Author’s Note: This December, I had the opportunity to attend the UN Climate negotiations in Copenhagen in two capacities: as a Junior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment and as part of the International Youth Climate Movement. Copenhagen was my first time attending a Conference of Parties (COP), the annual meeting of Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC or the Convention), and I came away with a few strong impressions of the outcome of COP-15 and the steps that will be necessary going forward to protect my and future generations. As a rookie to international negotiations who only recently entered the workplace, my perspective is a bit different from that of many negotiators, heads of state, and even other commentators: my generation will be alive well into the decades of serious climate change that today’s action (or inaction) shapes.
As Copenhagen becomes a memory, many are left attempting to make sense of its unconventional outcome and what it means for the future. The negotiations produced three main outcomes: the Copenhagen Accord, and the extension of both the AWG-LCA and the AWG-KP tracks.1 None of these were particularly progressive, although they do represent forward movement. In essence, the latter two simply mean that the two-track approach the UNFCCC has followed since the development of the Bali Road Map2 in 2007 has been extended through COP-16, to be held in Mexico from November 29 – December 10, 2010, with a view towards reaching a final conclusion at that meeting. The progress made in Copenhagen on the negotiating text for both tracks will be carried forward, with the reports made by each group serving as the starting point for future negotiations.
The AWG-KP track deals with all aspects of UNFCCC business associated with the Kyoto Protocol, including, but not limited to, assembling country greenhouse gas inventories and progress reports for the first commitment period, overseeing the Clean Development Mechanism, and setting mitigation targets for Annex I countries for a second commitment period. The AWG-LCA track focuses on the dual challenges mentioned above and any other issues that influence the long-term ability of Parties to implement the Convention. AWG-LCA’s work is generally broken down into shared vision, mitigation, adaptation, technology transfer, and financing. The legal format of the outcome it will produce has not yet been agreed upon, nor has its relation to the Kyoto Protocol. The two-track process was put in place largely as a way of addressing the dual challenges of incorporating Parties that are not signatories to the Kyoto Protocol—notably the United States—into a framework and of developing a framework that allows Non-Annex I Parties—essentially, developing countries—to undertake nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) in the context of a UN agreement, while still continuing to oversee the Kyoto Protocol.
The other outcome, the Copenhagen Accord, is operational immediately, considered politically but not legally binding and contains several elements. Under the Accord, Annex I countries may commit to economy-wide emissions targets for 2020 and choose their own target and base year, while non-Annex I countries may take on voluntary mitigation actions of any form. Developed countries also commit to providing USD 30 billion in fast-start (2010-2012) financing for adaptation and mitigation. Additionally, in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation, developed countries will jointly mobilize USD 100 billion a year by 2020. The majority of this money will be distributed through the Copenhagen Green Climate Fund, a yet-to-be-established body that would be an element of the financial mechanism of the Convention and would therefore require a COP decision to implement. The importance of limiting temperature rise to below 2°C to avoid catastrophic climate change, adaptation, curbing deforestation through REDD-plus, and technology transfer are noted, but no plans are laid out, other than deferring to the Convention. The Accord will be assessed in 2015. Interested countries have until January 31, 2010 to voluntarily sign on to the Accord. The Copenhagen Accord does not fit into either of the existing tracks. A COP decision takes note of the Accord, but the Accord itself is not under the COP or the UNFCCC because a handful of countries objected to enacting it as a COP decision since it was drafted by only a different handful of countries. It is however “guided by the principles and provisions of the Conventions” The legal status of the Accord is unclear because it is unprecedented – an ongoing analysis by the Secretariat should shed further light on the matter in coming weeks.
Copenhagen represents a start, albeit a very slow start, towards global progress. It is significant that several of the world’s largest emitters have expressed support for the Copenhagen Accord, although it remains to be seen how many of these countries will officially sign on. However, since the agreement’s binding nature is only enforceable through international peer pressure and other political tools, and countries set their own targets, it is highly unlikely that the reductions made under the Accord will be substantial enough to limit global temperature rise to 2°C – current estimates are that reductions under the Accord would lead to a 3.9°C rise. The outcome of Copenhagen falls well short of what was called for under the Bali Road Map, but only slightly short of what most experts had predicted in the months leading up to the meeting. It is disappointing to get such a rough political agreement outside the two UN tracks instead of a more detailed political framework for each track that would be filled in at COP-16: by only vaguely referencing many areas and by going outside the UN system, the Copenhagen Accord leaves a huge amount of ground to be covered in the next 12 months. However, the Accord and the continuation of the two-tracks is a far better outcome than the feasible alternative – a total collapse with no results – and the Accord will play an important role as a political backstop in future negotiations.
Resentment on the part of many developing countries about the secretive and non-inclusive manner in which the Copenhagen Accord is perceived to have been drafted, combined with the fact that it does not include details on many key issues for the developing world, is likely to make it even more difficult to make progress in the coming months. Almost before the outcome was announced, the finger pointing began: is China to blame for removing global and developed world emission reduction targets for 2050 from the Accord, or is Denmark to blame for poorly managing the Presidency of the COP? Perhaps blame instead rests on Tuvalu and other developing countries for blocking progress within the existing UN tracks during the first week of the conference, causing developed countries to look for other avenues to reach an agreement. Or is the U.S. Senate responsible, for its failure to pass a climate bill that would have allowed Obama to fully commit to an emission reduction target at the negotiations?
The truth is that all these actions, and many others, contributed to the outcome we saw at Copenhagen: just as there is no single technology that will save us all from climate change, there is no single country that is to blame for the failure of Copenhagen to produce the fair, progressive, and binding outcome that was hoped for, if not expected, by many. The world would be far better off if, instead of pointing fingers, negotiators put their energy towards finding areas of agreement and building on the text generated within the two tracks at Copenhagen, particularly where it meshes with the Accord, in order to ensure that a desirable outcome is achieved in Mexico. Copenhagen is over, and while it is important to learn from the mistakes made there, the future cannot be created while looking backwards. As someone likely to be alive in 2050 when the long-term targets which the delegates are debating come to bear, there are a few forward-looking actions I believe must be undertaken in the lead-up to COP-16 to ensure that we reach a fair and binding global climate deal in line with both the science and the Bali Action Plan.
First, the U.S. Senate needs to follow the lead of the House of Representatives by passing a climate bill – this is one of the places where I think blame for Copenhagen’s failures has been deservingly placed. Without a Congressional bill setting an economy wide emission target, President Obama cannot credibly commit to any meaningful mitigation target in an international climate treaty. While the President does have tools available to regulate greenhouse gases outside of Congress – such as using the EPA and the Clean Air Act – any international treaty would need to be ratified by the Senate, which is highly unlikely if they have not been in close consultation during its drafting. Any international financing commitments will also need to be approved by Congress. This limitation was evident in the intentional ambiguity regarding details of Secretary Clinton’s financing proposal: without legislation, the U.S. cannot commit a specific dollar amount of new and additional public money. The lack of domestic legislation is particularly problematic in the UN setting, as the differences between the American political system and most other political systems around the globe sometimes make it difficult for different countries to move at similar speeds, and, on occasion, for others to understand why the U.S. moves so slowly. And without a credible U.S. commitment, other countries will continue to resist making binding commitments of their own.
Second, negotiators should use the intersessional meetings leading up to COP-16 to flesh out structural details of finance, technology transfer, and REDD-plus, particularly under the AWG-LCA. While it is true that it does no good to have structures in place without money, it is likewise true that it does no good to have money without structures to distribute it. Additionally, countries are far more likely to make financing pledges if a transparent and effective structure for distributing that money is in place. The progress that working groups have made in these areas up to and during COP-15 should serve as the starting point for further work, and the focus should be on creating structures that are not only strong enough to ensure that money and technology are used in ways that are truly beneficial, but also flexible enough to account for differing country situations. A substantial amount of progress was made in Copenhagen, but several key areas still need further work. Once again, this process will be far more successful if countries direct their energy towards finding shared values rather than getting caught up in areas of disagreement: constructive ambiguity has a large role to play and should be embraced in the spirit of not letting the perfect become the enemy of the good, but should not be carried to the extreme of meaninglessness.
Finally, substantial efforts should be made to mend fences between the developing countries excluded from of the Copenhagen Accord drafting process and the major emitters who drafted it. Climate change is a global problem and it will require a global solution. While multi- and bi-lateral agreements certainly have a large role to play in a global climate solution and such agreements should work in concert with UN efforts, the UN is not the appropriate setting for reaching such agreements. A multi-lateral agreement among the major emitters may well be one of the most effective means of curbing climate change, but the mandate of the UNFCCC is not simply to mitigate and adapt to climate change, but also to do so in a way that is fair, inclusive, and in line with the values of sustainable development. COPs provide an essential opportunity for the most vulnerable countries—often the countries with the least power to mitigate or adapt to climate change—to make their voices heard to the major emitters who will ultimately determine how successfully humankind reacts to climate change. If the Copenhagen Accord is used to set a precedent of major emitters deciding what concessions they are willing to make to the most vulnerable countries with little to no consultation with the countries themselves, it will be incredibly threatening to the core principles of the UNFCCC and could derail the process all together. However, if the Accord is treated as a political statement of current positions, rather than the beginning of a new era of international climate negotiations, it has the potential to shake countries out of their ruts and jumpstart AWG-LCA and AWG-KP negotiations in the lead up to Mexico This would banish the notion that the UNFCCC process is ineffective, and, more importantly, bring a global solution closer. Countries truly interested in curbing climate change must do everything within their power to ensure that the latter comes to be.
Unless substantial efforts are made in the next year to pass legislation in the U.S. Senate, flesh out structural details within the AWG-LCA, and bridge the growing divide between the most vulnerable countries and the major emitters, the world is unlikely to see success in Mexico. With the 4th IPCC report from 2007 indicating that global emissions must peak by 2020 and decline rapidly thereafter in order to give the planet a fifty percent chance of limiting global temperature rise to 2°C, and more recent research indicating that even 2°C may be too high, the window for action is shrinking rapidly. It is time for countries to put aside posturing in favor of moral responsibility, to value the survival of all nations and peoples over short-term economic profit, and to act boldly to preserve the planet as we know it.
1The AWG-LCA is the Ad-hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA) and the AWG-KP is Ad-hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol. They represent the “two tracks” of UNFCCC negotiations.
2 The Bali Road Map was the outcome of COP-13 (Bali, 2007) that kicked off a two-year, two-track (AWG-LCA and AWG-KP) process aimed at finalizing a binding agreement in 2009 in Copenhagen at COP-15. It includes the Bali Action Plan, which created the AWG-LCA.
