Five problems—and solutions—to make it actually work as a tool of great power competition.
Afreen Akhter
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The Egyptian government’s crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood in advance of the April 8 local elections was motivated by its determination to exclude the Brotherhood from the 2011 presidential election and is likely to persist until the matter of presidential succession is settled.
WASHINGTON, Apr 14—The Egyptian government’s crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood in advance of the April 8 local elections was motivated by its determination to exclude the Brotherhood from the 2011 presidential election and is likely to persist until the matter of presidential succession is settled, argue two Carnegie experts.
In Egypt’s Local Elections Farce: Causes and Consequences, Carnegie’s Amr Hamzawy and Mohammed Herzallah argue that Egypt’s controversial April 8 elections underscore the present backward slide and broad deterioration in Egyptian politics.
Key points:
Reflecting on the boycott, the authors strike a cautionary note on the consequences.
“To the degree that the movement intended to retaliate for the regime’s flagrant actions, its decision may not pay off. After all, keeping the Muslim Brotherhood out of the local councils was the intention of the ruling establishment in the first place. What’s more, the movement is setting a dangerous precedent that the regime will certainly keep in mind: through sufficient political persecution and repression, the authorities can count on the Brotherhood to take itself voluntarily out the political equation,” they conclude.
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Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
Five problems—and solutions—to make it actually work as a tool of great power competition.
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