucasus), the conflict could be transformed, and Russia would lose any pretence to being a neutral arbiter/peacemaker, staying above the fray. Russia would also lose any remaining “moral equivalence” with Georgia in the eyes of the Western public.
Georgia, by contrast, would be able to turn to the West, in particular the U.S., for support, arguing that it had become a front-line state facing a revisionist power on its doorstep. To the West, this would mean that the conflict would have outgrown not only the internal Georgian dimension, but also the Georgia-Russian one. Eventually, Russia will be seen as a rogue state on a rampage.
The United States would then have to lead an international effort to make Russia retreat. Should this be successful, Russia would suffer a major humiliation, and her recent assertiveness in the CIS would be placed in check, and her recent gains reversed. This in turn would open the way to a new era of peacekeeping/conflict resolution in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, this time under the auspices of a Western-led international organization. Russian peacekeepers would be replaced by others, drawn from NATO member states (esp. in the Black Sea region) and some CIS nations, such as Ukraine.
Russia’s strategy has been to pinch Georgia without resorting to military threats. Thus far, Moscow has applied massive economic sanctions, hitting Georgia where it hurts hardest: the status of the (mostly illegal) hundreds of thousands of Georgian immigrants in Russia, whose remittances help keep the country afloat. By doing that, the Kremlin sent a clear message to the Georgian people both inside their country and in Russia: it is in your own interests to change the government of Georgia, and install a new one capable of repairing ties to Russia. While Moscow does not appear to have decided to stage a coup against Mikhail Saakashvili, it must have written him off as a partner. The Russian leadership probably believes that the economic sanctions would eventually make the Georgian elites to realize that they have too much at stake to trifle with Russia’s geopolitical and geo-economic interests in the region. Georgia, the Kremlin is saying, can have its independence and a decent relationship with Russia, and even Moscow’s cooperation in somehow resolving the conflicts with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, if Tbilisi withdraws its NATO application and terminates the de facto alliance with the United States.
How are these strategies working?
At the moment, Georgia’s strategy is basically working. Russia has been sufficiently provoked to respond with an obvious overkill. President Putin, only recently (during his France visit) disdainfully dismissive of Saakashvili’s “southern hot temper”, has apparently lost his cool, and looks positively enraged. Georgia has been able to portray Russian sanctions as the economic equivalent of war, and describe Russian police manhunt on Georgian citizens as a case of “ethnic cleansing”. This resulted in those (not an insignificant number) in the U.S. and EU who have always been skeptical of Saakashvili and even saw his actions as rash and reckless now are calling Moscow’s reaction “disproportionate”. Western public opinion’s sympathies toward Georgia the underdog have been strengthened, while long-standing criticism of Russian policies has found a fresh reason. Georgia is back on the American public’s radar screen (though still very much on the margins) as a victim of “authoritarian/neoimperialist” Russia.
Russia’s strategy is largely failing. It may have pre-empted a military confrontation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and avoided falling into the trap of an “armed response”, but its counter-measures are mostly counter-productive. The local elections in early October which had been regarded as a test of the Georgian government’s popularity have resulted in the support for Saakashvili’s party growing stronger, not weaker. The Georgian president’s political friends have certainly benefited from Russia’s ruthless, indiscriminate reaction, and succeeded in having many people, even those not fully pleased with the government’s policies, rally around the flag. It has also managed to use the spy scandal to deter, demoralize and isolate the Georgian opposition. Perhaps most importantly, Georgia as a nation has moved even further away from Russia. Rather than being a glitch or a blip, the present crisis may become a point of no return in Georgian-Russian relations: Georgia, of course, will not change its location, but it might forever change its attitude toward Russia.
America’s role and policies
The United States has a major role to play in the Georgian-Russian conflict, although those Russians who believe it is merely using Georgia as a pawn are wrong.
U.S. policies with regard to Georgia are linked to the prospects of promoting democracy and Western orientation in the South Caucasus/Black Sea region, and assuring a secure corridor for transporting Caspian oil and gas to Europe. At the same time, the U.S. seeks to prevent Russia’s resurgence as the hegemonic power in the region. Thus, U.S. and Russian interests clash where it comes to geopolitics and geo-economics.
In this situation the U.S. has a choice. One option would be to continue a policy of restraint, making sure that direct military confrontation between Georgia and the two separatist enclaves, and between Georgia and Russia is avoided. Thus, it was U.S. pressure that was reputed to be behind the Georgian decision to release the four Russian officers soon after their arrest. This policy would particularly seek not to antagonize Russia. The calculation here is, that, given time and a certain measure of Western and protection, Georgia can evolve into a stable country, a friend and ally of the U.S., and do so without much cost as to U.S. relations with Russia.
Another option would be a much riskier policy of backing Georgia all the way, and forcing Georgia’s Western integration on an enraged Russia. This policy would inevitably raise U.S.-Russian competition to a new pitch, make it much less “soft”, and logically lead to embracing containment of Russia across the board. This, in turn, would result in a major shift in Russia’s foreign policy toward direct opposition to the U.S. As a result, the post-Cold War pattern of relations among the major powers would become not merely more competitive, but, in the case of Russia and the U.S., more adversarial and actually hostile. Then, somewhere not too far down the road, Russia would be back as a foreign policy priority for the United States, but in a negative way.
Outlook for the future
The crisis in Georgian-Russian relations continues, even though the hostility has reached a new plateau for the time being. It will have its lulls and peaks, and the point of culmination is still in the future. South Ossetia’s new referendum on independence on November 12, 2006, could become another pretext for a rise in tension. Even the worst options (from Gazprom shutting off natural gas supplies to Georgia to resumption of hostilities in either one or both zones of conflict) cannot be ruled out. This lingering crisis is a cause for major concern and calls for fundamental policy re-evaluation and policy revision.
Russia’s Interests Demand a Change of Policy
Russia would do much better, in terms of its own interests, if it starts to de-escalate and calibrate its actions. Thus, crime-fighting and immigration monitoring should proceed, but separate from the anti-Georgian campaign, which should be ended as soon as possible. Riding the wave of popular chauvinism and xenophobia, not to speak of whipping it up, could have disastrous results for the Russian Federation itself. Russia should also clearly discriminate between the government of Georgia and other genuine political forces in the country, and of course the Georgian people. Even though this has been made more difficult in recent weeks, Russia should seek to be attractive and friendly to ordinary Georgians, trying to win their hearts and minds. In the light of its experience in Chechnya in the early 1990s, Russia needs to rethink the wisdom of supporting those Georgians who promise to deliver their country to the Kremlin in exchange for Russian support in bringing them to power. Most importantly, Russia would do best by launching a serious plan to resolve the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and leading the effort, in consultation and with cooperation from the international community. Maintaining the status quo has long ceased to be a winning strategy for Moscow.
Kosovo’s Ramifications
Kosovo is neither a unique case with no implications to other “frozen conflicts”, as many in the West argue, nor a model for solving these conflicts, as Russian officials have maintained. Kosovo will have ramifications, whether people like it or not. A dozen years after they first emerged, the unrecognized states are de facto political units, even if they remain unrecognized. Each conflict situation, of course, should be dealt with on its own merits, and there can only be some broad categories.
Kosovo needs to be assisted toward independence, but forcing this decision on Serbia would create problems down the road. Brussels has to pay much more attention to getting Belgrade on board. Transnistria can be integrated with Moldova, and Russia has a major role to play if it resumes its search for post-conflict settlement. Abkhazia and Karabakh would probably fall into the “Kosovo category”, while South Ossetia’s solution might be a kind of Transnistria-plus, but each of these solutions can only be possible if both parties decide that they would be better off with a deal than without one, and that new wars are no better option.
