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testimony

Russia: In Transition or Intransigent?

On May 24, 2007, Carnegie senior associate Lilia Shevstova testified before the United States Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki Commission) about the current state of democracy and society in Russia.

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Testimony before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
 on May 24, 2007

Source: Testimony before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe

On May 24, 2007 Carnegie senior associate Lilia Shevstova testified before the United States Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki Commission) about the current state of democracy and society in Russia.  Below are her remarks before the Commission and to the left is the full transcript of the hearing.

Dr. Shevstova:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Mr. Co-Chairman.

Well, it's team leadership, I see. Well, it's a privilege to be here. I'm here for the first time. And I am still excited. And it's honor, also, and it's fun to be here with the best Russia experts.

And in fact, I will try to give you Russian liberal take on Russia's developments and Russian situation. And in many aspects, my narrative will not contradict what we have heard already.

So very short, in a very short one sentence, my presentation will be the following, responding to the question posed to the panel. Russia is lost in transition.

And Russia has got stuck between past and future -  a very uncomfortable position for any political actor. And let's use the metaphor. Russia resembles the skier with his skis pointing in opposite direction.

And many people in Russia think and ponder how long Russia would keep balance in this rather strange and weird position.

What is interesting Russia does not want. It does not have any courage, any resources, no wish whatsoever to return to the past, which is a very optimistic conclusion to make.

On the other hand, Russia has no guts, no courage, no energy to move forward to the future, which, of course, has to more than concern us all, first of all Russia.

In our several points, which it seems to me will be relevant to our discussion -- and I will try also to follow up what my friends have said, and to edge toward Ambassador Dan Fried as elaborated.

Firstly, what is important with Russian domestic situation? What is the crucial issue? Is it authoritarianism? Is it crackdown on human rights and democracy? Well, yes. But in my view, the most important thing is another key word, and this word is imitation.

Russia survives through imitation, imitating the parliament, the parties, civil society, even a position -- even, you know, youth movements and rallies in the streets. Everything is fake.

And when you scratch the surface, you'll find absolutely totally different alternative substance. That's why for you folks and for the west to implement and to form -- to build any coherent policy toward Russia is very difficult, because we are fine on the (inaudible).

But even during the imitation -- which, by the way, is imitation not by default. This is the imitation by design. And Russian political class and President Putin are amazingly skillful and artful in imitating.

But of course, there's also one major trend. When you have (inaudible) ambiguity, you have one definite trend, and this trend today, as my colleagues have just pointed out, is decentralization of power and crackdown on everything that moves on the political scene.

Why? If they imitate, they can go ahead imitating. But there is one law with this type of system and situation. When you have a hammer in your hand, everything else looks like nail, OK?

And there is another law. As Ambassador Dan Fried discussed, the issue -- we are on the verge of changing the boss of the Kremlin.

And that's why not only President Putin, all Russian political class is so nervous, is so scared, apprehensive, because they have to guarantee continuity of power, self-perpetuation of power.

And you can do that only in one case and under one condition, if you control everything. That's why they are so control freak.

Second issue: What about foreign policy? I essentially agree with the analysis of the foreign policy given by my American colleagues. I would add only maybe several brush strokes to this issue.

After 16 years of retreat, Russia is back. And it has regained its confidence. And Russia wants to redefine its relationship with the west, and first of all with the only superpower, with the United States of America.

Russia politically does not want any more be the younger brother or to be the second tier international actor. And Russia has suggested you folks, Americans and Europeans, are kind of a Faustian bargain.

Russia has succeeded to form at least for itself the formula which could be defined as Russia, a partner of the west and opponent of the west. So Russia wants to sit with you, within G-8, Russia-NATO Council, and on all boards in all international institutions.

And at the same time, Russia wants to have the relationship on its own terms. That means that Russia wants you to not to meddle into its own affairs, and not to meddle in the developments in the former Soviet states. These are the conditions.

And under these conditions, Russia would welcome you, business corporations, and all (inaudible) welcome upstream. But of course, Russia will be waiting for you to let Russia downstream. So these are the terms.

And Mr. Hastings, Mr. Chairman, your, by the way, definition of Russia's foreign policy and relationships with the west was pretty interesting. You said cold peace. I would agree. There is no cold war. There are elements of cold peace. You are totally right.

But there is an irony and paradox in the situation that Russian political class, President Putin and the rest, and all candidates who will follow President Putin -- they hate to be in confrontation with the west.

They don't want any kind of friction with United States of America, because the irony of the situation is they want -- all of them want to be Mr. (inaudible) to have their accounts abroad, to have their families abroad, even to rule Russia from abroad, and to have it both ways and leave the Russian society consolidated on the anti- American platform.

So this is the formula and the pattern -- quite schizophrenic.

While it look like -- while it resembles -- of course, I will use the metaphor like driving, you know, horses in opposite direction, but Russians have succeeded to do.

And unfortunately, west and United States politics very often simply, you know, follows Russian. It's very reactive, because it's simply difficult to walk and chew the gum simultaneously, as Ambassador Fried has explained.

And maybe one of the last points, what do Russians think about Russia and the west and United States of America? Sarah Mendelson -- she's got terrific surveys regarding Russia, and she will prove to you, if you would be interested, that Russian mentality -- Russia's political conscience -- is a mess.

And it couldn't be otherwise, as Wayne Merry said. We just freshly from the totalitarian past. But it is very interesting that we underestimate Russians. Yes, 75 percent of Russians want order.

But if you ask them about democracy, they will say -- 44 percent will tell you that we think that human rights are much more important than the state. And even more important, last week, 65 percent of Russians said that they would like to have the real opposition.

And the most (inaudible) for me at least about Russia's conscience and mentality is Russia's attitude toward the United States.

You'll never guess how many Russians saying the United States is a benevolent country. Five years ago, 65 percent of Russians thought that United States is a free, positive, benevolent (inaudible) for Russia; today, 45 percent of Russians.

Despite all this, you know, really nasty anti-American climate in the political life, 45 percent of Russians consider United States as a benevolent (inaudible) comparing to -- and here I'm giving you Pew Foundation results -- comparing to 39 French who like you folks, 36 German, and 23 percent of Spaniards. So Russia is a much more pro-American -- benevolent toward American society.

So you can use that. And unfortunately, the trend is becoming worse. But this is the life in Russia, when the elite, having no other national ideas, tries to consolidate Russian society on the basis of the anti-American feelings. But still, Russians do resist.

Well, and I will miss a lot of issues that are defined -- or at least I elaborated on them in my written testimony. I have only one final comment.

Being a Russian citizen, I am not in a position and I have no right to give advice to the U.S. government. But at least tentatively I can tell you what Russian liberals would anticipate United States government and legislature to do regarding Russia.

We would anticipate you folks demonstrate patience and understanding, firstly.

Secondly, we would anticipate you remind Russia about Russia's commitment Russia has done when Russia has become member of the G-8, of the Council of Europe, of Parliamentary Assembly, and when Russia sign the Helsinki Act.

But at the same time, real liberals in Russia anticipate that you stand by your own principles and practice what you preach, because when we listen to Vice President Cheney when he lectures Russia on democracy, and after that he embraces President Nazarbayev -- when I read from the comments of the representative of the State Department yesterday that, in fact, President Nazarbayev's decision to stay forever means a correct move -- well, we start to suspect that you folks have double standards.

And finally, what we would anticipate you to do -- more engagement -- engagement not only with the Russian legislature, with Russian political leaders, but engagement on the level of society, society to society dialogue.

There are a lot of stakeholders in Russia interested in benevolent partnership, cooperation and dialogue with American society. Of course, we Russians have to sort it out.

But in the end, it's up to you to create benevolent atmosphere for Russia's transformation. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, both of you.

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.