Little is expected from the Washington summit between U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping. What would constitute a success? A failure?

Sheena Chestnut Greitens: The previous Xi-Trump meeting produced few concrete deliverables, and many people seem to expect this summit to also be more about spectacle than substance.

In any new presidential administration, Beijing often focuses on getting some kind of conceptual agreement to guide the bilateral relationship first, then seeks to fill in details in later meetings, including the one this week and others that might occur later this year. Beijing seemed pleased with the conceptual agreement it reached with the Trump administration on “constructive strategic stability” as the big-picture vision—but it is unclear whether this summit will move the ball forward toward concrete deliverables that address either country’s key priorities.

Tong Zhao: Trump and Xi’s conceptual agreement in May raised hopes that the two sides might begin to contain their intensifying competition over nuclear weapons, counterspace capabilities, and other strategic technologies. Rooted in Cold War nuclear arms control, “strategic stability” has traditionally meant making efforts to reduce the risk of catastrophic conflict. Yet no official bilateral dialogue on these issues has followed, even as military competition continues apace and becomes increasingly entangled with AI and other disruptive technologies. The Washington summit will be closely watched for any signal that the two leaders are prepared to open nuclear or broader arms-control talks.

Oriana Skylar Mastro: In the military realm, success would largely be maintaining the status quo. On Taiwan, this means no change in U.S. Taiwan policy, to include how Trump describes it and an arms package that keeps moving through the normal interagency and congressional process on a normal timeline without consultation with Beijing. Re-establishing crisis and military-to-military channels that function is a summit deliverable that would help reduce the risk of miscalculation between the two sides.

Failure is the opposite side of the coin, to include a shift in formulation, even a subtle one, of U.S. Taiwan policy (such as moving from “do not support” to “oppose” Taiwan independence) or if Trump improvises and says something that weakens the credibility of U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan if attacked. It would also be a failure if arms sales are quietly shelved or deferred indefinitely to preserve the atmosphere.

Ultimately, Beijing’s strategy is incremental rather than transactional. It is not looking for one large concession it can be blamed for extracting; it is looking for an accumulation of small deferrals that eventually become de facto policy change without anyone announcing one. The asymmetry is also worth naming: Xi gains the optics of a co-equal White House visit regardless of outcome, so his downside is limited.

Yukon Huang: Security concerns and protectionism have ratcheted up barriers and restrictions on bilateral investment flows. Trump has hinted that Chinese investment in building domestic capacity in the sensitive area of electric vehicles and related key components such as batteries might be welcome, but there is widespread political sentiment against such activities. Also, Beijing continues to be highly restrictive in allowing foreign investment in financial and digital services. Any agreement to encourage more foreign investment in such areas would be surprising.

What should third countries—especially in Asia—watch during the visit?

Oriana Skylar Mastro: The worry is not the specific arms package; it is the precedent that transactions, not trust, now drive U.S. policy.

Xi’s likely approach is not to propose a deal over Taiwan directly, but to frame reduced arms sales and a smaller U.S. military footprint in Asia as steps required to improve the overall relationship. If Taiwan arms sales slow while tariff and rare earth issues move, every ally in the region will believe U.S. security commitments can be sold to gain leverage in trade negotiations with China. Any reduction in U.S. operational activity would hit Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and Australia directly, not just Taipei. And the optics would exacerbate the situation as it would look like two great powers deciding the future of the region without any input from U.S. allies.

Tong Zhao: Several Asian countries may worry that the summit could move the region closer to a de facto U.S.–China condominium, in which the two powers dictate the regional security order at the expense of smaller states. From their perspective, strategic stability between superpowers may embolden lower-level coercion against weaker third parties.

U.S. allies already facing Chinese pressure may view Trump’s perceived deference to Xi with alarm. In particular, Japan and South Korea will seek reassurance that Washington views its alliances not as obstacles to U.S.–China stability, but as pillars of regional security.

Sheena Chestnut Greitens: U.S. allies will be watching whether the Trump administration’s efforts to reach a modus vivendi with China—or to structure “deals” that are, in the president’s eyes, good for the United States—lead to compromises that detract from U.S. commitment to the security of its allies and partners, whether that is South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, or somewhere else. 

What will you be watching for?

Tong Zhao: Given the frequent high-level exchanges between Chinese and Iranian officials, watch whether Beijing offers to play any concrete role in mediating the Iran conflict and what it seeks from Washington in return. Both would reveal China’s approach to nuclear proliferation and its broader strategic ambitions in the Middle East and beyond.

Equally consequential, if more politically sensitive, is any substantive discussion of North Korea. The issue may get only a passing mention in official readouts, but U.S.—China coordination will be necessary to contain proliferation risks in the Asia-Pacific over the long term and could facilitate a possible resumption of diplomacy between Washington and Pyongyang in the nearer term.

Oriana Skylar Mastro: The real measures come after both leaders leave the room. I’ll be looking mainly for three things. First, whether the Chinese military’s operational tempo around Taiwan—joint patrols, median line crossings, coast guard activity, etc.—declines in the weeks after. Second, whether military-to-military communication genuinely resumes at the working level. Third, whether the $14 billion arms package to Taiwan proceeds on schedule and is formally notified to Congress. I would also read the Chinese and English readouts side by side, to mark any discrepancies.

Even if all three indicators improve, I would see this as a temporary easing of tension, not a resolution of conflicting interests.

Sheena Chestnut Greitens: It’s also worth watching for signals on the future direction of U.S.—China law enforcement cooperation, since this administration has particularly leaned into law enforcement cooperation with China on counterdrug and immigration issues, which are two big domestic priorities for the Trump administration. There’s a tension, however, between the United States’ current desire to partner with the Chinese Ministry of Public Security on issues such as countering fentanyl and how Washington addresses the ministry’s growing role in building China’s influence and rewriting global governance in ways that could be detrimental to U.S. interests and values.