Civil Society Under Assault: Repression and Responses in Russia, Egypt, and Ethiopia

Governments around the world are narrowing the space for civil society activism. Pointing to threats of terrorism or the need to protect national sovereignty, they are erecting new barriers to the operations and funding of NGOs, harassing and discrediting civil society activists, and criminalizing dissent through expansive antiterrorism laws. An increasing number of states are also pushing back against the activities of governments and private funders that provide cross-border support to local civil society groups. This trend is widespread: it is no longer confined to a particular geographic region or type of political regime. Between 2014 and 2016 alone, more than sixty countries restricted citizens’ freedom of assembly and civil society’s ability to access funding.¹ The closing of civic space has become a defining feature of international political life.

There are multiple drivers of this phenomenon. After a decade of rapid expansion in the 1990s, democratic progress has stalled in many parts of the world.² Authoritarian regimes that had been weakened in the initial post–Cold War period have stabilized and now assume a more assertive role on the world stage. The shift in relative power from established Western democracies to non-Western actors has spurred a renewed emphasis on sovereignty norms and a pushback against perceived external interference.³ In addition, illiberal regimes increasingly fear the power of civic activism. Over the past decade, popular uprisings throughout the Middle East and the postcommunist world have exposed the vulnerability of seemingly entrenched political elites. These movements sparked a wave of preemptive measures aimed at deterring future popular mobilization and bringing foreign funding flows to civil society under greater state control.⁴ In a number of countries, the rise of populist leaders has fed the demonization of civil society organizations as cosmopolitan elites and enemies of the people. In addition, global concerns about terrorist financing and transnational crime have provided an excuse for governments seeking to suppress civic actors.⁵

The closing of civic space has started to attract significant international and scholarly attention.⁶ Yet substantial gaps in knowledge persist. Three questions in particular warrant further investigation.

1. What is the full range of formal and informal tactics used by governments to restrict civil society? While existing research has focused on the proliferation of restrictive NGO laws, we know much less about governments’ implementation and enforcement of these measures and their interplay with nonlegal and extralegal measures.
2. What impact do these measures have on affected civil society organizations and on civil society as a whole? In countries where civic space has narrowed, state actors have reshaped patterns of NGO emergence and activity as well as citizen mobilization more broadly. By examining how civic actors have adjusted to legal and political restrictions, we can bring to light sources of both vulnerability and resilience.
3. What have been the responses of Western governments, and how effective have these responses been? Since the end of the Cold War, the United States and Europe have played key roles in supporting nascent civil society in difficult places. As this support has come under increasing attack, Western actors have pushed back both in public and private—raising new questions about the nature and success of their efforts.

Three country cases have been at the forefront of the closing space trend and help to address the above questions: Russia, Egypt, and Ethiopia.⁷ All three have imposed sweeping restrictions on associational life and limited external support to civil society. As significant regional players, their respective measures to reshape civil society have set an important example within their respective neighborhoods and beyond. All three are also of strategic importance to the West—be it in the realm of counterterrorism, security cooperation, trade, or international migration management. As such, they highlight the conflicting interests that U.S. and European governments have to balance as they try to effectively support civil society activists in the face of shrinking civic space.

Notes

¹ “Lawful Civil Society Groups ‘Are Not Enemies of Democracy, But Key Allies,’ Says UN Expert,” UN News Center, October 26, 2015, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=52379#.WJJLUVUrLcs.

² Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, “The Myth of Democratic Recession,” Journal of Democracy 26, no. 1 (January 2015): 45–58.

³ See, for example: Jonas Wolff and Annika Elena Poppe, “From Closing Space to Contested Spaces: Re-Assessing Current Conflicts Over International Civil Society Support,”Peace Research Institute, 2015; and Xymena Kurowska, “Multipolarity as Resistance to Liberal Norms: Russia’s Position on Responsibility to Protect,” Conflict, Security & Development 14, no. 4 (July 2014): 489–508.

⁴ Karrie J. Koesel and Valerie J. Bunce, “Diffusion-Proofing: Russian and Chinese Responses to Waves of Popular Mobilizations Against Authoritarian Rulers,” Perspectives on Politics 11, no. 3 (September 2013): 753–68; and Kendra Dupuy, James Ron, and Aseem Prakash, “Hands Off My Regime! Governments’ Restrictions on Foreign Aid to Non-Governmental Organizations in Poor and Middle-Income Countries,” World Development 84 (August 2016): 299–311.

⁵ Jude Howell et al., “The Backlash Against Civil Society in the Wake of the Long War on Terror,” Development in Practice 18, no. 1 (2008): 82–93.

⁶ See, for example, Dupuy, Ron, and Prakash, “Hands Off My Regime!,” 299–311; Douglas Rutzen, “Civil Society Under Assault,” Journal of Democracy 26, no. 4 (October 2015): 28–39; Sarah E. Mendelson, “Why Governments Target Civil Society and What Can Be Done in Response,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 2015; Thomas Carothers, “The Closing Space Challenge: How Funders Are Responding,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 2, 2015; Thomas Carothers and Saskia Brechenmacher, “Closing Space: Democracy and Human Rights Support Under Fire,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 20, 2014; and Darin Christensen and Jeremy M. Weinstein, “Defunding Dissent: Restrictions on Aid to NGOs,” Journal of Democracy 24, no. 2 (April 2013): 77–91.

⁷ This analysis is based on a series of in-depth interviews with civil society activists, analysts, and researchers working in or on these countries, as well as a review of the secondary literature, government documents, and funder policies.

Tactics

The Russian government began tightening its regulatory control over civil society during President Vladimir Putin’s second term. This effort accelerated in the wake of Putin’s return to the presidency in 2012, after months of large-scale antigovernment protest.

Three key features have characterized the Russian government’s efforts to reshape civil society:

• A focus on discrediting foreign-funded groups, which are portrayed as undermining Russia’s national sovereignty and harming the collective good.
• A reliance on bureaucratic and legal tools to weaken independent civic actors, combined with selective prosecutions aimed at intimidating civil society as a whole.
• A related effort to fund and promote apolitical and pro-government organizations as socially useful, while at the same time maintaining tight state control over the entire sector.

Extending Executive Control

A Corporatist Vision of Civil Society

In Russia, the Soviet state’s monopoly over public life left a legacy of mistrust toward civic activism and autonomous organizational networks. During the 1990s, the term civil society was used almost exclusively by a small group of reform-oriented organizations supported primarily by Western donors eager to support Russia’s fledgling democracy. These organizations saw their role as holding the state accountable to global norms of governance, and they rejected close collaboration with the government. Still in a nascent state, they tended to operate in relative isolation from one another and from society at large.⁸

When Putin first came to power in 2000, he emphasized the importance of building a strong and vibrant civil society. However, it quickly became clear that his vision of civil society was at odds with that of the growing circle of independent groups that had mushroomed after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In Putin’s view, these organizations were foreign imposed and alien to Russian society and political culture.⁹ His speeches in the early 2000s emphasized the need to integrate civil society into the Russian executive’s chain of command, as a network of organizations that would represent citizen interests in state-approved public venues while simultaneously reinforcing state authority.¹⁰ Far from representing a new approach in the Russian context, this vision closely aligned with the country’s long-standing tradition of centralized, top-down governance.

Toward the end of his first term, Putin began building the organizational and regulatory structures for a more corporatist civil society. The Kremlin used the escalating war on domestic terrorism to concentrate power in the executive branch.¹¹ Following the 2004 Beslan school hostage crisis, Putin created the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation, an advisory body of 126 appointed individuals from various social and professional domains tasked with providing expert input on legislative proposals.¹² Parallel bodies were established at the regional level and within various government agencies.¹³ However, their role remained limited: whenever an advisory council broke through the boundaries of acceptable political discourse, its members were quickly demoted.¹⁴ The Public Chamber at times openly challenged government policy, but it lacked independent resources and investigative powers to follow up on its recommendations. Russian authorities encouraged civil society organizations to interact with the chamber rather than directly with government officials, but always in a consultative role and without exerting actual reform pressure on state institutions.¹⁵ Many independent groups dismissed these initiatives as a smokescreen for the executive’s increasing centralization of power and refused to cooperate.¹⁶

The First Wave of Restrictions

In the mid-2000s, the environment for NGOs critical of government policy started deteriorating. In response to the so-called color revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine, Russian officials stepped up their verbal attacks on foreign-funded groups and began imposing legal constraints on civil society.¹⁷ The 2006 NGO law gave authorities the power to deny registration to any organization whose goals and objectives “create a threat to the sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity, national unity, unique character, cultural heritage, and national interests of the Russian Federation.”¹⁸ It also implemented new burdensome reporting requirements for groups receiving foreign support and expanded the power of government authorities to interfere in the creation and operation of NGOs.¹⁹ The government justified the law by arguing that it was necessary to foster greater transparency in the sector and encourage the development of domestic funding sources.²⁰ In a further move to restrict foreign funding flows, Putin in 2008 issued a decree that reduced the number of foreign and international organizations allowed to give tax-free grants in Russia from 101 to twelve.²¹

The new legal framework hit human rights and political advocacy organizations the hardest. Many experienced repeated harassment by state officials and found that some of their activities were suddenly blocked or delayed. In several cases, Russian officials used a 2002 law on countering extremist activity—defined broadly to include vague charges such as “inciting racial hatred” and “accusing a public official of acts of terrorism”—to inspect NGOs and investigate their activities.²² For example, the Moscow-based Civic Assistance Committee, an NGO that focuses on migrant and refugee rights, was subjected to a criminal investigation after a parliamentarian accused the group of giving cover to “ethnic criminal groupings.”²³ Organizations suddenly had to devote more time and resources to complying with onerous reporting requirements and often had to wait months before their planned activities could be resumed. At the same time, pro-government media outlets scaled up their campaign against foreign-funded NGOs, portraying them as tools of Western intelligence services working to provoke or overthrow the Russian government. The result was a definitive choking effect on independent civil society.

A Double-Down On Repression

An Unprecedented Internal Challenge

The crackdown on Russian civil society intensified as antigovernment protests spread following flawed parliamentary elections in December 2011. Faced with the largest antigovernment mobilization since the fall of the Soviet Union, the Russian regime used its already consolidated control over television and key newspapers to ramp up its rhetoric against civil society activists. Throughout the election campaign, Putin repeated his accusation that unspecified “recipients of foreign grants” were following “the instructions of foreign governments” and interfering with Russia’s elections.²⁴ Other officials echoed these accusations, warning of a Libya-style uprising that would throw the country into disarray.²⁵ State media outlets also tried to discredit the demonstrators by dismissing them as “well-fed” and “angry urbanites” out of touch with the rest of the country.²⁶

This campaign of delegitimization laid the groundwork for a political and legal counteroffensive.

This campaign of delegitimization laid the groundwork for a political and legal counteroffensive. Once reelected, Putin rapidly brought his predecessor Dmitry Medvedev’s limited attempts at modernization to a halt. United Russia’s control of the Federal Assembly proved a crucial tool in this regard: the legislature moved quickly to push through a host of restrictive measures aimed at limiting freedoms of association, expression, and assembly. These included a dramatic increase in fines for violating rules on the participation in and organization of public protests, the reintroduction of defamation as a criminal offense for media outlets, amendments that increased Internet censorship, and changes to the criminal code expanding the definition of treason in ways that could be interpreted as criminalizing involvement in international human rights advocacy.²⁷ More than thirty people were charged with organizing mass riots and assaulting police during clashes at a rally on Bolotnaya Square the day before Putin’s inauguration—which civil society activists considered a politically motivated effort to discourage further civic mobilization.²⁸

The Foreign Agents Law

It was in this tense political climate that a new NGO law was fast-tracked through the Federal Assembly (the Russian Parliament) and came into force in November 2012. The so-called foreign agents law required all organizations engaged in “political activities” and receiving or planning to receive foreign funding to register with the Ministry of Justice as “carrying functions of a foreign agent.”²⁹ Designated foreign agents were obliged to follow a new set of burdensome administrative requirements and could be subjected to unscheduled audits. In a direct throwback to Soviet repression tactics, they were required to identify themselves in all public communications, presentations, and publications as foreign agents—a term that in Russia carries the clear connotation of a foreign spy or traitor.³⁰ According to the law, organizations that fail to voluntarily register as foreign agents risk suspension for up to six months, while failure to comply with registration, auditing, and reporting rules can be punished with fines of up to 500,000 rubles ($8,931).³¹ The law’s original definition of political activities was extremely vague, raising concerns that the provision could be selectively used against any organization critical of the government.³²

In the summer of 2012, the Russian government also moved to end all programs of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in Russia. The agency had operated in the country since the end of the Cold War, funding a multitude of public health and judicial reform programs while also providing support to civil society organizations.³³ The government accused USAID of meddling in Russia’s domestic politics by funding election monitoring and other prodemocracy initiatives.³⁴ The decision to expel USAID exacerbated fears among civil society activists, who anticipated dramatic funding losses.³⁵ A few months later, the Federal Assembly followed up with the Dima Yakovlev law, which allows the suspension, without a court order, of U.S.-funded organizations that participate in political activities or implement activities that represent a “threat to the interests of Russia.”³⁶ Together, these new measures represented a concerted effort to limit external funding flows to Russian civil society organizations.

Stalled Implementation

The foreign agents law initially relied on voluntary registration. However, Russian NGOs that received foreign funding decided almost unanimously to boycott the measure.³⁷ Some activists argued that the designation was of little importance to their work, but most felt that the label would negatively affect their public credibility and objected to the legislation as a matter of principle.³⁸ Russia’s Public Chamber refused to endorse it, and the Presidential Council for Civil Society and Human Rights challenged the vagueness of the term political activities. There was also evidence of dissent within the Russian establishment—particularly among the technocratic wing of the Russian ruling elite that had been promoted by Medvedev.³⁹ The Ministry of Justice appeared hesitant to enforce the law.⁴⁰ Justice minister Aleksandr Konovalov cautiously signaled his opposition, arguing in a speech to the State Duma (the lower house of the Federal Assembly) that the law did not give him the authority to register organizations against their will.⁴¹ However, the Constitutional Court upheld the law, arguing that there were no reasons to believe that the term foreign agent had negative connotations from the Soviet era.⁴²

Once it became clear that civil society organizations would not register voluntarily, the Kremlin’s tactics shifted. Prompted directly by Putin, the prosecutor’s office in March 2013 began an unprecedented wave of NGO inspections.⁴³ Teams of prosecutorial, judicial, and tax officials visited the offices of more than 500 groups in forty-nine regions, under the pretext of checking for “compliance with the laws of the Russian Federation.”⁴⁴ Eager to gain influence within the regime, the prosecutor’s office pursued its task aggressively, casting its net far beyond the government’s typical adversaries. The inspections were often highly disruptive and seemed aimed at intimidating the targeted organizations. At times, the inspection teams included agents from the Federal Security Service who claimed to have been alerted that the organization in question was involved in “extremist” work.⁴⁵

The inspections created an atmosphere of constant unpredictability. Given the vagueness of the law’s provisions, activists no longer knew which activities were in fact prohibited, whether the investigative officials’ actions complied with federal rules, and how law enforcement agencies and the courts would interpret key concepts.⁴⁶ State officials themselves did not necessarily know what they were looking for or what should count as a political activity. As a result, the inspections and subsequent penalties took different forms in different regions.⁴⁷ Dozens of groups received notices that they were or could be violating the foreign agents law as well as myriad other regulations, including fire codes and sanitation rules. Groups across the country went to court to challenge the fines, warnings, and notifications they received as a result of the inspections, but court hearings were frequently postponed and cases dragged on.⁴⁸

At the same time, foreign-funded civil society and human rights organizations continued to be targeted by an extensive propaganda campaign in the state media, which portrayed them as national traitors and a fifth column acting on behalf of foreign powers. The NGO investigations themselves had significant propaganda value: in Moscow, representatives from the state-owned channel NTV repeatedly joined the prosecutorial teams and broadcast reports on the inspections.⁴⁹ State media outlets also singled out specific organizations, such as the election-monitoring group Golos, and targeted them with undercover investigations meant to discredit their work as corrupt and harmful to Russian society.⁵⁰ The regime’s aggressive rhetoric fed anti-Western sentiments among pro-government activists and movements. The offices of several international NGOs, including Transparency International and the U.S. Russia Foundation for Economic Advancement and the Rule of Law, were picketed and vandalized by pro-Kremlin youth groups, adding to the general atmosphere of intimidation.⁵¹

Intensified Enforcement

Over the past three years, the Russian government has ramped up its campaign of administrative and judicial harassment. In a significant step, the Federal Assembly amended the foreign agents law to allow the Ministry of Justice to register groups as foreign agents against their will (see Figure 1).⁵² This amendment, which came into effect in May 2014, triggered a new wave of investigations by the ministry and public prosecutors. For example, the Executive Office initiated mass inspections of NGOs involved in HIV prevention—even though the law formally exempts public health organizations.⁵³ These unannounced checks typically led to administrative charges against organizations that had failed to register, followed by involuntary entry in the foreign agents registry.⁵⁴

During this period of intensified enforcement, authorities applied an extremely broad definition of political activities.⁵⁵ For example, in the eyes of law enforcement officials, providing information to the United Nations (UN) regarding Russia’s compliance with international treaties, disseminating public opinion data, and holding roundtables on government policies could be deemed political work.⁵⁶ By June 2016, at least 108 organizations had faced administrative proceedings for failing to register voluntarily, which led to fines ranging from 100,000 to 500,000 rubles ($1,765 to $8,828).⁵⁷ Despite these intensified enforcement efforts, not a single organization that was forcibly included in the registry accepted the foreign agent designation. Instead, all affected groups vowed to continue challenging the decision in court or—if unsuccessful—to give up their formal status.⁵⁸

Since mid-2015, the government’s focus has increasingly shifted toward sanctioning those groups that have already been designated foreign agents—for example, by pursuing administrative proceedings against NGOs that have refused to label their materials as required. By doing so, Russian authorities have turned the foreign agent law into a highly effective weapon of administrative attrition. Every report, website, or presentation that fails to identify its author as a foreign agent can trigger further fines—a powerful tool to deplete organizations that are already starved for funding.⁵⁹ Rather than defending civil society organizations’ from executive overreach, Russian courts have generally sided with federal agencies and exercised their discretion primarily to determine the amount of the fine.⁶⁰

A Widening Net of Legal Constraints

Russian authorities have also widened the net of legal constraints. First, in response to widespread complaints, the Ministry of Justice produced a more precise definition of the term political activities, supposedly to reduce the scope for arbitrary enforcement. However, far from narrowing the scope of the law, the resulting amendment defined the political activities of NGOs so broadly that they encompass almost any advocacy, public outreach, or research activity.⁶¹ A further amendment has ensured that even funding received from a domestic NGO can be considered foreign funding if the donor organization in question has previously received external support—a measure that has dramatically broadened the circle of potential foreign agents.⁶²

Even funding received from a domestic NGO can be considered foreign funding if the donor organization in question has previously received external support.

Russian authorities also moved to restrict international donors themselves. In June 2015, a new federal law came into force that allows the prosecutor general to declare any foreign or international NGO “undesirable” if it is deemed to represent a threat to Russia’s defense, constitutional system, or national security.⁶³ All activities of undesirable organizations on Russian territory are automatically prohibited. The vague wording of the law and the lack of required judicial review once again open the door to arbitrary or selective enforcement. After the law was passed, 156 out of 170 members of the upper house of the Federal Assembly voted to create a “patriotic stop-list” of twelve organizations believed to pose a potential threat to Russia and tasked the prosecutor general, the Foreign Ministry, and the Ministry of Justice with investigating whether they should be declared undesirable.⁶⁴ Two years later, the list of undesirable groups includes seven primary U.S. funders, including the National Endowment for Democracy, the National Democratic Institute, and the International Republican Institute.⁶⁵

In addition, Russian lawmakers in June 2016 passed the Yarovaya law, a set of legislative amendments purportedly aimed at combating terrorism that imposed new restrictions on freedom of speech and data privacy.⁶⁶ The law forces cellular and Internet providers to store all communications data for six months and help the government access encrypted messages. It also tightens restrictions on the activities of religious groups in the name of fighting extremism.⁶⁷ At the moment, the Internet remains one of the few domains in which Russian citizens can voice dissenting opinions, mobilize, and forge coalitions around common causes. This new wave of restrictions indicates that the government is shifting its focus accordingly. It opens the door to selective enforcement aimed at intimidation and may therefore lead to further self-censorship.

Selective Prosecution

Rather than engaging in sweeping and systematic repression, Russian authorities have used this widening net of restrictive laws to selectively prosecute activists, dissidents, and ordinary citizens. These test cases generally have not involved the most prominent human rights defenders and organizations. Instead, they signal that every organization or individual is potentially at risk, which serves to discourage broader civic mobilization. This logic has been particularly evident in Russian authorities’ enforcement of antiprotest regulations. For example, in 2014, eight ordinary Russians arrested during the 2012 Bolotnaya protests were convicted and sentenced to two and a half to four years in prison following a highly publicized trial.⁶⁸ The defendants seemed to have been picked at random from the more than 500 people briefly detained on the day of the protest. The trial thus sent a clear message: anyone participating in an unauthorized protest can face criminal prosecution.

Rather than engaging in sweeping and systematic repression, Russian authorities have used this widening net of restrictive laws to selectively prosecute activists, dissidents, and ordinary citizens.

The selective prosecution of individual activists and organizations also serves as a reminder that escalating repression remains possible. Several recent cases have caused widespread alarm among civil society activists. In 2016, Valentina Cherevatenko, chair of the human rights and peacebuilding organization Women of the Don, became the first person to face criminal (rather than administrative) charges for “maliciously evading” the 2012 foreign agents law. Cherevatenko was accused of refusing to register her organization as a foreign agent and setting up a parallel foundation to circumvent the law.⁶⁹ In another threatening move, the Ministry of Justice, after a formal investigation, accused the Human Rights Center Memorial of undermining the country’s “constitutional rule”—a serious charge that could also result in criminal penalties.⁷⁰ While the prosecutor’s office has yet to act on the ministry’s finding, it could press criminal charges at any point in the future. These cases, while still isolated, demonstrate that efforts to evade civil society restrictions can potentially result in serious criminal charges.⁷¹

Violent Repression and Harassment

Russian civil society actors have also faced physical violence and informal harassment by both state security forces and nonstate actors. Threats of violence and physical attacks have primarily targeted activists working on highly sensitive issues, such as electoral fraud, LGBTQ (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer) rights, government corruption, and human rights abuses in the North Caucasus. Investigative journalists covering the annexation of Crimea and Russia’s involvement in eastern Ukraine also face heightened pressure. Intimidation takes different forms. Security officials have arbitrarily detained, interrogated, and threatened activists. This type of harassment initially escalated following the December 2011 parliamentary elections, when police officials summoned numerous activists for interrogation or held them in administrative detention.⁷² In some cases, official harassment has driven activists to flee the country—as was the case with environmental campaigner Evgeniya Chirikova, who left for Estonia in fear that her children would be taken away by child services.⁷³ In addition, civic activists face violence by unidentified assailants whose identity and ties to political authorities often remain opaque. In some cases, ultranationalist groups have been suspected of being behind the attacks, as in the case of Igor Sazhin, a human rights defender in Russia’s Komi region who was assaulted in February 2014.⁷⁴ LGBTQ activists in particular have been repeatedly attacked by far-right groups. Such incidents, while isolated, contribute to an atmosphere of fear and intimidation, especially since prosecutors have often been reluctant or slow to open criminal investigations.⁷⁵

In the North Caucasus, the environment for human rights defenders and NGOs has long been dangerous, as local authorities and militants operate in a context of almost blanket impunity for abuses. The few human rights practitioners who provide legal aid and monitor abuses in the region face constant threats to their work. For example, in June 2015, the Grozny office of the Committee Against Torture was attacked and ransacked for the second time in the span of several months.⁷⁶ In March 2016, twenty masked men attacked representatives from the human rights NGO Joint Mobile Group who were traveling with journalists from Russia, Sweden, and Norway in Ingushetia.⁷⁷ Russian authorities investigated the attack as a case of “hooliganism,” even though it was the fourth such attack on the organization within fifteen months. As a result of routine violence, human rights defenders in Chechnya in particular have developed extensive risk management strategies, such as always traveling in groups and with recording equipment and never staying in one place for more than a few months.⁷⁸

Creation and Co-optation of Civic Actors

As governmental restrictions on foreign-funded and foreign civil society organizations have multiplied over the past several years, the Russian government has continued to encourage a tightly regulated civic sector comprised of pro-government and/or apolitical organizations. So-called marionette organizations are not a new phenomenon within the Russian context: they represent a continuation of institutionalized civil society actors that existed in the Soviet era. Although they often portray themselves as independent, they in fact cannot and do not challenge existing power structures and instead serve to reinforce state control.⁷⁹

Russian state authorities have encouraged divisions between advocacy groups on the one hand and so-called socially oriented organizations active in the areas of education, health, and social welfare on the other.⁸⁰ The latter are not only celebrated in the state media, but also benefit from targeted state subsidies. In 2016, more than $112 million was allocated to civil society from the federal budget—three times as much than in 2012.⁸¹ The Kremlin began making presidential grants available in 2006 and rapidly expanded the initiative over the past several years. Between 2013 and 2015 alone, the total amount available per year increased from 2.5 billion rubles ($35 million) to 4.2 billion rubles ($59 million).⁸² Between 2009 and 2015, the Ministry of Economic Development also channeled funding to socially oriented civil society organizations.⁸³ This type of support serves multiple purposes. First, supporting NGOs that provide valuable social services helps the government fill gaps in public service delivery. In some cases, state funding has also been channeled to organizations with direct financial or family ties to those in charge of the disbursement.⁸⁴ On a broader level, the distinction between socially useful organizations and illegitimate foreign agents drives a wedge between civil society groups and draws those organizations that want to qualify for government funding closer to governing authorities.

The Russian government has also created and funded patriotic and pro-government organizations that serve to propagate key elements of the Kremlin’s ideology, including its conservative social agenda and anti-Western stance. In the early 2000s, the Russian government began supporting patriotic youth movements with close ties to the executive. Yet these organizations never became the powerful social force they had perhaps been intended to be.⁸⁵ Following the 2011–2012 opposition protests and the annexation of Crimea in 2014, state authorities began encouraging and relying on a wider array of nationalist grassroots initiatives. Patriotic mobilization reached its peak during Russia’s initial intervention in eastern Ukraine. Yet Russian authorities quickly moved to reestablish top-down control once they perceived local activism to be spiraling out of control. They have since shifted their support back to groups that operate strictly within the limits set by the state.⁸⁶ A report by the Center for Economic and Political Reform found that the Orthodox Church has been the biggest beneficiary of presidential grants given over the past several years; organizations close to the church received at least sixty-three presidential grants worth 256 million rubles ($3.6 million) between 2013 and 2015.⁸⁷ Among other large recipients of government grants are pro-Kremlin youth organizations, including the Young Guard of United Russia, Rossiya Molodaya, and the Eurasian Youth Union.⁸⁸

Drivers

The closing of civic space in Russia represents one element of a broader process of democratic backsliding that has defined Russian politics over the past decade and a half. In the early 2000s, Putin began reversing the fragile democratic gains made after the collapse of the Soviet Union by systematically eliminating genuine political competition and further centralizing political authority in the executive branch.⁸⁹ As the Kremlin gradually marginalized the political opposition, independent civil society organizations emerged as an increasing threat to state authority. Two factors accelerated the government’s efforts to renationalize civil society organizations and assert greater government control: the fear of post-Soviet color revolutions spreading to Russia in the middle to late 2000s and the desire to prevent further popular mobilization following the 2011–2012 protest movement.

Fear of Western Political Influence

A central driver of civil society restrictions in Russia has been the fear that Western democracy assistance could help incite a popular uprising against the Putin regime. Russian authorities voiced their concern about the destabilizing role of U.S.-funded NGOs as early as 2000, when the protest group Otpor! along with a host of other civic and political actors helped unseat the Slobodan Milošević regime in Serbia.⁹⁰ The color revolutions in several former Soviet republics in the mid-2000s deepened the Kremlin’s suspicions of international civil society aid. The Russian government interpreted these popular uprisings in stark geopolitical terms. It considered Western support to activists in these countries to have functioned as a soft form of U.S.-led regime change aimed at preventing Russia’s reemergence as a regional and global geopolitical power.⁹¹ The 2006 NGO law and public statements delegitimizing foreign-funded organizations represented a direct response to this perceived threat. As Putin consolidated his power, he took further measures to renationalize Russian civil society—first through the 2012 foreign agents law and later through the undesirable organizations law and other related foreign funding restrictions.

Fear of Domestic Mobilization

While the color revolutions gave Russian authorities the initial impetus to extend state control over civil society, these efforts accelerated following the protest movement that emerged during the 2011–2012 election cycle. The mass protests occurred after several years of limited modernization under Medvedev, during which civil society organizations gained in strength and visibility. Although Russia’s established NGOs played a relatively marginal role in organizing or leading the protests, they represented a concrete threat to the Kremlin’s control of the political narrative.

Not surprisingly, the government’s initial response focused on limiting citizens’ right to protest. However, the rush to pass the foreign agents law immediately after Putin’s return to power betrayed Russian officials’ fear that civic groups could emerge as a potential alternative center of power. The authorities’ initial enforcement efforts targeted those organizations viewed as particularly threatening in light of the 2011–2012 protest movement. These groups included the Human Rights Center Memorial, which had documented cases of politically motivated arrests and unlawful detentions of activists; the Public Verdict Foundation, which had established a hotline for protesters who were detained arbitrarily by security forces; and Golos, a network of election-monitoring organizations.⁹² As Putin’s grip on power tightened, the circle of potentially threatening organizations continuously widened—from election watchdogs to environmental activists, cultural initiatives, and independent research institutions.

Impact

The Russian government’s restrictions on civil society have decreased the number of active independent NGOs and deepened divisions within the sector. Those organizations that have survived have been weakened by continuous administrative and legal harassment and funding cuts, which have reduced their overall capacity, effectiveness, and reach. Cooperation with state authorities and other public institutions has become increasingly challenging. To survive in the current political environment, independent organizations have increasingly shifted toward domestic funding sources, exploited legal loopholes, and experimented with new organizational models.

Consequences of the Crackdown

Weakened Independent Organizations

Far from affecting only human rights organizations, the closing of civic space has been felt by independent Russian organizations in a wide range of fields. As of this writing (March 2017), there are 102 active organizations on the government’s foreign agents register.⁹³ These groups face the bulk of administrative, legal, and informal harassment. Compared to the more than 200,000 NGOs registered with the Ministry of Justice, 102 may seem like a relatively insignificant number. However, many of the targeted organizations are among the most professional, active, and well-known organizations in the country, which have set standards for the rest of the sector and played an important role in shaping national and local public debates. They include organizations working on historical remembrance, migrant services, HIV prevention, election monitoring, prisoners’ rights, public opinion research, and environmental protection (see Figure 2).

It is difficult to measure the full impact that formal and informal governmental restrictions have had on these organizations’ activities and their constituents. Yet across the board, civil society groups have had to spend more time, energy, and resources on fulfilling the state’s complex registration and reporting requirements.⁹⁴ This heightened administrative burden has made it more difficult for citizens to form new organizations, as applications for registration can easily be rejected based on arbitrary grounds. Existing groups have less time to focus on substantive agendas and tasks. Unannounced and intrusive inspections disrupt NGOs’ daily activities, as investigators typically require organizations to submit detailed financial and activity reports. Organizations have also spent time and resources on challenging the foreign agent label in court. Those organizations that have nevertheless been declared foreign agents face frequent penalties, which drain their already limited budgets.⁹⁵ They also have to submit quarterly financial reports and expensive annual audits, adding approximately 284 hours to their workload.⁹⁶

As a result, many organizations have shifted to domestic funding sources. Yet proving that one’s organization has stopped receiving foreign funding has not necessarily been sufficient to ward off further administrative and legal challenges. In some cases, the Ministry of Justice has denied requests to be taken off the register, pointing to tenuous connections to other foreign agents as evidence of foreign funding.⁹⁷ Other groups have been included in the list despite never having received external support.⁹⁸ Rather than engaging in their day-to-day activities and advancing their strategic objectives, organizations have thus found themselves bogged down by administrative proceedings and legal disputes. As of November 2016, Russian authorities had initiated 235 judicial proceedings against NGOs, in addition to the ninety-eight initiated by NGOs to challenge state actions and decisions.⁹⁹ In a number of cases, civil society activists have prevailed—for example, in February 2017, the Russian Supreme Court annulled a 300,000 ruble penalty imposed on Women of the Don.¹⁰⁰ Yet these types of cases require significant organizational capacity. Smaller organizations have thus been particularly hard hit; they typically lack the resources to adjust.¹⁰¹ An even more pernicious effect has been the increase in self-censorship, as some foreign-funded organizations have stepped back from initiatives that could potentially be deemed political by Russian officials to preempt legal proceedings.¹⁰²

Fewer Funding Sources

In addition to legal and administrative challenges, activists have had to adjust to a sharp decrease in civil society funding. The increasingly challenging legal environment—including changes to the Criminal Code’s articles on treason and espionage—has led a number of international donors to scale back their operations in Russia amid fears of prosecution or endangerment of local staff (see Figures 3 and 4).¹⁰³ Others were forced to leave the country. The expulsion of USAID in 2012 hit the sector particularly hard: the agency had been one of the main providers of civil society support since the early 2000s.¹⁰⁴ The undesirable organizations law only exacerbated these trends. In response to the law, a number of private foundations—such as the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation and the MacArthur Foundation—chose to close their operations in Russia preemptively, in part to preserve funding that had already been allocated and also to avoid the potential reputational cost of being declared undesirable.¹⁰⁵ Others (such as the Open Society Foundations) insisted on staying; they were promptly blacklisted.

By formally outlawing seven of the most prominent U.S. civil society funders, the government cut off key sources of support for democracy and human rights work and discouraged other donors from investing in the country. At the same time, Russian NGOs have begun rejecting foreign support to avoid the stigma of being designated a foreign agent.¹⁰⁶ Domestic funding sources have been insufficient to fill this gap. Even though the government has made additional subsidies available, advocacy and rights organizations have received almost no state support.¹⁰⁷ Russian companies and foundations are hesitant to fund organizations that are critical of the government; in fact, a number of NGOs lost corporate funding after being labeled foreign agents.¹⁰⁸ As a result, they have had to scale back their activities. Smaller organizations have closed down or become inactive. Even though the total number of NGOs does not seem to be decreasing, most new organizations are not independent but instead have close ties to businesses or local political authorities.¹⁰⁹

Reduced Cooperation With Public Officials and Institutions

One of the most pernicious consequences of the foreign agent label has been the disruption of civil society organizations’ long-standing cooperation with various Russian state agencies and public sector institutions. The law does not officially prohibit public officials from collaborating with foreign agents, yet public officials at all levels have been discouraged from doing so.¹¹⁰ Some regional governments sent direct guidelines demanding that local officials break all ties with organizations that have been entered in the register. In other regions, the signals from above have been more subtle, but the outcome has been the same: officials have withdrawn from or blocked previously collaborative relationships and joint projects in fear of potential negative repercussions.¹¹¹

Many civil society organizations have worked closely with government agencies for years and depend on such vertical ties to effectively carry out their missions. For example, the environmental organization Bellona Murmansk collaborated with Russian nuclear authorities on the cleanup of nuclear waste and nuclear security issues. State agencies valued the group’s data collection efforts and international ties. Yet this working relationship did not protect the organization from being labeled a foreign agent, and it was forced to shut down in 2015.¹¹² In fact, the Ministry of Justice considered the popularity of the group’s work as proof that Bellona Murmansk had influenced public opinion and was therefore involved in political activities.¹¹³ Similarly, Moscow city authorities refused to prolong their lease agreement with the migrant rights organization Civic Assistance Committee after it was labeled a foreign agent. The premises had housed an “adaptation center,” where refugee children received lessons preparing them to transition into the Russian school system. For the first time since 1996, representatives of the Federal Migration Service and other agencies also refused to take part in the organization’s seminar on migrant and refugee rights—an activity that had been at the core of the Civic Assistance Committee’s advocacy and institutional reform efforts.¹¹⁴ Working with law enforcement has become particularly challenging: the human rights group Public Verdict Foundation was forced to end its cooperation with law enforcement agencies after it had been added to the register.¹¹⁵ The NGO Women of the Don—which focuses on peacebuilding, intercommunal reconciliation, and human rights education—has experienced difficulties accessing police officials and the Inspectorate for Juvenile Affairs, despite having collaborated closely with these institutions in the past.¹¹⁶

Civil society activists report that public institutions such as universities, high schools, and hospitals that depend on state support have also become wary of engaging with stigmatized organizations. This makes it difficult for NGOs to access certain target groups such as students, orphans, and people with disabilities housed in government-run institutions.¹¹⁷ For groups like the Human Rights Center Memorial that view public education about past repression as central to their mission, reduced access to schools and other institutions represents a direct hit to their effectiveness and reach.¹¹⁸

More Challenging Public Outreach

The designation of foreign agent has also made it difficult for civil society organizations to reach the wider Russian public. In addition to the barriers to access described in the previous section, NGOs struggle to disseminate their research and activities through government-controlled mass media outlets. They do not have a large enough public platform to effectively counter government smear campaigns. As a result, civil society activists note that public mistrust in NGOs has increased.¹¹⁹ For example, the Committee for the Prevention of Torture (previously the Committee Against Torture), which works to expose torture and provides legal assistance to victims of security force abuses, reports that its work has become more difficult: the foreign agent label allows authorities to dismiss the organization’s claims as illegitimate.¹²⁰ An amendment currently under discussion in the Federal Assembly that would force civic groups to display bigger labels identifying themselves as foreign agents would in all likelihood reinforce this pattern of stigmatization.¹²¹

Public ambivalence about advocacy organizations is not an entirely new phenomenon in Russia, where civic groups active on public policy issues have traditionally either been mouthpieces of the state or associated with dissident political movements. Government smear campaigns against independent groups have thus tapped into preexisting suspicions of civil society motives.¹²² Recent public opinion surveys corroborate these dynamics. A poll conducted by the independent Levada Center (which has also been designated a foreign agent) in late 2016 found that for 57 percent of Russians the term foreign agent inspired suspicion and fear.¹²³ Of those who reported negative associations, 45 percent noted that the term evoked designations such as “CIA agent,” “foreign spy,” and “mole.” Yet the survey also revealed widespread ignorance about the specifics of the law: 73 percent reported not knowing anything about it at all. These findings highlight the extent to which state-controlled media outlets have marginalized independent civil society groups from mainstream public discourse. In this context, civil society organizations rely heavily on the Internet to disseminate their research and activities and to coordinate collective action.¹²⁴

Greater Fragmentation in the NGO Sector

The closing of civic space has also led to greater fragmentation and disunity among civil society organizations. As noted above, the Russian government has openly embraced divide-and-rule tactics by repeatedly drawing a line between foreign-funded groups and those that provide “socially useful” services, such as direct assistance to orphans, sick, and disabled citizens. This division in fact does not reflect the complexity of the sector. Many civil society groups fulfill both advocacy and service provision roles.¹²⁵ Moreover, given the government’s sweeping definition of political activities, even social development and public health organizations have been classified as foreign agents.

The Russian government has openly embraced divide-and-rule tactics by repeatedly drawing a line between foreign-funded groups and those that provide “socially useful” services.

Although there is solidarity among civil society organizations, the current context has complicated cross-sectoral cooperation. Many social organizations are wary of openly cooperating with human rights groups or designated foreign agents out of fear that doing so may taint their reputation and make it more difficult to access government funding.¹²⁶ For example, Transparency International Russia has reported that several potential partners abandoned planned projects out of fear of working with a blacklisted organization.¹²⁷ Some socially oriented groups have blamed those engaged in political and civic activism for delegitimizing the sector as a whole. Those on the other side criticize direct service providers for not speaking out enough against government restrictions and focusing on short-term objectives at the expense of a broader enabling environment.¹²⁸ The presence of government-organized NGOs and other organizations that masquerade as independent organizations but in fact have close ties to political and business elites also makes coordinated action more difficult.

Adaptation Strategies

Closure and Relocation

It is difficult to count the total number of organizations that have shut down as a consequence of civil society restrictions in Russia. Smaller organizations began disappearing in 2006, defeated by onerous reregistration and reporting requirements. In recent years, the foreign agents law and accompanying restrictive measures have led to additional closures, as organizations do not want to carry the stigma and administrative burdens associated with the label. According to Human Rights Watch, thirty-one organizations that had formally been designated foreign agents have shut down.¹²⁹ These groups include the League of Women Voters in Saint Petersburg, the Center for Social Policy and Gender Studies in Saratov, the Humanist Youth Movement in Murmansk, and the Legal Expert Partnership “Soyuz.” Some NGOs have applied for voluntary liquidation in order to be removed from the foreign agents list—only to be met with significant bureaucratic hurdles and resistance by authorities.¹³⁰ As a result, a number of groups have been kept in a legal limbo: they can neither effectively carry out their work, nor get liquidated and removed from the list. Instead, they are forced to retain the foreign agent status, which means raising the resources needed to fulfill the myriad associated financial and administrative requirements.¹³¹

In many cases, activists have continued their work after losing or foregoing their formal registration.

The beginning of 2016 also saw the first instances of forced liquidation by court authorities. The targets were two of Russia’s largest civil society organizations, namely the Interregional Human Rights Organization “Agora” and the Golos Foundation in Support of Democracy. Both had been key antagonists of the Kremlin for years, and both have vowed to continue their work without formal legal status.¹³² This is not unusual: in many cases, activists have continued their work after losing or foregoing their formal registration, as will be discussed in greater detail below.

A number of Russian organizations have decided to relocate abroad and continue their work remotely, without an official presence within Russia. This strategy has been particularly attractive for Russian affiliates of international organizations and groups that do not rely on direct contact with their constituencies. Moving activities abroad or online has proven much more difficult for organizations whose mandate depends on regular interactions with target beneficiaries and state institutions. These groups have instead tried to circumvent the foreign agent label by shifting their activities to secondary branches, registering as international organizations, or reopening the same organization under a different name and with exclusively domestic funding sources. These strategies have often proven to be temporary solutions: in several cases, state authorities rapidly initiated proceedings against these alternative entities, often on dubious legal grounds.

Alternative Funding Strategies

Those organizations that have abandoned foreign funding sources have limited domestic options: they can seek private sector funding, apply for competitive presidential grants, or turn to crowdfunding.

Private sector grants. Private sector funding for civil society organizations remains scarce, particularly for rights-focused organizations. A number of companies have set up charitable trusts, such as the Mikhail Prokhorov Foundation and Vladimir Potanin Charity Foundation.¹³³ However, most private sector actors do not want to risk their relations with state authorities by funding politically sensitive activities or groups that have been branded as foreign agents. Russian small- and medium-sized enterprises have proven more willing to help civil society groups, often by offering in-kind services and technology, participating in crowdfunding campaigns, and providing free work spaces.¹³⁴ For example, civic groups that work on homelessness and LGBTQ rights at the grassroots level have successfully raised funding from local businesses. Yet the sums in question tend to be small.¹³⁵ Russia’s economic crisis has further reduced corporate donations, making the NGO sector as a whole more dependent on state financing.¹³⁶

Russian state funding. Several barriers prevent independent civil society groups from accessing the government’s civil society grants. First, the process is highly competitive: in 2015, only 636 out of 4,380 projects were selected.¹³⁷ Second, the bidding process lacks transparency and, as noted above, favors apolitical and pro-government organizations.¹³⁸ This trend has become more pronounced over the past several funding rounds. A few prominent human rights organizations have nevertheless benefited from state support. For example, in 2015, three human rights NGOs that had previously been declared foreign agents won presidential grants: a regional branch of the For Human Rights movement, the In Defense of Prisoners’ Rights foundation, and the Moscow Helsinki Group.¹³⁹ However, civil society activists have characterized these awards as little more than symbolic gestures—a “honey cake offered after a brutal whip,” as one activist put it.¹⁴⁰ Accepting state funding also poses significant risks to independent groups, as presidential grants come with difficult reporting requirements that increase government oversight over their activities. Some organizations have had to attenuate their public criticism of state policy to avoid being disqualified from future funding rounds.¹⁴¹

Groups that have failed to raise government or corporate funding have had to rely primarily on crowdfunding, income generation, and member donations.

Crowdfunding and income generation. Groups that have failed to raise government or corporate funding have had to rely primarily on crowdfunding, income generation, and member donations.¹⁴² Many organizations have set up crowdfunding pages to raise emergency funds to pay for court fines and legal fees. Others have raised money by organizing charity events and concerts for their supporters. A few groups have tried to develop more consistent income sources. Using a grant from the MacArthur Foundation, the Kazan Human Rights Center, for example, bought a small house that it rented out to raise funds.¹⁴³ The AGORA Association set up a small online news agency, which brings in approximately $10,000 a year. While such activities have provided immediate relief, they barely cover core organizational costs and require a significant time investment.¹⁴⁴

The anticorruption activist Alexei Navalny was among the first to use crowdfunding techniques to fund his anticorruption organization. In late 2011 and early 2012, the organizers of antiregime protests also successfully raised money online to pay for their logistical needs and equipment. Most civil society organizations have struggled to reach similarly large audiences. Smaller NGOs operating beyond the major cities still cannot rely on crowdfunding as a reliable source of income.¹⁴⁵ These fund-raising efforts nevertheless represent a significant shift in approach for a human rights community that had for any years been heavily dependent on external funding.¹⁴⁶

New Organizational Models

Given the hostile legal environment, there has been a considerable push among Russian activists to abandon the traditional NGO model in favor of other organizational structures that allow for greater flexibility and reduced government scrutiny. A number of organizations have transitioned to for-profit activities to subsidize their advocacy work. This model is particularly attractive to lawyers, who can provide paid legal services while continuing to engage in pro bono activities that advance human rights causes. Other NGOs have used the fact that the foreign agents law does not apply to commercial entities to their advantage: they have created subsidiary branches that they register as commercial entities, which has allowed them to continue receiving foreign grants.¹⁴⁷

As government pressure has increased, more groups have decided to give up their official status and continue operating as unregistered or volunteer-based associations.¹⁴⁸ For example, after the Freedom of Information Foundation was designated a foreign agent in August 2014, lawyers from the organization regrouped as Team 29 and continued pursuing their work as a nonregistered association. The group also maintains a registered entity abroad.¹⁴⁹ Similarly, the AGORA Association formally shut down after being labeled a foreign agent, but its former employees still provide legal assistance and engage in human rights monitoring activities.¹⁵⁰ Shifting to a nonregistered status of course brings new challenges: it inhibits cooperation with public authorities, restricts other activities such as publishing, and often makes fund-raising more difficult. For example, most foreign donors have policies that prohibit them from funding nonregistered groups. The movement toward more informal organizational structures has coincided with the emergence of citizen-led grassroots initiatives across many parts of the country. The latter tend to focus on local problems and do not necessarily have a larger political or human rights agenda.¹⁵¹ Yet the unexpectedly large March 2017 anticorruption protests that took place in cities across the country also indicate that the Internet continues to serve as a key mobilizing tool for younger generations of Russians—and that the latter remain invested in their country’s broader political trajectory.¹⁵²

International Responses

When the Russian government first moved to restrict civil society activities, U.S. and European governments exerted high-level diplomatic pressure, securing limited tactical victories. As democratic backsliding in Russia accelerated, U.S. policymakers split into two main camps: those who believed human rights and democracy to be central to a productive working relationship with Moscow and those who argued that cooperation should proceed along issues of mutual interest in spite of Russia’s domestic political trajectory. Attempting to forge a middle road, the administration of former U.S. president Barack Obama asserted that continued engagement would be more effective at pushing for greater civic space than open confrontation. On the European side, diverging strategic and commercial interests hindered a unified approach—despite significant economic leverage. Beginning with Putin’s return to power in 2012, the United States and its European partners struggled to respond to Russia’s increasingly assertive stance. In the years that followed, foreign policy crises overshadowed Russia’s domestic politics—even as the domestic crackdown accelerated.

When the Russian government first moved to restrict civil society activities, U.S. and European governments exerted high-level diplomatic pressure, securing limited tactical victories.

High-Level Pressure Against the 2006 NGO Law

The U.S. foreign policy community reacted strongly to Putin’s first proposal for a new NGO law in 2005–2006. In November 2005, at a meeting on the sidelines of the economic summit of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in South Korea, former president George W. Bush discussed his concerns about the draft law with Putin.¹⁵³ Then secretary of state Condoleezza Rice raised the issue directly with Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov, as did the U.S. ambassador in Moscow. At the time, the U.S-Russian relationship was already strained by the U.S. intervention in Iraq and Western support for the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. The Bush administration faced increasing domestic pressure to raise human rights concerns with its Russian counterparts. The U.S. Congress had passed a resolution denouncing the Russian NGO bill.¹⁵⁴ Two former vice presidential candidates, Republican Jack Kemp and Democrat John Edwards, had written a public letter expressing their concern.¹⁵⁵

Russian authorities initially signaled their responsiveness to high-level international pushback. Lavrov underscored that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had helped improve the draft bill to accommodate U.S. and European criticism. Putin himself suggested that the State Duma soften some of the law’s particularly harsh provisions.¹⁵⁶ On December 23, 2005, the State Duma approved the NGO bill, taking into account Putin’s recommendations. However, the final version failed to address key concerns raised by a Council of Europe expert review.¹⁵⁷ Putin signed the bill in secrecy on January 10, 2006, while hosting German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who had previously denounced the proposed legislation.¹⁵⁸ During her visit, Merkel continued to raise the issue both publicly and privately, noting the many objections to the law and emphasizing that Germany would closely monitor its implementation. She also set herself apart from her predecessor Gerhard Schröder by meeting with representatives of independent human rights organizations. The formal announcement of the law was published in the government’s official gazette without fanfare the following week, suggesting that Putin had wanted to avoid drawing further international attention to the measure.¹⁵⁹

Continued Engagement

Considerable uncertainty surrounded implementation of the NGO law. Russian government officials repeatedly reassured Western leaders that there would be no major drive to shut down independent NGOs and that the law would be implemented with minimum impact on civil society activities. Initial developments indeed suggested that Russian authorities were not as serious about enforcement as some activists had feared. Western governments nevertheless continued exerting pressure behind the scenes. U.S. officials used the July 2006 G8 Summit in St. Petersburg to press for the re-registration of prominent advocacy groups and urged Russian authorities to allow independent poll watchers to observe local elections—with little success.¹⁶⁰

At the same time, the United States and its European allies struggled to define their broader relations with Russia in light of Putin’s increasing authoritarianism. Several U.S. legislators called on Bush to boycott the G8 Summit to protest the Kremlin’s clampdown on dissent.¹⁶¹ Within the administration, former U.S. vice president Dick Cheney was the leading voice pressing for a more confrontational approach. At a conference of regional democratic leaders in Lithuania, he asserted that the Russian government had “unfairly and improperly restricted” the rights of Russian citizens and warned that the government’s counterproductive actions “could begin to affect relations with other countries.”¹⁶²

However, Bush sided with others in the administration who argued that it would be more effective to continue engaging the Russian leadership in private, particularly given the need for Russian cooperation on issues such as the Iranian nuclear crisis, energy security, and North Korea.¹⁶³ While Cheney’s statements signaled a clear shift in tone in Washington, there was also a widespread sense within the Bush administration that rising oil prices had diminished U.S. leverage and that direct confrontation with Moscow would most likely backfire. White House officials pointed to Bush’s behind-the-scenes pressure concerning the NGO law as evidence that an understated approach would be more effective at advancing U.S. interests.¹⁶⁴ However, in the two years that followed, escalating disagreements over missile defense in Europe, NATO enlargement, and Russia’s war with Georgia led to an almost complete breakdown of communications between the two countries.¹⁶⁵

On the European side, diverging strategic interests complicated a unified approach. Given Russia’s role as a primary energy provider and trading partner, many member states remained reluctant to subordinate their energy and commercial interests to human rights concerns—despite the push for greater European assertiveness by new member states of the European Union (EU) such as Poland and Lithuania.¹⁶⁶ Germany—Russia’s most significant European partner—had traditionally favored a nonconfrontational approach. The election of Merkel brought about a greater willingness to raise human rights issues with Russia’s leadership; she notably confronted Putin over the clampdown on pro-democracy protesters at the EU-Russia summit in May 2007.¹⁶⁷ However, the German government’s overarching policy did not change, and as Portugal assumed the EU presidency in the second half of the year, those advocating for closer cooperation with the Kremlin regained the upper hand.¹⁶⁸ In the absence of strategic agreement, formal policy consultations on human rights issues remained decoupled from high-level EU-Russia summits and therefore proved largely toothless.¹⁶⁹

A U.S. Dual-Track Approach

In 2008, the elections of Obama in the United States and Medvedev in Russia brought a brief thaw in U.S.-Russia relations, which had reached a low point toward the end of Bush’s second term. Both sides expressed their commitment to forging a new pragmatic partnership centered on shared interests in Afghanistan, Iran, and other places. The creation of the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission—which included a working group on civil society—heralded the beginning of enhanced bilateral cooperation. Those following the human rights situation within Russia hoped that the election of a more reform-minded Russian president would open up new opportunities for partnerships between Russian and Western civil society organizations.

Rather than making joint action on issues such as a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty conditional on human rights progress, the United States chose to collaborate with Russia on specific policy challenges while also reaching out to Russian civil society organizations.

During Obama’s first term, the United States embarked on a dual-track approach toward Russia. Rather than making joint action on issues such as a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty conditional on human rights progress, the United States chose to collaborate with Russia on specific policy challenges while also reaching out to Russian civil society organizations.¹⁷⁰ Obama considered U.S. finger-wagging to have been ineffective in the past and emphasized the need for greater pragmatism and increased peer-to-peer interaction among Russian and U.S. citizens and NGOs.¹⁷¹ His July 2009 visit to Moscow epitomized the administration’s new approach:¹⁷² At his meetings with Putin and Medvedev, Obama emphasized his desire to “listen rather than lecture,” repeatedly signaling that he recognized Russia’s resentment of American scolding. At the same time, he met with opposition figures and expressed his support of freedoms of expression and assembly at a civil society summit with Russian human rights organizations, which Medvedev chose not to attend.

While collaboration on security and nuclear issues initially moved forward, progress on human rights issues stalled. Rather than fundamentally revising the Russian government’s approach to civil society, Medvedev warded off domestic and international pressure by implementing a series of largely cosmetic reforms, often in advance of high-level U.S. visits. For example, he revived the Presidential Council for Civil Society and Human Rights, bringing in several opposition leaders and human rights activists, and tasked a newly announced working group on noncommercial organizations with developing amendments to the 2006 NGO law.¹⁷³ The amendments, approved shortly before Obama’s first official visit to Russia, turned out to be relatively minor: they relaxed registration and reporting requirements for smaller organizations and reduced the frequency of government audits.¹⁷⁴ The Obama administration’s dual-track approach thus attracted a fair amount of criticism, with some arguing that the United States had abandoned Russia’s democracy activists for the sake of closer strategic cooperation with the Kremlin.¹⁷⁵

Uncertainty in the Face of Russian Assertiveness

The U.S. approach was put to the test when the Russian government began cracking down on internal dissent following the 2011–2012 protest movement and Putin’s return to the presidency. During his 2012 presidential campaign, Putin repeatedly accused the United States of funding Russian protesters—going as far as suggesting that then secretary of state Hillary Clinton had instigated unrest in the country.¹⁷⁶ The United States remained muted in its public response, but collaboration between the two countries lost momentum. When news of the foreign agents law broke to the international community, Western governments and multilateral institutions issued statements of concern. A group of UN independent experts urged the Russian government not to adopt the legislation.¹⁷⁷ Catherine Ashton, the EU’s high representative for foreign affairs at the time, noted that she was “highly concerned” about the proposed bill and asserted that it could not be compared to “any legislation or practice existing in the EU or the U.S.”¹⁷⁸ A representative of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe—of which Russia is a member—traveled to Moscow for meetings with the justice minister and prosecutor general to voice the council’s concern about the restrictive measures.¹⁷⁹

However, in contrast to 2006, Russian leaders showed little receptiveness to international criticism and publicly denounced any such pressure. Over the course of 2011 and 2012, a series of international developments—including the U.S.-supported overthrow of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi in Libya—had led Russian authorities to view the Obama administration’s foreign policy with increasing suspicion and to question the value of continued cooperation.¹⁸⁰ In addition, the Kremlin was reacting against a protest movement that it viewed as at least partly driven by Western assistance and as a significant domestic threat. When the U.S. Department of State voiced “deep concern” about the NGO law, it was promptly rebuked by the Kremlin for “gross interference” in Russia’s internal affairs.¹⁸¹

The expulsion of USAID in September 2012 highlighted the Obama administration’s uncertainty about how best to counter the Kremlin’s increasing assertiveness without triggering further escalation. Once again, the two main policy options seemed to be to either isolate Russia and, in all likelihood, trigger further antagonism or to continue frosty cooperation along shared interests. The Obama administration opted for the second approach, responding with a muted statement that was careful not to criticize Russia directly. Former state department spokesperson Victoria Nuland noted that the decision to receive U.S. assistance was “a sovereign decision that any country makes” and emphasized areas of continued U.S.-Russia cooperation.¹⁸²

At the time, Obama—in the midst of his reelection campaign—faced significant domestic pressure to prove the success of his administration’s Russia policy. The Kremlin’s increasing anti-American rhetoric had reinforced the U.S. Republican Party’s view that Obama’s pragmatic approach had been profoundly misguided and that tougher action was needed.¹⁸³ While Obama tried to downplay tensions with Moscow, U.S.-Russian relations continued to deteriorate—particularly after the U.S. Congress passed the Magnitsky Act, which imposed sanctions on several Russian officials implicated in human rights violations.¹⁸⁴

A Divided European Approach

Despite concerns over the accelerating crackdown on dissent within Russia, the EU remained divided over its Russia policy. In contrast to the U.S.-Russian relationship, the European-Russian relationship has deep economic roots, and there is a significant group of private sector actors with high stakes in preserving close commercial ties.¹⁸⁵ As a result, key member states were concerned that using the EU’s economic leverage to exert pressure on Russia would trigger retaliatory measures.¹⁸⁶ At the first EU-Russia summit after Putin’s reelection, EU leaders were eager to highlight Russia’s importance as a trade partner and avoided discussions of the foreign agents law and other controversial issues.¹⁸⁷ Instead, visa-free travel negotiations and trade continued to dominate EU-Russian negotiations, even as political relations deteriorated.

The European Parliament repeatedly urged the European Council to follow the U.S. example and impose visa restrictions and asset freezes on a select list of Russian officials involved in human rights violations—but the proposal failed to garner sufficient political support among member states.¹⁸⁸ High representative Ashton refused to take up the issue, noting that the bloc had already voiced its concerns over human rights with Russian counterparts.¹⁸⁹ Bilateral initiatives such as the Russian-German Petersburg Dialogues, set up by Schröder and Putin in the early 2000s, proceeded with almost no discussion of human rights concerns—despite pressure from Merkel to change the nature of the forum.¹⁹⁰ The lack of European unity and assertiveness frustrated civil society activists in Russia and Europe, who argued that European leaders underestimated their leverage over the Russian government.

Despite European disunity over economic or political conditionality, several European governments faced increasing domestic pressure to stand up to the Russian government. For example, the German Parliament in November 2012 passed a resolution condemning Putin’s internal crackdown and demanding a tougher European stance.¹⁹¹ German concerns grew in early 2013 as Russian authorities launched the first wave of NGO inspections, which targeted several German political foundations and German-funded groups.¹⁹² Former foreign minister Guido Westerwelle expressed his concern about the inspections to the Russian embassy in Berlin, noting that any further measures to hinder the activities of German foundations could “inflict lasting damage on bilateral relations.”¹⁹³ At a joint news conference in April 2013, Merkel publicly confronted Putin on the foreign agents law, calling the NGO raids “a disruption and an intrusion” and emphasizing that a “vibrant civil society can only exist when [. . .] individual organizations can work without fear or concern.” Her statement reflected Germany’s greater willingness to speak publicly against the Russian government. Yet it provoked little response by the Kremlin.¹⁹⁴

A New Low Point

At the same time that Russian authorities began vigorously implementing the foreign agents law in 2013 and 2014, relations between Russia and Western governments reached a new low point. Faced with a newly assertive Russian foreign policy, U.S. and European leaders rushed to respond to a series of geopolitical crises—from the Russian annexation of Crimea and intervention in eastern Ukraine to the ongoing conflict in Syria. As a result, the domestic crackdown within Russia often took a back seat at international summits and bilateral meetings.

European and U.S. public diplomacy nevertheless continued. Between 2012 and 2017, the European Parliament passed more than five resolutions condemning the Russian government’s restrictions on freedoms of assembly, association, and expression, in addition to broader resolutions on EU-Russian relations.¹⁹⁵ The U.S. Department of State continued to speak out against the expulsion of international and U.S. funders under the undesirable organizations law, and the EU spokesperson issued regular public statements whenever a prominent human rights organization was added to the foreign agents list. These measures may have offered limited protection to these organizations.¹⁹⁶

In addition, international efforts have centered on helping embattled Russian civil society organizations survive in a hostile environment through innovative funding mechanisms, international exchanges, and support networks. The EU continues to support Russian civil society organizations through the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) program and the Non-State Actors and Local Authorities in Development program. However, this type of assistance remains relatively limited and difficult for small organizations to access: in 2015, only four Russian NGOs received EIDHR funding.¹⁹⁷ Calls by the European Parliament to increase EU aid for Russian civil society groups have to date not been taken up by the European Commission. Other international funders have shifted to remote operations for any work related to Russia. For example, the United States (together with the Swedish and Czech governments) helped set up the Prague Civil Society Center, which supports civil society development in Russia and other countries of the former Soviet Union by providing flexible and innovative funding and establishing networks among organizations and individual activists.¹⁹⁸ These efforts aim to ensure that Russian civil society groups remain connected to international forums and partners and build their capacity to respond to potential future political openings.

Notes

⁸ Sergej Ljubownikow, Jo Crotty, and Peter W. Rodgers, “The State and Civil Society in Post-Soviet Russia: The Development of a Russian-Style Civil Society,” Progress in Development Studies 13, no. 2 (2013): 153–66.

⁹  Julie Hemment, “Nashi, Youth Voluntarism, and Potemkin NGOs: Making Sense of Civil Society in Post-Soviet Russia,” Slavic Review 71, no. 2 (Summer 2012): 234.

¹⁰ Alfred B. Evans Jr., “Vladimir Putin’s Monocentric Design” (paper presented at the Annual Conference of the Western Social Science Association, Albuquerque, NM, April 13–16, 2005).

¹¹ “Choking on Bureaucracy: State Curbs on Independent Civil Society Activism,” Human Rights Watch, February 19, 2008, https://www.hrw.org/report/2008/02/19/choking-bureaucracy/state-curbs-independent-civil-society-activism.

¹² James Richter, “The Ministry of Civil Society? The Public Chambers in the Regions,” Problems of Post-Communism 56, no. 6 (November/December 2009): 7.

¹³ Ibid., 7.

¹⁴ Tatiana Stanovaya, “The Human Rights Council Deprived of Its Rights,” Institute of Modern Russia, July 3, 2012, https://imrussia.org/en/politics/258-no-rights-left-for-the-human-rights-council.

¹⁵ Geir Flikke, “Resurgent Authoritarianism: The Case of Russia’s New NGO Legislation,” Post-Soviet Affairs 32, no. 2 (2016): 105.

¹⁶ Alfred B. Evans, Jr., “The First Steps of Russia’s Public Chamber: Representation or Coordination?,” Demokratizatsiya 16, no. 4 (Fall 2008): 346.

¹⁷ Hemment, “Nashi, Youth Voluntarism, and Potemkin NGOs,” 234.

¹⁸ Katherin Machalek, “Factsheet: Russia’s NGO Laws,” in “Contending With Putin’s Russia: A Call for American Leadership,”eds. Arch Puddington et al., Freedom House, 2013.

¹⁹ Natalia Bourjaily, “Some Issues Related to Russia’s New NGO Law,” International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law 8, no. 3 (May 2006).

²⁰ Jo Crotty, Sarah Marie Hall, and Sergej Ljubownikow, “Post-Soviet Civil Society Development in the Russian Federation: The Impact of the NGO Law,” Europe-Asia Studies 66, no. 8 (2014): 1256.

²¹ Rebecca B. Vernon, “Closing the Door on Aid,” International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law 11, no. 4 (August 2009).

²² “Choking on Bureaucracy,” Human Rights Watch.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ “Russia: Stop Harassing Election Monitors, Release Demonstrators,” Human Rights Watch, December 5, 2011, https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/12/05/russia-stop-harassing-election-monitors-release-demonstrators.

²⁵ Ellen Barry, “Rally Defying Putin’s Party Draws Tens of Thousands,” New York Times, December 10, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/11/world/europe/thousands-protest-in-moscow-russia-in-defiance-of-putin.html.

²⁶ Artemy Magun, “The Russian Protest Movement of 2011–2012: A New Middle-Class Populism,” Stasis 2, no. 1 (2014): 160–91.

²⁷ “Civic Freedom Monitor: Russia,” International Center for Not-for-Profit-Law (ICNL), last updated March 28, 2017, http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/russia.html.

²⁸ Natalya Dzhanpoladova and Claire Bigg, “Two Years On, Russian Activists Battle to Keep ‘Bolotnaya’ Case In Public Eye,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, May 6, 2014, http://www.rferl.org/a/russia-bolotnaya-case-public-eye/25375291.html; and “‘You Feel That Just Anybody Can Be Detained’—Russia’s Shrinking Space for Peaceful Protest,” Amnesty International, October 6, 2014, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2014/10/you-feel-just-anybody-can-be-detained-russia-s-shrinking-space-peaceful-protest/.

²⁹ “Civic Freedom Monitor: Russia,” ICNL.

³⁰ Emily Sherwin, “Russian NGO Memorial to Fight ‘Foreign Agent’ Label in Russia,” Deutsche Welle, October 5, 2010, http://www.dw.com/en/russian-ngo-memorial-to-fight-foreign-agent-label-in-russia/a-35965436.

³¹ “Laws of Attrition: Crackdown on Russia’s Civil Society After Putin’s Return to the Presidency,” Human Rights Watch, April 24, 2013, https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/04/24/laws-attrition/crackdown-russias-civil-society-after-putins-return-presidency.

³² Ibid.

³³ “USAID in Russia,” U.S. Agency for International Development, last updated September 18, 2012, https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/fact-sheets/usaid-russia.

³⁴ “Russia Expels USAID Development Agency,” BBC, September 19, 2012, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-19644897.

³⁵ Françoise Daucé, “The Duality of Coercion in Russia: Cracking Down on ‘Foreign Agents,’”Demokratizatsiya 23, no. 1 (2015): 64.

³⁶ “Civic Freedom Monitor: Russia,” ICNL.

³⁷ Charles Digges, “Russian NGOs Receiving Foreign Funding Greet New Law to Register as ‘Foreign Agents’ With Yawns,” Bellona, November 21, 2012, http://bellona.org/news/russian-human-rights-issues/russian-ngo-law/2012-11-russian-ngos-receiving-foreign-funding-greet-new-law-to-register-as-foreign-agents-with-yawns.

³⁸ Interview with a Russian human rights activist, November 29, 2016.

³⁹ Brian Whitmore, “The Peculiarities of the National Hunt (for Foreign Agents),” Power Vertical (blog), Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, January 16, 2013, http://www.rferl.org/a/russia-power-vertical-foreign-agents-law/24840173.html.

⁴⁰ “Will Russia Play Tough With Its ‘Foreign Agent’ Law?,” Economist, May 28, 2013, http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2013/03/russian-politics.

⁴¹ Whitmore, “The Peculiarities of The National Hunt.”

⁴² “Russia: Constitutional Court Upholds ‘Foreign Agents’ Law,” Human Rights Watch, April 8, 2014, https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/04/08/russia-constitutional-court-upholds-foreign-agents-law.

⁴³ “Laws of Attrition,” Human Rights Watch; and Daucé, “The Duality of Coercion in Russia,” 67.

⁴⁴ “Will Russia Play Tough,” Economist.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Daucé, “The Duality of Coercion in Russia,” 65.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 67–68.

⁴⁸ “Russia: A Year On, Putin’s ‘Foreign Agents Law’ Choking Freedom,” Amnesty International, November 20, 2013, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2013/11/russia-year-putin-s-foreign-agents-law-choking-freedom/.

⁴⁹ “Will Russia Play Tough,” Economist.

⁵⁰ “Russian Propaganda Against Citizens’ Election Observers From Golos-Movement,” European Platform for Democratic Elections, http://www.epde.org/en/newsreader/items/russian-propaganda-against-citizens-election-observers-from-golos-movement-735.html.

⁵¹ Charles Digges, “NGOs Vandalized and Intimidated by Pro-Kremlin Youth Groups as New Law Takes Effect,” Bellona, November 23, 2012, http://bellona.org/news/russian-human-rights-issues/russian-ngo-law/2012-11-ngos-vandalized-and-intimidated-by-pro-kremlin-youth-groups-as-new-law-takes-effect.

⁵² “Russia’s Foreign Agent Law: Violating Human Rights and Attacking Civil Society,” Norwegian Helsinki Committee, August 27, 2014, 3.

⁵³ NGO Lawyers Club, “Russian NGOs After the Foreign Agents Law: Sustaining Civic Activism in an Adverse Setting,” Human Rights Resource Center, May 2016, http://www.hrrcenter.ru/awstats/2016NLC_report%20on%20FA_Eng.pdf.

⁵⁴ “Crackdown on Civil Society in Russia: A Brief Overview of How the ‘Foreign Agents’ and ‘Undesirable Organizations’ Laws Are Enforced in Russia,” Public Verdict Foundation, June 2016, http://en.publicverdict.org/articles_images/freedom_of_assosiation_eng_June_2016_IS.pdf, 1.

⁵⁵ Ekaterina Volosomoeva, “Valentina Cherevtenko: ‘I Am Concinced That the War Will Affect Us All,’” Open Democracy, November 17, 2016, https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/ekaterina-volosomoeva/valentina-cherevatenko-i-am-convinced-that-war-will-affect-us-all.

⁵⁶ Tanya Lokshina and Anna Sevortian, “Civic Space in Eurasia: Ideas for Change, Russia 2017,” Human Rights Watch and EU-Russia Civil Society Center, February 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/02/24/briefing-shrinking-space-civil-society-russia, 16–17.

⁵⁷ “Crackdown on Civil Society in Russia,” Public Verdict Foundation, 3.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 4.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 5.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ “Russia: Sham Upgrade for ‘Foreign Agents’ Law,” Human Rights Watch, May 27, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/05/27/russia-sham-upgrade-foreign-agents-law.

⁶² NGO Lawyers Club, “Russian NGOs After the Foreign Agents Law,” 8–9.

⁶³ Tanya Lokshina, “Russian Civil Society Deemed ‘Undesirable,’” Human Rights Watch, May 20, 2015, https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/05/20/russian-civil-society-deemed-undesirable.

⁶⁴ Aleksandr Gorbachev, “Russian Parliament Creates a ‘Patriotic Stop-List,’” Newsweek, July 7, 2015, http://www.newsweek.com/russian-parliament-creates-patriotic-stop-list-351562. As of April 2017, the registry includes the National Endowment for Democracy, Open Society Institute Assistance Foundation, Open Society Foundations, International Republican Institute, Media Development Investment Fund, U.S. Russia Foundation for Economic Advancement and the Rule of Law, and National Democratic Institute.

⁶⁵ See “List of Foreign and International Nongovernmental Organizations Whose Activity Is Recognized as Undesirable on the Territory of the Russian Federation” [in Russian], Russian Ministry of Justice, http://wwww.minjust.ru/ru/activity/nko/unwanted, accessed March 1, 2017.

⁶⁶ NGO Lawyers Club, “Secrecy of Communication VS ‘Yarovaya Package’ and Its Impact on Civic Engagement,” Human Rights Resource Center, November 28, 2016, http://www.hrrcenter.ru/awstats/2016_NLC_report-on-YAP_ENG1.pdf.

⁶⁷ Ivan Nechepurenko, “Russia Moves to Tighten Counterterror Law; Rights Activists See Threat to Freedoms,” New York Times, June 24, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/25/world/europe/russia-counterterrorism-yarovaya-law.html?_r=0.

⁶⁸ “Russia: Protesters Found Guilty in Flawed Case,” Human Rights Watch, August 18, 2014, https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/08/18/russia-protesters-found-guilty-flawed-case; and Kathy Lally, “Trial of Bolotnaya 12 Seen as a Warning Against Challenging the Kremlin,” Washington Post, October 30, 2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/trial-of-bolotnaya-12-seen-as-a-warning-against-challenging-the-kremlin/2013/10/29/5e1dec92-381f-11e3-89db-8002ba99b894_story.html?utm_term=.ff6e0c9db4cf.

⁶⁹ Volosomoeva, “Valentina Cherevtenko.”

⁷⁰ Tanya Lokshina, “Dispatches: Russian Government Targets Human Rights Giants,” Human Rights Watch, November 10, 2015, https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/11/10/dispatches-russian-government-targets-human-rights-giants.

⁷¹ Lokshina and Sevortian, “Civic Space in Eurasia,” 12.

⁷² “Russia: Harassment of Critics,” Human Rights Watch, March 1, 2012, https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/03/01/russia-harassment-critics.

⁷³ NGO Lawyers Club, “Russian NGOs After the Foreign Agents Law,” 42.

⁷⁴ “Russia: Human Rights Defender Targeted: Police Refuse to Investigate Attack,” Human Rights Watch, February 18, 2014, https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/02/18/russia-human-rights-defender-targeted.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ David M. Herszenhorn, “In Chechnya, Human Rights Group’s Offices Are Vandalized,” New York Times, June 3, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/04/world/europe/chechnya-ramzan-kadyrov-committee-against-torture.html?_r=0.

⁷⁷ The Joint Mobile Group comprises lawyers who travel to Chechnya for short periods of time to provide legal assistance to victims of human rights abuses. “Russia: Brazen Assault on Journalists and Human Rights Defenders in North Caucasus Illustrates Official Failures,” Amnesty International, March 10, 2016, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/03/russia-brazen-assault-on-journalists-and-human-rights-defenders-in-north-caucasus-illustrates-official-failures/.

⁷⁸ Freek van der Vet and Laura Lyytikäinen, “Violence and Human Rights in Russia: How Human Rights Defenders Develop Their Tactics in the Face of Danger, 2005–2013,” International Journal for Human Rights 19, no 7 (2015): 986–87.

⁷⁹ Ljubownikow, Crotty, and Rodgers, “The State and Civil Society in Post-Soviet Russia,” 162–63.

⁸⁰ Lester M. Salamon, Vladimir B. Benevolenski, and Lev. I. Jakobson, “Penetrating the Dual Realities of Government: Nonprofit Relations in Russia,” Voluntas 26, no. 6 (December 2015): 2187.

⁸¹ Olesya Zakharova, “Vladimir Putin Loves Civil Society (As Long As He Controls It),” Foreign Policy, October 12, 2016, https://www.yahoo.com/amphtml/news/vladimir-putin-loves-civil-society-152256689.html.

⁸² Moscow Times, “Orthodox Church Receives Majority of Russian Government Grants,” Johnson’s Russia List, December 22, 2015, http://russialist.org/orthodox-church-receives-majority-of-russian-government-grants/.

⁸³ Salamon, Benevolenski, and Jakobson, “Penetrating the Dual Realities of Government,” 2191.

⁸⁴ Olga Gnezdilova, “Under Attack: Freedom of Association in the Russian Federation,” Article 20, February 16, 2017, http://article20.org/ru/node/6794#.WN1iyUbyvcs.

⁸⁵ Alexander Baunov, “Going to the People—and Back Again: The Changing Shape of the Russian Regime,” Carnegie Moscow Center, January 2017, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP_292_Baunov_Russian_Regime_Web.pdf, 15.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 29.

⁸⁷ “Orthodox Church Receives Majority of Russian Government Grants,” Johnson’s Russia List.

⁸⁸ Ibid.; and NGO Lawyers Club, “Russian NGOs After the Foreign Agents Law,” 38.

⁸⁹ Andrew C. Kuchins, “Russian Democracy and Civil Society: Back to the Future” (testimony prepared for U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, February 8, 2006), http://carnegieendowment.org/files/helcommtestimony.pdf, 2.

⁹⁰ Orysia Lutsevych, “Agents of the Russian World: Proxy Groups in the Contested Neighbourhood,” Chatham House, April 2016, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/publications/research/2016-04-14-agents-russian-world-lutsevych.pdf.

⁹¹ Richter, “The Ministry of Civil Society?,” 10.

⁹² Interview with a Russian human rights activist, November 29, 2011.

⁹³ Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation, http://unro.minjust.ru/NKOForeignAgent.aspx.

⁹⁴ Crotty, Hall, and Ljubownikow, “Post-Soviet Civil Society Development in the Russian Federation,” 1260.

⁹⁵ Interview with Russian civil society expert, November 28, 2016.

⁹⁶ Gnezdilova, “Under Attack.”

⁹⁷ “Crackdown on Civil Society in Russia,” Public Verdict Foundation, 6.

⁹⁸ Gnezdilova, “Under Attack.”

⁹⁹ “The Foreign Agents Law Has Been Enforced for Four Years. The Public Verdict Foundation Summed Up the Implementation of the Law” [in Russian], Public Verdict Foundation, November 21, 2016, http://publicverdict.org/topics/news/12228.html.

¹⁰⁰ “Supreme Court of the Russian Federation Cancels 300,000 Ruble Fine for Women of the Don” [in Russian], Public Verdict Foundation, February 27, 2017, http://publicverdict.org/topics/news/12259.html.

¹⁰¹ Lokshina and Sevortian, “Civic Space in Eurasia,” 13.

¹⁰² Gnezdilova, “Under Attack.”

¹⁰³ Yana Rozhdestvenskaya et al., “NGO Funding at Risk as Pressure Increases,” Russia Beyond the Headlines, February 6, 2013, http://rbth.com/politics/2013/02/06/ngo_funding_at_risk_as_government_pressure_increases_22549.html.

¹⁰⁴ Crotty, Hall, and Ljubownikow, “Post-Soviet Civil Society Development in the Russian Federation,” 1257.

¹⁰⁵ “Russia Begins Blacklisting ‘Undesirable’ Organizations,” Amnesty International, July 28, 2015, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/07/russia-begins-blacklisting-undesirable-organizations/.

¹⁰⁶ Gnezdilova, “Under Attack.”

¹⁰⁷ NGO Lawyers Club, “Russian NGOs After the Foreign Agents Law,” 37–38.

¹⁰⁸ “Agents of the People,” Amnesty International.

¹⁰⁹ Lokshina and Servortian, “Civic Space in Eurasia.”

¹¹⁰ Interview with Russian human rights activist, November 29, 2016.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Bellona’s St. Petersburg branch was declared a foreign agent in January 2017. Interview with expert on Russian civil society, November 30, 2016.

¹¹³ Charles Digges, “Russia’s Putin Finalizes Baffling New NGO Amendments by Signing Them Into Law,” Bellona, June 6, 2016, http://bellona.org/news/russian-human-rights-issues/russian-ngo-law/2016-06-russias-putin-finalizes-baffling-new-ngo-amendments-by-signing-them-into-law.

¹¹⁴ “Russian Rights Activist: People Are Afraid to Deal With a ‘Foreign Agent,’” Civic Assistance Committee, July 21, 2016, http://refugee.ru/en/materials/russian-rights-activist-people-are-afraid-to-deal-with-a-foreign-agent/.

¹¹⁵ Gnezdilova, “Under Attack.”

¹¹⁶ Ibid.; and “Agents of the People,” Amnesty International.

¹¹⁷ Lokshina and Servortian, “Civic Space in Eurasia,” 13.

¹¹⁸ Interview with Russian human rights activist, November 29, 2016.

¹¹⁹ Lokshina and Servortian, “Civic Space in Eurasia,” 12.

¹²⁰ Amnesty International, “Agents of the People.”

¹²¹ Charles Digges, “Poll Shows Russians Spooked by ‘Foreign Agents,’” Bellona, February 16, 2017, http://bellona.org/news/russian-human-rights-issues/russian-ngo-law/2017-02-poll-shows-russians-spooked-by-foreign-agents.

¹²² Louise Hallman, “Building Bridges in Russian Civil Society,” Open Democracy, April 21, 2014, https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/louise-hallman/building-bridges-in-russian-civil-society.

¹²³ Digges, “Poll Shows Russians Spooked by ‘Foreign Agents.’”

¹²⁴ Interview with Russian human rights activist, November 29, 2016.

¹²⁵ Orsya Lutsevych, ed., “Russian Civil Society Symposium: Building Bridges to the Future”(Session Report 531, Salzburg Global Seminar, April 1–4, 2014), http://www.salzburgglobal.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Documents/2010-2019/2014/531/SalzburgGlobal_Report_531.pdf, 10.

¹²⁶ Lokshina and Servortian, “Civic Space in Eurasia,” 13.

¹²⁷ Zakharova, “Vladimir Putin Loves Civil Society.”

¹²⁸ Hallman, “Building Bridges in Russian Civil Society.”

¹²⁹ “Russia: Government vs. Rights Groups,” Human Rights Watch, April 10, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/russia-government-against-rights-groups-battle-chronicle.

¹³⁰ NGO Lawyers Club, “Russian NGOs After the Foreign Agents Law,” 23.

¹³¹ Ibid., 23.

¹³² Daria Litvinova, “Putin’s Pre-Emptive Strike: Kremlin Moves to Liquidate ‘Foreign Agents,’” Moscow Times, February 19, 2016, https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/putins-pre-emptive-strike-kremlin-moves-to-liquidate-foreign-agents-51871.

¹³³ Pavel Chikov, “Russian NGOs: The Funding Realities,” Open Democracy, February 15, 2013, https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/pavel-chikov/russian-ngos-funding-realities.

¹³⁴ Lutsevych, ed., “Russian Civil Society Symposium,” 15.

¹³⁵ Chikov, “Russian NGOs.”

¹³⁶ Polina Filippova, “Thought Paper,” in Lutsevych, ed., “Russian Civil Society Symposium,” 32.

¹³⁷ Georgi Ivanushkin, “Results of the Open Presidential NGO Grant Contest,” BEARR Trust, July 2, 2015, http://www.bearr.org/presidential-grants-competition-results/.

¹³⁸ “Report by TI-R: NGOs Receiving State Support Remain Opaque” [in Russian], Transparency International, May 25, 2015, https://transparency.org.ru/projects/prozrachnost-nko/doklad-tsentra-ti-r-poluchayushchie-gospodderzhku-nko-ostayutsya-neprozrachnymi.html.

¹³⁹ Ivanushkin, “Results of the Open Presidential NGO Grant Contest.”

¹⁴⁰ Anna Karpova, “Pavel Chikov, the Head of the Association “Agora”: The Honey Cake Offered After a Brutal Whip” [in Russian], Snob, August 22, 2013, https://snob.ru/selected/entry/64192.

¹⁴¹ Interview with Russian civil society expert, November 28, 2016.

¹⁴² Crotty, Hall, and Ljubownikow, “Post-Soviet Civil Society Development in the Russian Federation,” 1261.

¹⁴³ Chikov, “Russian NGOs.”

¹⁴⁴ Michael Allen, “Why Domestic Philanthropy Isn’t Enough for Russian NGOs,” Open Democracy, February 15, 2013, https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/michael-allen/why-domestic-philanthropy-isn’t-enough-for-russian-ngos.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Almut Rochowanski, “Funding Russian NGOs: Opportunity in a Crisis?,” Open Democracy, February 13, 2013, https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/almut-rochowanski/funding-russian-ngos-opportunity-in-crisis.

¹⁴⁷ Lyudmila Alexandrova, “Russian NGOs Look for Loopholes to Bypass Foreign Agents Law,” TASS, June 21, 2013, http://tass.com/opinions/763009.

¹⁴⁸ Interview with Russian civil society expert, November 28, 2016.

¹⁴⁹ “Rights Group of the Week: Team 29,” Rights in Russia, December 12, 2016, http://www.rightsinrussia.info/home/rights-group-of-the-week/team29-2.

¹⁵⁰ Interview with Russian human rights activist, November 29, 2016.

¹⁵¹ NGO Lawyers Club, “Russian NGOs After the Foreign Agents Law,” 54–55.

¹⁵² Roman Dobrokhotov, “Russia’s New Protest Generation,” Al Jazeera, March 29, 2017, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/03/russia-protest-generation-170329113346416.html.

¹⁵³ Peter Baker, “Bush to Query Putin on Kremlin Controls,” Washington Post, November 18, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/17/AR2005111701765.html.

¹⁵⁴ Yevgeny Volk, “Russia’s NGO Law: An Attack on Freedom and Civil Society,” Heritage Foundation, May 24, 2006, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2006/05/russias-ngo-law-an-attack-on-freedom-and-civil-society.

¹⁵⁵ Baker, “Bush to Query Putin.”

¹⁵⁶ Volk, “Russia’s NGO Law.”

¹⁵⁷ “Choking on Bureaucracy,” Human Rights Watch.

¹⁵⁸ Francesca Mereu, “Putin Quietly Signed NGO Bill Last Week,” Moscow Times, January 18, 2006, http://old.themoscowtimes.com/sitemap/free/2006/1/article/putin-quietly-signed-ngo-bill-last-week/207423.html.

¹⁵⁹ Volk, “Russia’s NGO Law.”

¹⁶⁰ Peter Baker and Peter Finn, “To Dismay of Some, Bush Takes Gentler Approach Toward Putin,” Washington Post, July 15, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/14/AR2006071401539_pf.html.

¹⁶¹ Guy Dinmore, “Bush Urged to Give Putin the Cold Shoulder,” Financial Times, May 18, 2006, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3def4476-e60a-11da-b309-0000779e2340.html?ft_site=falcon&desktop=true#axzz4dAYfx2ZS.

¹⁶² Brian Whitmore, “Russia: Expect No Showdowns at G8 Summit,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, July 14, 2006, http://www.rferl.org/a/1069847.html.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴ Baker and Finn, “To Dismay of Some.”

¹⁶⁵ Thomas Graham, U.S.-Russia Relations: Facing Reality Pragmatically (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2008), 3–4.

¹⁶⁶ Eleanor Bindman, “The EU’s Human Rights Policy in Russia: More Than Rhetoric?,” Open Democracy, September 30, 2010, https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/eleanor-bindman/eu’s-human-rights-policy-in-russia-more-than-rhetoric.

¹⁶⁷ “EU, Russia Clash Over Democracy at Volga Summit,” Deutsche Welle, May 5, 2007, http://www.dw.com/en/eu-russia-clash-over-democracy-at-volga-summit/a-2542317.

¹⁶⁸ Nikolaus von Twickel, “EU Will Not Lecture Russia, Portugal Says,” Moscow Times, July 4, 2017, http://www.pressreader.com/russia/the-moscow-times/20070704/281616710957608.

¹⁶⁹ Elena Klitsounova, “Promoting Human Rights in Russia by Supporting NGOs: How to Improve EU Strategies,” Center for European Policy Studies, April 2008, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/55298/287_Promoting%20Human%20Rights%20in%20Russia.pdf.

¹⁷⁰ Matthew Rojansky and James F. Collins, “A Reset for the U.S.-Russia Values Gap,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 30, 2010, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/russia_values_gap.pdf.

¹⁷¹ Samuel Charap, “Assessing the ‘Reset’ and the Next Steps for U.S. Russia Policy,” Center for American Progress, April 2010, https://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2010/04/pdf/russia_report.pdf, 16–17.

¹⁷² Peter Baker, “Obama Resets Ties to Russia, but Work Remains,” New York Times, July 7, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/08/world/europe/08prexy.html.

¹⁷³ “Russia: Revise NGO Law to Protect Rights,” Human Rights Watch, May 13, 2009, https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/05/13/russia-revise-ngo-law-protect-rights; and Olga Komaritskaya, “Russian President Discussed Problems with Human Rights Activists,” Human Rights House, November 23, 2009, http://humanrightshouse.org/noop/page.php?p=Articles/12593.html&d=zycmbmry.

¹⁷⁴ U.S. Embassy in Moscow, “Medvedev Sends Duma Watered-Down Amendments to NGO Law With Promise of More to Come,” WikiLeaks, June 19, 2009, https://wikileaksru.wordpress.com/2009/06/19/09moscow1620-medvedev-sends-duma-watered-down-amendments-to-ngo/.

¹⁷⁵ Charap, “Assessing the ‘Reset,’” 19.

¹⁷⁶ Max Fisher, “Russia’s Hacks Followed Years of Paranoia Toward Hillary Clinton,” New York Times, December 16, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/16/world/europe/russia-hacks-putin-hillary-clinton.html?_r=0.

¹⁷⁷ “UN Human Rights Experts Warn of Potential Damage by Russia’s Draft Law,” UN News Center, July 12, 2012, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=42457&Cr=&Cr1=#.WHk4vFUrLcs.

¹⁷⁸ “Statement by the Spokesperson of High Representative Catherine Ashton on the Amendments to the Russian NGO Law,” European Union, July 10, 2012, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/131655.pdf.

¹⁷⁹ “PACE Rapporteur Slams Russian Slander Bill as ‘Invitation to Punish’ Kremlin Critics,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, July 15, 2102, http://www.rferl.org/a/pace-rapporteur-slams-russian-slander-bill/24645905.html.

¹⁸⁰ Joby Warrick and Karen DeYoung, “From ‘Reset’ to ‘Pause’: The Real Story Behind Hillary Clinton’s Feud With Vladimir Putin,” Washington Post, November 3, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/from-reset-to-pause-the-real-story-behind-hillary-clintons-feud-with-vladimir-putin/2016/11/03/f575f9fa-a116-11e6-8832-23a007c77bb4_story.html?utm_term=.c8a169243883.

¹⁸¹ Andrey Ostroukh, “Russia’s Putin Signs NGO ‘Foreign Agents Law,’” Reuters, July 21, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-putin-ngos-idUSBRE86K05M20120721.

¹⁸² Natasha Abbakumova and Kathy Lally, “Russia Boots Out USAID,” Washington Post, September 18, 2012, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/russia-boots-out-usaid/2012/09/18/c2d185a8-01bc-11e2-b260-32f4a8db9b7e_story.html?utm_term=.bfe196ea6133.

¹⁸³ Angela Stent, “U.S.-Russia Relations in the Second Obama Administration,” Brookings Institution, December 31, 2012, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/u-s-russia-relations-in-the-second-obama-administration/.

¹⁸⁴ “Russia to Retaliate Over US Magnitsky Rights Act,” BBC, December 7, 2012, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-20638613.

¹⁸⁵ Stent, “U.S.-Russia Relations in the Second Obama Administration.”

¹⁸⁶ Eleonora Tafuro, “Can the EU Help Foster Democracy in Russia?,” FRIDE, October 2013, http://fride.org/download/PB_164_Can_the_EU_help_foster_democracy_in_Russia.pdf, 2.

¹⁸⁷ Roman Goncharenko, “EU-Russia Summit Steers Clear of Controversy,” Deutsche Welle, June 5, 2012, http://www.dw.com/en/eu-russia-summit-steers-clear-of-controversy/a-15998552.

¹⁸⁸ Andrew Osborn, “Sergei Magnitsky: European Parliament Recommends Tough Sanctions on Russian Officials,” Telegraph, December 16, 2010,http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/globalbusiness/8207690/Sergei-Magnitsky-European-Parliament-recommends-tough-sanctions-on-Russian-officials.html; and Richard Solash, “Push for Magnitsky Sanctions Intensifies in Europe,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, March 11, 2013, http://www.rferl.org/a/magnitsky-russia-europe-sanctions/24925139.html.

¹⁸⁹ “Russia and the Magnitsky Case: Europe Waits and Sees,” EuroWire, Bertelsmann Foundation, 2012, http://www.bfna.org/sites/default/files/EuroWire-Dec2012.pdf.

¹⁹⁰ Benjamin Bidder and Ralf Neukirch, “Mixed Messages From Berlin on Human Rights,” Spiegel Online, August 7, 2012, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/germany-russia-dialogue-group-silent-on-human-rights-and-pussy-riot-a-848442.html.

¹⁹¹ Matthias Schepp, “Only Dialogue Can Ease Moscow-Berlin Tensions,” Spiegel Online, November 14, 2012,http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/petersburg-dialogue-forces-russia-and-germany-to-overcome-tensions-a-867217.html.

¹⁹² Fred Weir, “Putin and Merkel Set for a Prickly Russian-German Summit?,” Christian Science Monitor, April 5, 2013, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2013/0405/Putin-and-Merkel-set-for-a-prickly-Russian-German-summit.

¹⁹³ Gareth Jones, “Germany Warns Russia Tax ‘Raids’ on NGOs May Harm Ties,” Reuters, March 26, 2013, http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-germany-russia-idUKBRE92P12G20130326.

¹⁹⁴ Melissa Eddy, “Protesters and Merkel Criticize Putin, Who Wears a Smile,” New York Times, April 8, 2013, https://mobile.nytimes.com/2013/04/09/world/europe/merkel-with-putin-at-her-side-criticizes-russia.html.

¹⁹⁵ See, for example, European Parliament Resolution of 13 September 2012 on the Political Use of Justice in Russia,” 2012/2789(RSP), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/d-ru/dv/dru_2012_0925_02_/dru_2012_0925_02_en.pdf; and European Parliament Resolution of 10 June 2015 on the State of EU-Russia Relations, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P8-TA-2015-0225+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN.

¹⁹⁶ “European Parliament Resolution on Closing Down of Memorial (Sakharov Prize 2009) in Russia,” website of Nicola Caputo, October 20, 20124, http://www.nicolacaputo.eu/eu/european-parliament-resolution-on-closing-down-of-memorial-sakharov-prize-2009-in-russia/.

¹⁹⁷ “Financial Transparency System,” European Commission, accessed April 13, 2017, http://ec.europa.eu/budget/fts/index_en.htm.

¹⁹⁸ Carothers, “The Closing Space Challenge.”

Tactics

Following a brief opening after the 2011 uprising, Egypt’s independent civil society organizations (CSOs) today face the most repressive environment in decades. Historically, autocratic governments in Egypt have selectively used civil society restrictions to ensure civic mobilization did not cross the ruling regime’s red lines. In contrast, Egypt’s new military government is using a multitude of tactics to undertake a much more comprehensive campaign to shrink civic space.

This renewed crackdown has the following features:

1. The criminalization of public dissent in the name of national security and counterterrorism.
2. The use of legal reforms and decrees to institutionalize previously extrajudicial repressive practices, close existing loopholes, and tighten security sector control over civil society.
3. Targeted harassment and defamation of Egypt’s leading human rights activists and organizations.

Legal Gray Zones and Selective Repression

A Restrictive Legal Framework

Under former president Hosni Mubarak, Egyptian civil society organizations operated in an environment of limited freedom and selective repression. The government had inherited a comprehensive system of state control over civil society established during the 1960s to limit the political and social influence of the Muslim Brotherhood, codified in the law of association (Law 32 of 1964).¹⁹⁹ Mubarak nevertheless tolerated the rapid proliferation of Egyptian civil society organizations during the 1990s, while at the same time closely monitoring and regulating their activities. In a strategy common to autocratic regimes in the region, the government relied on a mix of divide-and-rule tactics, selective enforcement of civil society laws, and unofficial security sector oversight to maintain state control over the sector.²⁰⁰

Following increasing domestic pressure in the early 2000s, the government enacted a new NGO law (Law 84 of 2002), which eased some of the worst restrictions but retained significant barriers to freedom of association. For example, the law required that all NGOs register with the Ministry of Insurance and Social Affairs, banned any civil society activities that threaten national unity or violate public order or morality, and prohibited groups from receiving foreign funding without advance approval.²⁰¹ It also gave government agencies high discretionary authority to deny funding applications for unwanted projects and dissolve those organizations that crossed the regime’s red lines. The State Security Investigations Sector of the Ministry of Interior regularly vetted NGO applications and operations, though it lacked the formal authority to do so.²⁰² In addition, Mubarak’s emergency powers, renewed every year following the assassination of former president Anwar Sadat in 1981, gave security forces sweeping powers to arrest, detain, and sentence anyone suspected of being a threat to public order—a powerful tool that was used to spread fear and silence prominent critics.²⁰³

Limited Expansion and Targeted Harassment

Despite this harsh legal framework, a relatively vibrant circle of NGOs emerged in the 1990s and early 2000s: between 1993 and 2011, the Egyptian NGO sector more than doubled in size.²⁰⁴ This expansion coincided with a period of economic privatization and welfare state retrenchment during which the government increasingly came to rely on civil society actors to fill the gaps left by the state.²⁰⁵ By 2011, there were approximately 30,000 officially registered civil society organizations active in Egypt—most of which focused on charitable work and service provision in areas such as health, education, and welfare.²⁰⁶

While the Mubarak regime tolerated social development groups, business associations, and state-dominated syndicates and unions, it regularly harassed civil society groups working on politically sensitive issues.²⁰⁷ Most human rights and pro-democracy organizations failed to successfully register with the government. Some operated while awaiting their formal registration approval—a process that often dragged out for months or years. Hundreds of others circumvented existing rules by registering as civil companies, law firms, or local branches of international NGOs, which allowed them to access foreign funding without ministerial approval.²⁰⁸

While the government at times seemed to turn a blind eye to these practices, the situation of many groups remained precarious. Even those that were formally registered experienced regular interference in their internal affairs and could easily be dissolved based on shaky evidence of administrative wrongdoing. The relative expansion of associational freedom throughout the 1990s and early 2000s also sharpened divisions within civil society, particularly between secularists and Islamists.²⁰⁹ Egypt’s legal framework made partnerships and informal coordination between civil society groups extremely difficult, leading to inefficiencies, duplication, and competition even among like-minded actors.²¹⁰

A Short-Lived Opening

A New Civic Awakening

Following the massive popular mobilization that led to Mubarak’s resignation in early 2011, many Egyptians expressed hope that Egypt’s beleaguered civil society would finally have the space to flourish without fear of repression. The lifting of the emergency law opened new opportunities for local and foreign NGOs to focus on political issues, such as voter registration drives and parliamentary training programs.²¹¹ International donors ramped up their funding for democracy and human rights programming. Civil society organizations played a crucial role in the subsequent transitional phase, chronicling the revolution’s progress, highlighting abuses of power, providing legal assistance, and filling the gaps created by the rapid reorganization of state structures.²¹² As Egyptian politics and society entered a state of flux, the red lines that existed under Mubarak appeared to have been erased.²¹³

The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), which assumed power after the fall of Mubarak, feared the increasing popularity of Egyptian democracy and human rights groups. Suddenly on the front line of politics, the military faced an unprecedented degree of public scrutiny. Activists began denouncing the long-standing use of military tribunals to try civilians and calling for greater civilian oversight of the military.²¹⁴ Organizations that had previously been isolated from one another joined forces to share resources and suddenly presented a united front that called on the ruling council to step down and stand trial for abuses of authority.²¹⁵ Human rights organizations attracted new funding and staff. For example, the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights grew from two dozen employees to more than seventy-five.²¹⁶

Tensions increased throughout the spring of 2011 as the new ruling authorities repeatedly ignored the demands and recommendations of civil society actors. The SCAF’s first government, under then prime minister Essam Sharaf, made some concessions to civil society, such as easing NGO registration requirements.²¹⁷ However, the Mubarak regime’s key tools of repression remained firmly in place, including the 2002 NGO law.²¹⁸ Many organizations continued experiencing delays in project and funding approvals. The state security apparatus, which had officially been disbanded with the revolution, continued to operate under the radar, exerting quiet pressure on civil society activists to let them know they were still being monitored.²¹⁹

The 2011 NGO Crisis

At the same time, the SCAF began striking back against civil society with a smear campaign that depicted activists as foreign agents set on fostering instability and upheaval.²²⁰ In doing so, the transitional authorities took advantage of the heightened nationalism and fear of instability that characterized the months following the January uprising. The United States’ announcement in early 2011 that it would allocate $65 million directly to Egyptian pro-democracy groups only provided fodder for these claims.²²¹ Egyptian officials argued that bypassing the government and giving money directly to civil society (including unregistered organizations) was an affront to national sovereignty. In July 2011, the former minister of international cooperation, Faiza Abou el-Naga, announced the establishment of a commission of inquiry tasked with investigating foreign funding of civil society groups.²²² Throughout the subsequent months, findings of the investigation were leaked to pro-government newspapers, which reported that some organizations might be prosecuted for operating illegally. In November 2011, a Cairo criminal court ordered banks to divulge all transactions on the private accounts of sixty-three human rights defenders and organizations.²²³

The transitional authorities took advantage of the heightened nationalism and fear of instability that characterized the months following the January uprising.

In December 2011, the SCAF-approved campaign against civil society reached its climax when security forces raided the offices of seventeen American, German, and Egyptian organizations, including the National Democratic Institute, Freedom House, and the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.²²⁴ The international groups were shut down, and forty-three of their employees were charged with operating and receiving foreign funds without the required license, triggering a diplomatic crisis between the Egyptian authorities and Egypt’s international partners.²²⁵ While foreign funding of Egyptian organizations had long been a highly sensitive issue in Egyptian politics, the raid represented an unprecedented move to shut down organizations that were seen as domestically threatening.

For several months, the NGO trial overshadowed the broader debate over the legal framework that would govern civil society in post-Mubarak Egypt. In early 2012, the military-appointed cabinet presented a new draft law to the Parliament that would have imposed even more draconian restrictions than the Mubarak-era law, triggering widespread protest by civil society activists.²²⁶ The Muslim Brotherhood–controlled legislature responded with a much more lenient bill, which was largely in line with international human rights standards. However, the balance of power at the time was not in the Brotherhood’s favor, and the proposal was tabled after the SCAF dissolved the lower house just before the election of former president Mohamed Morsi in June 2013.

Stalled Progress and Infighting

The Struggle Over a New Legal Regime

Morsi and his team, in power from mid-2012 to mid-2013, did little to reverse overarching repressive trends. Before coming to power, the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party had publicly condemned “all forms of politically motivated crackdowns against NGOs” and called for the “immediate lifting of restrictions on the establishment and registration” of civil society organizations.²²⁷ Many civil society leaders hoped that the Muslim Brotherhood’s own precarious status and long-running persecution would push it toward a more liberal stance.

However, following Morsi’s ascent to the presidency, the Freedom and Justice Party scrapped its push for a more progressive legal regime. Instead, prominent Brotherhood leaders echoed the military’s narrative that foreign groups were seeking to undermine Egypt’s stability.²²⁸ The Freedom and Justice Party also put forward a new draft NGO law that maintained significant restrictions on foreign funding and civil society activities more broadly.²²⁹ In particular, it proposed the formation of a coordination committee made up of the representatives of different ministries and agencies—including the security services—that would decide on all matters related to foreign funding and foreign-funded organizations. Following extensive pushback, the Morsi administration agreed to eliminate several particularly controversial provisions—such as the rule that would have treated all NGO assets as “public funds” subject to high penalties in case of misuse.²³⁰ Yet the new draft sent to the Shura Council in May 2013 nevertheless provided for strict government control over the sector.²³¹

The NGO Trial’s Chilling Effect on Civil Society

At the same time, the NGO trial set in motion by the SCAF in early 2012 continued unabated. In June 2013, all of the defendants, including seventeen U.S. citizens, were sentenced to up to five years in prison, mostly in absentia.²³² The court also ordered the closure of several implicated international NGOs. The trial had a chilling effect: Egyptian organizations began turning down foreign funding out of fear of governmental reprisals, and organizations that had embraced political work in the aftermath of the revolution returned to less controversial activities. Furthermore, many foreign donors who had invested in Egypt after the revolution froze their politically related activities or chose to withdraw from Egypt entirely, and they became more cautious about disclosing their activities in the country (See Figure 5).²³³

Throughout this period, nongovernmental groups struggled to register with the Ministry of Social Solidarity (previously the Ministry of Insurance and Social Affairs), and groups waited for months to get the green light even for relatively uncontroversial health and education projects.²³⁴ Large parts of Egyptian civil society grew increasingly frustrated with Morsi’s intransigent leadership style and the lack of meaningful avenues for political participation. New civic actors emerged that openly turned against the government—supported by the security apparatus behind the scenes. A wide range of NGOs, business leaders, and political forces encouraged Egyptians to join forces against Morsi and even supported the military’s takeover in early July 2013.²³⁵ Many secular leaders hoped that a new compromise with the military would finally bring about the governance infrastructure needed to enable greater pluralism and organized civic participation.²³⁶

Resurgent Authoritarianism

After two years of relative flux and uncertainty, the military’s intervention represented a clear return of the ancien régime to the fore of Egyptian politics. The new authorities moved quickly to reassert state control over civil society. Since then, the crackdown on Egyptian civil society has taken on a different character, in both breadth and intensity.

The Post-Coup Criminalization of Public Dissent

The military’s initial crackdown targeted the Muslim Brotherhood and Morsi’s key political constituencies, which represented the most immediate political threat. In the year following Morsi’s ouster, more than 40,000 people were arrested on political grounds.²³⁷ After a summer marked by direct violence against pro-Morsi protesters, the Cairo Court for Urgent Matters in September 2013 banned all activities by the Muslim Brotherhood and ordered the freezing of its assets.²³⁸ Four months later, the military-backed government officially designated the Islamist movement as a terrorist organization.²³⁹ This decree has since been used to shut down hundreds of charities and nongovernmental organizations, often with little evidence of actual ties to the Muslim Brotherhood.²⁴⁰

However, it quickly became clear that the government’s campaign of repression extended beyond the Muslim Brotherhood, also targeting an ever-widening range of journalists, activists, and protesters under the pretext that they threaten public order or national security. In November 2013, interim president Adly Mansour issued a new law “organizing the right to public meetings, processions and peaceful demonstrations” (often referred to as the protest law), which granted security services the power to cancel or postpone any demonstration based on “serious information or evidence” regarding security threats.²⁴¹ The law’s vague language facilitated a de facto ban on street protests—a highly effective political tool widely used since the January 2011 uprising. It also gave security services free rein to use violence against protesters and arbitrarily prohibit demonstrations in front of public institutions and facilities. Since its enactment, the law has played a key role in the clampdown on student protests and the detention and prosecution of thousands of Egyptians, including several high-profile activists.²⁴² An October 2014 presidential decree further placed large parts of Egypt’s civilian infrastructure under army jurisdiction, which means that anyone demonstrating outside of a civilian government building without permission can be tried in military court.²⁴³

New Efforts to Regulate Civil Society

Since Sisi’s election in 2014, Egyptian authorities have also initiated new efforts to regulate and weaken organized civil society. First, the state media’s campaign against civil society continued in full force, with pro-Sisi outlets claiming that various NGOs were allied with terrorists or working on behalf of foreign powers to divide the country along sectarian lines.²⁴⁴ Pro-government television channels regularly accused NGOs of acting as spies or secretly supporting the Muslim Brotherhood and depicted both domestic and international advocacy groups as national security threats.²⁴⁵

Rather than waiting for a new NGO law to pass, shortly after Sisi’s election, the government ordered all nongovernmental groups to reregister under the existing NGO law within forty-five days or risk being shut down and prosecuted.²⁴⁶ This ultimatum specifically targeted those organizations that had operated under the Mubarak regime by avoiding formal registration or registering as law firms, limited liability companies, or medical clinics. While government officials argued that the deadline would help ensure greater transparency in NGO financing and operations, activists feared further mass closures and prosecutions such as the ones initiated in late 2011.²⁴⁷ Rights groups were united in protesting the decree, arguing that registration would force them to give up their independence and allow the ministry to freeze their programs at any time.²⁴⁸ Faced with local and international pushback, Egyptian authorities initially agreed to extend the deadline and ultimately did not enforce the ultimatum.²⁴⁹ As a result, many groups have remained in legal limbo, vulnerable to future enforcement efforts.

At the same time, Sisi moved to institutionalize further foreign funding restrictions. In September 2014, he issued an amendment to Article 78 of the penal code that banned the receipt of foreign funding for any activity deemed harmful to “national interests” or “compromising national unity” and imposed life sentences for noncompliance.²⁵⁰ While the law was nominally aimed at Islamist terrorists, human rights defenders noted that its vague definition of national interests could easily be used to target any foreign-funded civil society organization, thereby essentially voiding their right to receive foreign funding. The decree was particularly worrisome for human rights defenders who had made it their primary task to defend those wrongfully accused of violent extremism and to document state abuses committed in the name of counterterrorism—activities that under the amendment could easily be prosecuted as acts of terrorism themselves. In this climate of legal uncertainty, and suddenly facing the prospect of severe criminal penalties, many human rights advocates left the country in fear of harassment and prosecution.²⁵¹

Legal and Extralegal Harassment of Human Rights Activists

Over the past two years, Egyptian authorities have proceeded to gradually undermine prominent human rights organizations using legal and administrative tools as well as extralegal harassment. Since 2013, a clear repertoire of repression has taken shape, consisting of the stifling of NGO operations through bureaucratic hurdles and delays, funding restrictions, raids and interrogations, asset freezes, travel bans, digital attacks, and—in the most extreme cases—office closures and criminal charges. The government’s pattern has been one of gradual and unpredictable escalation, which has created an atmosphere of heightened fear and uncertainty among activists.

Most notably, the Sisi administration has revived Case 173, which targets forty-one of Egypt’s most well-known human rights organizations.²⁵² The case has its origins in the 2011 NGO raids and subsequent trial. At the time, only foreign NGO workers and Egyptian employees of international organizations were charged and convicted, whereas the case against the Egyptian organizations was put on hold. Since 2015, Egyptian authorities have initiated a new wave of raids, interrogations, asset freezes, and travel bans in relation to the case. In September 2016, a criminal court issued an order to freeze the personal assets of five prominent human rights advocates and three NGOs: the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, the Hisham Mubarak Law Center, and the Egyptian Center for the Right to Education.²⁵³ Four months later, women’s rights advocate Azza Soliman became the first to be arrested in connection to the case—a few weeks after authorities had frozen her personal and organizational assets and prevented her from traveling abroad.²⁵⁴ In another escalatory move, Egyptian police in February 2017 shut down the El Nadeem Center for Rehabilitation of Victims of Violence.²⁵⁵ Egyptian authorities seem to view Case 173 as an effective tool to gradually increase the pressure on prominent activists and disrupt their work. An Egyptian judicial committee has imposed a gag order that prevents all local media outlets from reporting on the case.²⁵⁶

Instituting travel bans has emerged as a prominent tactic to stifle the work of human rights defenders. Between June 2014 and November 2016, Egyptian security services imposed at least eighty-four travel bans against lawyers, academics, and activists.²⁵⁷ Whereas in the past travel bans could only be applied pursuant to a court order, they now seem to serve as arbitrary sanctions, often imposed without officially declared reasons.²⁵⁸ In at least three cases, NGO workers who challenged their travel bans had their cases rejected in court.²⁵⁹ In addition, foreign researchers, human rights investigators, and staff of international organizations have been prevented from entering the country.²⁶⁰

Egyptian officials have also scaled up threats, interrogations, and detentions of human rights activists and other NGO workers, often on spurious charges. In one particularly stark example, security officials raided the house of the mother and brother of human rights lawyer Mohamed Ramadan and held them as hostages to force Ramadan to turn himself in.²⁶¹ Many others have been arrested and convicted under the protest law. For example, Yara Sallam, an officer at the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, and Sanaa Seif, a student activist and member of No to Military Trials for Civilians, were sentenced to three years in prison for participating in an unauthorized demonstration.²⁶² More recently, Egyptian prosecutors summoned several organizations to question them about their financial activities, following a joint report compiled by various government agencies that accused more than twenty human rights groups of tax evasion and money laundering.²⁶³ Researchers at the University of Toronto and the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights have also uncovered a large-scale phishing operation targeting the digital communications of seven prominent human rights NGOs—all of which are also involved in Case 173.²⁶⁴ The timing and sophistication of the attacks suggest government involvement—in line with the Sisi administration’s effort to boost its surveillance capacities.

Increase in Enforced Disappearances

Since the appointment of Magdy Abdel Ghaffar as minister of the interior in early 2015, another pattern of repression has gained prominence: the enforced disappearance and extrajudicial detention of suspected dissidents, students, and activists. Instead of being charged in the formal legal system, Egyptians are increasingly disappearing into secretive detention facilities, where they are often held incommunicado for weeks or months without legal protection.²⁶⁵ Prosecutors often rely on so-called confessions obtained during such disappearances to convict defendants under the penal code or the counterterrorism law.²⁶⁶ According to data collected by the group Freedom for the Brave, more than 160 people were kidnapped between early April and June 2015 alone.²⁶⁷ The Egyptian Commission for Rights and Freedoms documented 187 cases of enforced disappearances between August and November 2016, whereas the El Nadeem Center for Rehabilitation of Victims of Violence counted 110 cases in February 2017.²⁶⁸

Instead of being charged in the formal legal system, Egyptians are increasingly disappearing into secretive detention facilities, where they are often held incommunicado for weeks or months without legal protection.

While the government points to the threat of terrorism, the primary aim of these disappearances seems to be to intimidate anyone likely to speak out against government policies.²⁶⁹ Targets have included suspected Muslim Brotherhood members, but also the April 6 Youth Movement and other liberal activists, journalists, lawyers, and citizens that simply got caught in the security services’ web. Egyptian authorities to date have not targeted prominent human rights defenders. However, those who document enforced disappearances, torture, and other security force abuses seem to be particularly at risk. For example, human rights lawyer and researcher Mohamed Sadek went missing for three months before reappearing before state security prosecutors in late November 2016.²⁷⁰ Sadek had himself been involved in investigating cases of enforced disappearance. Similarly, two researchers of the Egyptian Commission for Rights and Freedoms—which had launched a “stop enforced disappearances” campaign—have been detained and charged for terrorism offenses.²⁷¹ The three-month state of emergency—instituted following an ISIS bombing of two Coptic Christian churches in April 2017—will likely provide further legal cover for these practices.²⁷²

Institutionalizing Repression

The Sisi government has taken several steps to further institutionalize previously extrajudicial practices. First, it has effectively exploited terrorist threats and rising violence by nonstate actors to legalize its prosecution of political opponents and critics. In February 2015, Sisi issued a law for “organizing lists of terrorist entities and terrorists” that conflates any “breaches of the public order” as defined by the state with terrorist activities.²⁷³ Once again, the use of vague legal concepts opens the door for civil society organizations, activists, and political parties to be included on the list of terrorists and terrorist entities. This law was ratified during the first parliamentary session in early 2016 without revisions or discussion, along with the new protest law and the amendments to the penal code, thus showcasing the Parliament’s subservience to the executive. In addition, Sisi in August 2015 approved a second antiterrorism law, which imposes fines for spreading “false” reports on terrorist attacks or anti-terror operations and protects law enforcement from accountability for abuses.²⁷⁴ In a clear example of the judiciary’s broad application of these laws, an Egyptian criminal court in January 2017 designated 1,538 citizens as terrorists for allegedly assisting the Muslim Brotherhood.²⁷⁵ The designation entails a travel ban, asset freeze, passport cancellation, and the loss of political rights. The law makes no provision for the affected individuals to contest the evidence presented against them.

Second, the Egyptian House of Representatives in November 2016 also approved a new NGO law to replace Law 84 of 2002 with virtually no parliamentary debate.²⁷⁶ The new law represents the toughest iteration of any draft NGO law to date. It limits civil society organizations’ work to “development and social objectives,” which are not defined any further in the legislation; prohibits “harmful” activities (also not defined); and introduces hefty fines and jail terms of up to five years for noncompliance. It also formalizes security agencies’ oversight over civil society funding and activities and bans NGOs from “interfering” with professional syndicates and labor unions, thereby disrupting the links between nongovernmental groups and the wider net of interest-based advocacy associations. Activists have warned that if implemented, the law will effectively eliminate independent civil society. However, as of April 2017, the new legislation is yet to be ratified by the president, and its future remains uncertain.²⁷⁷

In another shift away from overt repression toward more sophisticated tactics, Egyptian authorities in late 2016 began stripping the protest law of some of its harshest provisions—without changing its fundamentally repressive logic. In December 2016, the Supreme Constitutional Court struck down Article 10 of the law, which had required protesters to obtain ministerial approval before holding a rally, while upholding the notification requirement and other highly restrictive provisions.²⁷⁸ The House of Representatives approved an amended version of the bill, which now requires security services to obtain judicial authorization before banning or postponing a protest.²⁷⁹ However, these amendments in all likelihood will not facilitate greater civic mobilization. Instead, they allow the regime to maintain the appearance of reform—while tightening state control over the public sphere in other ways.²⁸⁰ The Sisi regime has already taken several steps to extend its authority over the judiciary, including forcibly retiring dissenting judges and proposing legislative amendments that would curtail judicial independence.²⁸¹ Egypt’s judiciary in the past served as an important ally for Egyptian civil society activists and often acted as bulwark against state repression.²⁸² However, since Sisi’s ascent to power in 2013, many Egyptian judges have repeatedly prioritized public order and security over human rights concerns.²⁸³ In addition, the antiterrorism law and state of emergency provisions could easily be used to criminalize and crack down on protest in moments of crisis. The government has also quietly bolstered its efforts to intercept encrypted Internet communications and acquire technology that would enable greater citizen surveillance.²⁸⁴

Drivers

The crackdown on Egyptian civil society can broadly be divided into two phases: (1) the 2011–2013 transition years that encompassed both SCAF rule and the Muslim Brotherhood’s brief stint in power and (2) the post-2013 return of military rule. The key driver of civil society repression throughout this period has been the attempt by various ruling authorities to reconsolidate power following the January 2011 uprising and insulate themselves from future antiregime mobilization. However, the incentives and motives of the chief actors and institutions have evolved over time.

Persistence of the Old Order

While the January 2011 uprising unsettled power relationships in the country, it failed to displace the central actors and institutions of the Mubarak regime that had little interest in liberalizing the public sphere. The revolution had been the product of disparate sociopolitical forces: both Islamists and non-Islamists had mobilized against corruption and repression, but the military establishment (led by the SCAF) had aimed to replace some of Mubarak’s policies while maintaining key elements of the status quo.²⁸⁵ In particular, the SCAF sought to ensure the military’s continued autonomy from and dominance over civilian politics. In the months following the transition, Egypt’s increasingly vocal civil society—which, for the first time, directly challenged Egypt’s coercive apparatus—represented a clear threat to the power of Egypt’s security services. As a result, the SCAF had little interest in acquiescing to greater civil society autonomy.²⁸⁶

Institutional continuity also partly explains the lack of progress for civil society during Morsi’s brief tenure. Egypt’s military and intelligence services—which relied on intimidation and repression as standard operating procedures over the past six decades—retained significant power behind the scenes.²⁸⁷ Many parts of the state bureaucracy remained virtually unchanged and continued to shape state policy vis-à-vis civil society, despite significant power struggles within specific institutions such as the judiciary.²⁸⁸ Institutional incentives played an important role: for those in the Ministry of Social Solidarity, monitoring and control of civil society represented their entire raison d’être. In addition, Morsi himself had little interest in pushing for greater civil society liberalization once in power. Not only did he need to carefully calibrate his relationship with the military, but he also knew that significant parts of civil society were opposed to the Muslim Brotherhood’s agenda. Morsi’s ouster brought Egypt’s military establishment back to the fore of Egyptian politics, which moved quickly to consolidate its hold on power and prevent further antiregime mobilization and fragmentation of authority.

Reshaping of Egypt’s Assistance Relationships

The transition period also left in place a number of Egyptian policymakers who had long wanted to reshape Egypt’s relationship with international donors. Faiza Abou el-Naga, the former minister of planning and international cooperation, had been a strong advocate for giving Egyptian authorities greater control over aid allocation under Mubarak and often denounced what she perceived as foreign meddling in the country’s internal affairs.²⁸⁹ For Naga and other senior figures, the sudden influx of civil society assistance following Mubarak’s departure underscored the urgency of the issue—particularly since most of this funding was intended for what they considered illegal democracy promotion activities.²⁹⁰ Naga and her allies seized on the opportunity to launch an investigation into the external funding of nonregistered organizations that eventually led to the 2011 NGO raids and trial.²⁹¹ The focus on foreign interference played well with the interim government and with the SCAF, which could bolster its internal legitimacy by arousing nationalist sentiments and blaming external foes for the difficulties of the transition period. It also resonated with the Egyptian public, as suspicions of foreign interference and concerns about Egypt’s dependence on the West are deeply engrained in Egyptian society.²⁹² Subsequent administrations have replayed the same narrative, arguing that foreign funding for politically related civil society activities represents an affront to national sovereignty—in direct contrast to military and development aid channeled through state institutions.

Fear of Renewed Public Upheaval

Several factors explain the escalating repression since the military’s return to power in 2013. First, the nature of the ruling elite has changed, with the military and security agencies gaining dominance over the business elites that had played a key role under Mubarak.²⁹³ During the Mubarak era, the Egyptian government tried to maintain a facade of liberalism through the National Democratic Party and strategically limited the use of state violence to preserve the regime’s international and domestic alliances. In contrast, the Sisi regime relies on the need to restore order and security rather than the promise of gradual liberalization to justify its rule.²⁹⁴ Second, repression under Sisi has become more decentralized among competing security agencies, which has made it more difficult to control. Different security agencies are vying to maintain their institutional autonomy as the military is consolidating its power.²⁹⁵

Human rights groups have had to adjust to persistent attacks by downsizing or relocating their activities and shifting to more informal ways of operating.

Most importantly, the Egyptian military has learned its lessons from the January 2011 uprising and the chaotic period that followed. Having seen Mubarak’s model of partial liberalization backfire, its response has been to close off or restrict all possible avenues for opposition consolidation and citizen mobilization.²⁹⁶ Escalating repression ahead of key dates—such as the fifth anniversary of the January 25 protests—indicates that the Sisi government remains deeply paranoid about the potential for popular mobilization, partly because it believes many of its own conspiracy theories.²⁹⁷ The regime’s profound sense of insecurity is reinforced by Egypt’s continued economic and security woes, which have weakened Sisi’s popularity and highlight the regime’s lack of political vision.²⁹⁸ In this context, both extrajudicial violence and the increasing institutionalization of repression can be seen as preemptive measures to protect the regime from future vulnerabilities.

Impact

After a brief period of rapid expansion following the January 2011 uprising, Egyptian civil society has once again been weakened by state repression—although many groups continue to fight back. Human rights groups have had to adjust to persistent attacks by downsizing or relocating their activities and shifting to more informal ways of operating. The government’s persistent persecution of all Muslim Brotherhood–affiliated entities has crippled local charities, while development and humanitarian groups have struggled to access resources for their work. The sense of cohesion that characterized Egyptian civil society after the 2011 revolution has dissipated, with the exception of a close-knit circle of human rights organizations that continue to collaborate closely.²⁹⁹

Consequences of the Crackdown

A Suffocated Human Rights Community

Before the January 2011 uprising, approximately sixty Egyptian organizations were actively involved in defending human rights and political freedoms.³⁰⁰ These groups exerted significant pressure on ruling elites by issuing reports on governmental abuses, providing public commentary, and pursuing strategic litigation in the courts. Since then, funding cuts, defamation campaigns, and government interferences have significantly reduced their scope for action.³⁰¹ Similarly as in Russia, repeated raids, investigations, and interrogations have drained activists’ time and resources and disrupted their activities and strategic planning, particularly since the reopening of Case 173.³⁰² Organizations like the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, which had hoped to expand their presence across the country, have instead been forced to scale back their plans, downsize from eighty to forty staff members, and focus on key priority areas.³⁰³ Many human rights defenders have invested most of their resources into defending and advocating for those detained and convicted under Egypt’s new repressive legal regime.³⁰⁴

The pool of available resources has drastically shrunk, pushing human rights groups to raise funds at the local level. Most groups have either struggled to secure government approval for foreign funding or decided internally to no longer accept such funds due to the associated risks.³⁰⁵ Over the course of the past year, asset freezes have also prevented prominent human rights groups from paying their rent, compensating staff, and resuming their regular activities.³⁰⁶ This was the case for the Center for Egyptian Women’s Legal Assistance, which works with grassroots communities to understand the issues facing Egyptian women and advocates for gender equality at the national level. With its funding currently blocked, the organization has struggled to pay its twenty-two employees.³⁰⁷ While organizations continue to survive with the help of international and local allies, these funding restrictions have put an abrupt end to the rapid expansion of human rights work that occurred in 2011.

Another key consequence has been the human rights community’s increasing disconnect from international forums. Many rights defenders can no longer freely travel abroad to attend meetings. For example, in November 2016, three renowned women’s rights activists—Aida Seif el-Dawla, a cofounder of El Nadeem; Azza Soliman, the head of the Center for Egyptian Women’s Legal Assistance; and Ahmed Ragheb, the director of the National Community for Human Rights and Law—were banned from traveling while on their way to attend international conferences.³⁰⁸ As a result of these travel bans, cross-regional coalitions that emerged in the wake of the Arab Spring have faltered, and partnerships with international organizations have become rarer. Egyptian activists note that Egypt’s internal challenges have made it difficult to monitor rights abuses and take part in political debates in neighboring countries.³⁰⁹

Fear of harassment and prosecution has led several organizations to reorient their activities. For example, just days before Egypt’s Universal Periodic Review at the United Nations in November 2014, seven outspoken rights groups chose to withdraw from the review’s proceedings out of fear of reprisals and persecution.³¹⁰ One Egyptian source said that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs offered some NGOs “better treatment” if they did not attend the review session.³¹¹ In another example, the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies canceled its annual training program on human rights, which it had held for students and graduates for the past twenty-two years.³¹² Explaining the decision in a published statement, the institute wrote, “It has become impossible to find a safe space for youth for learning and creativity. Prisons have become the fate of all those who care about public matters.” Smear campaigns against NGOs in pro-government media outlets have made public outreach more difficult and dangerous: activists report threats of violence from ordinary Egyptian citizens during public activities.³¹³ Yet despite these obstacles, most human rights groups have vowed to continue their activities, even if it means shifting to increasingly informal networks and clandestine tactics.³¹⁴

Repression of Faith-Based Charities

In addition to human rights organizations, faith-based groups have also faced harsh repression by the Egyptian state. Well aware that the Muslim Brotherhood built its network of supporters by providing social services at the local level, the Sisi regime is intent on closing this avenue for mobilization and preventing organizations from using “poverty for political gain.”³¹⁵ The Ministry of Social Solidarity has shut down more than 1,500 religiously affiliated organizations. Most of them have been accused of alleged ties to the Muslim Brotherhood. In May 2016, in the Governorate of Beheira, the ministry closed seventy-five NGOs and 121 childcare centers and nurseries, which it claimed had been affiliated with the Brotherhood.³¹⁶ The closures prompted officials to declare the governorate to be “free of any associations which receive foreign funding.” In some cases, the Ministry of Social Solidarity has ordered the offices and finances of the targeted organizations to be expropriated and channeled into a ministerial fund aimed at supporting “legally recognized” civil society groups.³¹⁷

The main consequence of this trend has been a growing gap in service provision, as many of the groups in question provided essential support to poor and marginalized communities.³¹⁸ For example, one prominent target has been the El Gameya El Shareya, an Islamic-based charity offering medical support to the poor. At its peak, the association operated thirty medical centers and maintained more than 1,000 branches in the most economically deprived parts of Egypt.³¹⁹ It played a particularly crucial role in rural villages that are largely beyond the reach of state services. Yet shortly after the military’s return to power, Egyptian authorities accused the group of spreading radical Islam, and an Egyptian bank froze its bank account. Although it successfully fought the funding freeze in court, the terrorism accusations have tarnished the association’s domestic and international reputation. It now operates at a third of its original capacity.³²⁰ Other development-focused religious charities, such as Resala and Sonaa Hayat, have faced similar charges and are now struggling to stay afloat.³²¹ They have had to increase their reliance on volunteers and cut back their hours, leaving local residents without the support they had come to rely on. There is little indication that the government is stepping in to fill the gap: Egypt’s 2017 budget failed to meet constitutionally required minimum spending thresholds on health and education, and existing social programs cover only a small fraction of those in need.³²²

Fewer Resources for Development and Humanitarian Work

Even nonreligious and apolitical development and humanitarian organizations struggle in the current context, particularly as a result of the funding shortage for civil society work. Given the uncertainty of Egypt’s current legal framework, many international donors have cut back their support for Egyptian organizations out of concern that they will be accused of offering illegal support to NGOs.³²³ Registered development organizations that submit requests for funding approvals to the Ministry of Social Solidarity have in many cases never heard back or have had their funding turned down, even when the projects in question appear to be in line with the state’s development objectives.³²⁴

Even nonreligious and apolitical development and humanitarian organizations struggle in the current context, particularly as a result of the funding shortage for civil society work.

As a result, they have been forced to either operate illegally and risk prosecution or stop working altogether. For example, Al Mawred Al Thaqafy (Culture Resource), an organization devoted to helping poor and marginalized communities participate in cultural and artistic activities, suspended its work in November 2014 because it feared prosecution for its receipt of foreign funds.³²⁵ The El-Gora Community Development Association, which served thousands of Bedouin in the Sinai peninsula, suffered the same fate.³²⁶ At least two Egyptian development organizations—Caritas and the New Woman Foundation—have won court cases against the Ministry of Social Solidarity after the latter repeatedly denied requests for foreign funding.³²⁷ In the case of Caritas, Egyptian authorities argued that funding from the group’s partner organization in Germany represented a threat to Egypt’s national security and threatened to destroy Egyptian society. If enacted, the new NGO law would further institutionalize this type of reasoning by granting Egyptian authorities the right to stop any civil society activity viewed as contradicting official policies or goals. The law is also likely to reinforce divisions between those organizations willing to work with the government on development issues and those that refuse to do so out of principle.³²⁸ The Ma’an for Developing Slums Foundation, which focuses on development in informal areas, has already announced that it will close down after the law is enacted; and other groups are likely to follow.³²⁹

Private Egyptian foundations, which had initially filled part of the gap left by the decrease in foreign funding, have also proved less willing to fund any projects that could attract the ire of the government.³³⁰ Yet the current Egyptian legal framework prevents NGOs from making up the loss in funding with income-generating activities. When the Youth Association for Population and Development set up a bookstore to help generate revenue and reduce its dependence on external support, it faced significant bureaucratic hurdles, and the initiative was eventually shut down by Egyptian authorities.³³¹ Similarly, the online collaborative learning platform Tahrir Academy, which offered educational content to Egyptian students based on crowdsourcing volunteer efforts, announced that it was halting its activities after it was prohibited from raising funds by creating content for private companies.³³²

Independent social development and cultural organizations provide a space in which civic participation and local leadership can flourish. As a result, they are deemed threatening by Egyptian authorities, who view them as forums in which citizens forge connections and may learn to challenge existing authorities.³³³ This might explain why government officials have closed down a number of community groups with no apparent political agenda or religious affiliation, resulting in a further decline in services for marginalized communities.³³⁴ For example, security officers shut down three branches of the Karama public library, which provided cultural programming in poor neighborhoods.³³⁵ The library was founded by rights activist Gamal Eid, and the closure was in all likelihood a retaliatory move against him. In May 2014, Egyptian police also raided the Belady Foundation, which worked with street children in Cairo, and arrested the two cofounders as well as six volunteers.³³⁶ They were accused of running an unlicensed organization and sexual abuse, among other charges. The initiative had in fact aimed to provide street children with access to education, sports, and art and had been previously celebrated in the media as an example of innovative civic volunteerism. The case of the Belady Foundation highlights the scope of the Egyptian government’s crackdown, which extends far beyond traditional human rights groups.

Adaptation Strategies

Pushback and Resilience

While the small circle of highly proactive human rights organizations has borne the brunt of state repression since 2013, these groups have paradoxically been better positioned to persist in the face of repeated government interference. International support networks as well as close collaboration have provided some layers of protection over the past several years. For example, rapid domestic and international mobilization of international support seems to have contributed to the speedy release of human rights activist and journalist Hossam Bahgat in November 2015 and the release of lawyer Malek Adly after three months of detention in September 2016.³³⁷ Human rights organizations have consistently and jointly advocated against further civil society restrictions at the national and international levels and managed to delay a number of restrictive NGO draft laws that were proposed between 2011 and 2015. They have also continued to protest prison conditions and the use of military courts, detention without trial, and police violence. In a number of cases, activists have successfully fought back against office closures and funding rejections in the courts. However, the government’s persistent harassment and the escalation of Case 173 throughout 2016 and early 2017 highlight the limits of these strategies.

Registration, Closure, and Relocation

Egyptian organizations have also faced difficult choices regarding their strategy of resistance or cooperation with state authorities. After the Sisi government ordered all civil society groups to reregister with the Ministry of Social Solidarity, some independent groups—such as the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights and the Egyptian Commission for Rights and Freedoms—chose to comply, hoping to end their legally ambiguous status and protect their staff and volunteers.³³⁸ However, registration has not protected them from further government investigations and harassment. Others, such as the Arabic Network for Human Rights Information, ignored the deadline at the risk of possible legal penalties or attempted to register only to have their application rejected.³³⁹ Rather than splintering over diverging tactics, Egyptian human rights groups supported each other in their respective strategies, affirming—in the words of rights activists Gamal Eid—that “tactical differences don’t affect the unity of our goals.”³⁴⁰

Several groups decided to circumvent the increasingly repressive environment by relocating their offices and staff abroad. For example, in 2014, the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies—which has worked on fostering connections between Arab human rights groups for the past twenty years—decided to move its regional and international programs to Tunisia in response to increasing government pressure, while keeping a small group of employees in Cairo. Partners of the institute, including UN officials, had been repeatedly detained at the airport and arbitrarily deported by state officials, making the organization’s work increasingly difficult.³⁴¹ The organization’s fears proved justified when the government raided the remainder of the institute’s Cairo office in June 2015.³⁴² Its director, Bahey eldin Hassan, chose not to return to the country after receiving multiple death threats.³⁴³ Journalists, academics, artists, and students have also left the country since the clampdown on civil society escalated in 2013 and 2014. At least three prominent rights groups have decided to quietly phase out their advocacy activities and legal assistance work after receiving threats from intelligence officials.³⁴⁴

Enduring Mobilization

Over the past two years, the Egyptian human rights community has struggled with the question of how to move forward, in light of the looming threats of prosecution and closure. Some have considered adapting their organizational structures and mandates to make themselves more resistant to government repression. Egypt’s traditional human rights community consists primarily of highly specialized and professionalized organizations. While none of these NGOs has fully transitioned to a membership model, many organizations are exploring new funding models that could generate greater community buy-in. For example, the Association for Freedom of Thought and Expression has relied on a broad network of academics that finance the organization’s legal support work for the student movement.³⁴⁵ Other groups have doubled down on their legal defense work while transferring advocacy activities to noninstitutionalized groups.³⁴⁶

Older human rights groups have forged new linkages to emerging movements like No to Military Trials of Civilians and Freedom for the Brave, as well as informal youth initiatives in Upper Egypt and the Delta region.³⁴⁷ These initiatives have primarily been driven by students and youth activists and have taken shape largely without formal organizational structures. For example, the Freedom for the Brave coalition was created in early 2014 to defend political prisoners and monitor conditions in Egyptian prisons. The campaign relies heavily on social networks and media to disseminate information, and many of its monitoring, documentation, and advocacy activities take place online.³⁴⁸ More informal coalitions and initiatives have also emerged in the social development realm. For example, citizens have started organizing at the local level to close the gaps in service provision resulting from the government crackdown on faith-based charities and associations. Villagers have formed local organizations that connect people in need with organizations or individuals that can offer help. There are reports of increasing numbers of people joining such grassroots charity efforts, as many remain wary of associating themselves with embattled charities and NGOs.³⁴⁹

Other spheres of Egyptian society continue to generate political mobilization, despite widespread repression. For example, the student movement has survived mass arrests, new administrative rules, and attempts to control student union elections. While student mobilization on university campuses has declined since 2014–2015, recent student council elections at the University of Cairo saw the victory of a coalition of students belonging to anti-authoritarian revolutionary movements.³⁵⁰ The election demonstrated that universities continue to be a space for resistance against the current government. Over the past three years, a number of trade unions and professional associations have also emerged to play an active role, repeatedly clashing with authorities over security service interference. Both the journalists and the doctors syndicates have led protests, with the latter mobilizing against systematic police attacks against individual physicians in the largest public assemblies since the 2013 coup.³⁵¹ In a few instances over the past two years, citizens have also come together to publicly protest specific incidents or policies, such as police brutality in Luxor.³⁵² These protests have generally occurred spontaneously and without the direct involvement of established civil society organizations. In a few cases, they have resulted in arrests and convictions of security officials involved in abuses—but these instances of increased accountability due to citizen anger and mobilization remain the exception rather than the rule.³⁵³

International Responses

The United States’ response to the escalating crackdown on civil society in Egypt took shape against the backdrop of a long-standing strategic partnership between the two countries. When Egyptian authorities began suppressing foreign-funded and international civil society organizations, the United States repeatedly struggled to balance its interest in maintaining a cooperative working relationship with the Egyptian military with its desire to sanction clear violations of democratic procedures and human rights. This dilemma resulted in mixed diplomatic messages that increasingly alienated all sides of the Egyptian political spectrum. Efforts to revise the EU’s relationship to Egypt following the Arab Spring also did not result in increased use of political conditionality, partly due to the lobbying efforts of southern member states. Instead, the EU has struggled to influence Egypt’s post-2011 reform dynamics and often followed the United States’ lead.

A Disrupted Status Quo

The popular uprising of January 2011 disrupted the status quo in U.S.-Egypt relations. Since the signing of the 1978 Camp David Accords with Israel, Egypt has been one of the United States’ most important allies in the Middle East, perceived as central to U.S. security concerns in the region. After Israel, Egypt is the second largest recipient of U.S. military aid, receiving an average of $1.3 billion a year since 1987.³⁵⁴ Military aid to Egypt has taken two forms: foreign military financing, which allows Egypt to purchase U.S.-manufactured military equipment; and international military education and training, which allows Egypt to purchase U.S. training and maintenance kits. In return, Egypt has assisted regional counterterrorism efforts and facilitated the passage of U.S. naval vessels through the Suez Canal. The United States has also justified aid to Egypt as an investment in sustaining the March 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty, which normalized relations between the two countries. While the Bush administration introduced a greater emphasis on political reform and civil society aid into the U.S.-Egyptian bilateral relationship, it did not review U.S. security assistance to the Egyptian military.³⁵⁵

Intent on distancing himself from his predecessor’s controversial Middle East policy, Obama focused his first term on improving relations with Egypt’s leadership.³⁵⁶ As a result, the United States appeared to be caught off guard when anti-Mubarak protests began in January 2011. There were significant divisions within the administration over how best to respond. Obama gradually moved to embrace the pro-democracy movement and called on Mubarak to step aside. Following Mubarak’s resignation, the Obama administration and Congress reprogrammed $165 million in already appropriated economic aid to support Egypt’s economic and political transition.³⁵⁷ In March 2011, the USAID office in Cairo began soliciting grant proposals from Egyptian civil society organizations and provided funding to at least thirty-five groups—many of them in rural areas.³⁵⁸

European powers were similarly unprepared for the Arab uprisings. Since 2004, the EU had developed its relations with Egypt within the framework of the European Neighborhood Policy. Despite the policy’s formal promise of political conditionality, EU member states often used their political and economic weight to push for cooperation on trade, migration, and counterterrorism issues while sidestepping questions of democratic reform.³⁵⁹ Following Mubarak’s ouster, European leaders after initial hesitations vowed to transform their approach to the region. Yet despite mobilizing financial support for Egypt’s nascent democratic process and civil society, the EU struggled to remain relevant in Egypt’s post-2011 reform dynamics, in which the United States played a much more significant role.³⁶⁰

A Muted U.S. Response to the 2011 NGO Crisis

When the transitional SCAF regime began its smear campaign against foreign-funded civil society organizations, the United States was slow to react. Egyptian leaders openly accused the Obama administration of violating Egyptian law by channeling money to nonregistered groups, including the National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute. Behind the scenes, Egyptian officials assured U.S. representatives that American organizations operating in Egypt would not be affected.³⁶¹ As a result, the United States chose not to respond publicly to the Egyptian investigation into foreign funding in the fall of 2011.³⁶² The U.S. Congress appropriated the standard amount of $1.3 billion in military aid and $250 million in economic aid, as Obama had promised after Mubarak’s ouster.³⁶³ However, Congress added various certification requirements, which mandated that the secretary of state certify that Egypt was upholding the 1979 treaty with Israel, carrying out the transition to a civilian government, and protecting minority rights. These requirements could be waived by the Secretary of State if this was deemed in the national security interest of the United States.

Despite the escalating rhetoric of the preceding months, the raids of several U.S.-based international NGOs on December 29, 2011, took U.S. officials by surprise. The United States publicly condemned the raids, and the SCAF initially promised that the confiscated equipment would be returned and the organizations’ activities would be allowed to resume.³⁶⁴ These promises did not materialize. Instead, Egyptian officials barred the American and European NGO workers in question from leaving the country and initiated criminal proceedings against them. Throughout February and early March 2012, U.S. officials negotiated in secret with Egyptian authorities to allow the non-Egyptian staff—who had for the most part taken shelter at the U.S. embassy in Cairo—to leave the country.³⁶⁵ Behind closed doors, the United States threatened to withhold bilateral aid and implied that it would obstruct an impending International Monetary Fund loan to the Egyptian government. Egyptian authorities eventually lifted the travel ban on March 1, after the United States had paid a total of $5 million in bail for seven Americans. Yet the court case against the NGO workers nevertheless proceeded.

Divisions Over U.S. Assistance

The crisis triggered heated debates over U.S. assistance to Egypt. Many U.S. officials believed that the Egyptian authorities’ unprecedented action warranted a strong response. Others argued that cutting off aid or other drastic measures would potentially strengthen those forces within the Egyptian ruling apparatus that were the instigators of the crisis.³⁶⁶ For example, key players in the Obama administration emphasized that the SCAF may not have been the driving force behind the raids.³⁶⁷ Several U.S. legislators nevertheless firmly advocated against waiving the certification requirements for U.S. military and economic aid in light of the ongoing NGO trial.³⁶⁸ Despite this congressional opposition, secretary Clinton issued the waiver in March 2012, thereby allowing the next tranche of U.S. aid to be delivered for the first time since October 2011. Justifying the waiver, the U.S. Department of State released a statement noting that the United States had “a huge number of interests and equities at stake” with Egypt and that “rather than talking about leverage, we’re talking about partnership.”³⁶⁹

At the time, the administration’s logic may have been that it was not worth jeopardizing its relationship with a rapidly changing Egypt over an issue that in its eyes had essentially been resolved once the foreign NGO workers left the country. U.S. officials may have calculated that the transition was still advancing and that canceling aid would have imperiled rather than helped the reform process. However, the debate within the administration on how to respond was unusually contentious. Clinton herself argued for a partial waiver to permit some assistance to go through while keeping sufficient pressure on the Egyptian military to stick with the assistance timetable. Others in the State Department argued for withholding all new military aid until the case was fully resolved.³⁷⁰

But given the looming payment deadline, both the White House and the Defense Department pressured for the release of aid. The Pentagon in particular insisted that existing contracts with American arms manufacturers should be met: breaking the contracts could have shut down production lines at Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics, and the costs would have been carried by the American taxpayer. In addition, a significant number of U.S. jobs would have been endangered in the middle of Obama’s reelection campaign.³⁷¹ Most members of Congress, on the other hand, opposed this decision. Senator Patrick Leahy, who had added the certification requirements to the appropriations bill, called the decision a regrettable return to “business as usual.”³⁷²

A Passive European Response

The United States was not the only country affected by the 2011 crackdown. Egyptian security forces also raided the German Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, and the targeted NGO workers included several European citizens. The European response for the most part mirrored the U.S. approach of trying to maintain a positive working relationship with the SCAF government while pushing for continued political reforms. Yet few European embassies had direct links to the SCAF, and there was a sense among European policymakers that they wielded little influence over the transition process—a perception that led to further passivity.³⁷³

Germany was most directly implicated in the crisis. The Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung had been working in Egypt for more than thirty years with the permission of the Egyptian government, and the German government vigorously rejected the accusations leveled against the organization.³⁷⁴ It summoned Egypt’s ambassador in Berlin to protest the raid, and the German Parliament passed a unanimous resolution demanding that Egypt stop the attacks against the foundation and other NGOs.³⁷⁵ However, the German government nevertheless decided to continue aid flows to Egypt. In addition, German officials reportedly attempted to cut a deal with the Egyptian security services to have the foundation excluded from the NGO trial in exchange for German diplomatic support—an attempt that, albeit unsuccessful, infuriated Egyptian activists.³⁷⁶

The crisis proved to be a landmark moment. While it is impossible to determine in retrospect whether a more forceful response before and after the raids would have changed the Egyptian authorities’ course of action, it is likely that the Egyptian security establishment interpreted the weak response as a signal that it could move ahead with further repressive measures. European powers appeared marginalized and unwilling to push back against the SCAF regime with any great force. The U.S. government had failed to prove or exercise any leverage in a situation that directly endangered U.S. nationals and organizations, and this signaled that the United States would continue to prioritize its strategic relationship with the Egyptian military over human rights concerns. The Egyptian authorities had also effectively manipulated Western powers: by repeatedly delaying hearings and promising speedy resolutions, they strategically extended the NGO trial to ensure that international attention moved to other issues.³⁷⁷

Back to Business as Usual

During Morsi’s brief presidency, the Obama administration focused on supporting Egypt’s fragile democratic process without backing any particular political force. It hoped that by working with a democratically elected Islamist leader, it could demonstrate the United States’ commitment to Egypt’s political transition and push the Muslim Brotherhood to forge a greater political consensus.³⁷⁸ The administration’s response to escalating rights violations and democratic setbacks remained relatively weak—even as Obama grew increasingly frustrated with Morsi’s power grabs.³⁷⁹ Whereas the White House prioritized the normalization of relations with the Muslim Brotherhood, the U.S. Congress advocated for a more hostile stance. During Morsi’s tenure, Congress passed fifteen resolutions aimed at cutting or freezing Egypt’s aid—with limited success. The State Department once again quietly waived the certification requirements to allow the disbursement of Egypt’s assistance, despite the conviction of American NGO workers shortly beforehand.³⁸⁰

Rather than engaging public confrontation, the EU relied on quiet diplomacy to push the Muslim Brotherhood toward greater inclusiveness.

On the European side, officials were deeply concerned that they not be viewed as interfering in Egypt’s escalating tensions between Islamists and the military and secular forces. Rather than engaging public confrontation, the EU relied on quiet diplomacy to push the Muslim Brotherhood toward greater inclusiveness. At the same time, it decided that EU funds should not be withheld, despite the lack of progress on tangible political reforms (disbursements ended up being held up by economic rather than political conditionality).³⁸¹ Germany also made efforts to restore its bilateral relationship. It struck a deal with Egyptian authorities to welcome Morsi in Berlin in exchange for the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung’s return to Egypt. Yet these diplomatic openings were hardly rewarded: the agreement was declared null after Morsi’s high-profile visit, leaving German leaders with the sense that they had been deceived.³⁸² Germany nevertheless released 172 million euros in development aid.³⁸³ Merkel and Westerwelle strongly criticized the sentencing of forty-three international NGO workers shortly thereafter, angry that Egyptian reassurances had failed to protect the German political foundations. But they remained ambivalent when asked about further aid restrictions.³⁸⁴ In private, diplomats noted that Egypt was considered too important an ally to be abandoned.³⁸⁵

Mixed Signals After the Military’s Takeover

The Egyptian military’s forceful return to power in mid-2013 highlighted the tensions between Western powers’ security interests and efforts to support the country’s democratic transition. When the military overthrew Morsi’s increasingly embattled government, the United States largely stepped back and let events run their course. The Obama administration did not issue a strong statement in support of Morsi, nor did it call the intervention a military coup—which would have legally required a suspension of military aid. The State Department argued that it did not need to make a public determination on whether a coup had happened. This stance was significant as it signaled that in the face of regularly changing Egyptian governments, the U.S. administration was leaning toward prioritizing its relationship with the military in pursuit of long-term American interests. While EU ministers denounced the military’s intervention, they also did not use the term coup, partly to avoid contradicting the U.S. stance.³⁸⁶

As the situation in Egypt escalated with massacres against pro-Morsi protesters in July and August 2013, the U.S. government was hesitant to impose strong punitive measures. After the first mass killing on July 8, it halted the delivery of four F-16 fighter jets but emphasized that the move was not intended as a punishment and that there would be no implications for continued military-to-military cooperation.³⁸⁷ The decision was recognized as relatively insignificant on both sides, particularly in light of the administration’s assurances. As violence in Egypt escalated, Obama canceled the biannual joint military exercises and strongly condemned Egypt’s security forces yet stopped short of announcing any suspension of aid. Senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham traveled to Egypt and conveyed the warning that further assistance might be stopped if the crackdown continued, but their efforts seemed to have little effect.³⁸⁸ By the end of August, top national security aides recommended that a significant amount of aid be withheld until a democratically elected government returned to power.³⁸⁹ However, it was not until October that the United States announced the suspension of the delivery of F-16 fighter jets, tank kits, Harpoon missiles, and Apache helicopters, “pending credible progress toward an inclusive, democratically elected civilian government through free and fair elections.”³⁹⁰ The EU was equally slow to respond. Most EU aid had already been put on hold in the absence of an International Monetary Fund deal, and EU member states were divided on further aid cuts (although they did revoke export licenses for some military equipment).³⁹¹

The U.S. government may have been hesitant to freeze aid out of concern that doing so would cut off any remaining leverage that the United States still had over Egypt’s generals or drive Egypt further away from the United States into the hands of Saudi Arabia and Russia. Its apparent solution to this dilemma was to impose a partial aid cut while at the same time reassuring the Egyptian military of Washington’s continued commitment to the bilateral relationship. The result of this middle route was a profoundly inconsistent policy message. U.S. officials repeatedly played down the significance of the partial aid cuts. Former secretary of state John Kerry congratulated Egypt’s military leaders on implementing the roadmap “that everybody has been hoping for” and did not publicly address the new draft protest law that had been introduced two weeks before his visit.³⁹² While then secretary of defense Chuck Hagel stressed the need for political inclusiveness in more than twenty-five phone calls to Sisi following the coup, he also opposed the suspension of military aid.³⁹³ To maximize leverage, aid cuts would have to have been far reaching and coordinated with European nations and other donors. Instead, for the year-and-a-half duration of the weapons suspension, the vast majority of U.S. military assistance continued to flow.³⁹⁴

Normalization Amid Decreasing Leverage

The muddled handling of the post-coup crackdown set the tone for subsequent U.S. and EU responses to the civil society restrictions that followed. Two key trends emerged over the subsequent year: First, Western governments seemed to have little leverage over the regime’s overall authoritarian trajectory, partly because they repeatedly prioritized normalizing their relationship with Egyptian partners and resumed previous aid flows even as the situation within the country worsened. Second, international pressure at times proved effective at temporarily delaying further repressive measures by the Egyptian authorities, for example by denouncing human rights violations at international forums.

During 2014 and 2015, international attention subsided as the Egyptian authorities’ attention turned from foreign NGOs to Egyptian groups and activists. The United States proceeded to normalize relations with the Egyptian regime—despite the fact that the latter continued to stir up anti-American sentiments at home. Following Sisi’s victory in the presidential election, Kerry released $575 million in aid that had been frozen for nearly a year.³⁹⁵ The administration also lifted the suspension on the sale of Apache helicopters without securing any significant human rights concessions. The 2015 appropriations bill in fact loosened some conditions applied in the previous year, despite the accelerating crackdown within the country. In 2015, the United States resumed the delivery of F-16s, relaunched the U.S.-Egypt strategic dialogue, and announced that it would resume joint military exercises—without significant concessions by the Egyptian government. Critics also noted that a number of these decisions were strategically unnecessary but imparted the Egyptian regime with legitimacy and prestige.³⁹⁶ For example, the United States has continued supplying Egypt with heavy weaponry that is of limited use in the fight against terrorism—while doing little to prevent the abuses that are fueling radicalization in Egypt’s prisons.³⁹⁷

External pressure may have successfully delayed repressive measures at various points in time. During the fall of 2014, U.S. and European pressure reportedly contributed to warding off the Egyptian government’s planned mass closure of nonregistered civil society organizations. The United States expressed its concerns over the repression of activists and demonstrators in a statement submitted during Egypt’s Universal Periodic Review at the United Nations, which angered the Sisi regime.³⁹⁸ When human rights defender Hossam Bahgat and newspaper owner Salah Diab were arrested in November 2015, immediate international pressure by the United States, the UN, and others likely contributed to their rapid release.³⁹⁹ However, these successes remained temporary: subsequent developments showed that Egyptian authorities had not allowed more space but had simply delayed or shifted their tactics. In addition, European and U.S. efforts to solidify economic ties with the Egyptian government—for example, by organizing a large investment conference for American businesses that coincided with the reregistration ultimatum imposed on Egyptian civil society—often appeared to nullify statements of concern.⁴⁰⁰

High-level officials have continued to speak out against the crackdown, particularly since the reopening of Case 173. In March 2016, Kerry issued a forceful statement of concern following the reopening of legal proceedings against foreign-funded NGOs, thereby attracting the ire of Egyptian parliamentarians.⁴⁰¹ This past year, the EU and the German Foreign Office also expressed their concern about the repression of human rights organizations in Egypt, and the European Parliament called on the European External Action Service to “develop urgently a strategy” to respond to the reopened NGO investigations.⁴⁰² However, these public pronouncements have not translated into substantive policy changes or direct pressure on Egyptian officials. For example, when Kerry met with Sisi a few weeks after his statement of concern, he mostly expressed solidarity and only vaguely referenced differences regarding “the international politics and choices for the people of Egypt,” rather than directly speaking out against the NGO restrictions.⁴⁰³ Nor did the NGO investigations come up during his July 2016 meeting with Egyptian Foreign Affairs Minister Sameh Shoukry, which once again focused on counterterrorism and economic issues.⁴⁰⁴

The new U.S. administration has signaled that it will not prioritize democracy and human rights concerns in its bilateral relations with Egypt and will focus instead on forging closer counterterrorism ties. In April 2017, President Donald Trump officially welcomed Sisi in Washington, DC—an honor that the Obama administration had consistently denied him. During the visit, Trump failed to publicly raise the ongoing crackdown on civil society in the country, highlighting instead issues of mutual agreement and cooperation.⁴⁰⁵ At the same time, he did not promise additional U.S. assistance or commit to restoring cash flow financing, which would allow the Egyptian government to once again pay for U.S. defense equipment in multiyear installments.⁴⁰⁶ A number of U.S. senators also marked Sisi’s visit by cosponsoring a resolution condemning human rights abuses in Egypt. After several years of tensions over the appropriate balance between human rights and security concerns in U.S. policy toward Egypt, it remains to be seen whether Washington will revert back to a strategy of unconditional support or whether the United States will eventually begin questioning Egypt’s value as a counterterrorism partner. At the moment, a shift in U.S. policy that would prioritize the concerns of Egyptian civil society activists and organizations appears unlikely.

Notes

¹⁹⁹ Miranda Sissions, “Egypt: Margins of Repression—State Limits on Nongovernmental Organization Activism,” Human Rights Watch, July 3, 2005, https://www.hrw.org/report/2005/07/03/egypt-margins-repression/state-limits-nongovernmental-organization-activism.

²⁰⁰ Sarah E. Yerkes, “State-Society Relations After the Arab Spring: New Rulers, Same Rules,” Democracy & Society 9, no. 2 (Summer 2012), 9.

²⁰¹ “Backgrounder: The Campaign Against NGOs in Egypt,” Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED), February 10, 2012, http://pomed.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Egypt-NGO-Backgrounder.pdf.

²⁰² Ibid., and Human Rights Watch, “Egypt: Margins of Repression.”

²⁰³ Human Rights Watch, “Egypt: Margins of Repression.”

²⁰⁴ Catherine E. Herrold, “NGO Policy in Pre- and Post-Mubarak Egypt: Effects on NGOs’ Roles in Democracy Promotion,” Nonprofit Policy Forum 7, no. 2 (2016).

²⁰⁵ Viviane Fouad, Nadia Ref’at, and Samir Murcos, “From Inertia to Movement: A Study of the Conflict Over the NGO Law in Egypt,” in NGOs and Governance in the Arab World, eds. Sarah Ben Nefissa and Carlos Milani (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2005).

²⁰⁶ Ehaab Abdou et al., “How Can the U.S. and International Finance Institutions Best Engage Egypt’s Civil Society?” Brookings Institution, June 2011, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/06_egypt_civil_society.pdf; and Herrold, “NGO Policy in Pre- and Post-Mubarak Egypt.”

²⁰⁷ Nadine Sika, “Civil Society and Democratization in Egypt: The Road Not Yet Traveled,” Democracy & Society 9, no. 2 (2012): 29.

²⁰⁸ Todd Ruffner, “Under Threat: Egypt’s Systematic Campaign Against NGOs,” Project on Middle East Democracy, March 2015, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/documents/droi/dv/55_underthreat_/55_underthreat_en.pdf; and Sarah Carr, “Despite Cabinet Shakeup, One Mubarak-Era Minister Remains Firmly in Place,” Egypt Independent, July 24, 2011, http://www.egyptindependent.com//news/despite-cabinet-shakeup-one-mubarak-era-minister-remains-firmly-place.

²⁰⁹ Maha M. Abdelrahman, Civil Society Exposed: The Politics of NGOs in Egypt (I.B. Tauris, 2004), 108.

²¹⁰ Herrold, “NGO Policy in Pre- and Post-Mubarak Egypt.”

²¹¹ Mohamed Elagati, “Foreign Funding in Egypt After the Revolution,” Arab Forum for Alternatives, FRIDE, and Hivos, 2013, 6, https://hivos.org/sites/default/files/publications/wp_egypt1.pdf.

²¹² Ibid., 2.

²¹³ Yerkes, 10.

²¹⁴ Nancy Okail, “Rights Groups Face a Withering Assault in Egypt,” Freedom House, September 11, 2013, https://freedomhouse.org/blog/rights-groups-face-withering-assault-egypt.

²¹⁵ Yerkes, 10.

²¹⁶ Sharif Abdel Kouddous, “Egypt Escalates Repression Against Human Rights Groups and NGOs,” Nation, November 12, 2014, https://www.thenation.com/article/egypt-escalates-repression-against-human-rights-groups-and-ngos/.

²¹⁷ Ann M. Lesch, “The Authoritarian State’s Power Over Civil Society,” in Egypt and the Contradictions of Liberalism: Illiberal Intelligentsia and the Future of Egyptian Democracy, eds. Dalia F. Dahmy and Daanish Faruqi (London: Oneworld Publications, 2017).

²¹⁸ Yerkes, 9.

²¹⁹ Ibid, 10.

²²⁰ Sherif Mansour, “Stifling the Public Sphere: Media and Civil Society in Egypt,” National Endowment for Democracy, October 2015, http://www.ned.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Stifling-the-Public-Sphere-Media-Civil-Society-Egypt-Forum-NED.pdf.

²²¹ Kristen Chick, “Why Egypt Is Angry Over $65 Million in US Democracy Grants,” Christian Science Monitor, August 12, 2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2011/0812/Why-Egypt-is-angry-over-65-million-in-US-democracy-grants.

²²² Stephen McInerney, “The SCAF’s Assault on Egypt’s Civil Society,” Foreign Policy, September 28, 2011, http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/09/28/scafs-assault-on-egypts-civil-society/.

²²³ “Egypt Country Summary,” Human Rights Watch, January 2012, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2013/06/14/egypt_0.pdf.

²²⁴ Peter Beaumont and Paul Harris, “US ‘Deeply Concerned’ After Egyptian Forces Raid NGO Offices in Cairo,” Guardian, December 29, 2011, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/dec/29/us-egyptian-forces-raid-cairo.

²²⁵ Associated Press, “Defendants’ Names in NGO Funding Case Revealed as US Warns Egypt,” Egypt Independent, February 6, 2012, http://www.egyptindependent.com//news/defendants-names-ngo-funding-case-revealed-us-warns-egypt.

²²⁶ Sarah el-Sirgany, “Politicized Verdict May Sway Brotherhood on Egypt NGO Law,” Al-Monitor, June 13, 2013, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/06/egypt-ngo-law-muslim-brotherhood.html.

²²⁷ “Freedom and Justice Party Supports Role of NGOs as Essential to Democratic Process,” IkhwanWeb, February 20, 2012, http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=29692.

²²⁸ El-Sirgany, “Politicized Verdict May Sway Brotherhood on Egypt NGO Law.”

²²⁹ International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL), “The Muslim Brotherhood on the State of Civil Society and Civil Society Law in Post-Mubarak Egypt,” International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law 4, no. 1 (April 2013).

²³⁰ Catherine Shea, “Egypt’s Morsi Continues Pursuit of New Civil Society Restrictions,” Freedom House, June 18, 2013, https://freedomhouse.org/blog/egypt%E2%80%99s-morsi-continues-pursuit-new-civil-society-restrictions.

²³¹ “Egypt: New Draft Law on Assault on Independent Groups,” Human Rights Watch, May 30, 2013, https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/05/30/egypt-new-draft-law-assault-independent-groups.

²³² “Judge Imposes Gag Order on NGO Foreign Funding Case,” Mada Masr, March 21, 2016, http://www.madamasr.com/news/judge-imposes-gag-order-ngo-foreign-funding-case?mc_cid=afef8336c3&mc_eid=cc52e0bec6.

²³³ John Pollock, “Future of Egyptian Civil Society,” Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, July 21, 2012, http://www.fletcherforum.org/home/2016/9/6/president-morsi-and-the-future-of-egyptian-civil-society.

²³⁴ Ibid.

²³⁵ Adel el-Adawy, “Egypt’s Multiple Power Centers,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 17, 2014, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/egypts-multiple-power-centers.

²³⁶ Daniel Brumberg, “The Resurgence of the Egyptian State,” in “Egypt’s Political Reset,”Project on Middle East Political Science, July 23, 2013, 16.

²³⁷ “Egypt: Rampant Torture, Arbitrary Arrests and Detentions Signal Catastrophic Decline in Human Rights One Year After Ousting of Morsi,” Amnesty International, July 3, 2014, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2014/07/egypt-anniversary-morsi-ousting/.

²³⁸ “Egypt Court Bans Muslim Brotherhood ‘Activities,’” BBC News, September 23, 2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24208933.

²³⁹ Erin Cunningham, “Egypt’s Military-Backed Government Declares Muslim Brotherhood a Terrorist Organization,” Washington Post, December 25, 2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/egypts-military-backed-government-declares-muslim-brotherhood-a-terrorist-organization/2013/12/25/7cf075ca-6da0-11e3-aecc-85cb037b7236_story.html?utm_term=.d074604fe31a.

²⁴⁰ “434 Muslim Brotherhood NGOs Shutdown,” Daily News Egypt, July 8, 2015, http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2015/07/08/434-muslim-brotherhood-ngos-shutdown/.

²⁴¹ Amr Hamzawy, “Egypt’s Anti Protest Law: Legalising Authoritarianism,” Al Jazeera, November 24, 2016, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2016/11/egypt-anti-protest-law-legalising-authoritarianism-161107095415334.html.

²⁴² Brad Youngblood and Noor Hamdy, “Why Is Egypt Amending Its Protest Law Now?” Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, August 16, 2016, https://timep.org/commentary/why-is-egypt-amending-its-protest-law-now/.

²⁴³ Patrick Kingsley, “Egypt Places Civilian Infrastructure Under Army Jurisdiction,” Guardian, October 28, 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/28/egypt-civilian-infrastructure-army-jurisdiction-miltary-court.

²⁴⁴ Ruffner, 13.

²⁴⁵ Ibid., 14.

²⁴⁶ Ibid., 4.

²⁴⁷ Ian Cash, “Egypt Daily Update: NGO Registration Deadline Passes; U.S. Delegation Meets With Sisi,” Project on Middle East Democracy, November 10, 2014, http://pomed.org/regional-news-digests/egypt-11-10/.

²⁴⁸ “Egypt NGOs ‘Robbed of Independence,’” Al Jazeera, September 22, 2014, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/09/egypt-ngo-law-crackdown-2014913121624569527.html.

²⁴⁹ Mahmoud Mostafa, “EIPR to Register Under ‘Flawed’ NGO Law, Will Continue to Work to Replace It,” Daily News Egypt, December 22, 2014, http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2014/12/22/eipr-register-flawed-ngo-law-will-continue-work-replace/.

²⁵⁰ Patrick Kingsley, “Egypt’s Human Rights Grou