Climate Governance in MENA and Africa: Knowledge, Policies, and Cooperation

Globally, developing effective and inclusive government strategies for climate crisis mitigation and adaptation is becoming increasingly challenging. The difficulties in accurately predicting impacts, along with the limitations in quantifying Earth’s carbon sequestration capacity and the challenges in determining critical tipping points, potentially add layers of complexity to climate governance in the least studied regions of Africa. These regions, heavily reliant on climate-sensitive sectors such as agriculture and hydropower, face significant constraints in adaptive capacity due to economic and political limitations. Similarly, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region contends with extreme heat events, unprecedented flash floods, and chronic water stress, exacerbated by urbanization and rapid population growth that impedes their adaptation efforts. Given these threats and the barriers to effective governance, this article draws on existing data to assess the regions’ shared challenges and opportunities around climate knowledge production and dissemination, climate governance policy development and implementation, and regional collective action.

Africa and the MENA region have different ranges of climate adaptation resilience capacity, but they face similar dire effects of the climate crisis (for example, water scarcity and food insecurity). The two regions have a production-based carbon footprint larger than their domestic consumption-based carbon footprint. This reflects their role in the global economy as producers of fossil fuels/carbon-intensive goods that are consumed in other parts of the world. While acknowledging the significant disparities in resilience and resources between countries, there is the potential for equitable cooperation, and it will be crucial in addressing the increasing impacts of climate change.

Climate Knowledge Production and Dissemination

Effective climate action and policymaking in MENA and Africa are highly contingent on overcoming the challenges facing climate knowledge production and dissemination. The most well-documented challenge is the lack of sufficient climate research funding, which hinders the ability to conduct in-depth climate research. The Second Working Group contribution to the sixth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) mapped that African countries have the lowest number of adaptation research projects. Interestingly, the report also highlighted a noticeable imbalance between the funding allocated for adaptation versus the funding allocated for mitigation projects, especially in North Africa.

Inadequate data collection and information sharing, unstable political realities, and insufficient research approaches focused on global rather than local issues hinder the development of more resilient and informed responses to climate change in Africa and MENA. For instance, as one comparative study noted, media framing in Norway is primarily influenced by enterprising journalism and academic perspectives, while media framing in Ghana is predominantly shaped by politicians and public officials, with a significant reliance on international sources. This study emphasizes the importance of local, evidence-based narratives and collaboration, offering valuable insights that African countries could adapt to enhance their responses to climate change. There are systemic gaps in the production and dissemination of conservation knowledge in African countries, as most funding, authors, and publication outlets are concentrated in European and North American countries. These gaps disproportionately affect local researchers, Indigenous communities, and grassroots organizations, who are often sidelined from active participation in knowledge production processes. They limit the inclusion of local perspectives and priorities, perpetuating historical and ongoing systems of unequal power structures in environmental conservation sciences. As a result, adopted strategies may lack the cultural and contextual relevance necessary for sustainable impact.

An analysis of 25,899 publications from the Web of Science database on only climate change in MENA and African countries reveals that only a little over 12 percent of these studies originate within the MENA and Africa regions. Furthermore, just four African nations—and none from MENA—are listed among the top twenty countries in global research collaboration networks producing climate studies for MENA and Africa (see Figure 1). While international collaborations can introduce diverse perspectives and advanced technologies, they often fail to integrate local knowledge and voices, potentially marginalizing regional expertise in climate discourse. Inequalities in knowledge production toward MENA and African states can also be seen with funding flows. For example, only 3.8 percent of global funding for climate change research is spent on African topics, and African institutions received only 14.5 percent of it.

Such disparities, coupled with data collection challenges, raise concerns about biased research outcomes and the potential for greenwashing, where research serves to reinforce certain political or economic agendas. For instance, studies that downplay specific countries’ carbon emissions or overstate their adaptation capacities have become increasingly common, contributing to an atmosphere where critical debate is limited.

In global discourse, a meaningful comparative analysis of regional emissions must extend beyond per capita emissions or the temporal trends in emissions. It should also integrate historical emissions, sectoral contributions, material footprints, land-based pollution (for example, nutrient runoffs), and key socioeconomic contexts. Incorporating these factors provides a more nuanced understanding of each region’s responsibilities and strategies for emissions mitigation over the coming decades. The sixth assessment report of the IPCC highlights that while global emissions have risen in most regions, their distribution remains highly uneven. Notably, cumulative anthropogenic carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions from 1850 to 2019 account for just 4 percent in Africa and 2 percent in the Middle East. However, the report also points out Africa’s disproportionately high share of emissions from land use, land-use change, and forestry relative to its total emissions, underscoring the regional variation in emission sources. Additionally, Africa exhibits the highest emissions per unit of revenue, signaling the critical need to prioritize forest conservation, improve carbon efficiency in production processes, and adopt sustainable land management practices across the continent.

Given the disparity in emissions and resilience between the global North and South, it is essential to develop region-specific mitigation and adaptation strategies. Adopting a framework that assesses each country’s contributions in detail—across various sectors and social metrics—is crucial for effective policy planning. For example, the “safe and just space” framework, also known as the “Doughnut Model,” provides a holistic lens that integrates environmental and social metrics, building on the foundational “planetary boundaries” framework. This boundaries framework envisions a “safe space” where humanity can thrive without exceeding ecological limits (the outer boundary) or falling short on essential social foundations (the inner boundary). Biophysical boundaries include not only safe levels of greenhouse gas emissions but also limits on nutrient loading and biodiversity loss. Based on their assessments, they observed that countries exceed biophysical limits more rapidly than they meet social thresholds. Figure 2 illustrates the significant variability among countries in the MENA and Africa regions concerning the extent to which they exceed their biophysical boundaries.

In African countries, land-use changes are particularly impactful, whereas, in the Arab Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, material footprint and emissions are more prominent. For instance, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) ranked among the highest in CO₂ emissions per capita. Notably, the UAE also exhibited a significant ecological footprint and had the second-largest material footprint globally, following Singapore. According to research by Andrew Fanning and others, although the GCC states and Libya exceed most biophysical boundaries, they have not yet fully achieved certain social thresholds, such as democratic quality and equality. This situation is comparable to that in many Global North countries, where high levels of social achievements have been attained but often at the expense of ecological sustainability.

The research involved analyzing data on eleven social indicators (for example, life expectancy, educational enrollment, and equality) and six biophysical indicators (for example, carbon emissions and ecological impact) across more than 140 countries from 1992 to 2015, supplemented with business-as-usual projections to 2050. The study findings highlight the necessity of adopting a comprehensive approach that not only addresses emissions but also considers other central socioeconomic factors. Incorporating these dimensions is crucial, especially given the significant intraregional inequalities. For instance, spatial inequalities in access to water and energy underscore the need for in-depth studies that can inform evidence-based mitigation and adaptation strategies. Such measures must be tailored to the specific economic, social, and environmental contexts of each region to ensure they are both equitable and effective.

 Contributions to ecological degradation and emissions vary significantly among countries in the MENA and African regions, and similarly, the impacts of climate change are unevenly distributed across these areas. Projected mortality rates from climate change are expected to be highest in the MENA and Sahel regions (see Figure 3). However, the adaptive capacities of North African and GCC states are considerably stronger than those of sub-Saharan countries. For example, sub-Saharan Africa has a much higher proportion of urban populations living in informal settlements or slums, which heightens their vulnerability to climate impacts.¹ Additionally, the large number of internally displaced persons in East Africa, resulting from ongoing climate-related disasters, complicates efforts to plan for future adaptation. This challenge is compounded by the fact that migration from Africa—defined as individuals born in Africa now residing outside the continent, primarily in Europe or North America—has tripled over the past three decades. The significant increase in migration reflects the socioeconomic strains and environmental pressures facing many African countries, which are expected to intensify under more extreme future climate scenarios. These challenges underscore the urgency of fostering more socioeconomically sensitive and inclusive knowledge production mechanisms in the climate space, ensuring that adaptation and mitigation strategies are equitable and effective across diverse regional contexts.

Climate Challenges and Governance

In 2015, over half of the global population were living under conditions of permanently poor water security, with Africa identified as one of the most severely affected regions, as indicated by the Global Water Security Index (GWSI). Approximately 844 million people globally lacked access to safe drinking water, and about 2.3 billion people lacked access to safe sanitation. Africa had the highest concentration of people without safe water access. The GWSI highlights that most of Africa’s population does not have access to safe water or adequate sanitary conditions, contributing significantly to the continent’s water security challenges. Another challenge is the impact on Africa’s water resources, which are already strained by variability in rainfall and increasing temperatures. Africa’s reliance on rain-fed agriculture (94.5 percent or 728,830,680 hectares) and shared transboundary water resources makes the continent particularly vulnerable to conflicts exacerbated by climate-induced stress on water availability. Similarly, while hydropower in Africa offers a relatively cleaner energy option, it faces operational challenges due to unprecedented floods and droughts.

In addition to the widely reported challenges of water scarcity and unprecedented extreme weather events in the MENA region, the sixth assessment report by the IPCC highlights the high likelihood of local extinctions of indigenous species in the southwest Arab Gulf and off the coasts of Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. In regions reliant on groundwater resources, such as Gaza and the West Bank, a reduction in average rainfall by 10 percent could lead to a corresponding decrease in aquifer recharge rates by approximately 14 to 24 percent. Furthermore, a 15-percent decline in rainfall could reduce recharge by 28 to 50 percent. Unfortunately, according to researchers Jeremy Pal and Elfatih Eltahir, under a business-as-usual greenhouse gas scenario, human adaptability thresholds in the region may reach their limit by 2100. In addition to the risks of biodiversity loss, the Arabian Gulf faces increasing environmental challenges, including rising dust storms and seawater intrusion into coastal aquifers. Moreover, researcher Banafsheh Keynoush suggests that severe climate impacts in Southeast Asia and sub-Saharan Africa could drive climate-induced migration to the GCC states, adding further pressure to that region.

The MENA region’s ability to address these challenges is hindered by political tensions, which complicate the adoption of integrated environmental policies. These tensions often result in insufficient investments in renewable energy and delays in implementing climate-resilient infrastructure. Northern Africa (the world’s most water-stressedregion) is projected to experience increased temperatures, reducedprecipitation, and more frequent extreme weather events, such as flash floods, heat waves, and droughts. Weak coordination between national and local governments, limited public participation in policy formulation, overcentralization, and inadequate resource allocation can hinder efforts to address climate change impacts. The relatively limited capacity for climate adaptation to water shortages, food insecurity, and rising temperatures could also drive migration and fuel conflicts, particularly in rural areas where livelihoods depend onagriculture. Addressing these governance and policy gaps is critical to enhancing MENA’s ability to navigate the complex interplay of climate and socioeconomic pressures.

In Africa, biophysical changes, such as rising temperatures and unpredictable flash floods, interact with sociopolitical factors, such as power imbalances and social inequalities, consequently influencing the effectiveness of climate adaptation strategies. Targeted interventions and policies are needed to promote the adoption of climate-resilient crops, particularly drought-tolerant varieties, by small-scale producers in Africa, and they should take into account socioeconomic and educational disparities. Socioeconomic barriers can hinder the implementation of agricultural practices, such as adopting drought-resistant crops, practicing dry season farming, and using mulching techniques.

Although Climate-Smart Agriculture is gaining traction in low-income countries, a key challenge lies in its suitability for small-scale farmers (who make up 80 percent of Africa’s farmers), as the approach may lead to increased input costs and be further constrained by declining commodity. Finally, gender-responsive climate policies should leverage both modern technologies and indigenous knowledge to strengthen resilience to climate change, while also promoting green reskilling initiatives for women.

Climate Policy Implementation

This section highlights climate policies implemented across Africa and MENA, focusing on samples of key initiatives for mitigating climate change and promoting environmental conservation. Globally, over 3 billion people continue to rely on traditional biomass fuels for cooking, with sub-Saharan Africa expected to maintain a high dependence on wood as a primary energy source. Consequently, Senegal’s biogas initiative, part of the National Domestic Biogas Program, aimed to provide a sustainable alternative to traditional biomass fuels, addressing environmental and health concerns. However, despite government support and technical potential, the initiative struggled with high costs, limited financial access, and inadequate infrastructure. Of the 8,000 digesters planned for the period 2009–2013, fewer than 600 were installed, many of which became nonfunctional. The main barriers included poverty, financial limitations, and a lack of market-oriented farming.

Similarly, South Africa, Africa’s highest carbon emitter, signed into law the Climate Change Act in July 2024 (originally published in 2018), establishing a framework to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and enhance climate resilience. The law mandates sectoral emission targets and carbon budget compliance for major emitters. But the promising plans could be challenged by South Africa’s reliance on coal for electricity generation, along with little focus on adaptation and resilience and limited financial resources.

Likewise, the Green Legacy Initiative in Ethiopia aims to restore ecosystems, combat climate change, and promote environmental awareness through tree planting. While it has shown positive outcomes in carbon sequestration, biodiversity, and soil conservation, further studies are required to fully assess its long-term impacts. Finally, the Africa Carbon Markets Initiative, launched at the 2022 United Nations Climate Change Conference, aims to provide significant revenues to African economies but is raising concerns related to incentivizing land-grabbing practices (as one form of green grabbing), especially through tree plantation, solar, and hydropower projects.

Before discussing the MENA region’s initiatives, it is important to recognize the differences in capacities and policies within the region. For example, Figure 4 shows the varying low-carbon energy percentages in MENA and Africa. All GCC states remain significantly less reliant on low-carbon energy sources, primarily renewables, compared to both low-income countries in the region and globally. As illustrated in the figure, the proportion of low-carbon energy (including fossil fuels with carbon capture and storage) in the primary energy mix is less than 0.1–0.2 percent in all GCC countries and only 1 percent in the UAE. In contrast, many African countries achieve a significantly higher share, with low-carbon energy comprising around 10 percent of their primary energy mix. Ironically, this comes with a flourishing investment outside the GCC states. For example, the UAE’s Masdar, a leading global renewable energy company focused on advancing clean energy solutions, has recently signed agreements with Angola, Uganda, and Zambia to invest in renewable energy projects totaling 5 gigawatts, alongside a 500 megawatt investment in Ethiopia.

On the other hand, North African countries tend to implement green projects within their borders via partnerships with both GCC states and the EU. Morocco and Egypt lead the renewable energy development in the region. Over the past decade, North Africa has successfully increased its renewable energy output by 40 percent, adding 4.5 gigawatts of capacity from wind, solar photovoltaic (PV), and solar thermal sources to its energyportfolio. The Saudi Green Initiative, launched in 2021, aims to plant 10 billion trees, rehabilitate 40 million hectares of land, and ensure that 50 percent of the country’s energy comes from renewable sources by 2030. MENA countries such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt have also launched carbon market initiatives, but just as in Africa, there are concerns about transparency and greenwashing, with companies potentially offsetting emissions without making meaningful environmentalchanges.

Political instability and conflicts in certain areas of MENA and Africa disrupt development efforts and exacerbate impacts of climate change. To illustrate, the conflict and state fragility in Libya contributed to unsuccessful dam reassessments and maintenance in the country’s coastal town Derna. Improving governance and reducing conflicts could create a conducive environment for cooperation. Based on the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG), few countries have shown increased improvement in overall governance over the last decade. The IIAG evaluates governance performance through four key categories: security and rule of law, participation, rights and inclusion, foundations for economic opportunity, and human development. Each category encompasses subcategories and indicators that assess specific aspects of governance. Within the human development category, the sustainable environment subcategory monitors progress in areas such as environmental policy improvement trends.

Regrettably, a small number of countries have exhibited slower progress in advancing environmental policies and enforcing regulations during this period (see Figure 5). Weak governance has been linked to negative environmental outcomes, including the degradation of carbon sinks such as forests and wetlands. According to the Mo Ibrahim Foundation, except for Tanzania, all countries within or partially in the Congo Basin have shown no improvement in performance over the last decade. This poses a significant threat to the basin, which is the world’s largest carbon sink, absorbing more carbon than even the Amazon. Additionally, several countries, including the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Niger, South Africa, and Zimbabwe, have experienced widespread artisanal mining, which has led to significant wetland and habitat loss, eco-hydrological degradation, riverbed siltation, and mercury pollution.

 Funding Burden and Gaps

 Except for the GCC states and Libya (refer to the data released by Andrew Fanning and others in 2022), the rest of the MENA region experiences a significantly disproportionate impact from climate change, despite contributing only low-to-moderate levels of emissions. For example, the sixth assessment report of the IPCC documented an accumulative loss of 11–12 percent of GDP per capita in Egypt due to climate change during 1991–2010. Even if the Paris Agreement target of 1.5 degrees Celsius is achieved, child mortality in Egypt is expected to rise by approximately 2.3 percent by 2050 and by about 1.4 percent by 2070. Hence, Egypt has committed significant financial resources for climate adaptation projects, with plans to allocate $52 billion from 2022 to 2050 for the agriculture sector and $59 billion from 2020 to 2037 for water resource management. Despite these substantial commitments, the funding gaps for adaptation and mitigation projects remain staggering at $94.7 billion and $153.6 billion, respectively. This highlights the immense financial challenge Egypt faces in fully addressing its climate resilience goals.

The disproportionate burden on Africa, despite its minimal contribution to global emissions,necessitates urgent global action. The financial burden of climate adaptation in sub-Saharan Africa is projected to be between $30 billion and $50 billion annually over the next decade, which corresponds to approximately 2–3 percent of the region’s GDP. Wealthy nations—including those in MENA—should prioritize providing climate finance, enhancing resilience, and addressing both adaptation and mitigation to prevent widespread destabilization and health crises in Africa and beyond. Africa’s climate finance needs are vast, with an estimated $2.8 trillion needed annually by 2030 to implement nationally determined contributions. But current annual climate finance flows are only around $30 billion, far below the necessary amount.

A recent analysis found that wealthy nations have benefited from climate funding meant for developing countries by attaching interest rates or conditions that favor their own economies. This includes $18 billion in market-rate loans and $11 billion linked to purchases from donor-country companies. Egypt and Kenya, followed by Sri Lanka, Tunisia, and Iraq, have emerged as the largest recipients of these climate-related loans. The 2022 UN report titled “Avoiding ‘Too Little Too Late’ on International Debt Relief” emphasized the critical positions of Egypt and Kenya, which rank high in both debt sustainability assessment risk and climate vulnerability. Given the substantial climate funding gaps mentioned earlier, this situation is highly concerning. Moreover, it could undermine the original objective of compensating poorer nations for the disproportionate impacts they face due to climate change.

Regional Cooperation Between Africa and MENA

There is a significant opportunity to enhance knowledge production and exchange between MENA and African countries, particularly in response to their shared climate change challenges. Collaborative efforts focused on developing innovative technologies tailored to the socialcontexts of neighboring regions, securing financial resources, and strengthening local institutions should be central to an effective climate change strategy. This approach emphasizes a shift away from the prevailing model of Global North funding and support toward one that fosters greater regional autonomy and resilience.

Several measures can serve as essential pillars for fostering regional cooperation between the MENA region and Africa. The Second Working Group contribution to the IPCC’s sixth assessment report highlights the critical role of early warning systems and seasonal and dynamical forecasting, both of which received the highest scores for feasibility and effectiveness in facilitating socio-institutional adaptation to climate change. Additionally, institutional transboundary agreements and financial and market mechanisms, along with active participation (beyond mere public awareness), were rated as highly effective in reducing climate change risks.

Outlined below are suggested strategies to ensure the effectiveness of regional cooperation in addressing climate change:

Just transition. The transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy in MENA and African countries could drive significant social and political transformations. In the MENA region, where economies are heavily reliant on fossil fuels, Professor Ali Khalifa Al-Kuwari argued in 1974 that oil revenues have historically concentrated power in the hands of regional rulers. And the current economic diversification strategies in the GCC states, which partially rely on investing in high-emission sectors such as maritime transport and coastal and marine resources based tourism, do not necessarily ensure substantial reductions in emissions.

North African countries could further advance their efforts in renewable energy investment by not only focusing on large-scale centralized solar and wind projects but also by promoting decentralized renewable initiatives. These decentralized projects would ensure broader accessibility across all economic segments of society. Finally, financing a just transition in Africa is critical to ensure the continent can move toward low-carbon, resilient economies without sacrificing development goals such as poverty alleviation and job creation. African countries need tailored financial strategies, with a focus on balancing green investments and social protections to avoid worsening inequalities during this transition.

Peace and stability. Political instability and conflicts in certain areas of MENA and Africa disrupt development efforts. Improving governance and reducing conflicts can create a conducive environment for cooperation. While there is no compelling case of past climate-related interstate war in the region, there are plausible future contingencies for this outcome. Conflict-related environmental destruction and climate change exacerbate each other, creating a vicious cycle of degradation, vulnerability, and incapacity for adaptation.

One potential way to mitigate these risks is through aligning GCC investments in renewable energy (solar and wind) with regions at risk of water conflicts, such as near the controversial Ethiopian Grand Renaissance Dam. Strategic investments in renewable energy could help partially mitigate the dam’s impacts on downstream countries. However, this is not as simple as it seems, as fostering cooperation beyond the river in the Eastern Nile requires open negotiations, built on shared benefits, equitable terms of engagement, and trust, rather than proposing ambitious projects without addressing underlying issues of mistrust and differing perceptions.

Moreover, GCC states should move beyond mere land acquisition and adopt a holistic approach to agro-investments. This approach should emphasize collaborative projects that integrate local communities into the value chain, ensuring that investments contribute to local food security, employment, and sustainable land management practices. The current approaches transfer significant biophysical resources—including water and soil nutrients—from Africa to the Gulf, creating a form of ecologically unequal exchange that depletes local resources without commensurate benefits to the local population.

Knowledge production. To strengthen governance in MENA and Africa, national universities, as key players, must address natural and environmental governance and accountability constraints by adopting more transparent and autonomous governing structures, enabling them to function independently, foster academic freedom, and contribute to the development of good governance practices. For example, to promote a more equitable and sustainable energy transition in MENA and Africa, it is crucial to foster transparent discussions around the current centralized energy projects and to critically examine the structure of power purchase agreements. Additionally, there should be a strong focus on encouraging decentralized renewable energy projects, which can enhance local energy resilience and facilitate broader community involvement in the transition to clean energy.

This approach would ensure that energy benefits are more evenly distributed across urban and rural areas, while also increasing flexibility in energy systems. The inefficiency in knowledge production across both regions, as previously discussed, cannot serve as a sustainable approach to addressing the ongoing impacts of the climate crisis.

Cooperation, not green colonization. African tropical forests play a critical role as carbon sinks, helping to mitigate global warming. Protecting these forests from illegal logging and poor agricultural practices is vital. At the same time, a growing regional interest in carbon offset projects in Africa is evident. These projects are framed as environmental initiatives but are criticized as a new form of exploitation, akin to a “scramble for Africa,” where vast tracts of land are acquired for carbon credits. A more equitable regional framework must be developed to ensure the health of forests and their role in climate mitigation.

Additionally, the increasing pressures on aquatic systems across Africa, such as wetlands and rivers, demand urgent attention. Investments should prioritize comprehensive action plans for areas threatened by human pollution, extending beyond basic afforestation and reforestation efforts to include more proactive sustainable land management practices and integrated conservation strategies. Cooperation policies should be designed to protect the rights of local communities, prevent ecological degradation, and promote long-term, mutually beneficial partnerships rather than short-term extraction.

Local innovations and evidence-based adaptation measures. Combining traditional knowledge in MENA and Africa with modern technologies is crucial for addressing climate change impacts. Interestingly, although low-tech methods produce lower crop yields, they might be the most effective in enhancing food security and supporting sustainable agriculture in Africa. Similarly, the MENA region has a long history of adapting to harsh climatic conditions, with some traditional practices still in use today, while others have been lost or deemed outdated due to modernization and technological advancements.

To develop region-specific adaptation strategies, a broader range of ecosystems—including often overlooked marine ecosystems, grasslands, coastal zones, and freshwater systems—should be integrated into nature-based solutions.  This approach should also expand its focus to address a wider array of climate-related challenges, ensuring that adaptation strategies receive equal attention as emissions mitigation. It is recommended that innovative financial incentive approaches be developed to simultaneously enhance both productive and environmental outcomes, as achieving this balance remains a significant challenge.

Moving beyond conventional emission reduction strategies offers promising alternatives for sustainable environmental management. For instance, the implementation of eco-innovative decentralized sanitation systems can significantly reduce freshwater demand while also mitigating the pollution of water resources and ecosystems. These systems, alongside other innovations, represent promising alternatives to traditional approaches, allowing for more resilient, adaptable and localized responses to climate change.

Conclusions

Given the climate knowledge production crisis in MENA and Africa, simply importing technologies and policies—developed and tested in different environments and lacking local social acceptance—falls short of capturing the regions’ untapped opportunities, making it imperative to generate reliable, high-resolution data as the first step toward building effective, evidence-based policies.

In their study, titled “Compensation for Atmospheric Appropriation,” researchers Andrew Fanning and Jason Hickel argue that the cumulative emissions of many African countries will not reach their fair share of emissions of 350 parts per million and even remain very far from reaching their fair share of the 1.5-degrees-Celsius target by 2050 under all scenarios. As a result, these nations are entitled to compensation from overshooting countries, including the GCC countries. Specifically, sub-Saharan Africa should receive an estimated $45 trillion in compensation, based on historical emissions from 1960 to 2019 and projections under a net-zero scenario from 2020 to 2050. These estimates far exceed any planned loss and damage funding or other available financial mechanisms.

There is a significant opportunity to preserve Africa’s vast carbon sinks and ensure a just transition that guarantees a decent standard of living for Africans, which is easily achievable with current global resource and energy use. However, authoritarian regimes could prefer centralized control through large climate mitigation projects (such as renewable energy plants or reforestation programs) and thus avoid the societal empowerment that climate adaptation needs. This preference could partially explain the imbalance of adaptation to mitigation efforts in MENA and Africa.

Energy sovereignty, environmental justice, and inclusive development should be prioritized in renewable energy development in North Africa. Finally, overshooting countries in the MENA region should prioritize investing in threatened ecosystems in Africa, while ensuring that these efforts also benefit the local populations. Investment in Africa, such as the extraction of materials required for renewable technologies or the installation of renewable energy infrastructure, should be strategically designed to mitigate, rather than exacerbate, conflicts over resources. Careful consideration of existing resource-related tensions is essential to ensure that such investments contribute to stability and sustainable development.

Acknowledgments

The author thanks Joy Arkeh, Saker Elnour, and Yasmine Hafez for their constructive comments and suggestions. Andrew Fanning is also acknowledged for critical suggestions and his support in providing the country level biophysical boundary related data.