Our world is built on the assumption of climate stability. We expect the land beneath our feet, the climate we experience, and our way of life to remain constant. Today, these assumptions no longer hold. Rising sea levels, coastal erosion, drought, and increasingly frequent extreme weather events are reshaping landscapes, hindering livelihoods, and endangering lives. As the climate continues to change and the habitability of once-stable territories shifts, humans—along with other species—must adapt to the new realities redefining where and how we live.
Climate change and its related disasters are already influencing patterns of human mobility and will continue to impact people’s mobility choices significantly. To empower individuals and communities to make climate-informed decisions about where to live and work in the face of accelerating climate risks, there is a need to develop creative governance arrangements, accessible finance mechanisms, and forward-looking policies that acknowledge the intersection of climate change, human mobility, and various other policy areas. Central to this effort is the need to develop a greater understanding of how the adverse effects of climate change interact with patterns of human mobility. Only then will it be possible to craft the necessary context-specific policies and plans to maximize adaptation benefits, uphold human rights, and minimize further vulnerabilities.
What Is Climate Mobility?
Given the reality of climate change, significant numbers of people are, and increasingly will be, on the move. While this movement will primarily occur within country borders, it will also happen across international boundaries. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the body tasked with assessing climate science and its impacts, reports that climate hazards are already driving displacement in all regions globally.1 Around the world, droughts, wildfires, floods, food crises, and storms are forcing people from their homes. The International Organization for Migration estimates that weather-related disasters have resulted in over 218 million internal displacements over the past ten years.2 In 2024 alone, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre reported 45.8 million new internal displacements caused by disasters—more than double those caused by conflict.3
Despite the escalating impact of climate hazards on human mobility, there is no universal framework to govern such movements. Existing definitions and international legal protections for refugees, such as the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, do not extend to those displaced by climate or environmental factors. Terms such as “climate refugee” are not recognized under international law.4 While there is no consensus on nomenclature for climate-related human movement, the term climate mobility is currently used to encompass the range of population movements that result from climate impacts.5 There are three key forms of population movements:
- Migration involves some degree of agency when moving within or across borders. For example, prolonged drought in Central America’s “Dry Corridor” has severely devastated traditional agricultural livelihoods, driving many to migrate to larger cities or, in some cases, to other countries in search of better opportunities.6
- Displacement refers to the forced movement of people within or across borders, often driven by acute environmental pressures that overlap with existing crises. In the cases of Sudan and the Lake Chad Basin, the loss of livelihoods and scarce water resources exacerbates existing conflicts, forcing people out of their homes.7
- Planned relocation refers to the planned process of moving individuals or communities because the land has become—or threatens to become—uninhabitable, usually within a country’s borders and with the government’s support. This was the case for Gardi Sugdub in Panama, Vunidogoloa in Fiji, and Isle de Jean Charles in the U.S. state of Louisiana.8
Thus, climate mobility serves as an inclusive term to represent the multiplicity of causes, forms, directions, and dimensions of human movement in the context of climate change.9 It encompasses movement that is voluntary or forced, temporary or permanent, within countries or across borders.10 This complex phenomenon can also span diverse time frames, legal categories, and geographic and climatic contexts. Receiving communities must be equipped to understand and prepare for this phenomenon. If not, climate-displaced individuals risk resettling in vulnerable areas and once again exposing themselves to new and future climate risks.
Decisions about abandoning homelands or staying in the face of climate impacts involve complex social, economic, and political considerations. In many cases, political leaders shy away from these decisions for fear of appearing to abandon places that communities have called home. The challenge, then, is to create a response framework that can make these decisions more manageable to navigate, offering both individuals and governments more options. Ultimately, measures adopted to facilitate climate mobility must accomplish three fundamental goals: (1) enable people to stay at home where adaptation in situ is feasible and desired; (2) empower people and communities who seek or need to move to do so safely, voluntarily, and with dignity, including facilitating evacuations or relocation for those at great imminent risk; and (3) provide support for receiving communities.
The Challenge of Estimating Climate Mobility
Understanding the scale and direction of climate mobility is not a straightforward endeavor. Climate change rarely causes movement on its own.11 Instead, climate mobility is typically the result of the intersection of multiple factors that create emergent harms.12 The direction, scale, and duration of people’s movements in response to climate risks are influenced by highly complex dynamics that cannot be easily disentangled. For example, individuals who move because of food security or livelihood challenges may not directly attribute their decision to climate change but may be influenced by climatic stressors.
Best efforts by the World Bank estimate that anywhere between 44 and 216 million people across six regions could be internally displaced by 2050, depending on the severity of future climate scenarios.13 However, attempts to estimate climate mobility face significant challenges, such as the issue of attributing causality, the inherent unpredictability of climate hazards, unforeseen shifts in border governance, and the uncertainty of future adaptation plans.14 These all hinder the ability of stakeholders to make accurate forecasts. Given the current scale of climate mobility, it is essential that modeling, future planning, and projection exercises continue. There is an urgent need to estimate the direction, magnitude, and duration of climate-related mobility more precisely to allow for adequate responses by states and other stakeholders.
A better understanding of the relationship between climate hazards and human mobility is crucial.
While unlikely to fully resolve the causation conundrum, innovative modeling exercises can offer valuable predictions of how climate change will likely affect movement trends. Such predictive tools will allow for effective policies to be crafted, direct public and private investments to the right places, and strengthen the communities likely to receive inflows of new residents. Continued innovation and investment in modeling, future planning, and projection exercises are essential.
New Questions, New Solutions
Climate mobility introduces challenges that traditionally have not been considered in migration policy. One key dimension of that is immobility: Individuals may choose to remain in their homes despite imminent climate risks, guided by a strong attachment to place, cultural traditions, or other factors. Protecting the “right to stay,” where safe and possible, is a relevant policy concern for addressing climate mobility.15 On the other hand, there are those who need to or prefer to migrate from areas of high climate risk but are unable to do so. This may be because they lack the financial resources to move, face physical limitations, or encounter a restrictive policy environment. Vulnerable communities, such as people with disabilities, unaccompanied minors, and older people, are disproportionately affected by this challenge.16 Strengthening adaptive capacities by facilitating people's right to either stay safely or migrate with dignity is a key policy priority.
Another set of questions concerns how people move. While cross-border migration garners the most media attention, most climate mobility occurs internally.17 Given that challenge, policymakers thus need to consider the appropriate domestic responses to prepare for—or mitigate—internal mobility. For some, that might entail a legal approach: In Colombia, disaster-related displacement in 2023 surpassed conflict-related displacement by more than 50,000 individuals.18 As a result, in 2024, the Constitutional Court ruled that climate change could be legally considered a cause of forced displacement, creating obligations for state protection.19 Other policymakers may have to contend with a more systemic approach toward preventing large-scale displacement. In the United States, approximately 40 percent of the population lives in coastal areas facing escalating flood risks.20 Despite that, the housing finance system has been slow to adapt to physical climate risk, threatening a coastal property market collapse that may spur large-scale movement. In that case, policymakers might want to consider reforms aimed at creating a more secure and resilient housing market. 21
When cross-border mobility does occur, it generally remains within the region—a pattern similar to non-climate-related movement. 22 For example, out of the 7.89 million Venezuelans abroad, 6.7 million remained in the region, with 2.8 million living in Colombia, compared to the 770,000 in the United States.23
Finally, different climate hazards result in movement with distinctive characteristics. Understanding the underlying factor driving an instance of climate mobility is essential in allowing for adequate legal and policy responses to be crafted. Sudden-onset hazards, like hurricanes, floods, and tropical storms, often cause immediate and evident displacement. This movement is generally temporary, though it may result in permanent migration if return becomes unviable, and usually involves shorter distances. 24 This form of climate mobility is comparably well understood and will often activate government disaster-related responses in the immediate aftermath of a disaster. Greater policy attention should hence be directed toward longer-term post-disaster results.25
In contrast, slow-onset events like sea level rise, salinization, and desertification produce adverse effects that are often less understood. These events can also force migration when livelihoods become unsustainable. However, this form of climate mobility is less identifiable, more individualized, and more permanent. It also often involves greater distances traveled.26 As a result, crafting an adequate and supportive policy and programmatic response becomes more challenging. In this context, given a likely greater level of agency for individual migrants, mobility has the potential to serve as an important adaptation and risk management strategy; greater attention should be given to policies and programming that support proactive decisionmaking in migration that will enhance the benefits of migrating and minimize associated risks.27
Complexity Does Not Mean Inaction
No universal framework exists to manage or govern human mobility related to climate change. Thus far, most policy responses focus on either disaster management or reducing displacement; few focus on facilitating human mobility.28 Until recently, no government had committed to offering legally binding remedies based on an individual’s exposure to climate change.29
However, this does not mean that nothing can be—or has been—done to address climate mobility. A nascent, if patchy, international governance framework is emerging that recognizes the importance of addressing the impacts of climate change on human mobility. States are increasingly considering their duties regarding climate mobility. Chile and Colombia, for example, have asked the Inter-American Court of Human Rights for guidance on the obligations and principles that should inform the measures that states—individually and collectively—adopt to deal with involuntary human mobility exacerbated by the climate emergency.30
Within the existing institutional frameworks supporting the implementation of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), climate mobility has received formal recognition in the form of the 2010 Cancun Adaptation Framework and the decision of the eighteenth session of the Conference of States Parties (COP18) on loss and damage adopted in Doha in 2012.31 In 2013, the Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage was established during COP19 (with a mandate to increase knowledge on how the impacts of climate change affect human mobility) and dedicates a strategic workstream focused on “human mobility, including migration, displacement and planned relocation.”32 In addition, the Task Force on Displacement was created under the Warsaw Mechanism during COP21 to “develop recommendations for integrated approaches to avert, minimize and address displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change.”33 In COP27, a loss and damage fund under the Sharm el-Sheikh Implementation Plan was created to address, among other things, “forced displacement . . . [and] human mobility.”34 COP28 confirmed the inclusion of human mobility in the loss and damage fund, and COP29 referenced human mobility in both the funding decision and as part of the indicator recommendation in its Global Goal on Adaptation.35
Outside of the UNFCCC, the migration and displacement policy field has also produced a raft of instruments to address climate mobility. For instance, the 1998 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement included considerations for internal displacement in the context of disasters.36 In March 2015, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction was adopted to “prevent new and reduce existing disaster risks” and “increase preparedness for response and recovery, and thus strengthen resilience,” recognizing disaster displacement as a relevant concern and acknowledging the role of disaster in driving human mobility.37 That same year, the Protection Agenda of the Nansen Initiative provided guidance to enhance protection for people displaced across borders in the context of climate change and disasters.38 Finally, the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, adopted in 2018, made specific recommendations aimed at ensuring safe human mobility in the contexts of disasters, environmental degradation, and the adverse impacts of climate change.39
A range of international instruments and innovative “soft law” frameworks have been developed in recent years to address the intersection of climate change and human mobility. They provide a foundation for addressing this issue, and a more comprehensive list can be found in Annex I of this article.
Moving Forward
The key focus of addressing climate mobility is not to “solve” the impacts of climate change. Instead, the challenge is to strengthen the adaptive capacity of vulnerable communities, ensuring that those who wish to stay can do so in safety, while those who need or choose to move can do so voluntarily, safely, and with dignity. Effective responses will have to be context-specific and sensitive to the particular needs of affected communities.40 As such, a panoply of measures will be needed to ensure that responses adequately address the varieties of climate mobility, for those who have to or choose to move, those who stay behind, and the transit and receiving communities.
We must draw from the existing toolbox of policies, practices, and initiatives to address this challenge. While many of these tools were not explicitly designed with climate mobility in mind, they offer solutions for people displaced by a deteriorating climate, ensuring access to socioeconomic rights and lawful status for individuals displaced directly or indirectly by climate change. The path forward lies in understanding what tools are already available and what needs to be created to develop the responses that communities require. Successfully doing so will require a better understanding of the phenomenon of climate mobility and a more holistic approach to supporting communities and individuals with heightened climate vulnerabilities, wherever they are.
Notes
1Guéladio Cissé et al., “Health, Wellbeing and the Changing Structure of Communities,” in Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability, ed. Hans-Otto Portner, Debra C. Roberts et al. (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2022), https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/chapter/chapter-7/.
2“Displacement Tracking Matrix DTM Insight January 2025,” International Organization for Migration, January 2025, https://dtm.iom.int/dtm-insights/january-2025-edition/data-update-climate-who-are-climate-migrants.
3“Global Report on Internal Displacement 2025,” Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, May 13, 2025, https://doi.org/10.55363/IDMC.XTGW2833.
4Kristy Siegfried, “Climate Change and Displacement: The Myths and the Facts,” UNHCR, November 15, 2023, https://www.unhcr.org/us/news/stories/climate-change-and-displacement-myths-and-facts.
5“Who Are Climate Migrants? A Global Analysis of the Profiles of Communities Affected by Weather-Related Internal Displacements,” International Organization for Migration, 2024, https://publications.iom.int/books/who-are-climate-migrants-global-analysis-profiles-communities; and Ian Fry, “Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in the Context of Climate Change,” United Nations, July 28, 2023, https://docs.un.org/en/A/78/255. The then UN special rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights in the context of climate change, Ian Fry, identified in his 2023 report that many terms were used in reference to the people displaced by climate change, such as “climate refugees,” “climate migrants,” “environmental refugees,” “environmentally induced migration and displacement,” “climate change-related migration,” “environmental migrant,” “displaced person,” and “cross-border disaster-displaced persons,” among others.
6Marielys Padua Soto, “Indigenous Youth's Climate Displacement in Central America's Dry Corridor,” International Organization for Migration Environmental Migration Portal, June 5, 2024, https://environmentalmigration.iom.int/blogs/indigenous-youths-climate-displacement-central-americas-dry-corridor.
7Weam Al Sharif, “Climate Change and Conflict: A Perfect Storm in Sudan's Countryside,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 4, 2024, https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2024/06/climate-change-and-conflict-a-perfect-storm-in-sudans-countryside?lang=en; and Alexandra Lamarche, “Climate-Fueled Violence and Displacement in the Lake Chad Basin: Focus on Chad and Cameroon,” Refugees International, January 19, 2023, https://www.refugeesinternational.org/reports-briefs/climate-fueled-violence-and-displacement-in-the-lake-chad-basin-focus-on-chad-and-cameroon/.
8Joe Kottke, “Hundreds of Indigenous Families Complete Relocation Off Gardi Sugdub Due to Rising Sea Levels,” NBC News, June 8, 2024, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/hundreds-indigenous-families-complete-relocation-gardi-sugdub-due-risi-rcna156169; Kate Lyons, “How to Move a Country: Fiji’s Radical Plan to Escape Rising Sea Levels,” Guardian, November 8, 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2022/nov/08/how-to-move-a-country-fiji-radical-plan-escape-rising-seas-climate-crisis; and “Resettlement Plan,” Louisiana Office of Community Development, Isle de Jean Charles Resettlement Program, https://isledejeancharles.la.gov/resettlement-plan.
9Ingrid Boas et al., “Climate Migration Myths,” Nature Climate Change 9 (2019), https://www.nature.com/articles/s41558-019-0633-3.
10Jane McAdam and Tamara Wood, “Kaldor Centre Principles on Climate Mobility,” UNSW Kaldor Centre for International Refugee Law, November 2023, https://www.unsw.edu.au/content/dam/pdfs/unsw-adobe-websites/kaldor-centre/2023-11-others/2023-11-Principles-on-Climate-Mobility_v-4_DIGITAL_Singles.pdf.
11Jan Freihardt, “Climate Change Alone Does Not Cause Mass Migration,” ETH Zurich, November 27, 2024, https://ethz.ch/en/news-and-events/eth-news/news/2024/11/climate-change-alone-does-not-cause-mass-migration.html.
12David Cantor et al., “International Protection, Disasters and Climate Change,” School of Advanced Study University of London Refugee Law Initiative, 2024, https://www.refworld.org/reference/research/acadothers/2024/en/148104.
13Viviane Clement et al., “Groundswell Part 2: Acting on Internal Climate Migration,” World Bank Group, 2021, https://hdl.handle.net/10986/36248; and “Climate Change Could Force 216 Million People to Migrate Within Their Own Countries by 2050,” World Bank Group, September 13, 2021, https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2021/09/13/climate-change-could-force-216-million-people-to-migrate-within-their-own-countries-by-2050.
14Samuel Huckstep and Michael Clemens, “Climate Change and Migration: An Omnibus Overview for Policymakers and Development Practitioners,” Center for Global Development, May 9, 2023, https://www.cgdev.org/publication/climate-change-and-migration-omnibus-overview-policymakers-and-development.
15“Legal Action Agenda for Climate Displacement: United States, Latin America, and the Caribbean,” International Refugee Assistance Project, 2024, https://refugeerights.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Climate-Legal-Action-Agenda-English.pdf.
16Ian Fry, “Providing Legal Options to Protect the Human Rights of Persons Displaced Across International Borders Due to Climate Change,” United Nations, April 18, 2023, https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/53/34
17Dina Ionesco, “Let’s Talk About Climate Migrants, Not Climate Refugees,” United Nations Sustainable Development, June 2019, https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2019/06/lets-talk-about-climate-migrants-not-climate-refugees/.
18“Country Profile: Colombia,” Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, August 27, 2024, https://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/colombia/.
19“Colombian Court Recognizes Environmental Refugees,” France24, April 23, 2024, https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20240423-colombian-court-recognizes-environmental-refugees.
20“Economics and Demographics,” National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Office for Coastal Management, 2020, https://coast.noaa.gov/states/fast-facts/economics-and-demographics.html.
21Susan Crawford and Daevan Mangalmurti, “Flood Insurance Reform for the U.S. Housing Market,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 14, 2025, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/01/flood-insurance-reform-for-the-us-housing-market?lang=en.
22Huckstep and Clemens, “Climate Change and Migration.”
23“About the Regional Venezuela Situation,” International Organization for Migration, February 6, 2025, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/venezuelan-immigrants-united-states; Ana Alanis Amaya and Jeanne Batalova, “Venezuelan Immigrants in the United States,” Migration Policy Institute, February 6, 2025, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/venezuelan-immigrants-united-states.
24Dennis Mombauer, Ann-Christine Link, and Kees van der Geest, “Addressing Climate-Related Human Mobility Through NDCs and NAPs: State of Play, Good Practices, and the Ways Forward,” Frontiers in Climate 5 (2023), https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/climate/articles/10.3389/fclim.2023.1125936.
25These responses may fall short when long-lasting solutions are required. To illustrate this point, see, for example, the complaint filed by communities from the island of Providencia in Colombia’s Caribbean archipelago of San Andres, in which they argued they suffered from the lack of a consultation process as well as insufficient climate considerations in rebuilding. “Landmark Legal Case Provides Hope for Indigenous People Around the World Displaced by Climate Change,” University of Reading, October 30, 2021, https://www.reading.ac.uk/news/2021/research-news/pr860871. In some contexts, post-disaster scenarios can create an opportunity to drive adaptation toward a more resilient future. Katie Mears and Sarah Labowitz, “Adaptation Through Shock,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 17, 2024, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/10/adaptation-through-shock?lang=en.
26Mombauer, Link, and van der Geest, “Addressing Climate-Related Human Mobility Through NDCs and NAPs.”
27Emily McInerney, Jennifer Saxon, and Laurie Ashley, “Migration as a Climate Adaptation Strategy: Challenges & Opportunities for USAID Programming,” U.S. Agency for International Development, June 2022, https://web.archive.org/web/20250201102940/https://www.climatelinks.org/sites/default/files/asset/document/2023-01/FTF1537_USAID_Climate%20Migration%20Strategy_012723.pdf; “Technical Guide on Integrating Human Mobility and Climate Change Linkages into Relevant National Climate Change Planning Processes,” United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, The Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage Executive Committee, November 2024, https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/WIM_ExCom_human-mobility_TFD_2024.pdf
28“Human Mobility in the Context of Disasters, Climate Change and Environmental Degradation: Ten Insights From the GCM Baseline Mapping Report,” Platform on Disaster Displacement, May 2022, https://docs.google.com/viewerng/viewer?url=https://disasterdisplacement.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Ten_Insights_compressed.pdf&hl=en.
29The Australia-Tuvalu Falepili Union Treaty, which entered into force in August 2024, is considered the world’s first bilateral agreement on climate mobility, referencing climate change as a key force shaping movement between states.
30Liliana Gamboa, “A Seminal Case for Climate Litigation,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 26, 2024, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/06/a-seminal-case-for-climate-litigation?lang=en
31“Cancun Agreements,” United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, accessed May 19, 2025, https://unfccc.int/process/conferences/pastconferences/cancun-climate-change-conference-november-2010/statements-and-resources/Agreements; “Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Sixteenth Session, Held in Cancun from 29 November to 10 December 2010,” Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, March 15, 2011, https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/cop16/eng/07a01.pdf; and “Approaches to Address Loss and Damage Associated with Climate Change Impacts in Developing Countries that Are Particularly Vulnerable to the Adverse Effects of Climate Change to Enhance Adaptive Capacity,” United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, December 8, 2012, https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2012/cop18/eng/08a01.pdf#page=21.
32“Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Eighteenth Session, held in Doha from 26 November to 8 December 2012. Addendum. Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties at its Eighteenth Session,” United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, February 28, 2013, https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2012/cop18/eng/08a01.pdf#page=21; “Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Nineteenth Session, Held in Warsaw from 11 to 23 November 2013. Addendum. Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties at Its Nineteenth Session,” United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, January 31, 2014, https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/docs/2013/cop19/eng/10a01.pdf#page=6; “Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage Associated with Climate Change Impacts,” United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, https://unfccc.int/process/bodies/constituted-bodies/WIMExCom/TFD.
33“Human Mobility, Including Migration, Displacement and Planned Relocation,” United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, accessed May 19, 2025, https://unfccc.int/process/bodies/constituted-bodies/WIMExCom/TFD#Task-Force-on-Displacement.
34“Sharm el-Sheikh Implementation Plan,” United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, accessed May 19, 2025, https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cop27_auv_2_cover%20decision.pdf
35Alice Baillat, “COP29: Key Outcomes on Displacement and Implications for Climate Policy,” Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, December 18, 2024, https://www.internal-displacement.org/policy-analysis/cop29-key-outcomes-on-displacement-and-implications-for-climate-policy/.
36“Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, October 2001, https://www.unhcr.org/media/guiding-principles-internal-displacement.
37“Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030,” United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, March 18, 2015, https://www.undrr.org/publication/sendai-framework-disaster-risk-reduction-2015-2030; “Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030,” United Nations, March 18, 2015, https://www.undrr.org/media/16176/download?startDownload=20250527.
38“Agenda for the Protection of Cross-Border Displaced Persons in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change Volume I,” Nansen Initiative, December 2015, https://disasterdisplacement.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/EN_Protection_Agenda_Volume_I_-low_res.pdf.
39“Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration,” International Organization for Migration, December 19, 2018, https://www.iom.int/global-compact-migration.
40Jane McAdam and Tamara Wood, “Kaldor Centre Principles on Climate Mobility,” UNSW Kaldor Centre for International Refugee Law, November 2023, https://www.unsw.edu.au/content/dam/pdfs/unsw-adobe-websites/kaldor-centre/2023-11-others/2023-11-Principles-on-Climate-Mobility_v-4_DIGITAL_Singles.pdf.