Ministers Meet on Nuclear Crisis

Source: Carnegie

On Thursday, June 4, the foreign ministers of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council will meet in Geneva to forge a common strategy in response to the South Asia nuclear crisis. They will, according to Gary Samore, Director for Nonproliferation at the National Security Council, try to reinforce three key messages to India and Pakistan: the May nuclear tests have not enhanced the national security of either nation and, in fact, they exacerbated tensions; the tests have not gained either nation international prestige; and, this course of action will result in tangible international losses for both economies.

The five permanent members are also the five declared nuclear-weapon states recognized in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, or the NPT. (A summary of the nuclear arsenals and basic profile of each nation is provided below.) Indian officials and analysts have often noted this correlation and argued that India’s bid to become a permanent member of an enlarged Security Council could be secured by openly declaring its own nuclear arsenal. The foreign ministers may well demonstrate on Thursday that rather than enhancing India’s prospects, its move to test and deploy nuclear weapons has had the reverse effect. India and Pakistan’s actions have pushed them dramatically outside the international norms of behavior that have, in general, characterized the non-proliferation regime since the NPT was signed thirty years ago on July 1, 1968. (The treaty entered into force on March 5, 1970.)

Permanent Security Council Members, India and Pakistan

At a news conference today, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright made clear that "the NPT will not be amended to accommodate either country." The treaty defines a nuclear-weapon state as "one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967." According to the treaty, any amendment "must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States." The amendments must be, like the treaty itself, ratified by the individual nations. With 185 members (all the nations of the world save for India, Pakistan, Israel, Brazil and Cuba) amendments are practically impossible. Thus India and Pakistan cannot join the treaty as nuclear-weapon states and they have refused, thus far, to renounce their weapons and join as non-nuclear-weapon states.

The Non-Proliferation Regime

Defining India and Pakistan’s status is more than mere semantics. The NPT is the centerpiece of the non-proliferation regime, a regime that until last month had successfully stopped or significantly slowed the spread of nuclear weapons for thirty years. Rather than the twenty or thirty nuclear nations that President John Kennedy feared would emerge by the end of the 1960s, there remained only the five, plus the "threshold states" of India, Pakistan and Israel. The treaty established the international inspection regime that helps prevent the diversion of nuclear reactor fuel to bombs. It provided the diplomatic framework that allowed Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan to give up the thousands of nuclear weapons they inherited from the former Soviet Union and to join the treaty as non-nuclear-weapon states. It encouraged first Sweden, and most recently South Africa, Argentina, and Brazil, to abandon their nuclear programs and become members of either the treaty or regional non-proliferation pacts. It is the main reason the 1994 crisis over suspected North Korean nuclear activities could be resolved through inspection and negotiation rather than war.

Still, the regime has failed to match the expectations of many nations that it would more effectively stop the spread of nuclear weapons and reduce existing arsenals. There were approximately 38,000 nuclear weapons in the world in 1970, primarily in the arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union. Today, there are still 35,680 weapons worldwide, although that number has declined substantially from the Cold War peak. Even if all the arms control treaties currently under consideration are implemented (START I, II, and III) the United States still plans to maintain 10,000 nuclear warheads indefinitely (with about 2,500 strategic warheads deployed and the remainder in reserve, stockpile or for tactical use). This is a mountain of nuclear weapons from the perspective of a country that has none. And the stagnation of the reduction process strengthens India’s argument that the posture of the nuclear-weapon states is steeped in hypocrisy.

Next Steps

Even if the foreign ministers can prevent further escalation of the crisis - no small task - it will still be very difficult to, as Secretary Albright put it, "roll this movie back." Incorporating India and Pakistan into the NPT regime will be problematic. In addition to the steps outlined by President Clinton (sign the test ban, cap production of fissile material, eschew deployment of nuclear-tipped missiles, and begin bilateral discussions), all parties should begin to consider construction of a regional regime that could adapt NPT norms to the South Asian situation. A useful model is provided by the experience of Argentina and Brazil, who overcame decades of hostility and walked back from a regional nuclear arms race. While outside the NPT, they established in 1991 mutual inspection of nuclear installations through the Argentine-Brazilian Accounting and Control Commission, capping a series of confidence building measures both had taken. Further steps lead to both joining the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone (the Treaty of Tlatelolco) in 1994 and Argentina joining the NPT in 1995. Brazil is now considering NPT membership and has accepted full IAEA safeguards on all its nuclear facilities. Argentina also abandoned its Condor II missile program.

President Clinton today urged that "America set the example" for India and Pakistan. He called on the Senate to ratify promptly the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Steps by the foreign ministers to revive the nuclear reduction process and dramatically devalue the military utility of nuclear weapons would also enhance the moral, legal and international security arguments these nations will present in the weeks and months ahead. This can only help efforts to resolve the most serious nuclear crisis the world has experienced in decades.

Joseph Cirincione is a Senior Associate with the Carnegie Endowment Non-Proliferation Project.