Introduction
Under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s Vision 2030, Saudi Arabia has deepened its engagement with the Greater Horn of Africa—specifically, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Eritrea. This pivot marks a strategic shift toward a region long overlooked in the kingdom’s foreign policy. Although Vision 2030 has as its central aim the diversification of the Saudi economy, it also seeks to expand Riyadh’s geopolitical influence. The plan is to leverage the Horn of Africa’s agricultural potential and the strategic position of the Red Sea to achieve these two objectives.
Yet competition between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is in certain cases leading both countries to run roughshod over matters of national sovereignty as well as local economic needs. In Sudan, the ongoing conflict will only worsen if Saudi and Emirati differences sharpen, and if their support for opposing parties continues. As for the regionwide picture, all of this fuels perceptions of neocolonial exploitation—by which foreign powers take control of a country’s resources, with little benefit to the local population. Equitable practices are critical to mitigating this risk, and to ensuring something close to a win-win situation.
The Greater Horn of Africa Through Saudi Eyes
Riyadh’s engagement with Sudan, Ethiopia, and Eritrea has evolved from decades of minimal involvement to being a cornerstone of Vision 2030, which was launched in 2016. This new engagement has three drivers. The first is a mission to attain food security by reducing Saudi Arabia’s reliance on imports. The second is intensifying competition with the UAE for geopolitical influence and regional dominance. And the third driver is Riyadh’s bid to counterbalance China’s growing footprint in the African continent.
From Saudi Arabia’s founding in 1932 through the early twenty-first century, the country’s foreign policy was centered on its leading role in the Arab and Muslim worlds, as well as its domination of global energy markets, which accounted for 90 percent of its export revenue by 2000. Dealings with the Greater Horn of Africa consisted in large part of minor religious outreach, such as the funding of mosques in Sudan and Ethiopia, with limited economic activity. Investments in the region were modest, despite the fact that it is home to 65 percent of the world’s uncultivated arable land, and even though 12–15 percent of global trade passes through the Red Sea. The absence of sustained engagement created a trust deficit, with African states in general viewing Saudi Arabia as a distant actor possessing only a limited understanding of local dynamics.
This changed with the launch of Vision 2030. The latter casts the Greater Horn of Africa as a critical frontier for addressing Saudi Arabia’s water scarcity and its dependency on oil to power its economy. Vision 2030 also seeks to address the kingdom’s 80 percent reliance on food imports. To tackle this issue, Riyadh decided to try to enhance domestic production and secure stable, sustainable food supplies by investing in agricultural technology and farmland in African countries. Around the same time, the UAE was also beginning to take an interest in the same region. The stage was set for the Saudi-Emirati rivalry to assume a new dimension.
Historically, the rivalry between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi was rooted in competition over Gulf leadership. It was characterized by Saudi Arabia’s oil wealth and religious authority versus the UAE’s focus on turning Dubai into an international trade hub. Intensified by Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 and the UAE’s Vision 2021 (which was announced in 2010, and which seeks to diversify the Emirati economy and enhance its global competitiveness through innovation and sustainable development), the rivalry began to extend to the Horn of Africa. Here, competition centers on controlling Red Sea trade routes and investing in agricultural programs for purposes of ensuring domestic food security and economic diversification.
Economically, the extension of the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the UAE has fueled aggressive investment strategies. Abu Dhabi’s $442-million stake in turning Somaliland’s Berbera seaport into a trade hub is one example. Riyadh’s multi-billion-dollar deal to develop Eritrea’s Assab seaport is another. This sort of competition can strain inter-Gulf coordination, which could otherwise contribute to peace and stability. For example, the Ethiopia-Eritrea peace deal in 2018, brokered by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, resolved a two-decade-long conflict over borders and Addis Ababa’s access to the sea.
Saudi Arabia also has another concern: China’s growing economic clout in Africa. This development poses a challenge to the kingdom’s strategic interests and investments in the region, particularly in securing food supplies and geopolitical leverage. China’s extensive trade, infrastructure projects, and resource agreements in the Horn of Africa could limit Saudi Arabia’s ability to expand its own economic and political foothold. By offering diversified investments in agriculture, infrastructure, and energy, Saudi Arabia appeals to African states wary of Beijing’s approach, positioning itself as a partner aligned with local priorities. In theory, this strategy enhances opportunities for equitable partnerships. However, it requires transparency and local engagement to differentiate itself from the Chinese model.
For all its economic and geostrategic benefits, Riyadh’s pivot toward Africa, with its emphasis on the extraction of wealth from African countries for the purpose of serving Saudi interests, may prompt accusations of neocolonialism. Riyadh’s efforts to offset China’s increasing economic sway in the Horn of Africa heighten this risk, as does the Saudi-Emirati rivalry; single-mindedly extractive policies pursued by both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi pay short shrift to local exigencies and consequently provoke popular backlash. Steering clear of these pitfalls, which can undermine the region’s aspirations for sustainable growth and also strain Saudi Arabia’s fiscal resilience, constitutes Riyadh’s biggest challenge in realizing its Africa-related ambitions.
The Perils of an Inequitable Approach
In virtually any context, an economic project by a foreign entity that provides minimal benefit for the host country—even if it enriches the latter’s rulers—will stir resentment, ignite opposition, and sometimes disrupt the undertaking itself. Predictably, where Riyadh’s investments in the Horn of Africa have prioritized Saudi interests over local needs, the result has been just that. Extractivism that has not in any way contributed to the welfare of local communities, and has sometimes harmed them directly, does not simply generate resistance and cause unrest; it has cost Riyadh hundreds of millions of dollars in stalled projects and tarnished the country’s reputation. Saudi Arabia is having to reckon with the fact that the inequitable approach is detrimental for all involved.
In 2011, protesters in Gambella, Ethiopia, who were primarily displaced farmers and pastoralists, clashed with security forces over large-scale land leases to foreign investors. The Saudi Star Agriculture and Irrigation Project, a private venture led by Saudi-Ethiopian billionaire Mohammed Hussein Ali al-Amoudi (under Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah Initiative for National Food Security), had leased 10,000 hectares for rice production, with plans to expand to 500,000 hectares. Over the next few years, ongoing displacement and human rights abuse allegations fueled further unrest, while the project struggled with poor rains and management, halving projected rice yields from 10,000 to 5,000 tons. By 2015, persistent resistance and logistical issues forced a significant scale-back, stalling expansion plans. Something similar occurred in Sudan’s River Nile State and elsewhere, where protests against foreign land deals broke out in 2016 and 2018.
Today, dueling Saudi-Emirati investments also risk exacerbating Sudan’s civil war—which erupted in 2023—as they may effectively fund opposing factions, thereby entrenching divisions. In November 2024, the Sudanese government rejected the UAE’s $6-billion Abu Amama port deal. This was due to the fact that the UAE was arming the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the main rival to the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF)-led government. Whereas Emirati economic overtures are seen as extensions of the UAE’s military backing of the RSF, Saudi Arabia is close to the SAF, though it has also positioned itself as a mediator in peace talks between the two sides. Such divergent engagements risk escalating the conflict, as the Gulf heavyweights vie for influence in Sudan’s resource-rich regions.
Another problematic dynamic is at play when it comes to Saudi Arabia’s attempts to outmaneuver China. Beijing is gaining significant leverage over African countries by lending them large sums of money. This has raised concerns that African countries are pursuing unsound financial policies and that China is saddling them with debt sustainability issues. Riyadh portrays itself as a viable alternative to Beijing, offering a partnership model that consists of direct investments, humanitarian aid, and development projects that are ostensibly free from debt traps or extractive conditions.
Yet Saudi Arabia has undermined its own quest by too often focusing on ingratiating itself with governments and neglecting to forge meaningful relationships with the inhabitants of the regions in which it seeks to invest. This approach has continued even after a deal with the government of this or that state is struck. Instead of turning part of its attention to local matters, Riyadh persists in dealing with government officials far removed from rural and underdeveloped regions, thereby shutting out local communities from economic projects—however lucrative—that are subsequently launched in their areas.
Beyond provoking localized opposition that sometimes scuttles deals, inequitable investment projects jeopardize Saudi Arabia’s broader influence and, in the final analysis, severely limit its reach throughout the Greater Horn of Africa. Weak coordination between Gulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, can have a similar effect. For example, competing Saudi-Emirati interests could destabilize fragile countries such as Sudan, turning investments into flashpoints for conflict rather than catalysts for progress, thereby generating resentment among many Sudanese. To avert this danger and ensure sustainable outcomes, it is imperative that relationships be grounded in mutual benefit and respect for local priorities.
Fostering Equitable Engagement in East Africa
Equitability is the foundation of a sustainable investment project. This is all the more so when it allows for the expression of agency on the part of the people who, due to where they live, are most directly affected by the undertaking in question. To build equitable partnerships in the Greater Horn of Africa, Saudi Arabia must adopt three strategies. All three would align its Vision 2030 ambitions with local development needs.
The first of the three proposed strategies that Riyadh should adopt consists of hiring and training locals for jobs that are part of Saudi-funded projects. This is of great importance in the Horn of Africa, where youth unemployment is quite high. For example, in Eritrea, where infrastructure gaps limit job opportunities, training programs in construction or logistics would empower individuals and communities as a whole. Quotas for young people and women would ensure effective participation on their part. Additionally, this lays the groundwork for sustainable growth, as it equips locals with skills that would hold them in good stead for subsequent jobs and projects, whether Saudi-connected or not.
The second approach is the creation, in conjunction with host country governments as well as local municipalities, of legally empowered joint oversight committees. More than town halls and community forums, where grievances are aired but may subsequently remain unaddressed, this ensures transparency and accountability. On the national level, joint oversight committees that adhere to global governance standards would mean that Saudi Arabia is not seen as violating the country’s sovereignty. Separately, local oversight committees would ensure that the people in the vicinity of investment projects have a say in how they are carried out. In conflict-ridden Sudan, where corruption risks are high, local committees could monitor fund allocation and project execution to guard against funds being usurped by conflict parties to the conflict.
The third strategy entails directing a portion of investment profits to addressing critical local needs. Consider Sudan’s water scarcity, which translates to 40 percent of rural households lacking clean water and only 20 percent of arable land being cultivated. Building water wells and irrigation systems would improve welfare and boost agricultural output. Take, also, Eritrea, where only about 10 percent of the rural population has reliable electricity, something that hinders all manner of economic activities. Directing profits toward installing solar panels and mini-grids would provide clean energy to remote areas, fostering small-scale industries. This would not only address immediate energy needs but also contribute to long-term sustainable development.
Notably, these three strategies would dovetail with the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) and Agenda 2063. CAADP is a policy framework established by the African Union in 2003 to accelerate agricultural growth across the continent, enhance food security and nutrition, and boost rural economies through increased public and private investments. Agenda 2063, also an African Union initiative, aims to achieve inclusive socioeconomic growth and continental integration by 2063, with a strong emphasis on advancing renewable energy and a green transition so as to ensure environmental sustainability. All this is of particular relevance to Saudi Arabia, given its massive investments in Sudan, Ethiopia, and Eritrea. Equitable arrangements would not only harmonize Riyadh’s ambitions with the exigencies of these countries, particularly communities in areas where Saudi-funded development and extraction occur, but would align Saudi economic and geopolitical goals with the African Union’s aspirations for the continent. This cannot come a moment too soon.
Conclusion
Only by prioritizing inclusive engagement and local empowerment can Riyadh transform itself from a perceived exploiter into a partner. Should it undertake this transformation, Saudi Arabia would also balance its politico-economic ambitions with the development goals of several Greater Horn of Africa states. Given that the region is becoming increasingly critical to global trade and security, this should be a pressing concern in Riyadh. If it is taken seriously, we may yet see Saudi policies that pursue Vision 2030’s objectives while simultaneously advancing Africa’s path to stability and growth.
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