Other
- +5
Frances Z. Brown, Zainab Usman, Erin Jones, …
{
"authors": [
"Aqil Shah"
],
"type": "other",
"centerAffiliationAll": "dc",
"centers": [
"Carnegie Endowment for International Peace"
],
"collections": [],
"englishNewsletterAll": "ctw",
"nonEnglishNewsletterAll": "",
"primaryCenter": "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
"programAffiliation": "SAP",
"programs": [
"South Asia"
],
"projects": [],
"regions": [
"South Asia",
"India"
],
"topics": [
"Democracy"
]
}
Source: Getty
Other
The Dog That Did Not Bark: The Army and the Emergency in India
The Indian military chose to stay out of politics when Indira Gandhi imposed Emergency rule, despite numerous factors that might have facilitated an intervention.
By Aqil Shah
Published on Oct 17, 2017
Source: Commonwealth & Comparative Politics
In June 1975, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi imposed Emergency rule, capping off a decade long process of the ‘deinstitutionalisation’ of the founding Congress party, increased social mobilisation, and political instability – factors generally considered conducive to military intervention in politics. Organisational factors encouraging military praetorianism, such as military involvement in internal security missions and the growth of ‘rival’ paramilitary institutions, accompanied this process of political decay. But the Indian military did not exploit this window of opportunity. This article offers an institutionalist explanation of the military’s political restraint based on two factors. First, institutionalised mechanisms of civilian control, forged during the critical juncture following independence, insulated the military from politics and the politicians from the military despite the weakening of the political system under which these were created. Second, military internalisation of the norm civilian supremacy, continually reinforced via professional socialisation processes, acted as an internal barrier to military role expansion...
This article was originally published in Commonwealth & Comparative Politics.
About the Author
Aqil Shah
Former Visiting Scholar, South Asia Program
Aqil Shah was a visiting scholar in the South Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Global Views of Biden’s Democracy Summit
- Pakistan’s “Moderate Taliban” Strategy Won’t Hold Up—For AnyoneCommentary
Aqil Shah
Recent Work
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
More Work from Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Early Lessons in the Pursuit of Sovereign AIArticle
As the experiences of India and the UAE suggest, attaining complete sovereignty is unrealistic for most nations. But that doesn’t mean they must depend on the United States or China.
Shreya Joshi
- Senegal’s Debt Crisis Has Moved Its Leaders from Partners to RivalsCommentary
The impacts of the Faye-Sonko rupture could go well beyond the country’s borders.
Lesley Anne Warner
- Post-U.S. International Democracy Support: Aspiration in Search of SubstancePaper
The reinvention of democracy support needs to be carried forward without the clear leadership of one dominant player.
Richard Youngs, Thomas Carothers
- Orbán, Fidesz, and Hungary’s Populist Foreign PolicyPaper
Hungary under Viktor Orbán deployed right-wing populism as a foreign policy strategy, embedding the country in a web of illiberal transnational networks whose legacy will endure even after his April 2026 electoral defeat.
Zsuzsanna Végh
- Managing Divergence: India’s BRICS Presidency in 2026Article
This piece argues that India’s central challenge is not managing a single flashpoint but resolving the underlying tension between expansion and institutional coherency of the BRICS grouping.
Vrinda Sahai
