Photo of U.S. president Jimmy Carter, Egyptian president Anwar Sadat, and Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin shaking hands.

U.S. president Jimmy Carter, Egyptian president Anwar Sadat, and Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin shake hands after signing the Camp David Accords.

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Today’s Middle East: Lessons Learned from Past Attempts at Collective Security

Five twentieth-century Middle Eastern peace settlements point a path forward for Israel, Hamas, and the Houthis.

Published on March 31, 2025

Full-scale war has resumed in Gaza after Israel launched attacks into the strip in mid-March, bringing the January ceasefire to an end. Negotiations for a new ceasefire position the Middle East at a critical juncture. The potential for continuous and wide-scale military confrontations is just as present as the opportunities for building security and peace.

In experimenting with collective security arrangements, the Middle East does not lack experience. Regional powers, occasionally in collaboration with international actors, have tried their hands at bilateral and multilateral dialogue and settlement efforts, albeit to varying results.

Looking Back at the Region in the Twentieth Century

The twentieth century presented a particularly volatile landscape for the Middle East and Northern Africa, as colonial politics, independence movements, the creation of Israel, the emergence of the United States as a hegemonic superpower, military coups in various Arab countries, consolidation of power by remaining royals, successive Arab-Israeli wars, and civil wars dramatically altered the character of the region.

Against the background of absent stability and peace in the Middle East, regional and international powers have sometimes engaged in proposing collective security arrangements. A case in point was the Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation that was signed by the members of the League of Arab States in 1950, stipulating a commitment of all signatories to help protect one another’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. A second case in point was the Baghdad Pact, which was created by the United Kingdom and sponsored by the United States, and which brought Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and Türkiye together as members with the objective of containing communism in the Middle East. The region has also witnessed various declarations committing regional and international powers to security coordination.

As the League of Arab States stands today united behind Egypt’s March 2025 Gaza reconstruction plan, ready to rebuild Gaza without displacing Palestinians and with security guarantees in place for all relevant actors including Israel, it is time to look back at former instances of regional war and instability that ended (or at least were subdued) as a result of bilateral or multilateral security arrangements. Five past agreements—the Khartoum Resolutions, the Egypt-Israel peace treaty, UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 598, the Taif Agreement, and the Damascus Declaration of 1991—illustrate that an enduring commitment to collective security in the Middle East is necessary to ensure lasting success not only in rebuilding Gaza, but also in guaranteeing peace and stability in the region broadly.

The Five Case Studies

1. Yemen’s Civil War of the 1960s and the Khartoum Resolutions

In the 1960s, Egypt and Saudi Arabia engaged each other in a proxy war in Yemen, with Saudi backing the royalist forces and Egypt backing the republicans. Both countries committed arms and troops to the conflict, ultimately sustaining a long war. Over the course of the civil war, however, the facts on the ground changed. Domestic politics in Saudi Arabia became embroiled in succession dramas and disagreements, and Egypt went to war alongside Syria and Jordan against Israel in June 1967, losing in a crushing defeat.

Because of dramatic domestic and regional changes, the two sides came together at the behest of the Arab League and committed to ending the war. In August 1967, shortly after the Arab loss to Israel, the Arab League met in Sudan, where the heads of state signed the Khartoum Resolutions affirming Arab unity and refocusing the attention of the league’s members on the Palestinian cause. The war in Yemen ended when Saudi Arabia and Egypt agreed within the framework of the Khartoum Resolutions to stop funding their proxies and withdraw their troops from Yemen. Egypt and Saudi Arabia privileged collective security, and it worked.

2. The Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty

Egypt led a coalition of Arab states in the Arab-Israeli War in 1948, refuting the creation of Israel in the face of mass displacement of Palestinians. In 1967, Egypt once again led Arab forces in a battle against Israel that Israel won after only six days. At the time, Egypt had almost one-third of its army in Yemen fighting the proxy war with Saudi Arabia—which highlights the interconnectivity of regional conflicts. In 1973, Egypt and Syria joined forces to liberate their occupied territories. Hostility underscored the Israeli-Egyptian relationship, engendering an unstable environment for direct neighbors.

Egyptian president Anwar Sadat made the bold decision that the two states needed to reorient their relationship from war to peacemaking and security arrangements. In November of 1977, Sadat made a historic trip to Jerusalem, where he garnered popular support in Israel for peace with Egypt. The United States became involved in the peace process, as president Jimmy Carter hosted the talks that led to the Camp David Accords, which saw Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin and Sadat commit to formalizing peace. In March 1979, Israel and Egypt signed the official peace treaty, evidencing bold leadership driven by peacemaking.

3. UN Security Council Resolution 598: Ceasefire Between Iraq and Iran

In 1980, Iraq and Iran went to war over a host of issues, including historic tensions, border disputes, and concern over ideology spreading. The war lasted eight years and was characterized by extreme violence, including the use of chemical weapons by Iraq. By 1988, both sides realized that they had reached a military stalemate—uncontested victory would not be possible. Having accepted the dead end and realized one’s hegemony over the other would not be possible, Iraq and Iran came to the negotiating table. The UN, backed by the United States and the former Soviet Union, had already begun peace negotiations that culminated in UNSCR 598.

UNSCR 598 first affirmed that an immediate ceasefire with full compliance was requisite for a settlement to be reached. Furthermore, the resolution called on both Iran and Iraq to withdraw to internationally recognized borders. The resolution proposed a team of UN observers to monitor the ceasefire and make reports to UN leadership regarding adherence and progress. UNSCR 598 also included a proposition for the secretary-general to convene a meeting with states in the region to determine ways to enhance regional security and stability. In July of 1988, Iran and Iraq formally accepted the resolution, ending the war.

4. The Taif Agreement of 1989

Lebanon suffered through a fifteen-year civil war that began in 1975 and saw fighting primarily along religious and ethnic divides over frustrations about political representation, among other issues. At various points during the war, troops from Israel, Syria, and the Palestinian Liberation Organization penetrated the civil war, reflecting its regional importance. The war was immensely destructive and caused the death of an estimated 150,000 people. It provoked an economic crisis and stripped state institutions of their power, putting people in dangerous conditions.

With pressure from the Arab League, which was following the lead of Syria and Saudi Arabia, the warring parties entered into negotiations that ultimately yielded the Taif Agreement. Although the agreement was meant to radically adjust Lebanese politics to prevent war, it essentially reinforced the existing system of confessionalism with new power-sharing ratios. The agreement allowed state institutions to partially reestablish their power and mitigate the economic crisis. The Taif Agreement reaffirmed divisions of power along sectarian identity lines, appeasing the war’s major actors, who consequently continued their involvement in government. The agreement represented, therefore, a settlement for peace.

5. The Damascus Declaration

On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait in a blatant act of aggression. The invasion was swiftly met with international condemnation and action. The UN Security Council initiated an arms embargo and sanctions on Iraq. The United States led a coalition of Arab and international countries in an air and ground war (Operation Desert Storm) against Iraq, successfully liberating Kuwait in February 1991. One month later, the Gulf Cooperation Council members, Syria, and Egypt met in Damascus to reaffirm their principles of cooperation and collective security. They signed the Damascus Declaration, establishing a commitment to economic and cultural cooperation, as well as a commitment to peace and security in Kuwait via an Arab peace force and pledges for rebuilding destroyed infrastructure. The declaration centered Arab unity in creating peace and security in a turbulent period.

 A few months after the Damascus treaty was signed, however, the Arab states revised the language, removing the peace force language. The reality in the region had changed as U.S. troops were permanently stationed in the region, positioning the United States as the security guarantor in the Gulf. Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates signed security accords with the United States. The Arab unity described in the Damascus Declaration fell apart as alternative security arrangements with the superpower grew more viable, rendering the agreement obsolete.

Looking Ahead: What Path Can Arab States Follow to Pursue a Lasting Peace?

These five Middle Eastern instances demonstrate that Arab and international diplomatic efforts can lead to the peaceful settlement of conflicts. It is striking that, apart from the 1991 Damascus Declaration (which failed to achieve the establishment of an Arab collective security system), all these agreements led to peaceful settlements that have successfully lasted for long periods of time.

Egypt and Saudi Arabia have never gone back to direct military confrontation or proxy war since the Yemen war was brought to an end in the Khartoum Resolution of 1967.

The Egyptian-Israeli peace has remained stable in the face of many domestic and regional challenges since 1979. Not a single military clash between the two countries has occurred since then.

As for UNSCR 598, which ended the Iraq-Iran war, it was never breached by the two countries. The fact that the two countries have used their military tools in regional conflicts has not led to renewed hostilities.

In spite of ongoing domestic tensions that have not stopped in Lebanon since the signing of the Taif Agreement, and despite constant regional and international interference in the affairs of this small Arab country (by Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Syria regionally; by France and the United States globally), the Taif Agreement has protected Lebanon from falling into the clutches of civil war ever since the end of the 1980s.

These five instances reveal some of the conditions for successful peaceful settlements in the Middle East.

The first condition is the realization by the warring and conflicting actors that they are unable to achieve military victory and their resulting willingness to consider compromises and accept diplomatic efforts and negotiations. This was precisely what prompted Egypt and Saudi Arabia in Yemen’s civil war in the 1960s to accept the diplomatic settlement mediated by Arab countries in Khartoum in 1967. It was also what prompted Iraq and Iran to accept UNSCR 598. Sometimes, warring and conflicting actors reach this conviction in the context of a severe internal or external crisis, such as Egypt’s military defeat in June 1967 that preceded the Khartoum Resolutions in August 1967, or the collapse of economic and social conditions in Iraq and Iran after the long years of war between 1980 and 1988, which prompted the countries to accept UNSCR 598 and the internationally negotiated ceasefire.

The second condition is the presence of visionary political leadership capable of overcoming bloodshed and destruction to make peace. Thus was the leadership of former Egyptian president Sadat. He sought an end to the war between his country and Israel, and to negotiate with an enemy that he had fought in successive wars. Sadat’s commitment to peace pushed him to make a historic visit to his enemy’s capital and to give an unprecedented emotional speech in the Knesset calling for peace and an end to all wars. Sadat’s visionary leadership was instrumental in achieving the Egyptian-Israeli peace in the last years of the 1970s and in sustaining it to this day.

The third condition for the success of peaceful settlements is the presence of strong international guarantees that protect the peaceful settlement and ensure that it is upheld. UNSCR 598 was only possible because of the American, Soviet, and European guarantees. The Taif Agreement was also made possible by the American and European guarantees given to the Lebanese sectarian factions as well as to the regional actors involved in Lebanese affairs (Iran, Israel, and Syria).

Likewise, the failure of the 1991 Damascus Declaration was a direct expression of regional collective security arrangements that were insufficient if rejected or not favored by a great power. The United States, in the wake of its leadership of the 1991 Kuwait Liberation Alliance, was not willing to accept Arab security arrangements in the Gulf. Rather, after winning the Cold War, the emerging global hegemon wanted to spread its Pax Americana to the Middle East. Far from endorsing Arab efforts, the United States in 1991 was busy stationing its troops and building military bases in the region.

What do these conditions mean for the current wars and conflicts in the Middle East, which is witnessing flare-ups in Gaza and Yemen?

They mean that unless Israel, Hamas, and the Houthis resist the temptation of resorting to military measures and embrace negotiated compromises, the ongoing wars will not end. Regional actors, such as Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, can play a constructive role in persuading Hamas to go back to the negotiating table accepting that it will not be part of Gaza’s government in the future and to stay away from military responses to the Israeli strikes. However, only the United States can push Israel to halt the current escalation and to negotiate an extension of the ceasefire arrangements with Hamas. There are legitimate doubts as to whether U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration is interested in following this path. As for the Houthis, while a sustained U.S. military campaign against them could ultimately neutralize the threat they pose to security in the Red Sea and to Israel, it is Iran that can persuade them to change their behavior. However, as long as the Iranian government sees no opening in negotiating a settlement with the United States regarding its nuclear program and its foreign policy interests in the Middle East, it is unlikely that Iran will pressure the Houthis to adopt a new course.

In today’s Middle East, Arabs, especially in Egypt, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, stand alone as conflict mediators and peacemakers without active peace partners in Iran, Israel, or the United States.

The conditions for successful peaceful settlements outlined in the five instances discussed in this article make the absence of visionary leadership in today’s Middle East painfully clear. The region does not have a visionary peace leader like Sadat in the 1970s. It also lacks politicians who are able to either acknowledge the impossibility of uncontested military victories, as Yitzhak Rabin did in pushing Israel to sign the Oslo Accords in 1993, or to promote negotiated compromises as acceptable historical solutions, as Yasser Arafat did in the 1990s to save the Palestinian national liberation movement.

Furthermore, these five instances, which stretched over most of the second half of the twentieth century and were followed by a few less significant attempts in the last decades, make it clear that while regional actors can initiate collective security in the Middle East, such efforts warrant support from the great powers.

Without U.S. security guarantees, the Egyptian-Israeli peace would have been unthinkable. Without international assurances to Iraq and Iran, UNSCR 598 would not have been implemented. Therefore, current Arab efforts to achieve collective security in the Middle East and peaceful settlements of ongoing wars and conflicts are bound to be minimally effective in the absence of positive endorsement by the great powers, especially the United States. Regionally designed and internationally endorsed collective security must be prioritized for peace to be realized.

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.