• Research
  • Emissary
  • About
  • Experts
Carnegie Global logoCarnegie lettermark logo
DemocracyIran
  • Donate
REQUIRED IMAGE

REQUIRED IMAGE

Article

Heavy Metal

If you do not know the difference between uranium metal and uranium oxide, you never heard of “Green Salt” until today, and you have been more interested in Pittsburgh vs. Seattle than Tehran vs. Vienna, here’s your chance to catch up on the latest developments in the Iranian nuclear showdown. 

We provide answers (with extensive quotes from the confidential IAEA report) to three key questions:  What did the IAEA report say that was new, what does reporting to the Security Council mean, and what happens next?


1. What new evidence was in the January 31 IAEA confidential report on Iran?

Iran has taken some measures to attempt to assure the IAEA that it is in compliance with its safeguards agreement. Yet key issues remain unresolved, including explanation of particles of enriched uranium found on centrifuges, IAEA access to critical sites and scientists, and the interesting document detailing how to turn uranium into a metal.  This later procedure has no role in fuel production; uranium in metal form is only used in nuclear weapons

The updated brief by the Deputy Director General for Safeguards says:

“Iran has shown the Agency more than 60 documents said to have been drawings, specifications and supporting documentation handed over by the intermediaries, many of which are dated from the early- to mid-1980’s. Among these was a 15-page document describing the procedures for the reduction of UF6 to metal in small quantities, and the casting of enriched and depleted uranium metal into hemispheres, related to the fabrication of nuclear weapon components. It did not, however, include dimensions or other specifications for machined pieces for such components. According to Iran, this document had been provided on the initiative of the network, and not at the request of the AEOI. Iran has declined the Agency’s request to provide the Agency with a copy of the document, but did permit the Agency during its visit in January 2006 to examine the document again and to place it under Agency seal.”

Much of this language was reported in the November 2005 IAEA Report on outstanding questions on the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear activities. New to the latest report is a direct reference to a 15-page document and the critical phrase, “…related to the fabrication of nuclear weapon components.” (Read More)


Link Copied
By Joseph Cirincione, Jill Marie Parillo, Caterina Dutto
Published on Feb 2, 2006
Program mobile hero image

Program

Nuclear Policy

The Nuclear Policy Program aims to reduce the risk of nuclear war. Our experts diagnose acute risks stemming from technical and geopolitical developments, generate pragmatic solutions, and use our global network to advance risk-reduction policies. Our work covers deterrence, disarmament, arms control, nonproliferation, and nuclear energy.

Learn More

If you do not know the difference between uranium metal and uranium oxide, you never heard of “Green Salt” until today, and you have been more interested in Pittsburgh vs. Seattle than Tehran vs. Vienna, here’s your chance to catch up on the latest developments in the Iranian nuclear showdown. 

We provide answers below (with extensive quotes from the confidential IAEA report) to three key questions:  What did the IAEA report say that was new, what does reporting to the Security Council mean, and what happens next?

1. What new evidence was in the January 31 IAEA confidential report on Iran?

Iran has taken some measures to attempt to assure the IAEA that it is in compliance with its safeguards agreement. Yet key issues remain unresolved, including explanation of particles of enriched uranium found on centrifuges, IAEA access to critical sites and scientists, and the interesting document detailing how to turn uranium into a metal.  This later procedure has no role in fuel production; uranium in metal form is only used in nuclear weapons

The updated brief by the Deputy Director General for Safeguards says:

“Iran has shown the Agency more than 60 documents said to have been drawings, specifications and supporting documentation handed over by the intermediaries, many of which are dated from the early- to mid-1980’s. Among these was a 15-page document describing the procedures for the reduction of UF6 to metal in small quantities, and the casting of enriched and depleted uranium metal into hemispheres, related to the fabrication of nuclear weapon components. It did not, however, include dimensions or other specifications for machined pieces for such components. According to Iran, this document had been provided on the initiative of the network, and not at the request of the AEOI. Iran has declined the Agency’s request to provide the Agency with a copy of the document, but did permit the Agency during its visit in January 2006 to examine the document again and to place it under Agency seal.”

Much of this language was reported in the November 2005 IAEA Report on outstanding questions on the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear activities. New to the latest report is a direct reference to a 15-page document and the critical phrase, “…related to the fabrication of nuclear weapon components.”

In addition, the IAEA report expressed the Agency’s frustration that Iran still denied inspectors access to critical scientists, particularly a professor related to the “Green Salt Project” (related to the conversion of uranium dioxide into UF4).  The Agency was also following up on information provided by the United States related to missile tests that may have been part of an effort to develop a re-entry vehicle suitable for a nuclear warhead.

2. What does reporting to the Security Council mean?

Article 12 of The IAEA statue says, “The Board shall report the non-compliance to all members and to the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations.”  The resolution does not formally cede control of the Iranian case to the Security Council, but U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said, “I want there to be no confusion here that a report is a formal step to the Security Council…This is the referral we have been seeking.”

The five permanent members of the Security Council (United States, France, Britain, Russia, and China) and Germany have agreed that no Security Council action will be taken until the next IAEA Board meeting on March 6. The Director General will then present his latest report on the Iranian case. During this time the countries will try to resolve the Iranian impasse diplomatically.

This is still a diplomatic, not a military crisis. There is no imminent threat of an Iranian bomb.  US intelligence agencies and most experts agree that Iran is five to ten years away from the ability to enrich uranium for either fuel or weapons.

3. What happens next?

Russia says it will continue to negotiate its proposed compromise:  construction of Iranian nuclear reactors would proceed, but Iran would ship its uranium to Russia for enrichment and fabrication into fuel rods for the Iranian reactors. The IAEA will press for answers to the outstanding questions.   

On March 6 the IAEA Board of Governors will meet again.  IAEA Director ElBaradei will issue a comprehensive report on Iranian compliance that could be quite hard-hitting.  ElBaradei told reporters, “if I say that I am not able to confirm the peaceful nature of that program after three years of intensive work, well, that’s a conclusion that’s going to reverberate ... around the world.” (Reuters, Jan. 15). 

If Iran has not agreed to a compromise by that time, the issue will formally move to the Security Council. Security Council action is likely to proceed in stages, beginning with a general resolution urging Iran to suspend its enrichment activities. If Iran ignores the resolution, a second resolution could require Iran to suspend its enrichment activities and increase the authority of IAEA inspectors in any case where a country is found to have violated its safeguards obligations. If Iran continues to ignore the resolutions, then targeted sanctions directed against the Iranian leadership become a real possibility.

Russia and China still hope that negotiations can solve the matter short of sanctions. Russia does not want a nuclear-armed Iran, but nor does it want the situation dictated by the United States. Both nations are unconvinced that sanctions could work (a view shared by other nations and experts) and do not want their countries to bear the brunt of the sanctions burden.  But Iranian action and speeches have surprised and alienated many Russian and Chinese officials.  They are willing to bring the issue to the United Nations in the hope that the diplomatic pressure will force a change in Iranian behavior and prevent the disagreement from escalating into a military confrontation.

About the Authors

Joseph Cirincione

Former Senior Associate, Director for NonProliferation

Jill Marie Parillo

Caterina Dutto

Authors

Joseph Cirincione
Former Senior Associate, Director for NonProliferation
Joseph Cirincione
Jill Marie Parillo
Caterina Dutto
North AmericaUnited StatesMiddle EastIranCaucasusRussiaNuclear Policy

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

More Work from Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

  • Commentary
    Carnegie Politika
    What Does Central Europe’s Post-Orban Russia Policy Look Like?

    Though Orban is gone, Putin can still count on some like-minded individuals in Central and Eastern Europe. However, they will seek to avoid open confrontation with EU institutions over Ukraine and their ties with Moscow.


      Dimitar Bechev

  • Commentary
    Carnegie Politika
    Are Russia-Japan Relations Really Warming Up?

    The truth is that Japan’s government is seeking a degree of reengagement but at a vastly reduced level than under Abe. Most significantly, Japan has shown no willingness to ease sanctions.

      James D.J. Brown

  • Commentary
    Strategic Europe
    Trump Turns NATO into a Tool of Coercion

    The full list of humiliations Europe has endured since Donald Trump returned to the White House makes for grim reading. But Washington’s adversarial approach to its allies undermines its own power base.

      • Rym Momtaz

      Rym Momtaz

  • Climate desalination plant Saudi Arabia
    Paper
    Ecological Statecraft in the Midst of War: Water, Regeneration, and the Future of Gulf Security

    The U.S.-Iran war has crossed a dangerous threshold: water infrastructure in the Gulf is now a target. Ecological statecraft is no longer peripheral to security, it's part of its foundations.

      • Ali Bin Shahid

      Olivia Lazard, Ali Bin Shahid

  • Commentary
    Diwan
    Pushing Beirut into an Armed Conflict With Hezbollah Is Insane

    The party’s domestic and regional roles have changed, so Lebanon should devise a disarmament strategy that encompasses this.

      Michael Young

Get more news and analysis from
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Carnegie global logo, stacked
1779 Massachusetts Avenue NWWashington, DC, 20036-2103Phone: 202 483 7600
  • Research
  • Emissary
  • About
  • Experts
  • Donate
  • Programs
  • Events
  • Blogs
  • Podcasts
  • Contact
  • Annual Reports
  • Careers
  • Privacy
  • For Media
  • Government Resources
Get more news and analysis from
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
© 2026 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. All rights reserved.