IMGXYZ2111IMGZYX What are the current prospects for the successful negotiation of a two-state solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict?
Trying to negotiate a two-state solution as if there were a viable Palestinian leadership, no Hamas, no Palestinian civil war, and no ongoing settlement activity has led us to where we are today.
Despite a recent surge in diplomatic discussions, negotiations over a two-state solution to resolve the Israeli–Palestinian conflict have reached a dead end.. The problem is not the solution itself—it still holds some attraction for many of those involved—but the bitter realities on the ground and the utter collapse of a diplomatic process that ignored those realities.
The obstacles are all too well known: leaders who lack the ability or the willingness (or both) to coax their societies toward the necessary compromises; deep (and often quite justified) mutual mistrust; political disarray on both sides; deliberate actions to impose realities that would make a two-state solution impossible; and disillusionment stemming from the fecklessness of past U.S. efforts.
Can elections solve the Palestinian split or oust Hamas from Gaza?
No long-term solution is possible without a viable Palestinian leadership, but this requires a Hamas–Fatah reconciliation, difficult as this may be. Some—both in Washington and Ramallah—have fixed on elections as a device to heal the rift in Palestinian ranks, defeat Hamas, or approve an agreement with Israel. Such proposals are very promising—from the vantage point of 2006. They are no longer realistic.
Elections are possible only after a Palestinian unity government has agreed on them. And that will not happen easily or soon. Nor will it happen without external support.
To turn back the clock, the international community—perhaps most importantly, the United States and Egypt—must apply carrots and sticks, showing both generosity and a heavy hand. The goal must be to force Palestinian leaders to present their people with real long-term political choices, not merely to have unity for unity’s sake.
How might the Obama administration's approach to the conflict differ from past U.S. policy?
Recent speeches by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and by General Keith Dayton, the American official now overseeing training of Palestinian security forces loyal to President Mahmoud Abbas, indicate that the administration will continue precisely where the Bush administration left off -- using assistance to shore up the Palestinian government based in Ramallah, ignoring the Palestinian government based in Gaza, and hoping that the Ramallah government can realize enough success to help lead the path back to a two-state solution.
But if the past two years have shown nothing else, it is that showering Palestinian Authority President Abbas and Prime Minister Salam Fayyad with help, hoping Hamas will disappear, and going through the motions of two-state diplomacy only opens the door to a darker future.
Can the administration use its commitment to help rebuild Gaza as leverage to restart the peace process?
Economic assistance cannot create prosperity in Gaza -- or the West Bank, for that matter -- under current conditions, nor reverse the ascendancy of Hamas and deteriorating public support for the Palestinian Authority headed by President Mahmoud Abbas.
Since 1994, taxpayers in the United States., Europe, and other countries have contributed some $14 billion to various programs in order to demonstrate to Palestinians that their lives will improve under a moderate leadership that cooperates with Israel. Those efforts pay off only when there is political and diplomatic momentum.
When that diplomacy collapses, the fruits of assistance do not merely collapse -- they are targeted. In Gaza, the cycle of construction and destruction is a Sisyphean process: a port, an airport, a power plant, and a set of government buildings have been built with international funds, and then bombed when war broke out, first in 2001 and again in January.
Aid money can mitigate some of the worst effects of the conflict, but it can do no more as long as the conflict continues. Even in the absence of active fighting, there is -- in the words of an International Crisis Group report released in July 2008 -- a "natural ceiling" to any genuine and sustainable economic recovery.
What realistic steps can the Obama administration take to promote progress between Israel and Palestine?
It's important to recognize that talks between Israel and Hamas have been going on since the last year of the Bush administration. The talks deal with some familiar issues -- the terms of Israeli withdrawal, the nature of the cessation of hostilities, the role of international forces, the release of prisoners, the flow of goods, the patrol of borders, and the supply of weapons. But negotiations are now punctuated with violence rather than posited as an alternative.
Making sure these real negotiations succeed -- and only then immediately worrying about the next step -- is a far more promising approach than pretending that the parties can be cajoled, muscled, and jawboned into a final and comprehensive settlement anytime soon.
So the first step is to establish a cease-fire that builds on the common interest of both Israel and Hamas to avoid fighting. Unlike past agreements this one should be clear and perhaps even written. International mediators of the ceasefire, whether Arab or European, must make it more attractive to both sides to maintain: Hamas can be enticed by some opening of the border with Egypt; Israel will demand serious efforts to halt the supply of arms to Hamas.
The second step is to broaden that short-term cease-fire into a workable armistice that can last for at least five to ten years. The armistice agreements negotiated between Israel and its Arab neighbors at the close of the 1948 war provide precedent.
An armistice would allow Hamas to operate freely and govern, and Israel to live free from rocket fire and other attacks on civilians. Neither side could be allowed to use the period to impose permanent changes: Israel would have to accept a real settlement freeze, and Hamas would have to live with an internationally patrolled arms embargo.
Would both sides be willing to accept an armistice?
Hamas has indicated its willingness to negotiate an armistice for years, but its terms have been vague and unrealistic, which fuels Israeli suspicions. But the bottom line of Hamas’s negotiating position has never been tested. In all likelihood, its leaders themselves do not know precisely what they would accept. In fact, they would probably argue vociferously among themselves. A short-term cease-fire would allow international diplomatic muscle to put Hamas to the test and devise an armistice that would be more realistic.
What political dangers would this plan pose for the Obama administration?
Any U.S. effort to engage Hamas would immediately provoke severe criticisms that it violates the long-standing taboo on negotiating with a terrorist organization. But the important question is not whether the United States enters into formal discussions with the Islamist group, but what the United States says and does when other countries attempt to speak with Hamas. On this point, even the Bush administration itself quietly shifted last year when it endorsed Egyptian mediation between Fatah and Hamas.
How can the United States promote a long-term solution to the conflict?
The first task is to encourage an effort to rebuild a Palestinian political system capable of making decisions. That means tolerating reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah -- as long as it leads in the long run to elections and rotation in power rather than permanent power-sharing and paralysis.
The second order of business is confronting each side with the need to make hard choices. Faced with options, both Israelis and Palestinians have a habit of selecting "all of the above." Israel has raced to build settlements while talking of a two-state solution; Hamas has pursued diplomacy and governing while also continuing its bloody version of "resistance." Over the short term, it often makes sense for politicians to preserve options. But over the long run, the result has been fatal to any diplomatic process.
