The effects of the second administration of U.S. President Donald Trump on U.S. democracy are attracting intense analysis and debate. An equally important but less explored question is what effects the president and his new administration will have on democracy globally.
The United States has long viewed itself as, and has in many ways tried to be, a positive international force for democracy, through the power of its example and diplomatic, security, economic, and assistance policies aimed at strengthening democracy and limiting autocracy. These efforts have frequently been inconsistent, undercut by U.S. policies that, for the sake of various U.S. economic or security interests, have bolstered some autocratic leaders. But on balance, for the past eighty years, the United States has been a net contributor to democracy’s global fortunes. With a new U.S. administration that is raising doubts about its commitment to democratic norms and practices at home and taking significant steps to curtail U.S. tools for supporting democracy abroad, that position is now in doubt.
It is too early in the new administration to reach a definitive conclusion about how it will impact democracy around the world. But it is not too early to map out a framework for analyzing the effects the administration is having so far and will continue to have on global democracy as it puts its domestic and foreign policies fully into place. This article offers such a framework. Our hope is that it will be useful to observers and analysts interested in understanding the relationship between the United States and global democracy during the next several years. Our plan is to monitor that relationship going forward, utilizing and iteratively adapting the framework as events unfold.
We divide our framework into two parts. The first comprises the effects on global democracy resulting from the basic fact of Trump being back in power and how the Trump administration is governing domestically. The second focuses on the effects of Trump’s foreign policy on democracy abroad. We disaggregate each of these halves into specific categories of effects and elaborate some initial analytic considerations for each. Figure 1 sets out the framework in brief.
Global Spillover of Trump’s Domestic Governance
Emboldening Antidemocratic Leaders
Some antidemocratic leaders around the world are feeling or will feel emboldened to go further on their antidemocratic path because they assume that they will get no serious pushback, and will perhaps even receive praise, from Trump and his team for doing so. More generally, they interpret Trump’s electoral victory as a signal that the world is moving in their direction politically, that the winds of history are now at their backs.
Hungary’s Viktor Orbán is already a visible case of this emboldening effect. In the past two months, the Hungarian prime minister has made a series of inflammatory statements about his intention to crack down mercilessly on civic groups in the country, which he likens to “stink bugs” that somehow survived the winter and need to be crushed. The recent stepping up of repression in Türkiye, marked by the arrest of the mayor of Istanbul, is a second case. Multiple experts on Turkish politics argue that President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan decided to tighten the political screws further in his country, at least in part, because he now feels safe from any possible blowback from Washington.
Other leaders to watch in the months ahead for signs of such emboldening include President Javier Milei in Argentina, President Nayib Bukele in El Salvador, Prime Minister Narendra Modi in India, President Prabowo Subianto in Indonesia, President Paul Kagame in Rwanda, and Prime Minister Robert Fico in Slovakia.
Inspiring Antidemocratic Copycat Actions
A related but different category of effects comprises those where specific political actions taken by Trump and his team inspire copycat antidemocratic actions by foreign leaders.
During his first presidency, some of Trump’s most frequently repeated illiberal or antidemocratic lines of attack on his opponents echoed widely in the rhetoric and actions of foreign leaders. Three that were especially notable in this regard were the framing of his attacks on governmental structures and personnel as a fight against a supposedly antidemocratic “deep state”; his rejection of disliked news analysis or information as “fake news,” together with his verbal attacks on journalists; and his questioning and eventual denial of the legitimacy of the 2020 presidential election. These strategies were picked up in other countries. In 2022, for example, Brazil’s president Jair Bolsonaro did not concede defeat after losing to opposition candidate Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in the presidential elections, leading many Bolsonaro supporters to believe that the vote had been fraudulent.
Already one new set of negative copycat actions has occurred. After Elon Musk referred to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) as a “criminal organization” and some senior U.S. officials described it as a source of lawlessness and corruption, leaders in several other countries, including Hungary, Serbia, and Slovakia, began investigating and persecuting recipients of USAID funding in their countries.
A potential copycat issue to watch is Trump’s amped-up challenges to judicial constraints on his power. Autocratically inclined leaders in various countries, including Israel, Mexico, and Türkiye, have in recent years been undermining judicial systems in order to govern with less restraint. If Trump and his administration go far in this direction, the power of the American example could widen this trend.
Influencing Other Conservative Parties
Trump’s return to power and his assertive policymaking since being back in office may impel some conservative parties in other democracies to move further to the right, particularly on hot-button issues like immigration, diversity, gender rights, and LGBTQ issues, either out of a desire to join what they view as a rising global trend in this direction or to curry favor with the U.S. president. Such a movement may increase toxic political polarization in some countries, with attendant corrosive effects on democracy.
Australia may be such a case. The conservative opposition leader Peter Dutton, who is often compared to Trump, has waded into the culture wars and positioned himself as anti-woke. Other cases to watch include right-wing politicians in Brazil, Chile, and France in the run-up to the next elections in those countries.
At the same time, in some places, the opposite effect may occur—in countries where anti-Trump sentiments are widespread, conservative parties may distance themselves from Trumpian tropes or policies. One possible case is Canada, where the conservative party, whose leader Pierre Poilievre initially sought to move closer to Trump, sought to partially distance himself from the U.S. president after sliding in the polls. In Germany, Friedrich Merz, the leader of the conservative Christian Democratic Union, which came out on top in the February national elections, has strongly criticized Trump, a popular posture given Germans’ concern about the United States’ decreasing commitment to European security and free trade.
Diminished Positive Power of the American Example
Over the years, many U.S. politicians and diplomats have held up America’s democracy as an example for others. Within the U.S. democracy promotion community, it has long been assumed that the power of example is a vital element of U.S. democracy support. With U.S. democracy now in a state of heightened conflict and uncertainty, this power of positive example is likely to diminish.
It should be noted, however, that the example of American democracy has already suffered substantial damage over the past several decades. The disputed U.S. presidential election in 2000, for example, tarnished America’s reputation as a country capable of competently organizing a national election. Also damaging were the limitations imposed on civil liberties in the United States in the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the country. The rampage at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, shocked many people around the world. Thus, whatever damage to America’s status as a global exemplar of democracy is currently occurring will not represent a radical shift in profile for many external observers, but instead a further step in a longer-term process of erosion. In addition, such damage will amplify a rising chorus around the world that questions whether democracy is preferable to autocracy.
Reduced U.S. Role as a Political Haven
Some democracy and rights activists in other countries have traditionally looked to the United States as a potential safe haven if they are persecuted at home. Having a political plan B helps embolden them to advocate forcefully for democracy in backsliding or autocratic countries.
The new, more restrictive immigration policies of the new administration, including the near cessation of the U.S. refugee resettlement program, make clear the administration’s lack of interest in America serving as such a safe haven. The targeting of numerous foreign students at U.S. universities for deportation based on their participation in university protests, or in other cases for no stated reason, is contributing to the diminished status of the United States as a safe haven.
This negative effect is compounded by the fact that the administration has cut off funding for the programs helping persecuted rights activists internationally by facilitating their escape from contexts where they were in danger and providing financing as a bridge to a safer life somewhere else.
Direct Effects of Trump’s Foreign Policy
Although most elements of Trump’s foreign policy are still taking shape, enough actions have been taken to give some sense of the different ways they will affect democracy.
Uncertain Willingness to Defend the Principle of National Sovereignty
Respect for national sovereignty is critical to democracy’s future in a world of competing powers where some are engaged in threatening and sometimes attacking democracies on or near their borders. Whether the Trump administration will be a force of defense for sovereign democracies is uncertain.
Trump’s soft approach to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, underlined by him and his top advisers being unwilling to acknowledge that Russia started the war and even suggesting Ukraine is responsible for the conflict, has raised serious questions about his administration’s commitment to defending European democracies against potential further Russian expansionism. The outcome of the ongoing U.S.-Russian negotiations over ending the war could clarify this issue.
On China and Taiwan, the administration’s policy is only starting to take shape, and much uncertainty still exists concerning Trump’s commitment to defending Taiwanese sovereignty. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s promise of “credible deterrence” by the United States against China during a recent trip to Asia was a signal of positive intent on the administration’s part in this regard.
The fact that Trump has repeatedly floated the possibility of forcible U.S. territorial expansion, whether involving Greenland, Gaza, Canada, or the Panama Canal, weakens the norm of national sovereignty and potentially gives China, Russia, Rwanda, or other powers justification for existing or contemplated expansive actions of their own. How significant these negative effects will be will depend on how far Trump takes these projects.
Reduced Prodemocratic Diplomacy
For many years, a crucial form of U.S. support for democracy globally has been to diplomatically discourage backsliding leaders from going further down a negative path or to reward democratic reformers for positive steps. U.S. pushback against democratic erosion has been inconsistent, depending on whether Washington has substantial security or economic interests in maintaining good relations with a backsliding leader. Under the administration of Joe Biden, for example, U.S.-Indian ties were warm, despite Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s illiberal drive at home. Nevertheless, when Washington has engaged, its role has sometimes been meaningful. In 2022, for example, the Biden administration pressured Brazilian generals aligned with Bolsonaro to accept the result of the presidential election, a strategy seen as vital to prevent the breakdown of democracy in the country.
Similarly, the United States is at best an inconsistent friend of democratic reformers but can be influential when it does act. The United States was crucial in helping Bernardo Arévalo, the winner of the 2023 Guatemalan presidential election, take office in the face of fierce resistance on the part of the country’s entrenched illiberal elites.
It is not yet clear whether the Trump administration will engage in such efforts. The lack of any stated commitment by the president to advancing democracy globally gives rise to concerns that his administration will not engage in prodemocratic diplomacy at key junctures. The administration’s reported plans to greatly scale back the State Department’s annual global human rights reports and shrink the Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor—key tools for and sources of U.S. prodemocratic diplomacy—underline those concerns. The administration’s muted response when Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan tightened his autocratic grip in March by arresting the mayor of Istanbul was one early country-specific indication. While it will be impossible to know how stronger U.S. responses would change the outcomes of these key junctures, it seems likely that the absence of U.S. intervention on behalf of democracy and its supporters will be felt in many places.
Active Promotion of Illiberal or Autocratic Political Actors
Trump and his team have shown some early inclination to support illiberal or antidemocratic parties or politicians in other countries. In the case of Vice President JD Vance’s statements at the Munich Security Conference in February supporting a greater role for the Alternative for Germany (AfD), Germany’s far-right party, he justified such efforts as supporting increased democratic space. However, his intervention was not viewed as such by mainstream German politicians and observers. Trump adviser Elon Musk has publicly supported the far-right presidential candidate who was banned from Romania’s upcoming elections. Trump came out in full-throated defense of French far-right politician Marine Le Pen after her recent conviction of embezzlement by a French court.
It is not yet clear how frequently and how far Trump and his administration will go in backing illiberal or autocratic parties and politicians in other countries. It is also uncertain how consequential their support will be. Their efforts to bolster the AfD do not appear to have significantly influenced its performance in the recent German elections. But they may be effective in other contexts, depending on the political dynamics at work and the solidity of democratic norms in particular political contexts.
Major Reduction of Democracy Aid
In dismantling USAID, the administration has eliminated most U.S. democracy aid. A small amount survives through the State Department’s Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor and the National Endowment for Democracy, but it is unclear whether that will continue for long. It is possible that some democracy aid will be resurrected as part of an eventual reconstitution of some parts of foreign aid under the State Department, but this is only speculative at present. It is also possible that some other Western governments will provide funding to substitute for some of the lost U.S. funding, but this too is highly uncertain given intense pressures on Western aid budgets generally.
The effects of stopping nearly $3 billion a year of democracy aid will be widespread but difficult to chronicle with precision. Thousands of human rights defenders, media organizations, election monitoring organizations, women’s rights groups, civic education groups, and other types of prodemocratic actors have been weakened in approximately one hundred countries. Numerous programs to bolster political party reforms, strengthen parliaments, empower local governments, and improve governmental responsiveness around the world have been canceled.
It is unlikely that this major reduction of U.S. democracy aid will produce decisive near-term effects on the political trajectory of countries where it has been terminated. But over time it will:
- weaken democratic processes and the basic stability of shaky democracies;
- undercut the United States’ ability to bolster new democratic windows of opportunity when they emerge;
- make it easier for elected autocrats to further squeeze the democratic life out of the systems they oversee; and
- help consolidated autocrats suppress any challenges to their power or any independent information available to their citizens.
Major Reduction of Development Assistance
The administration’s rapid decimation of not just democracy aid but also U.S. foreign aid generally (with some partial exceptions for humanitarian assistance and global health work) may weaken the stability of shaky developing democracies that are struggling to prove to citizens that democracy can deliver for them. It will reduce the chances of success for democratic openings that occur with the election of prodemocratic reformers, who now will receive less assistance aimed at helping them move their countries forward economically.
At the same time, U.S. assistance went to some autocratic governments as well, and sizeable reductions of such aid may weaken those governments, though in most cases, like Jordan and Morocco, those governments have a fairly strong political grip and are unlikely to be politically undermined.
Dismantling of Anti-Corruption Policies and Programs
The administration has pulled back from U.S. policies and assistance programs to fight corruption internationally, an area of significant relevance to the course of politics in many places. This has included announcing a six-month pause in all investigations and enforcement under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, disbanding the anti-kleptocracy team at the U.S. Department of Justice, and eliminating the funding and technical assistance the United States was providing for anti-corruption activists and anti-corruption bodies in other countries. The administration has also taken various actions that may increase the possibility of governmental corruption within the United States, such as limiting regulation of cryptocurrency markets, firing inspectors general at seventeen federal agencies, and initiating plans to establish a sovereign wealth fund.
Corruption will have the opportunity to increase in other countries, and potentially also in the United States, as a result of these policy changes, though it is impossible to predict with any certainty where this will happen and to what extent. Heightened corruption works against democracy by making powerholders less accountable and increasing the resources of actors that seek to distort governmental behavior for their own financial gain. It also leads to greater political instability—citizen anger over corruption has been one of the main drivers of regime change in the past ten years.
Promoting Illiberal Norms in Multilateral Institutions
The administration is seeking to shape the debates in various multilateral institutions, as well as the actions they take, in favor of conservative policies the administration favors, policies that in some cases are viewed as illiberal by the majority of established democratic governments. For example, the administration challenged basic gender equality language at the 2025 Commission on the Status of Women at the United Nations, claiming it violated Trump’s executive orders against diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) initiatives, and also denounced the UN Sustainable Development Goals. The United States’ decision to vote in February with Russia against a UN General Assembly resolution that denounced Russia’s actions in Ukraine can also be seen as a move against a liberal norm (supporting Ukraine’s sovereignty) in a major multilateral forum.
The administration is in the process of significantly reducing U.S. participation in and funding for international organizations and multilateral institutions. It has announced the U.S. withdrawal from the World Health Organization and the UN Human Rights Council and stopped funding contributions to both. As this wave of withdrawals and funding reductions widens, it will affect more international organizations engaged in democracy support and weaken the multilateral domain of democracy support. This will have negative effects on issue areas where such organizations are traditionally helpful, like support for free and fair elections, protection for human rights defenders, and the normative defense of democracy in general.
Conclusions
Both through its domestic political governance and its foreign policy, the Trump administration—like all U.S. administrations of recent decades—will have significant effects on the state of democracy globally. Many initial signs point in a negative direction, raising the sobering question of what will happen to a global democratic landscape already marked by years of erosion if the United States becomes a global actor that is on balance more harmful than helpful to democracy internationally.
The ways in which the second Trump administration may impact global democracy are varied and evolving, and new effects are bound to emerge over time. To name just one example, it may be that the administration’s policies regarding whether and how to regulate major U.S. technology companies significantly affect how those companies operate in other countries and the sorts of influence they have on politics elsewhere. In addition, several of the categories we identify in this analysis may interact with one another in ways that amplify or modify their individual relevance.
The framework presented above is a first attempt to provide an analytic guide for examining this question in detail. It is meant to be reasonably comprehensive, though certainly not exhaustive. The authors plan to continue monitoring the relationship between U.S. political and foreign policy dynamics and global democratic trends to offer a more complete picture as events unfold.
