• Research
  • Emissary
  • About
  • Experts
Carnegie Global logoCarnegie lettermark logo
DemocracyIran
  • Donate
{
  "authors": [
    "Petr Topychkanov"
  ],
  "type": "commentary",
  "centerAffiliationAll": "",
  "centers": [
    "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
    "Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center"
  ],
  "collections": [],
  "englishNewsletterAll": "",
  "nonEnglishNewsletterAll": "",
  "primaryCenter": "Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center",
  "programAffiliation": "",
  "programs": [],
  "projects": [
    "Eurasia in Transition"
  ],
  "regions": [
    "South Asia",
    "India",
    "Pakistan"
  ],
  "topics": [
    "Nuclear Policy",
    "Arms Control"
  ]
}

Source: Getty

Commentary
Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center

Does a Special Case of South Asia Really Exist?

After 1998 nuclear tests, India and Pakistan experienced several crises, including the 1999, 2002, and 2008 events. They have already agreed on some confidence-building measures, though unverified. Do India and Pakistan need a more dangerous crisis to start arms control talks and negotiations on verification mechanisms?

Link Copied
By Petr Topychkanov
Published on Oct 7, 2013
Project hero Image

Project

Eurasia in Transition

Learn More

From September 30 till October 1, there was a Conference in Brussels of the EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, which can be described as the main venue in this field in Western Europe. South Asia was one of the regions discussed very often at the conference. Besides a special session dedicated to this region, there India and Pakistan were mentioned at its every other session as well.

It was not the first time that I attended an international nonproliferation conference which paid serious attention to South Asia. At every single of these events, experts from India and Pakistan argued that their countries' case is very special. They are not the Soviet Union or the United States of the Cold War time. They differ from the cases of North Korea and Iran. Their main controversies are legal (non-NPT states), political (disputed territory of Kashmir), and security-related (trans-border terrorism).

It is difficult to disagree with the unwillingness of experts from India and Pakistan to compare their countries with other cases (generally speaking, comparative studies are not very often both well-based and fruitful).

Yet in the nuclear field India and Pakistan can hardly be regarded as pioneers. They were not the first to invent nuclear deterrence and strategic stability. It was not these countries that first exercised ambiguity and cheating in relations with their rivals. Before India and Pakistan other countries had felt a destabilizing effect of tactical and cruise missiles armed with nuclear warheads. India and Pakistan are not the first to resist verified confidence-building measures (CBMs) and arms control, explaining their positions by inappropriate political conditions and the existing risks of compromising national security.

USSR/Russia, United States, and other nuclear states have already experienced all these policies, many elements of which were present even before nuclear weapons were created. Their experience demonstrated that without verified CBMs and arms control these policies can lead to a catastrophe. That is why several crises made these countries start negotiations on verified CBMs and arms control between USSR/Russia and the United States, and in Europe.

After 1998 nuclear tests, India and Pakistan experienced several crises, including the 1999, 2002, and 2008 events. They have already agreed on some CBMs, though unverified. Do India and Pakistan need a more dangerous crisis to start arms control talks and negotiations on verification mechanisms?

It would not be wise to advise India and Pakistan to learn Cold War lessons. They know these lessons very well, which is evident from a number of serious studies on nuclear issues published in India and Pakistan. It would also be a mistake to deny the particularities of these two countries. Yet India and Pakistan are special rather as states than as nuclear-weapons states. In the nuclear weapons field, they do not really differ a lot from other nuclear-weapons state, despite their non-NPT status.

About the Author

Petr Topychkanov

Former Fellow, Nonproliferation Program, Moscow Center

Topychkanov was a fellow in the Carnegie Moscow Center’s Nonproliferation Program.

    Recent Work

  • Report
    Entanglement: Chinese and Russian Perspectives on Non-nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Risks
      • +3

      James M. Acton, Alexey Arbatov, Vladimir Dvorkin, …

  • In The Media
    Iranian and Russian Perspectives on the Global System

      Petr Topychkanov

Petr Topychkanov
Former Fellow, Nonproliferation Program, Moscow Center
Petr Topychkanov
Nuclear PolicyArms ControlSouth AsiaIndiaPakistan

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

More Work from Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

  • Commentary
    AI in Outer Space: Opportunities, Risks, and the Governance Gap

    How is AI reshaping space security, creating governance challenges, and where does international diplomacy stand today?

      Tejas Bharadwaj, Almudena Azcárate Ortega

  • Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (C) visits the Natanz uranium enrichment facilities April 8, 2008
    Paper
    Demystifying the Nuclear Threshold

    The nuclear weapons threshold is increasingly important for proliferation strategy and policy. Policymakers should better understand the implications of the threshold phenomenon in the current international security environment and plausible strategies to deal with the growing challenge that it presents.

      Ariel (Eli) Levite, Toby Dalton

  • 1990s USS Pennsylvania United States Navy Nuclear Powered Ohio-Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Cruising On Ocean Surface
    Paper
    Nuclear Weapons and the Future of American Power

    It seems likely that, no matter what, the power of the U.S. nuclear arsenal will face erosion, not least in the credibility of its commitments to defend allies and the political durability of those alliances.

      James M. Acton, Ankit Panda

  • Paper
    Threading the Needle: India’s Path Forward with China

    After the chill in ties between 2020 and 2024 that brought India–China relations to their lowest point in several decades, the two countries have engaged each other afresh. This paper argues that there are predominantly four imperatives guiding India’s approach to China, and they exist in an order of priority.

      Saheb Singh Chadha

  • Commentary
    President Lee Jae Myung: A Year in Power

    President Lee marked his first year in office after one of the most tumultuous periods in South Korean politics. Though Lee has enjoyed a high approval rating, a large majority in the National Assembly, and foreign policy victories, Lee and his party’s political fortunes depend on generating economic growth, learning the right lessons from the recent local elections, and managing contentious factional strife within his political base.

      Chung Min Lee

Get more news and analysis from
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Carnegie global logo, stacked
1779 Massachusetts Avenue NWWashington, DC, 20036-2103Phone: 202 483 7600
  • Research
  • Emissary
  • About
  • Experts
  • Donate
  • Programs
  • Events
  • Blogs
  • Podcasts
  • Contact
  • Annual Reports
  • Careers
  • Privacy
  • For Media
  • Government Resources
Get more news and analysis from
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
© 2026 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. All rights reserved.