On December 1, 2005, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace hosted a meeting entitled “A Simmering Fire in East Asia: Averting Sino-Japanese Strategic Conflict.” The speakers were Minxin Pei, Director of the Carnegie Endowment’s China Program; Michael Swaine, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment; and Mike Mochizuki, U.S.-Japan Relations Chair at George Washington University. Carnegie’s Albert Keidel moderated the discussion. The discussion was held in conjunction with the release of a policy brief, “Simmering Fire in East Asia,” by Dr. Pei and Dr. Swaine.
IMGXYZ435IMGZYXMinxin Pei opened the discussion by identifying China’s role in the creation and persistence of Sino-Japanese tensions. He argued that China missed opportunities to reach out to Japan during the 1990s. During this period, a generational shift in Chinese leadership occurred and the leaders of the rapprochement era passed away. China focused on improving relations with the United States and took Japan’s goodwill for granted. Advocating positive relations with Japan was risky in the context of Chinese domestic politics. China’s “patriotic education” campaign, while not directed against Japan, nevertheless resulted in negative shifts in public sentiment toward Japan that were amplified by the media. In addition, the Chinese government exhibited poor crisis-management ability regarding Sino-Japanese crises such as the Asian Cup incident, the Chinese submarine intrusion, and the April 2005 protests in China. While Chinese President Hu Jintao did initially appear to be interested in better relations with Japan, Koizumi’s decision to visit the Yasukuni shrine in October 2005 resulted in a stalemate between the two countries.
Michael Swaine argued the United States must more unambiguously explain why the current state of Sino-Japanese relations does not serve U.S. interests. He acknowledged that the perception in China and elsewhere in Asia that the United States benefits from weaker Sino-Japanese relations makes taking a stronger role in discussions of Sino-Japanese relations more difficult for the United States. Nevertheless, deteriorating Sino-Japanese relations harm U.S. and regional interests by lessening cooperation on issues like the Six Party Talks, undermining incentives for continued Sino-Japanese economic and financial ties, increasing the potential influence in each country of ultra-nationalistic ideas, strengthening the possibility that the United States will be drawn into a dispute with China over a Sino-Japanese conflict, and increasing the polarization in Asia as a whole.
Dr. Swaine suggested several concrete initiatives the United States should take to improve Sino-Japanese relations. First, the United States should encourage the establishment of a tripartite commission to study the history issue, beginning with the textbook dispute. Secondly, the United States should encourage the establishment of an Asian regional energy consortium to promote the efficient use of power, strengthen the bargaining positions of China and Japan, and avoid costly competition for energy resources. Additionally, the United States should advocate the creation of a regional security dialogue between the United States, China, and Japan, and possibly including South Korea. Fourth, the United States should quietly explore alternatives to the Yasukuni Shrine visits, such as the creation of an alternative secular shrine. Finally, the United States should establish the basis for a set of accommodations between the two countries to lessen tensions by first consulting with the Japanese and then consulting with the Chinese.
Mike Mochizuki discussed how perception gaps between China and Japan on issues like militarization, history, and the East China Sea, the failure to reciprocate the goodwill gestures of the other side, and misunderstandings of the other side’s position on the Yasukuni Shrine visits cause the deterioration of bilateral relations. Dr. Mochizuki suggested that the existence of Japanese textbooks that tone down, though do not actually distort, history is the result of a nationalistic backlash against the screening policy implemented by the Ministry of Education following the 1982 textbook controversy, which resulted in the approval of liberal textbooks. In addition, Dr. Mochizuki proposed resolving the East China Sea conflict by redefining the issue in terms of economic costs and benefits rather than territory, and assigning rights based on the amount of investment in development projects in the Sea.
Question and Answer Session:
Q. Is it in the interest of the United States to promote some degree of tension in Sino-Japanese relations?
Michael Swaine: The United States does not have any interest in maintaining even a little tension between China and Japan. There is a danger that the deterioration in Sino-Japanese relations will accelerate. The United States does not want to be responsible for maintaining an optimal level of tension. The United States has no incentive to maintain Sino-Japanese tensions unless it assumes that China will be its strategic adversary in the future. Rather, the United States should try to improve Sino-Japanese relations in order to demonstrate to the Chinese that the United States is not simply anti-China and pro-Japan.
Q: How can the United States be an honest broker on Sino-Japanese relations, given the Bush administration’s support of alliance-based policies and its identification of Japan as an ally and China as not an ally?
Minxin Pei: The United States should, at a minimum, make an even-handed statement of general principles at a high level and declare that the deterioration of relations is not in Chinese, Japanese, or American interests, without discussing specific positions on particular conflicts.
Michael Swaine: The United States should see what roles the United States can take that would be beneficial to both sides by consulting with each side in a private and sensitive manner.
Q: Some would argue that the main cause of poor Sino-Japanese relations is not conflicting views of the past, but rather conflicting visions of the future. How can the United States address these underlying strategic issues?
Michael Swaine: There is a tension between the current Asian security structure, which is built on a “hub and spoke” system and a series of bilateral alliances, and the Chinese desire for a new security structure that is pan-Asian and multilateral. The Policy Brief recommends building a dialogue first, and then fixing structural issues.
Mike Mochizuki: There are four possibilities for an East Asian security structure. The first possibility is a modified “hub and spoke” system in which the United States is the pivotal, hegemonic power. The second possibility is the creation of an East Asian Community that excludes the United States and decreases Japanese power. The third possibility is a Pacific Community that expands the number of countries involved. The final option is an expanding community of democratic countries that would exclude China. But given fundamentally different visions of the ideal East Asian security structure, we cannot wait until this issue is resolved to start fixing Sino-Japanese relations.
Q: Some argue that countries that trade together will become risk-adverse and peace-loving. Does the relationship between China and its major trading partners, Japan, the United States, and Taiwan, contradict this argument?
Minxin Pei: One should consider the counterfactual: what would happen if there was not massive trade between China and these countries? Trade may not promote certain relationships, but it does act as a braking mechanism to prevent further deterioration of bilateral relations. While there may still be a ceiling on the extent to which bilateral relations can improve, trade raises the floor on how far they can fall.
Q: Can you discuss the competition between China and Japan regarding relations with third parties? For example, China and Japan have been competing for the benefits from a planned Russian trans-Siberian oil pipeline and China appears to be winning.
Mike Mochizuki: Japan may attempt to gain leverage over China and compensate for the power shift between China and Japan by developing relationships with South Asian countries, India, and Russia to counteract China’s successful regional strategy. With regards to Russia, this strategy has been disappointing and Russia seems to be shifting toward China. But we should realize that India and Russia also have their own strategic interests regarding the competition between China and Japan.
Q: Could the Six Party Talks improve Sino-Japanese relations?
Michael Swaine: Some say the United States has attempted to develop a dialogue related to a Five Party Talk type structure (China, Japan, South Korea, United States, and Russia), but the Chinese government has resisted this by persuading Russia to oppose it. Is this true? If so, to what degree is it true? Why do China and Russia oppose a Five Party structure? These are important questions to study.
Q: How does Chinese public opinion toward Japan compare with Chinese public opinion toward Taiwan?
Minxin Pei: For a long time, there was a ban on polling on the Taiwan issue in China. The question the surveys were allowed to ask was whether the respondent would support the use of force against Taiwan. Of course, the answer was overwhelmingly yes. Regarding Japan, the question has always been whether the respondent’s image of Japan is positive or negative, and what factors contribute to this image. Therefore, comparing polling data regarding Chinese views of Taiwan and Japan is like comparing apples and oranges. Moreover, we do not know the intensity or degree of public opinion toward either country.
