Q&A
- +2
Judy Dempsey, Alexander Gabuev, Rose Gottemoeller, …
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Source: Getty
Other
Rethinking Nuclear Arms Control
Where is nuclear arms control—negotiated restraints on the deadliest weapons of mass destruction—headed?
Published on Sep 15, 2020
Source: Washington Quarterly
Where is nuclear arms control—negotiated restraints on the deadliest weapons of mass destruction—headed? This 50-year tool of US national security policy is currently under attack. The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), the last remaining nuclear arms agreement with the Russian Federation, will go out of force in February 2021 unless it is extended for an additional five years as the treaty permits. At this moment, nothing is on the horizon to replace it, though the Trump administration has promised a new and more extensive agreement that includes China as well as Russia. The negotiators have scant time to finish such a treaty before New START ends.
Nuclear arms control is not “dead,” however, contrary to what is fashionable to proclaim these days. Humankind is now used to negotiated restraint, if only as a way to avoid building up arms that do not defend people and their interests on a day-to-day basis. If we overspend on nuclear weapons, then we underspend on other systems—not just conventional weapons, but also the intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance, communications, and command-and-control systems needed to make our defenses effective every day. Budget and opportunity costs are at the heart of the rationale.
This article was originally published in the Washington Quarterly.
About the Author
Rose Gottemoeller
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Nuclear Policy Program
Rose Gottemoeller is a nonresident senior fellow in Carnegie’s Nuclear Policy Program. She also serves as lecturer at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution. Ambassador Gottemoeller served as the deputy secretary general of NATO from 2016 to 2019.
- The Spectacular Rise of the “Bad Boys” of NATO During the Ukraine Crisis
Recent Work
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
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