Preface
China Local/Global
China has become a global power, but there is too little debate about how this has happened and what it means. Many argue that China exports its developmental model and imposes it on other countries. But Chinese players also extend their influence by working through local actors and institutions while adapting and assimilating local and traditional forms, norms, and practices.
With a generous multiyear grant from the Ford Foundation, Carnegie has launched an innovative body of research on Chinese engagement strategies in seven regions of the world—Africa, Central Asia, Latin America, the Middle East and North Africa, the Pacific, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. Through a mix of research and strategic convening, this project explores these complex dynamics, including the ways Chinese firms are adapting to local labor laws in Latin America, Chinese banks and funds are exploring traditional Islamic financial and credit products in Southeast Asia and the Middle East, and Chinese actors are helping local workers upgrade their skills in Central Asia. These adaptive Chinese strategies that accommodate and work within local realities are largely ignored by Western policymakers.
Ultimately, the project aims to significantly broaden understanding and debate about China’s role in the world and to generate innovative policy ideas. These could enable local players to better channel Chinese energies to support their societies and economies; provide lessons for Western engagement around the world, especially in developing countries; help China’s own policy community learn from the diversity of Chinese experiences; and potentially reduce frictions.
Evan A. Feigenbaum
Vice President for Studies, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Introduction
During President Xi Jinping’s visit to Saudi Arabia in December 2022, a memorandum was inked with Huawei entailing collaboration in cloud computing, artificial intelligence (AI), and building high-tech infrastructure in Saudi cities. The deal was part of a broader “comprehensive strategic partnership agreement” that saw the consolidation of relations between the two countries. Xi described his visit as a “pioneering trip” to open “a new era” of energy and tech relations with the Arab world.1
China’s digital industry has gained increasing prominence abroad, with China assuming center stage as a leading tech power. Over the past few decades, Beijing’s aspiration for global technological leadership has driven considerable investments in digital technologies, including AI. Alongside its traditional infrastructure projects, China has been exporting its digital technologies through the so-called Digital Silk Road (DSR) (shuzi sichou zhilu), the digital component of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Launched in 2015 in an official Chinese white paper, the DSR places emphasis on the establishment of digital infrastructure, such as fiber-optic cables, 5G networks, data centers, smart cities, cloud computing, and AI applications.2 The DSR operates within a complex framework of nonbinding soft law instruments, including memorandums of understanding (MOUs) and policy documents.
At the same time, thriving digital economies rose to the top of the development agenda among planners and policymakers throughout oil-rich Gulf states after the 2014 drop in hydrocarbon prices. This economic shock underscored the vulnerabilities of oil-dependent economies and highlighted the urgent need for diversification to ensure long-term growth. In recent years, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries have witnessed a significant expansion of China’s digital footprint. SenseTime, one of China’s leading AI companies, announced the establishment of its Europe, Middle East, and Africa (EMEA) R&D headquarters in the United Arab Emirates (UAE).3 Over the next five years, the company’s AI Centre of Excellence is projected to create hundreds of jobs, primarily for highly skilled engineers. Similarly, Alibaba, China’s e-commerce giant, has secured agreements to store cloud data in Oman,4 and has already established a substantial presence in Saudi Arabia.
The globalization of China’s digital industry has become a prominent and controversial topic, frequently highlighted in media reports, think tank analyses, and conferences that often label Chinese digital capital as problematic. Much of the existing literature on China’s digital expansion abroad describes it as a threat to challenge U.S. dominance over the global internet.5 Observers commonly assume that China’s digital and information and communication technology (ICT) industries operate as a cohesive, powerful entity, seamlessly exporting a distinctively Chinese internet model to developing countries. In this view, Beijing is exporting a model that has been dubbed “digital authoritarianism,”6 “digital imperialism,” or even more vaguely, “digital Leninism.”7 Efforts to spread China’s model are believed to be channeled by Chinese tech firms and facilitated by Chinese loans. Yet, this narrative overlooks the complexities of how these firms operate on the ground, particularly in relation to local governments, regulations, and institutions. This raises critical questions: What role does local agency play in shaping emerging digital governance frameworks in the region? Do firms headquartered in China act differently in Gulf monarchies from their Western rivals? And are Chinese digital corporations in fact exporting a playbook for data governance?
Drawing on policy research and interviews with ICT experts, managers at Chinese and U.S. tech firms, and policymakers, this paper examines these questions. The paper focuses on the case of the cloud market in two key GCC states: Saudi Arabia and the UAE. It illustrates how tech firms from China and the United States have adapted to local demands, capitalizing on the profit opportunities created by the push for data localization in the two countries. Despite weak data protection frameworks and a history of digital censorship and surveillance in GCC countries, tech companies—regardless of their country of origin—comply with local laws and regulations, including responding to government requests for accessing user data. While this compliance is framed as adherence to domestic legal frameworks, it can enable authoritarian practices such as mass surveillance and the suppression of dissent.
The paper underscores the importance of local agency in shaping the effects of the globalization of China’s tech industry, highlighting how host countries’ policies, governance structures, and strategic priorities play a pivotal role in determining whether the engagement of Chinese digital firms fosters the development of an open or restrictive model of internet governance. Rather than presuming that Chinese tech firms actively promote China’s internet model abroad, this paper argues that China’s digital model may be unintentionally spreading to other regions as leaders in the Global South voluntarily embrace similar practices to pursue their own objectives of data sovereignty and rapid digital development. Beijing's remarkable achievements in fostering rapid digital growth while maintaining strict control over its population serve as a powerful source of inspiration for leaders worldwide.
The GCC’s Digital Turn and China’s Comparative Advantage
Long dependent on hydrocarbons for substantial portions of their gross domestic product (GDP) and government revenues, GCC countries launched ambitious diversification strategies a decade ago. The sharp drop in global oil prices in 2014 highlighted the vulnerabilities of economies heavily reliant on hydrocarbons, pushing policymakers to shift gears. Developing thriving digital economies was a critical aspect of the GCC countries’ strategy for making local economies more resilient to external shocks.8
Countries across the region have adopted national plans to enhance digital infrastructure and innovation. For instance, Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 emphasizes technological advancement, with investments in AI and cloud computing, including partnerships with global tech firms.9 In 2022, the kingdom’s digital economy contributed 14 percent to its GDP, a significant rise from its modest beginnings in recent years, reflecting significant progress in digital transformation.10 The UAE’s Digital Government Strategy 2025 focuses on e-government services and smart city projects, aiming to position the nation as a global digital leader.11 The Emirati government has set a target to raise the digital economy’s contribution to non-oil GDP from 11.7 percent to over 20 percent within the next decade.12 These efforts underscore GCC countries’ commitments to leverage digital technologies to drive economic diversification and long-term resilience.
As countries across the region undergo a critical period of economic transformation, aiming to build knowledge-based economies, a convergence of interests has emerged with China, a country that counts some of the most technologically advanced digital firms seeking to capture new markets. To be clear, the energy sector remains by far the most significant area of cooperation between China and countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). In 2022, more than 41 percent of China's total crude oil imports originated from GCC countries, an increase from 35 percent in 2012.13 Saudi Arabia alone supplied 17 percent of China’s total crude imports in 2023, worth around $53.8 billion, underscoring the deep interdependence between Beijing and the region’s oil producers.14 This growing reliance is a result of China’s expanding energy needs and the GCC’s efforts to maintain its role as a leading energy supplier to global markets, even as it diversifies its economy.
China’s digital footprint in GCC countries has expanded considerably for a myriad of reasons. First, the price competitiveness of Chinese tech firms represents a significant advantage. Firms like SenseTime, Alibaba, Tencent, and Huawei, among others, have proven capable of selling high-quality software and hardware at a lower cost compared to their Western competitors. Some analysts suggest that Chinese digital technologies are approximately 30 percent more affordable than those of their rivals, although estimates vary depending on the technology type.15 A notable factor behind China’s cost advantage is the companies’ access to financial mechanisms like the EPC + F scheme. In such schemes, Chinese tech companies manage the engineering, procurement, and construction (EPC) of infrastructure projects, with Chinese banks providing state-backed financing (adding the F).16
Another key factor behind the rapid expansion of Chinese digital firms across the MENA region, beyond cost, lies in the capacity of these firms to adjust to disparate cultural, political, economic, and institutional settings in different regions around the world. The ability to learn and adjust services has been at the heart of the localization of Chinese digital firms abroad. For instance, when the Saudi government wanted to leverage digital tools to improve the Hadj experience, Huawei stepped in with an offer to develop smartphone apps and internet and TV channels. The collaboration between the Gulf kingdom and the Chinese tech firms is aimed at improving the quality of digital services as well as the pilgrimage experience for Muslims participating in Umrah and Hadj.17
Moreover, a key driver behind the growing presence of Chinese tech firms in the region is their emphasis on training and technology transfer schemes. Chinese tech firms have demonstrated noteworthy engagement in fostering collaborative partnerships with regional universities and facilitating student training initiatives in several MENA countries. At GITEX GLOBAL 2023, an annual tech expo in Dubai, Alibaba Cloud reiterated its commitment to advancing digital talent development in the MENA region.18 The focal point of its educational efforts is the Alibaba Cloud Academic Empowerment Program (AAEP), a global initiative collaborating directly with accredited universities and educational institutions. Through the AAEP, over 55,000 individuals in the Middle East and Africa, including customers, partners, developers, students, and researchers, are anticipated to benefit from Alibaba Cloud’s training resources over the next three years.19 The company has formalized partnerships with the Hashemite University in Jordan and Khalifa University of Science and Technology in the UAE. These collaborations involve the development of technical training programs, professional development initiatives, and research activities, aiming to equip teachers, students, and engineers with practical skills in cutting-edge technologies aligned with sectoral needs.
Beyond the factors mentioned above, many analysts have argued that the success of Chinese digital corporations in the Middle East can be attributed to the authoritarian nature of the region’s governments. This argument posits that since these corporations are dispatched from an authoritarian regime, their operations in host countries inherently reinforce an authoritarian vision of the internet. In the Arab world, China’s model of digital governance appeals to leaders who admire Beijing’s ability to achieve rapid digital development while maintaining strict control over its population.20 Similar to China, countries in the MENA region actively engage in collecting and analyzing citizens’ data from online activities.21 As one example of this argument, Marc Owen Jones’s writing shows through carefully selected case studies across the region how Middle Eastern regimes exploit digital technologies to monitor, suppress, and manipulate both domestic and international audiences.22
The prevailing narrative often attributes the region’s authoritarian digital practices to China’s influence. But does this mean that Chinese tech firms are actively imposing China’s internet governance model on GCC countries? Do these firms operate differently in Gulf monarchies compared to their Western competitors? Furthermore, how do local actors shape the development of digital governance frameworks in the region? Are Chinese companies promoting a standardized approach to data governance that mirrors Beijing’s own practices? The following section examines how both Chinese and U.S. firms have responded to the GCC’s initiatives to localize a growing share of data generated within the region.
Data Localization, Digital Authoritarianism, and U.S.-China Rivalry
In recent years, countries across the Arab Gulf have witnessed a renewed sense of nationalism and sovereignty. This shift, coupled with ambitions to build robust digital economies, has driven efforts to localize data storage in sensitive sectors within national borders. The GCC, similarly to other regions across the Global South, is increasingly motivated to localize strategic data for both economic and security reasons. Economically, local data storage fosters domestic tech ecosystems, reduces dependency on foreign providers, and enhances control over valuable data that can drive innovation and digital industries. From a security perspective, localizing data mitigates risks of foreign surveillance, cyber attacks, and unauthorized data access, safeguarding national sovereignty and sensitive information.
Consequently, countries in the region have adopted strong regulations on data residency, and financial institutions are often mandated to maintain domestic data sovereignty. Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE adopted a personal data protection law (PDPL) that mandates that personal data collected within their respective borders be stored domestically, with transfers abroad subject to strict conditions.23 Similarly, the United Arab Emirates Central Bank Consumer Protection Regulations require licensed financial institutions to store and process consumer data within Emirati borders.24 These measures ensure that financial institutions maintain domestic data sovereignty in the UAE. Saudi Arabia also introduced a separate Cloud Computing Regulatory Framework that contains stipulations about the retention and storage of personal data in its jurisdiction.
To be able to localize data domestically, countries in the region need the infrastructure that enables data storage; that is, data centers and cloud computing. Data centers constitute an essential infrastructure for data localization initiatives. A data center is a physical space within a building or a group of buildings that contains the servers used to store the digital information produced by different types of organizations.25 Their interiors are filled with multiple rows of computer servers and vast quantities of cables and switches, all of which rely on substantial amounts of electrical power. Poetically referred to by Google as the places “where the internet lives,”26 data centers are responsible for the crucial tasks of storing, managing, processing, and distributing large amounts of data and applications needed for the operations of businesses, agencies, and institutions. Often, data centers combine on-premises physical servers with virtual networks, which are known as the cloud and support applications and workloads across pools of physical and cloud infrastructure.27 Cloud services play a pivotal role in AI training, making them an increasingly central focus in the ongoing U.S.-China tech rivalry.
The competition between the two powers over the GCC’s cloud market is intensifying as data consumption in the region is projected to grow by 400 percent between 2022 and 2028.28 According to McKinsey & Company, cloud services in ten MENA countries could generate up to $183 billion in value by 2030, equivalent to roughly 6 percent of the region’s current GDP.29 Leading U.S. tech firms have rushed to capture shares of this lucrative market. Amazon Web Services (AWS) and Google Cloud each operate three cloud regions, while Microsoft leads with four Azure cloud regions. Chinese companies are also making inroads: Alibaba, Huawei, and Tencent have each expanded their presence in the region, underscoring the strategic significance of this market for global technology firms.
The rapid expansion of data centers in GCC countries has raised serious concerns among digital rights advocates as the geographic location of data centers is crucial.30 This is because data falls under the jurisdiction of the country where it is stored and processed. In the GCC, data protection laws are weak and riddled with loopholes, leaving personal data highly vulnerable to misuse.31 In the UAE, data protection regulations grant sweeping powers to government entities, allowing them access to personal data with minimal oversight. Similarly, Saudi Arabia’s PDPL, though a step forward, contains vague provisions that permit government access to data for undefined purposes.32 The PDPLs in the two countries include broad exceptions for cases related to national security, the two kingdoms’ reputations, diplomatic relations, confidential information, and public authorities, effectively enabling the government to bypass the law at will. These gaps in legal protections give governments significant control over data management, undermining privacy and increasing the risks to human rights across the region. Without comprehensive safeguards, the data stored in GCC countries remains exposed to possible exploitation and misuse.
Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE have a history of employing tools of digital authoritarianism through extensive surveillance, censorship, and the suppression of dissent, leveraging advanced technologies to monitor and control their populations. For instance, the UAE has implemented pervasive internet censorship, blocking content deemed politically sensitive or contrary to moral values33, and has been implicated in deploying surveillance tools like the ToTok messaging app, which was reportedly used for state spying purposes.34 Similarly, Saudi Arabia has been reported to use sophisticated spyware, such as the Pegasus software from the Israeli firm NSO Group, to target activists and journalists, thereby infringing on privacy and freedom of expression.35 These practices exemplify how GCC states can utilize digital technologies to reinforce authoritarian governance and stifle dissent.
Against this backdrop, Chinese firms are not exporting technologies designed to impose Beijing’s digital blueprint or implementing a grand strategy to diffuse China’s domestic internet model. Instead, they focus on providing the infrastructure required to meet the specific demands of governments in the region, adapting to the diverse political economies of the GCC. The influence of Chinese tech giants in GCC countries is far from uniform, varying significantly based on each country’s political context and development priorities. For example, after Saudi Arabia emphasized the need for increased cloud capacity to store digital data domestically, Alibaba Cloud became the first major hyperscaler to enter the Saudi market.36 Through a joint venture with the Saudi Cloud Computing Company (SCCC), Alibaba Cloud delivers advanced cloud computing services tailored to the needs of businesses in Saudi Arabia, supporting their entry into the market with specialized solutions and ecosystem support.
Tencent is another player that has attempted to adjust to the developmental demands of countries in the Middle East. In 2024, the firm announced its plan to expand its cloud investment in the region in line with local digital development visions.37 According to Dan Hu, Vice President of Tencent International for the Middle East and North Africa,
“There is no “one-size-fits-all” approach when delivering digital services, especially on a regional scale. While Tencent Cloud deploys the technical know-how, our partners provide invaluable local knowledge and insights into consumer demand, allowing us to customize our offerings accordingly. Over the years, our partners have consistently highlighted the push within the Middle East to diversify the regional economy.” 38
While concerns about data localization in authoritarian countries with weak data protection laws are valid—especially in terms of privacy and human rights—Chinese digital firms are not the only participants in the GCC’s burgeoning cloud market. In fact, empirical evidence suggests that U.S. firms dominate the sector, far surpassing their Chinese counterparts.39 GCC countries have effectively leveraged the competition between the two global powers to secure investments and build digital capacity. Fearing the loss of market space to Chinese competitors, Amazon’s AWS ramped up its investment in March 2024 when it announced plans to establish an infrastructure region in Saudi Arabia by 2026, with a projected investment exceeding $5.3 billion (approximately 19.88 billion Saudi riyals).40 This new AWS Region will feature three Availability Zones, enabling clients to store data locally, meet residency requirements, and reduce latency. The initiative is designed to support a range of sectors, including healthcare, education, and gaming, by providing cutting-edge cloud services.
Similarly, Microsoft established its Azure Cloud data center regions in the UAE in 2019.41 It now operates three cloud regions across the UAE, providing organizations, enterprises, and developers access to scalable, highly available, and resilient cloud services while ensuring compliance with data residency, security, and regulatory requirements. These developments highlight the competitive nature of the GCC’s cloud market, driven by multiple global players, with U.S. firms maintaining a significant advantage over their Chinese counterparts.
It is important to avoid attributing excessive political weight to technological artifacts themselves. The impact of digital components—ranging from the internet and data centers to artificial intelligence systems—is not determined by the country of origin of the technology but is instead shaped by the political, social, and economic context in which they are deployed. Technologies are neutral tools; their effects are mediated by how they are used, regulated, and embedded within local governance structures.
The conclusions of this analysis align with research conducted in other regions. Iginio Gagliardone’s 2019 book compares how Chinese ICT actors and ideas interacted with two democracies—Kenya and Ghana—and two autocracies—Ethiopia and Rwanda. It reveals that China’s intervention in Africa’s information societies has been driven by the idiosyncratic preferences of different African states rather than those of Beijing.42 The author shows that Chinese ICT firms have worked at promoting both open and closed visions of the internet depending on the political economy of the host country. Through case studies of Chinese involvement in Ethiopian and South African ICT development, Amy Tong highlights that simplistic narratives of political ideology or resource extraction fail to capture the complexity of China’s actions. Instead, a focus on practicality and adaptability to local contexts, framed through soft power, offers a more accurate understanding of Chinese companies’ impacts and political and economic outcomes.43
Ultimately, tech companies strive to comply with local laws and regulations, which may include responding to government requests for user data. While this compliance is framed as adherence to domestic legal frameworks, it can inadvertently enable authoritarian practices, such as mass surveillance and suppression of dissent. This dynamic illustrates that the real impact of technology lies not in its origin but in how governments and institutions leverage it to achieve their objectives.
Conclusion
The GCC’s journey toward becoming a global digital hub underscores the interplay between technological ambition, geopolitical strategy, and domestic governance. The paper finds that both Chinese and U.S. firms have tailored their strategies to meet the needs of these lucrative markets, independently of the local political and regulatory environment. This includes setting up localized data centers and cloud infrastructure within Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s national territory, something that grants local powerholders enhanced access to and control over digital data. Rather than passively importing foreign digital models, this paper has shown that both the Saudi and Emirati governments have actively shaped the engagement of tech giants within their countries, ensuring alignment with their national objectives. By leveraging competition among global powers, they have secured investments and strengthened their digital capabilities.
This dynamic underscores the agency of GCC nations in shaping their digital futures, skillfully navigating the interplay between competing firms and technological standards. Contrary to narratives that suggest Beijing is imposing its digital model on other countries—thereby sidelining their agency and portraying them as passive recipients—a closer analysis reveals a more nuanced reality. Both Chinese and non-Chinese tech firms have adapted their strategies to align with local political systems and regulatory environments, reflecting the active role of Saudi Arabia and the UAE in steering their digital transformation according to the interests of ruling elites.
It could be, as suggested by some, that China’s authoritarian internet model is inadvertently disseminated to other regions of the world as leaders in the Global South voluntarily adopt similar practices to achieve their own goals of data sovereignty and swift digital development.44 Unlike the United States and, to a lesser extent, the European Union, China has avoided leveraging international law to export its data governance model. However, Beijing’s remarkable success in achieving rapid digital transformation while maintaining strict control over its population serves as a source of inspiration for many leaders worldwide.
The Gulf has become a significant node in the evolving multipolar world, marked by competition among major players such as China against the backdrop of the West’s long-standing economic and geopolitical dominance. The growing tech decoupling between the United States and China holds substantial implications for the future of GCC digital economies, encompassing infrastructure, hardware, digital platforms, and AI applications. Regional powers like Saudi Arabia and the UAE face substantial challenges and opportunities arising from the intense competition between these two major powers. In this complex context, GCC countries must adeptly navigate the consequences of this rivalry, carefully considering the optimal technological mix that will simultaneously foster digital development and enhance cybersecurity.
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2Elisa Oreglia, Hongyi Ren, and Chia-Chi Liao, “The Puzzle of the Digital Silk Road,” in “Digital Silk Road in Central Asia: Present and Future,” ed. Nargis Kassenova and Brendan Duprey (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, 2021), 136, https://daviscenter.fas.harvard.edu/research-initiatives/program-central-asia/digital-silk-road-central-asia-present-and-future.
3Senstime, “SenseTime to Establish EMEA R&D Headquarters in Abu Dhabi,” https://www.sensetime.com/en/news-detail/3911?categoryId=1072.
4Omanobserver, “China’s Alibaba to Invest in Cloud Computing Centre in Oman,” June 7, 2021, https://www.omanobserver.om/article/1101963/business/economy/chinas-alibaba-to-invest-in-cloud-computing-centre-in-oman.
5Clayton Chenley, “China’s Digital Aid: The Risks and Rewards,” 2019. Available at: https://www.cfr.org/china-digital-silk-road ; Jonathan Hillman, The Digital Silk Road: China’s Quest to Wire the World and Win the Future (Harper Business, 2021).
6Broadly speaking, digital authoritarianism is defined as the use of digital information technology by authoritarian regimes to surveil, repress, and manipulate domestic and foreign populations.
7Chen Bing-Ming, “Digital Leninism: The Complex, Dangerous Relationship Between Tech Giants and the Chinese Communist Party,” Center for International Private Enterprise, January 15, 2021, https://www.cipe.org/resources/digital-leninism-the-complex-dangerous-relationship-between-tech-giants-and-the-chinese-communist-party.
8Dominik Treeck, “The GCC’s Digital Economy Is Growing, but Risks Must Be Managed,” Atlantic Council, December 9, 2020, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/the-gccs-digital-economy-is-growing-but-risks-must-be-managed/?utm_source=chatgpt.com.
9Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Vision 2030, accessible at https://www.vision2030.gov.sa.
10Saudi Arabia General Authority for Statistics, Digital Economy Statistics, 2022, retrieved from https://www.stats.gov.sa/sites/default/files/Digital%20Economy%20Statistics%202022EN.pdf.
11UAE Government, UAE National Digital Government Strategy 2025, retrieved from https://u.ae/en/about-the-uae/strategies-initiatives-and-awards/strategies-plans-and-visions/government-services-and-digital-transformation/uae-national-digital-government-strategy.
12Thomson Reuters, “UAE Digital Economy Strategy Fuels Tech Transformation,” October 25, 2024, https://insight.thomsonreuters.com/mena/legal/posts/uae-digital-economy-strategy-fuels-tech-transformation#:~:text=The%20'UAE%20Digital%20Economy%20Strategy,innovation%20and%20create%20digital%20opportunities.
13Joseph Webster and Joze Pelayo, “China Is Getting Comfortable with the Gulf Cooperation Council. The West Must Pragmatically Adapt to Its Growing Regional Influence,” Atlantic Council, April 5, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/china-is-getting-comfortable-with-the-gulf-cooperation-council-the-west-must-pragmatically-adapt-to-its-growing-regional-influence.
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15 Melanie Hart and Jordan Lind, “There Is a Solution to the Huawei Challenge,” Center for American Progress, October 14, 2020, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/solutionhuawei-challenge.
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17“Saudi Arabia Partners with Huawei on Smart Umrah and Hajj Technology,” Arabian Business, February 24, 2019, https://www.arabianbusiness.com/industries/technology/413831-saudi-arabia-partners-with-huawei-on-smart-umrah-hajj-technology.
18Alibaba Cloud, “Alibaba Cloud Strengthens Service Capabilities in MEA Region with Upgraded Service Program and Digital Talent Development,” October 18, 2023, https://www.alibabacloud.com/blog/alibaba-cloud-strengthens-service-capabilities-in-mea-region-with-upgraded-service-program-and-digital-talent-development_600490.
19 Alibaba Cloud, “Alibaba Cloud Strengthens Service Capabilities in MEA Region with Upgraded Service Program and Digital Talent Development.”
20Matthew S. Erie and Thomas Streinz, “The Beijing Effect: China’s Digital Silk Road as Transnational Data Governance,” New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 54, no. 1 (Fall 2021): 1–92, https://cld.web.ox.ac.uk/article/beijing-effect-chinas-digital-silk-road-transnational-data-governance.
21Xiao Qiang, “Chinese Digital Authoritarianism and Its Global Impact,” Project on Middle East Political Science, Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University, accessed December 20, 2024, https://pomeps.org/chinese-digital-authoritarianism-and-its-global-impact.
22Mark Jones, Digital Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Deception, Disinformation, and Social Media (Hurst Publishers, 2022); and Marc Owen Jones, “The New, Unsustainable Order of Arab Digital Autocracy,” in Fred Wehrey (ed.), “Disruptions and Dynamism in the Arab World,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 3, 2023, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2023/05/disruptions-and-dynamism-in-the-arab-world?lang=en#the-new-unsustainable-order-of-arab-digital-autocracy.
23DataGuidance, “Saudi Arabia: Data Residency Under PDPL–Part 1,” November 2021, retrieved from https://legacy.dataguidance.com/opinion/saudi-arabia-data-residency-under-pdpl-part-1.
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26This is the title of Google’s podcast, called Data Centers: Where the Internet Lives. See https://www.google.com/about/datacenters/podcast.
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29McKinsey & Company, “The Middle East Public Cloud: A Multibillion-Dollar Prize Waiting to be Captured,” January 30, 2024, https://www.mckinsey.com/capabilities/mckinsey-digital/our-insights/the-middle-east-public-cloud-a-multibillion-dollar-prize-waiting-to-be-captured.
30Sam Winter-Levy, "The AI Export Dilemma: Three Competing Visions for U.S. Strategy," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 13, 2024, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/12/ai-artificial-intelligence-export-united-states.
31Amnesty International, “UAE: Concerns Around Authorities’ Use of Digital Surveillance During COP28,” November 15, 2023, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/11/uae-concerns-around-authorities-use-of-digital-surveillance-during-cop28.
32Aksel Eck, “Mapping Tech Companies Cloud Expansion in the Gulf and Its Human Rights Implications,” SMEX, March 2024, https://smex.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Mapping-report-Final.pdf.
33Rory Cormac, "Digital Dictatorship: A Brutal Examination of the UAE," Engelsberg Ideas, accessed December 29, 2024, https://engelsbergideas.com/reviews/digital-dictatorship-a-brutal-examination-of-the-uae.
34Mark Mazzetti, Nicole Perlroth, and Ronen Bergman, “ToTok Messaging App Accused of Being a Spy Tool for UAE Government, Independent, December 23, 2019, https://www.independent.co.uk/tech/totok-app-uae-spying-privacy-apple-google-investigation-a9257561.html.
35Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, “Israel: Surveillance Technology Companies Allegedly Aided Saudi Spying Despite Khashoggi Killing,” July 17, 2021, https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/israel-surveillance-technology-companies-allegedly-aided-saudi-spying-despite-khashoggi-killing/.
36Alibaba, Alibaba Cloud Services in Saudi Arabia, 2022,
37“Tencent to Boost Mideast Cloud Amid Regional Push,” Bloomberg, March 21, 2024, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-03-21/tencent-to-boost-mideast-cloud-investments-amid-regional-ai-push?embedded-checkout=true.
38Gulf Business, “Tencent Cloud’s Dan Hu on Driving Digital Transformation in the Middle East,” October 21, 2024, https://gulfbusiness.com/tencent-clouds-dan-hu-middle-east.
39Vili Lehdonvirta, Boxi Wu, and Zoe Hawkins, "Weaponized Interdependence in a Bipolar World: How Economic Forces and Security Interests Shape the Global Reach of U.S. and Chinese Cloud Data Centres," SSRN, November 15, 2024, https://ssrn.com/abstract=4670764.
40Amazon, “AWS to Launch an Infrastructure Region in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,” press release, March 2024,
41Microsoft, “Microsoft Cloud Datacenter Regions Now Available in the UAE to Help Fuel the Middle East’s Future Economic Ambitions,” press release, June 19, 2019, https://news.microsoft.com/en-xm/2019/06/19/microsoft-cloud-datacenter-regions-now-available-in-the-uae-to-help-fuel-the-middle-easts-future-economic-ambitions.
42Iginio Gagliardone, China, Africa, and the Future of the Internet (Zed Books, 2019).
43Amy Tong, “China’s ICT Engagement in Africa: A Comparative Analysis,” Yale Review of International Studies, winter issue (February 8, 2021):
44Matthew S. Erie and Thomas Streinz, “The Beijing Effect: China’s Digital Silk Road as Transnational Data Governance,” New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 54, no. 1 (Fall 2021): 1–92, https://cld.web.ox.ac.uk/article/beijing-effect-chinas-digital-silk-road-transnational-data-governance.
