Take Two: Iran's Plan for Nuclear Compliance

Squassoni, Sharon; Gerami, Nima

Article

Take Two: Iran's Plan for Nuclear Compliance

The February IAEA safeguards report on Iran indicates that the answers provided by Iran on all but two issues are "consistent" or "not inconsistent" with its information and on schedule with the agreed-upon work plan. However, the final outstanding issues are those most closely associated with weaponization.

By Sharon Squassoni and Nima Gerami

Published on Mar 5, 2008

In August 2007 Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) agreed to a work plan (INFCIRC/711) for resolving all outstanding questions concerning Iran’s past nuclear activities. We illustrated in a past Proliferation Analysis entitled "Iran's Plan for Nuclear Compliance" that the timeline proposed by the Iran-IAEA deal would allow Iran about eight months of continued centrifuge installation and operations, but that it failed to appropriately address certain issues, in particular the 1987 uranium metal document received from Pakistan. We did not include any dates for resolution of Iran's "alleged studies"—the Green Salt Project, high explosive testing, and the design of a missile re-entry vehicle—because Iran categorically rejected considering them.

The February IAEA safeguards report on Iran (GOV/2008/4) indicates that the answers provided by Iran on all but two issues are "consistent" or "not inconsistent" with its information and on schedule (if not earlier) with the agreed-upon work plan. However, the final outstanding issues are those most closely associated with weaponization. An illustration of Iran’s progress shows that questions regarding its alleged weaponization studies and uranium metal will likely remain contested issues into April 2008 and beyond. (See below for a side-by-side comparison of INFCIRC/711 and GOV/2008/4.)

Comparing Iran’s Nuclear Compliance: INFCIRC/711 and GOV/2008/4
How close is Iran in complying with the Iran-IAEA work plan?

	IAEA PROVIDES QUESTIONS	MEETING IN IRAN TO DISCUSS		CLOSURE
	INFCIRC/711//GOV/2008/4	INFCIRC/711	GOV/2008/4	INFCIRC/711	GOV/2008/4
Plutonium	July 23	July	July	August 20	August 20
P1/P2	August 31	September 24-25 mid-October	September 24	November	November
HEU Contamination	September 15	2 weeks after P1/P2 closure (mid-November)	December 10-12 December 15-16	January	January 8
Uranium Metal	INFCIRC/711: Iran agrees to facilitate comparison of sections of uranium metal document after which IAEA will close issue. GOV/2008/4: Iran provides copy of document to IAEA; IAEA awaiting information from Pakistan.
Po-210	September 15 after all other questions closed.	2 weeks after HEU Contamination/ U Metal talks (end of January)	January 20-21	March*		February 22
Ghachine Mine	September 15	2 weeks after Po-210 closure (February 22)	January 22-23	April*		February 22
Alleged Studies	INFCIRC/711: Iran finds allegations as “baseless” and “political motivated” but will review IAEA-provided documents. GOV/2008/4: Iran finds allegations as “baseless” and “fabricated”. Minimal responses on two issues following meetings on January 27-28 and February 3-5; IAEA awaiting further Iranian responses.

*These dates were Carnegie estimates for possible issue closure, based on the text of INFCIRC/711. The IAEA indicated in GOV/2008/4 that it no longer considered the Po-210 and Ghachine mine issues to be outstanding.

Click here to download the PDF version of the above table.

About the Authors

Sharon Squassoni

Former Senior Associate, Nuclear Policy Program

Squassoni came to Carnegie from the Congressional Research Service. She also served for nine years in the executive branch. Her last position at the State Department was director of Policy Coordination in the Nonproliferation Bureau.

Nima Gerami

Former Research Assistant, Nuclear Policy Program

North America United States Middle East Iran Nuclear Policy

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

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