The October 7 Hamas attack and subsequent region-wide escalation pushed Middle Eastern politics into yet another era of profound fluidity. But it is uncertain whether the shifting dynamics will lead to a new regional order with distinct security, economic, and ideational elements or merely a slightly modified Gulf-centered order. For Türkiye, a key regional power, the evolving landscape presents both opportunities and challenges—ones that are best examined through the lens of Türkiye-Iraq relations given their centrality to Ankara’s engagements with the Middle East and recent transformations across security and economic domains.

The centrality of the Iraq relationship for Türkiye and its engagements with the Middle East cannot be overstated. Iraqi territory is integral to the Kurdish issue in Türkiye, given that the PKK’s current leadership, main bases, and logistical networks are located in the Qandil Mountains, Sinjar, Makhmour, and along the border, rendering Ankara’s security policies toward Iraq paramount in both domestic and regional terms. Iraq is among Türkiye’s top export destinations, with exports reaching nearly $11.4 billion as of November 2025. And deepening the relationship even further is a landmark “oil-for-water” agreement the two countries recently signed to address long-standing disputes over water sharing and oil transit, especially from the semiautonomous Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). Under this arrangement, revenues from Iraqi oil exports to Türkiye are channeled into water infrastructure projects in Iraq implemented by Turkish firms. Together with the Iraqi-led Development Road Project (DRP) and a growing web of bilateral agreements, these developments position Iraq as a central partner in Türkiye’s evolving regional strategy.

Both the weakening of the Iranian-supported Axis of Resistance and the post–Bashar al-Assad reconfiguration in Syria have expanded Türkiye’s room for maneuver, but they have also intensified Ankara’s security concerns, particularly in relation to Kurdish actors and Israel’s growing military assertiveness. Israel’s operations in Syria and its signals of possible support to Kurdish groups have heightened Ankara’s perception of threat, reinforcing the salience of Iraq in Türkiye’s calculus. Ankara has sought to expand cooperation with Baghdad as a means of managing cross-border security threats, thereby elevating its relations with Iraq and engagement with Syria.

Four Pillars of Türkiye’s Middle East strategy

In response to these dynamics, Türkiye’s government, led by the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, or AKP), has recalibrated the country’s regional strategy around four main pillars: 

Reorienting toward the United States. Although Ankara continues to pursue strategic autonomy, it has moved closer to Washington, most visibly through enhanced cooperation on Syria, particularly regarding the post-conflict political order and military de-confliction. Such improved relations with the United States—facilitated by the U.S. presidential transition from Joe Biden to Donald Trump and Russia’s retrenchment from Syria—have reduced Ankara’s need for hedging and enabled it to leverage closer ties with Washington while also advancing its regional ambitions and quest for greater influence and autonomy.

Deepening normalization with Arab states. Türkiye has increased its bilateral and multilateral engagement with Arab countries, aligning more closely with them across diplomatic, economic, and security domains. This effort builds on a normalization process that started at the beginning of 2021.

Domestically resetting the Kurdish question. The AKP and its partner Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, or MHP) have initiated a new process, titled “Türkiye without terror,” aimed at ending the conflict with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan, or PKK). Ankara views the PKK’s cross-border networks in Iraq and Syria and the rise of Kurdish political structures in Syria as core strategic vulnerabilities, therefore making the Kurdish issue a central focus domestically. 

Institutionalizing regional partnerships. Türkiye continues to formalize its relationships with regional countries through energy cooperation, connectivity projects, and other long-term infrastructural and economic frameworks. This engagement approach, which relies on creating economic interdependencies, has historically been an important element of Türkiye’s foreign policy and becomes more visible in different epochs.

The growing centrality of Türkiye’s relations with Iraq can also be easily observed in the large and diverse agenda items of bilateral meetings. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s visit to Erbil, the capital of KRI, and Baghdad in June 2024 and Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani’s visit to Ankara in May 2025 represented turning points in this regard. These meetings broadly demonstrate that Iraq lies at the nexus of Türkiye’s internal and external priorities for several reasons. 

First, Iraq has the potential to become an arena for Iran-Israel-U.S. confrontation due to the presence and influence of Iran-backed militias operating within its territory and their role in shaping regional dynamics. For Türkiye, this makes Iraq not only a neighbor but a strategic buffer and a space where Ankara must navigate complex interactions with Iran over security, political influence, and connectivity projects.

Second, Iraq, and particularly the KRI, is pivotal to the “Türkiye without terror” agenda, as the PKK’s main bases, logistic networks, and operational depth lie in northern Iraq, especially in the Qandil Mountains, Sinjar district, and border areas. Any attempt by Ankara to resolve its long-running PKK issue, whether through military operations or a political process, necessarily involves Iraqi territory. Baghdad’s growing cooperation on counterterrorism and the Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG) role on the ground have made Iraq indispensable to Türkiye’s efforts to reshape the domestic security and political environment. Over the past decade, Türkiye’s counterterrorism strategy has shifted from periodic cross-border operations to forward deployment aimed at confronting the threat at its source. This approach, supported by military positions, armed drones, and automated systems, has been largely effective, making Iraq a suitable case for understanding Türkiye’s evolving security policy.

To consolidate its position at the intersection of emerging regional and transregional corridors, Ankara believes it must institutionalize its long-term regional partnerships with Baghdad.

Finally, Iraq remains an essential partner in achieving Türkiye’s economic, energy, and connectivity goals. To consolidate its position at the intersection of emerging regional and transregional corridors, Ankara believes it must institutionalize its long-term regional partnerships with Baghdad. 

In this sense, Iraq simply is not one component of Türkiye’s broader regional calibration but, together with Syria, it is rather an arena where Türkiye’s strategic adjustments, domestic priorities and long-term regional ambitions converge most visibly. Developments in Iraq directly shape Türkiye’s counterterrorism posture, its approach to Kurdish politics across borders, and its efforts to position itself as a central node in emerging connectivity, energy, and reconstruction frameworks. As such, Iraq functions not just as an external theater of engagement but also as a space where Türkiye’s internal and external policy logics are continuously negotiated and recalibrated.

As a result, Türkiye’s security cooperation and economic ties with Iraq, including major connectivity projects such as the DRP, have expanded significantly. Yet significant challenges persist, stemming from Iraq’s internal instability, the continued influence of Iran, and the fragility of regional dynamics. Türkiye is also constrained by uncertainties in its domestic and foreign policy and insufficient financial depth to sustain its involvement in large-scale connectivity projects.

Security Cooperation

The KRG has historically been Türkiye’s primary partner on the ground for pragmatic coordination since 2008. Yet Ankara’s engagement with Baghdad has been increasing recently. After years of reluctance and criticisms of Turkish operations, the Iraqi central government has moved toward formalized security cooperation with Ankara, including, most notably, by designating the PKK as a banned organization following high-level talks in Baghdad in March 2024. The two countries’ commitment to cooperation was then reiterated in April 2024 during Erdoğan’s historic visit to Baghdad after thirteen years. The meeting marked a major shift in Türkiye’s relations with the Iraqi government, bringing the countries in closer alignment. Changes in Iraq’s domestic politics, with Sudani as a more independent minded prime minister, Baghdad’s recognition of the PKK as a threat to its sovereignty, and sustained Turkish diplomatic outreach have been significant factors in Iraq’s willingness to participate in joint mechanisms. As one Turkish bureaucrat noted in 2024:

In the past, Iraq used to dismiss the issue [security cooperation], stating that it was solely our problem. Some even argued that Türkiye created the problem by pushing terrorist groups toward Iraq. However, the balance in Baghdad-KRG relations has recently shifted more in favor of Baghdad. This shift has also influenced the discourse of Kurdish actors in both the KRG and Baghdad regarding the PKK, leading to a noticeable change in their stance on the issue.¹

Türkiye now seeks to translate these developments into more institutionalized arrangements, such as joint operations centers and border security architecture and coordinated military planning. Ankara is aiming for a stable and predictable (rather than ad hoc) security framework. Several Turkish policy actors have emphasized the desire for “institutionalization” and “sustainability in bilateral relations beyond election cycles.”²

Progress, however, has been neither smooth nor uncontested and remains fraught with challenges. Fragmentation between Baghdad and Erbil, among Kurdish groups, and between Arab parties regularly undermines the coherence of Türkiye’s counter-PKK efforts. For instance, Iran-backed militias, which hold substantial influence in the Sinjar area at the border with Türkiye, limit Ankara’s efforts to build a stable security mechanism and increase the risk of escalation with Iran. Furthermore, Iraq’s willingness to institutionalize security cooperation is constrained by its sovereignty-related sensitivities, especially if Baghdad is perceived as legitimizing a long-term military presence. For example, the proposal to transform the Turkish base in Bashiqa, Iraq, into a Türkiye-Iraq Joint Training and Coordination Center has yet to be realized.

Finally, Iraq sits at the intersection of broader persistent conflicts, making strategic coordination difficult to sustain. Iran’s post–October 7 strategic repositioning is particularly consequential. The country’s affiliated networks such as Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) in Iraq not only intensify competition between Iran and Türkiye but also constrain Türkiye’s room for maneuver in Iraq.

As a result, while Türkiye-Iraq security cooperation has made clear progress, it is contingent on Iraq’s political stability, alignment between Baghdad and the KRG, improvements in the wider geopolitical environment, and a successful domestic Kurdish process in Türkiye.

Energy and Connectivity Cooperation

Both Türkiye and Iraq view economic integration and infrastructure development as mutually beneficial, reinforcing Türkiye’s ambition to position itself as a regional hub and Iraq’s desire to diversify its economy and rebuild state capacity. Yet there are structural, financial, and political constraints.

Energy has long been a cornerstone of Türkiye-Iraq relations, particularly because of the Kirkuk–Ceyhan oil pipeline and Ankara’s close cooperation with the KRG in exporting northern Iraqi oil. However, disputes between Baghdad and Erbil, especially over revenue sharing and control of oil exports, have repeatedly disrupted flows. The 2023 arbitration ruling against Türkiye further complicated matters, resulting in the suspension of oil exports.

Nevertheless, as part of a recent rapprochement, Ankara, Baghdad, and Erbil moved to build a trilateral framework for energy cooperation, focusing on reviving and upgrading the Kirkuk–Ceyhan pipeline, agreeing to a new revenue-sharing formula that would be acceptable to both Baghdad and Erbil, as well as developing natural gas cooperation. Türkiye leveraged its increased policy coherence with the United States, which in turn played a role in mediating an agreement between Baghdad and Erbil to facilitate the building process. In September 2025, after more than two years, oil began flowing to Ceyhan, Türkiye, again, illustrating how Ankara used improved alignment with Washington to strengthen relations with both Erbil and Baghdad.

Beyond energy, connectivity has become the most forward-looking component of Türkiye-Iraq economic cooperation, symbolized by the ambitious DRP. The multibillion-dollar corridor linking Iraq’s Al Faw Grand Port to Ovaköy in Türkiye positions Ankara as a main gateway to Europe while deepening its ties with Iraq, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Qatar. For Türkiye, the DRP aligns with its broader strategy of institutionalizing regional partnerships and consolidating its position at the intersection of emerging transregional corridors. Led by Iraq, but anchored by a 2024 memorandum of understanding signed by Türkiye, Iraq, UAE, and Qatar, the DRP reflects Türkiye’s active role in advancing its interests in the Gulf through economic statecraft. Interviews with Turkish bureaucrats confirm Ankara’s heavy involvement in shaping the initiative.³ The 2024 agreement can also be interpreted as a joint Turkish-Iraqi response to the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) announced in 2023. President Erdoğan has publicly criticized the IMEC, insisting that there can be “no corridor without Turkey.”

The DRP offers multiple advantages for Türkiye. Based on official documents and interviews, it strengthens Türkiye’s role as a transit country in global trade by integrating Gulf maritime routes, supports Iraq’s economic revival in ways that may benefit Turkish industry and construction firms, and contributes to Türkiye’s own rail integration through new cross-border connections.⁴ It also promises unprecedented logistical, industrial, and energy integration between Türkiye, Iraq, and the Gulf. The Turkish segment of the DRP was formally initiated in October 2025 with the launch of an Environmental Impact Assessment for a 25 kilometer railway connecting the Turkish border towns of Cizre and Ovaköy. While on the Iraqi side, completion of one of the five navigation channels planned for Al Faw Grand Port was announced in November 2025.

Despite these advancements, however, several constraints remain: Iraq’s limited financial power, especially given the current low oil prices; its inadequate bureaucratic capacity; and the ongoing security risks in Iraq and constant difficulties in Baghdad-Erbil relations.

Multilateral Cooperation

The collapse of the Assad regime in Syria in December 2024 generated significant concerns in Baghdad, particularly due to the prominent role of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham—a recently dissolved group with former links to al-Qaeda—and its previous leader, now Syrian President Ahmad al-Shaara, in shaping the post-Assad political landscape. Iraqi officials fear that the dominance of such actors in Syria could empower groups hostile to Baghdad and exacerbate sectarian polarization. Another pressing issue is the fate of many self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS) fighters, as well as family members originally from Iraq who remain in detention camps in Syria.

Türkiye has stepped in to facilitate dialogue between Iraq and Syria and spearhead initiatives to contain regional security risks.

Amid this uncertainty, Türkiye has stepped in to facilitate dialogue between Iraq and Syria and spearhead initiatives to contain regional security risks. A multilateral forum involving Türkiye, Iraq, Syria, and Jordan was launched in Amman on March 9, 2025, to coordinate counterterrorism efforts, especially against IS, and support stabilization of Syria. For Ankara, this initiative also serves to demonstrate to the Trump administration Türkiye’s capacity to add value to regional security and the fight against IS—reflecting a broader effort to increase policy coherence with Washington. Crucially, Ankara was successful in its attempt to prove the argument that the United States’ reliance on the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) is no longer necessary.

In this context, Ankara’s role offers Baghdad an avenue to recalibrate its ties with the new Syrian government, giving another regional dimension to Türkiye-Iraq relations. At the same time, efforts by Türkiye and several Arab states to normalize Iraq-Syria relations have faced resistance from Shiite-factions aligned with Iran, constraining Sudani’s room for maneuver. The episode surrounding Sudani’s public announcement that Shaara would be invited to the May 2025 Arab League Summit in Baghdad illustrates the constraints imposed by Iraq’s fragmented political landscape: Shaara did not attend due to protests and explicit threats from several Iraqi political leaders and armed groups. Deep divisions among Shiite factions, particularly between Iran-aligned groups and those favoring a more balanced regional policy, continue to constrain Baghdad’s policy options.

Outlook for Türkiye and Its Relations with Iraq

Türkiye is likely to continue consolidating its four pillars of regional engagement.

Reorienting toward the United States. Türkiye’s reorientation toward the United States, and the resulting convergence of interests in Iraq is likely to progress throughout 2026. As post-election bargaining intensifies, Iraq will remain a crowded arena where Türkiye and the United States operate alongside Iran. After winning a third of the seats in Iraq’s parliament, Iran-backed parties are expecting to form the next government. Consequently, Türkiye-Iran rivalry in Iraq will inevitably persist as a structural feature—playing out through competing influence in the KRI, their respective relationships with the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), their leverage in Baghdad, and their overlapping political and economic networks. Closer U.S.-Türkiye alignment is likely to sharpen these competitive dynamics, making Iraq one of the most consequential theaters. Notably, the Trump administration’s constant push for the disarming and dismantling of Iraq’s Iran-backed PMF, as well as the appointment of a U.S. Special Envoy to Iraq, both signal renewed U.S. interest in the country.

Türkiye’s reorientation toward the United States is most visible in Syria and, depending on the trajectory of Syria’s political transition, is likely to have spillover effects on Iraqi politics and Ankara’s indirect competition with Iran. As one Middle East scholar notes, “Turkey’s growing influence in Syria has emboldened Iraqi factions—most notably the KDP and several Sunni Arab groups—who are increasingly disillusioned with Iran.” Developments in Syria therefore serve as an important multiplier for Türkiye’s position in Iraq.

At the same time, the direction of U.S. policy has remained a key intervening variable. Until January 2026, divisions within the Trump administration over maintaining a military presence in Syria, justified primarily by counter-Islamic State objectives, created uncertainty. Tensions over the SDF further complicated U.S.-Türkiye cooperation in Syria and Türkiye’s domestic reset of the Kurdish issue. While U.S. Ambassador to Türkiye and Special Envoy for Syria Tom Barrack had emphasized integration as a policy objective, this approach did not have uniform support across the administration. As a result, Ankara faced significant challenges in shaping its policies for the engagement of Syria, reorientation toward the United States, and the “Türkiye without terror” process—challenges that reverberate across Türkiye’s engagement with Iraqi actors, further complicating Ankara’s regional strategy. These challenges, however, appear to have been partially alleviated through Barrack’s declaration that the United States is now able to ally with Damascus against IS and SDF support is no longer needed. This shift has deepened Türkiye’s realignment with the United States over Syria, resulting in the loss of SDF’s political and military control over significant territories and in the de facto dismantling of SDF with the defection of Arab tribes. The new ceasefire deal between Damascus and SDF, signed on January 27, 2026, reinforced this trend, resulting in the handover of the oil fields and control of Türkiye-Syria border crossings.

At the same time, however, Türkiye has continued to diversify its diplomatic contacts to achieve its objectives. In 2024 and 2025, Ankara engaged directly with the PMF through several meetings between Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Hakan Fidan and PMF leader Falih al-Feyyad. Türkiye sought this controlled engagement first and foremost to bolster its containment of PKK forces in the Sinjar region. Notably, there are also indications that elements within the PMF are themselves reassessing aspects of their relationship with Iran, opening limited but potentially significant space for tactical maneuvering by Ankara.  

Deepening normalization with Arab states. Türkiye’s deepening relations with Baghdad will continue to play a role in wider normalization efforts. As stated above, Iraq and Türkiye recently joined a multilateral forum with Jordan and Syria to intensify cooperation against terrorism. Türkiye, alongside Qatar and the UAE, is also actively engaged in the Iraqi-led DRP. In June 2025, the Turkish minister of transport and infrastructure proclaimed that Türkiye was close to completing the preparation process for its initial DRP project. Overall, Ankara seems to be carefully situating its bilateral relations with Iraq within its broader strategy of rapprochement with Arab countries; it wants to steer clear of an appearance of dominance in Iraq that might create a negative reaction from Arab countries.

Domestically resetting the Kurdish question. Türkiye’s recalibration, initiated in fall 2024 and subsequently institutionalized through the establishment of a parliamentary commission, will likely be a principal axis of its regional engagement in 2026 and its relations with Iraq. This resetting initiative, closely intertwined with developments in both Iraqi and Syrian Kurdish politics, is not unidirectional: Kurdish political actors in Iraq and Syria also shape its parameters and trajectory. For example, in late 2025, when former Iraqi Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani visited Türkiye for a symposium on Kurdish literature, he brought heavily armed security guards, sparking a significant domestic controversy and public debate regarding the sustainability and direction of the domestic reset. Even Devlet Bahçeli, the leader of Türkiye’s Nationalist Movement Party and one of the initiative’s most committed supporters, felt compelled to issue highly critical remarks.

Structural dynamics will also continue to influence this domestic process, particularly the implementation of the deal to integrate the SDF into the Syrian national army and the broader challenges of state-building in Syria. Türkiye remains deeply involved in these negotiations, rendering developments in Syria—whether armed clashes or rhetorical escalation between Kurdish forces and the central authorities—immediately salient for domestic political debates in Türkiye. Ankara has consistently sought to link progress in the domestic reset to developments in Syria. While Türkiye’s domestic politics have long been influenced by Middle Eastern regional dynamics—and while issues of nationalism, secularism, and Islamism have historically mediated relationships—the current degree of entanglement is unprecedented. Encouraged by what Ankara perceives as diplomatic, military, and political relative successes in the KRI and in Iraq, Türkiye is now pursuing an equally, if not more, expansive and deeply embedded presence in Syria. Yet the intermingling of the domestic Kurdish process in Türkiye with the developments in Iraq and Syria will continue to create a complex, multilevel political and strategic game.

Institutionalizing regional partnerships. After years of deliberation in the permanent bilateral councils on water, the 2025 oil-for-water deal seems to be bringing a concrete, institutionalized solution to the matter. Iraq is found to be ‘‘highly exposed to climate change–related extreme weather events.” Water scarcity affects critical parts of social and political life, including food security. The deal will channel revenues from Iraqi oil exports via Türkiye into large-scale water infrastructure projects in Iraq implemented by Turkish firms. Framed by Turkish officials as a landmark investment, the deal is presented as a potential turning point for rehabilitating Iraq’s water systems. This is an example of Türkiye’s eagerness to institutionalize partnerships at a government-to-government level. This year, Türkiye will likely work toward similar accords in other domains, as demonstrated by Sudani’s last visit to Iraq to sign broad-ranging agreements on defense and telecommunications, for example.

Momentum in Bilateral Relations

Several stress tests are ahead for the domestic reset on the Kurdish issue and the Syrian integration process. Any pause or friction in one process will negatively impact the other. Another potential challenge is any military conflict between Israel and/or the United States and Iran. Although Türkiye benefits from Iran’s diminished influence in the region and would benefit from a further decrease in Iraq, a military conflict would probably spill over to Iraq and cause security cooperation and critical connectivity projects, including the DRP, to be paused. A third challenge will be the U.S. mediation process between Türkiye and Israel, particularly in Syria but also generally in the region. Any escalation of Türkiye-Israel tensions would risk damaging the four pillars of Türkiye’s regional engagement. Overall, the sustainability of Türkiye’s current strategy and relations with Iraq will depend on its ability to simultaneously manage these interconnected stress tests without allowing disruptions in one arena to spillover to the others.

For Türkiye-Iraq relations to generate mutually reinforcing gains in prosperity and stability, sustained momentum in the DRP is essential. Incremental yet visible progress in connectivity and economic integration can incentivize deeper security cooperation. The pace of the project hinges on two critical factors: Iraq’s post-election government makeup and progress on the Ovaköy border crossing, where Turkish policy choices are important. Delays risk weakening the project’s political appeal, even if financing arrangements advance.

Progress on the security track likewise depends on policy coherence and momentum. Advancing the “Türkiye without terror” process to a politically legible stage and reaffirming the new Iraqi government’s commitment to bilateral security frameworks would help institutionalize cooperation, reduce uncertainty, and enhance Ankara’s capacity to engage Iraq through institutionalized rather than reactive policies. Sustained progress across both economic and security tracks is therefore critical for anchoring Türkiye-Iraq relations amid a fluid regional landscape.

Acknowledgments

This paper is part of a research project, Türkiye-Iraq Relations: Opportunities and Tensions in Security and Connectivity. It is a project of the Centre for Applied Turkey Studies’ (CATS) network, housed at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik in Berlin and funded by Stiftung Mercator and the Federal Foreign Office. The CATS Network is an international group of think tanks and research institutions working on Türkiye.