The Carnegie Asia Program’s “Reimagining Continental Asia” project explores strategic dynamics across Asia’s land spaces and how regional players—not the United States or the transatlantic West—are driving both diplomacy and economic integration.
Central Asia has faced seismic geopolitical shifts over the past few years. Major global crises—the deterioration of U.S. relations with China and ensuing trade restrictions, the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan, and Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine—have shaken the region.
Observers predicted that these events would have severe effects on Central Asia’s stability or destabilize long-standing regimes in the region. Although none of the catastrophic scenarios materialized, many still perceive Central Asia as a fragile region.
What most analysis misses is the increased agency that countries in the region have over their own fates. The region is no longer a backdrop for the new Great Game, nor is it anyone’s backyard.
Rather than cowering in fear and calling on larger powers to save them, Central Asian nations are exuding an independent confidence. Far from being passive or helpless players, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan are demonstrating that they are not pawns in a larger geopolitical game, but important actors who understand the leverage they have over larger goliaths. They are boldly and creatively tackling some of the world’s most complex geopolitical tasks.
Afghanistan as an Opportunity
Following the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021, analysts voiced serious concerns about the stability of Central Asia. They feared an influx of refugees would overwhelm the region’s capacity and that Taliban actions and Islamist extremism would destabilize the area, potentially leading to a surge in drug trafficking and terrorist attacks. Ironically, the U.S. withdrawal has opened new possibilities for Central Asian states as they seek to engage the Taliban. Rather than chaos, the U.S. withdrawal has meant greater regional stability—for the time being.
Three years have passed since the Taliban came to power in Afghanistan. Largely unnoticed by most of the world, the other countries of Central Asia are on the forefront of crafting unique diplomatic and economic tools to deal the Taliban.
Uzbekistan has spearheaded diplomatic efforts to come to terms with the Taliban government and has thought constructively about how to engage with it. Tashkent has done this by providing humanitarian assistance, promising economic investment, and hosting the largest global conference featuring Taliban participation. In August 2024, Uzbek Prime Minister Abdulla Aripov became the highest-ranking government official of any country to visit Taliban-controlled Afghanistan.
It has also been working to bring the United States, the Taliban, Russia, and other players to the table to discuss the future of Afghanistan. Although Tashkent’s strategy focuses far more on regional integration and economic dimensions, it says it will not recognize the Taliban until it has a more inclusive government. Yet, Uzbekistan has ensured that the Uzbek-speaking minority in Afghanistan still has instruction in its native language and has worked to pressure the Taliban to keep some girls’ schools open in northern Afghanistan.
Despite concerns about Afghanistan’s long-term stability under the Taliban, Central Asian states are engaging with the country in hopes of fostering economic growth and mitigating the threat of groups such as the Islamic State–Khorasan. Kazakhstan removed the Taliban from its list of extremist organizations and hosted a major business forum with Afghan representatives. Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan maintain regular official meetings with the Taliban, and even Tajikistan, which has not formally recognized the group, continues to provide electricity to Afghanistan despite unpaid bills.
Russia has used fear of terrorism to assert its role as the security guarantor in Central Asia, a region it still considers its “near abroad.” It is becoming evident to Central Asia that Russia has taken advantage of this concern about extremist spillovers into Central Asia from Afghanistan to maintain robust military presence in the region. It maintains bases in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and extensive infrastructure in Kazakhstan. While Moscow claims this is necessary because of the fragility of Central Asian forces, recent years have demonstrated Russia’s own struggles with combating terrorism. Russia’s deadliest terrorist attack in the past two decades, which happened in Moscow on March 2024, was partially possible because Russian special security forces were too busy countering perceived “color revolutions” and neglected real threats.
This does not mean that all is rosy in Central Asian states’ approaches to Afghanistan. The Taliban irked Tashkent by moving forward with the construction of the controversial Qosh Tepa canal, which directs Amu Darya River’s water from Afghanistan to Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan and Tajikistan both suffered their first rocket attacks from Afghanistan after the Taliban came to power. However, a catastrophic spillover of terrorism has yet to materialize.
Ukraine and Confronting Russian Aggression
Observers also predicted that Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 would force Central Asian states to choose sides. As with the Taliban takeover of Kabul, this logic suggested that the five states in the region would be forced to support the Kremlin or face sanctions and isolation. Once again, however, these dire predictions have not come to fruition.
Contrary to expectations, none of the states in Central Asia openly supported Russia’s aggression. Some even spoke up against the invasion. In March 2022, then Uzbek foreign minister Abdulaziz Kamilov became the first Central Asian official who called for an immediate ceasefire in Ukraine, affirmed the sovereignty of that country, and refused to recognized Donetsk and Luhansk as independent republics.
Kazakhstan surprised many when it recognized the sovereignty of Ukraine and also refused to recognize Luhansk and Donetsk as republics. This was even more surprising given that just a few weeks before, in January 2022, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev called on the Russian military, through its membership in the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), to help defend his government from internal unrest that seemed to come from allies of former president Nursultan Nazarbayev. Tokayev did not waver from this position, reiterating it in person before the press and Russian President Vladimir Putin at the St. Petersburg International Economic forum in June 2022.
Kazakhstan has been defiant not only in its rhetoric but also in its actions. It has sent aid to Ukraine, banned Russian military propaganda, cancelled its May 9 military Victory Day parade, and approved an anti-war rally in Almaty. In response, Russia has repeated claims made by Putin in 2014 that “Kazakhs never had statehood.”
In a major rhetorical shift, Central Asia is now speaking about the Soviet legacy not through the lens of communism but through a new lens of Russian imperialism. Official speeches commemorating victims of political repression under the Russian Empire and Soviet rule have become commonplace in the past two years. For instance, Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev began his address on his country’s thirty-first Independence Day in August 2023 by honoring these victims. His daughter Saida, a deputy in his administration, delivered a candid speech during her visit to Kazakhstan, highlighting the pre-Soviet Central Asian intelligentsia who sought to “liberate our peoples” but were suppressed. She said, “We are beginning to implement their ideas and raise enlightenment and education to the level they dreamed of.”
Central Asian states are actively rewriting their histories, no longer fearing Russian retribution for challenging the Soviet narrative of harmony and brotherhood. In Kazakhstan, over 2.4 million archival records of victims of political repression from 1929 to 1956 were declassified in September 2023. Uzbekistan’s Higher Court posthumously exonerate thousands of Soviet-era political prisoners, and a new museum honoring the Jadid movement is about to be opened in Bukhara later in 2024. Even Kyrgyzstan, more cautious and pro-Russia under President Sadyr Japarov, is actively working to uncover the truth about political prisoners and victims of repression. Similarly, efforts to promote national languages and shed Soviet linguistic legacies are underway, despite Russia viewing this as a sensitive issue.
Since the full-scale invasion, these leaders have attended Moscow’s contentious May 9 parade, yet this has not hindered their cooperation with NATO members. The countries’ approaches to sanctions are similarly pragmatic, with countries such as Kazakhstan openly refusing to adhere to anti-Russia sanctions if they contradict its own national interests.
Regional Cooperation
Regional cooperation is another way Central Asia is seeking to counter the influence of Russia, China, and other external players. Leaders realize that, on their own, they may be too weak to counter larger neighbors, but if they band together on specific economic and political issues, they may become a more formidable threat. However, coming together is not an easy task, as Central Asian states have long had frosty relations with one another. It is one of the only regions in the world that does not have regional cooperation organization like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
For most of the postindependence period, cooperation among states in the region was largely ad hoc. This began to change with the transition of power in Uzbekistan in 2016, but the war in Ukraine gave new impetus. Regional leaders recognized the need to develop new partners to help them diversify and lessen their dependencies on Russia and China.
Central Asian leaders now convene regularly, a stark contrast to just a few years ago. Their most recent summit in Astana in August 2024 marked a significant milestone, with leaders proposing a road map for regional integration for the first time. Notably, Kazakhstan’s Tokayev advocated for closer cooperation in the sensitive areas of defense and security.
The war in Ukraine and Taliban control of Afghanistan did not isolate Central Asia. On the contrary, these events revitalized the region’s relationships with major global powers. The region’s leaders, acting as a unified “C5” bloc, have visited Beijing, Berlin, Brussels, Moscow, New York, and Xi’an. In turn, international leaders have made an unprecedented number of visits to the region. Russia’s Putin visited all five Central Asian states in 2022 alone, China’s Xi Jinping has toured the region twice since February 2022, Emmanuel Macron became France’s second president to visit Central Asia, and Germany’s Olaf Scholz is planning a trip to the region in September 2024.
Overall, Central Asian states have successfully deepened ties with international partners who are often at odds with one another. The region has avoided making binary choices and instead fostered an environment where even conflicting states can coexist. They have turned crises into opportunities for positive-sum cooperation.
Internal Threats
While Central Asia projects confidence on the global stage, the past three years have revealed that the most serious threats to the region’s political stability are internal, not external. Internal vulnerabilities pose the greatest risk to long-term regional peace.
Rising nationalism has accompanied growing assertions of sovereignty. This was tragically demonstrated by Central Asia’s first inter-state conflict: a series of armed clashes between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in April 2021 and September 2022 that killed hundreds of people.
The growing politicization of societies and a willingness to challenge authoritarian governments is another trend. This was particularly evident in Kazakhstan in January 2022, Uzbekistan’s Karakalpak autonomous republic in summer 2022, and Tajikistan’s Gorno-Badakhshan autonomous region throughout 2022 and 2023.
More Central Asians are demanding greater accountability from their governments than ever before. With street protests often targeted by authorities, the internet has become a relatively secure platform for citizens to voice their opinions and pressure their leaders, even on foreign policy matters.
While regional leaders have demonstrated extraordinary skill managing complex diplomatic crises, they have not shown the same dexterity when navigating relations with their own people. These internal dynamics—not terrorism, the Taliban, and Russia—may be the most formidable challenge to regional stability and prosperity.
