Other
- +5
Frances Z. Brown, Zainab Usman, Erin Jones, …
{
"authors": [
"Aqil Shah"
],
"type": "other",
"centerAffiliationAll": "dc",
"centers": [
"Carnegie Endowment for International Peace"
],
"collections": [],
"englishNewsletterAll": "ctw",
"nonEnglishNewsletterAll": "",
"primaryCenter": "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
"programAffiliation": "SAP",
"programs": [
"South Asia"
],
"projects": [],
"regions": [
"South Asia",
"India"
],
"topics": [
"Democracy"
]
}
Source: Getty
Other
The Dog That Did Not Bark: The Army and the Emergency in India
The Indian military chose to stay out of politics when Indira Gandhi imposed Emergency rule, despite numerous factors that might have facilitated an intervention.
By Aqil Shah
Published on Oct 17, 2017
Source: Commonwealth & Comparative Politics
In June 1975, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi imposed Emergency rule, capping off a decade long process of the ‘deinstitutionalisation’ of the founding Congress party, increased social mobilisation, and political instability – factors generally considered conducive to military intervention in politics. Organisational factors encouraging military praetorianism, such as military involvement in internal security missions and the growth of ‘rival’ paramilitary institutions, accompanied this process of political decay. But the Indian military did not exploit this window of opportunity. This article offers an institutionalist explanation of the military’s political restraint based on two factors. First, institutionalised mechanisms of civilian control, forged during the critical juncture following independence, insulated the military from politics and the politicians from the military despite the weakening of the political system under which these were created. Second, military internalisation of the norm civilian supremacy, continually reinforced via professional socialisation processes, acted as an internal barrier to military role expansion...
This article was originally published in Commonwealth & Comparative Politics.
About the Author
Aqil Shah
Former Visiting Scholar, South Asia Program
Aqil Shah was a visiting scholar in the South Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Global Views of Biden’s Democracy Summit
- Pakistan’s “Moderate Taliban” Strategy Won’t Hold Up—For AnyoneCommentary
Aqil Shah
Recent Work
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
More Work from Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Duterte’s Populist Foreign Policy as Illiberal Defiance: Consequences and ProspectsPaper
In the Philippines, Duterte-era discourse emphasizing sovereignty, anti-Western skepticism, and strongman diplomacy mirrors tenets of populist foreign policy around the world.
Aries A. Arugay
- The Shadow of the Military in Modern South AsiaArticle
Military rule is now a defining political factor in South Asia. Here’s how analysts can understand and account for it.
Paul Staniland
- India’s Oil Security Strategy: Structural Vulnerabilities and Strategic ChoicesArticle
This piece argues that the present Indian strategy, based on opportunistic diversification and utilization of limited strategic reserves, remains inadequate when confronting supply disruptions. It evaluates India’s options in the short, medium, and long terms.
Vrinda Sahai
- The Impact of Ending U.S. International Media AssistancePaper
The future looks bleak for independent media worldwide, but there is a robust infrastructure of knowledge, organizations, and people to build upon.
Daniel Sabet, Susan Abbott
- Alarm or Caution? Defending Democracy During BackslidingPaper
Defenders of democracy often split over perceptions, methods, urgency levels, and priorities.
Murat Somer, Jennifer McCoy
