Commentary
By focusing only on hard security, the Shield ignores the conditions that fuel cartel power.
Alejandro Martin Rodriguez, Kayly Ober
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Source: Getty
In The Media
Competition Without Catastrophe: How America Can Both Challenge and Coexist With China
The United States is in the midst of the most consequential rethinking of its foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. Although Washington remains bitterly divided on most issues, there is a growing consensus that the era of engagement with China has come to an unceremonious close.
Published on Sep 13, 2019
Source: Foreign Affairs
The United States is in the midst of the most consequential rethinking of its foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. Although Washington remains bitterly divided on most issues, there is a growing consensus that the era of engagement with China has come to an unceremonious close. The debate now is over what comes next.
Like many debates throughout the history of U.S. foreign policy, this one has elements of both productive innovation and destructive demagoguery. Most observers can agree that, as the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy put it in 2018, “strategic competition” should animate the United States’ approach to Beijing going forward. But foreign policy frameworks beginning with the word “strategic” often raise more questions than they answer. “Strategic patience” reflects uncertainty about what to do and when. “Strategic ambiguity” reflects uncertainty about what to signal. And in this case, “strategic competition” reflects uncertainty about what that competition is over and what it means to win.
The rapid coalescence of a new consensus has left these essential questions about U.S.-Chinese competition unanswered. What, exactly, is the United States competing for? And what might a plausible desired outcome of this competition look like? A failure to connect competitive means to clear ends will allow U.S. policy to drift toward competition for competition’s sake and then fall into a dangerous cycle of confrontation....
About the Authors
Jake Sullivan
Former U.S. National Security Advisor to Former President Joe Biden
Jake Sullivan, a senior fellow at the University of New Hampshire's Carsey School of Public Policy, served as the United States national security advisor to former President Joe Biden from 2021 to 2025. Sullivan previously served as deputy assistant to former President Barack Obama, national security advisor to former Vice President Biden, director of policy planning in the State Department, and as deputy chief of staff to former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.
Kurt M. Campbell
Kurt M. Campbell is Chair and CEO of the Asia Group. He is 2018-19 Kissinger Fellow at the McCain Institute and was U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs from 2009 to 2013
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
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