The Group of Eight (G8) Summit will be held on July 7 to 9, 2008, in the Lake Toya area of Hokkaido, Japan. The Government of Japan, as chair, has presented the major themes of the Summit: (1) Environment and Climate Change; (2) Development and Africa, (3) World Economy; and (4) Political Issues, including nuclear nonproliferation.
While climate change is a top priority, nonproliferation and the ongoing nuclear challenges of North Korea and Iran continue to be urgent tasks for the G8. There is a growing sense that effectively addressing global nonproliferation issues requires concerted action by the international community. Thus, at the Hokkaido Toyako Summit the G8 leaders should take action to strengthen the nonproliferation regime. The most urgent nonproliferation-related objectives for the G8 should include the following:
Maintain and Strengthen the Multilateral Treaty System
The WMD-related treaties—in particular, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)—are the cornerstones of nonproliferation efforts. The G8 leaders should reaffirm their commitment to maintaining and strengthening those treaties through concrete actions.
With regard to the NPT, the First Session of the Preparatory Committee of the 2010 Review Conference, which was held in Vienna last year, successfully set in motion the preparatory process for the 2010 Review Conference. The Second Session will be held in Geneva from April 28 to May 9, 2008. The G8 member states should engage proactively in constructive and substantive discussions on all three pillars of the NPT, namely nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, to help forge a common ground and, hopefully, a successful outcome of the 2010 Review Conference.
It is regrettable that, due to a lack of consensus amongst member states, the Conference on Disarmament (CD)—the only multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community—has not been able to begin negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), which is considered a key milestone for realizing a nuclear-weapons-free world. The so-called “P6 proposal,” put forth by the six presidents of the CD last year, has been recognized by a wide range of member states in the CD as the most balanced and realistic way for overcoming a decade-long stalemate. The G8 leaders should work together to reach consensus on the P6 proposal, which will enable the commencement of the negotiations on an FMCT, as well as substantive discussions on Nuclear Disarmament, the Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space, and Negative Security Assurances.
Resolve Cases of Nuclear Non-Compliance
The DPRK: The nuclear development of the DPRK continues to pose a grave threat to the peace and security of East Asia and the international community. It is vital that the DPRK carry out steady actions toward complete denuclearization, such as the abandonment of all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs in accordance with the Joint Statement of the September 2005 Six-Party Talks. The G8 should continue to support these steps for a peaceful, diplomatic resolution of the DPRK nuclear issue at the Six-Party Talks.
Iran: Despite repeated demands of the international community, Iran continues to pursue a uranium enrichment and plutonium production capability, thereby failing to meet its obligations under UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions 1696, 1737, and 1747. On March 3, 2008, UNSC Resolution 1803 was adopted containing additional punitive measures against Iran’s nuclear program. In adopting the resolution, the EU3/EU+3 (China, France, Germany, Russia, UK, US) called upon Iran to heed the requirements of the UNSC and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and also urged Iran to engage with them to find a negotiated way forward. With a view to bringing about a peaceful and diplomatic solution to Iran’s nuclear issue, it is essential that the G8 send a clear and unequivocal message to the Iranian government that in order to establish international confidence that its nuclear program is purely peaceful it must promptly suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and return to the negotiating table.
Strengthen the G8 Global Partnership
The Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction launched at the 2002 G8 Summit in Kananaskis, Canada, has proven to be a successful endeavor in preventing nuclear materials, equipment, and technology from falling into the hands of non-state actors. Under this initiative, the G8 has been supporting bilateral and multilateral cooperation projects in Russia and the Ukraine to address nonproliferation, disarmament, counterterrorism, and nuclear safety issues. To date, the Global Partnership has focused on five major areas: (1) the dismantlement of nuclear submarines in the northwestern Russian and the Russian Far East; (2) the destruction of chemical weapons; (3) the disposition of fissile materials; (4) the employment of former weapons scientists, and (5) the physical protection of nuclear materials. More than twenty countries are now providing financial support for this initiative.
Last year’s Heiligendamm Summit reviewed progress made so far and identified future priorities of the Global Partnership, including the implementation and universalization of the Amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), the IAEA’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol, UNSC Resolution 1540, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Due to the prevailing need for addressing threat reduction and nonproliferation requirements worldwide, it is critical that the G8 expand globally the scope of the Global Partnership. The Global Partnership is currently limited to Russia and Ukraine on the recipient side, but should be expanded to implement various projects related to the abovementioned priorities in other regions such as Asia, Middle East and Africa.
Ensure Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy
While the role of nuclear energy is being reevaluated in the context of the so-called “nuclear renaissance,” it is imperative to find effective ways to ensure that future nuclear expansion is safe, secure, and peaceful.
The G8 agreed at the Sea Island Summit in 2004 to increase vigilance of the transfer of nuclear technology, equipment and material that could contribute to enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, and that such exports should occur only pursuant to criteria consistent with global nonproliferation norms. Over the last three years, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) has actively engaged in the development of such criteria. However, it has failed to reach agreement on this issue. The G8 should make utmost efforts to complete work at the NSG and reach consensus as soon as possible.
A number of initiatives regarding multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle as an alternative to uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities are presently being discussed; among them: the Russian proposal on an international fuel supply center; the US proposals on the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership; the Six-Nation proposal of standing mechanisms for reliable access to nuclear fuel; the Japanese initiative on an IAEA standby arrangements system for nuclear fuel supply assurance; the UK proposal for a non-revocable advanced export approval; the German proposal to establish a sanctuary under the exclusive control of the IAEA; and the Nuclear Threat Initiative Fuel Bank.
In June 2007, the report by the IAEA Director General on the Assurance of Supply of Nuclear Fuel—a compilation of the aforementioned initiatives—was submitted to the IAEA Board of Governors. Taking into account some states’ concerns over limiting their access to enrichment and reprocessing technologies, the G8 should encourage further substantive discussion with the IAEA to facilitate an agreeable framework of assuring a nuclear fuel supply that meets nonproliferation standards.
Support Initiatives to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and its potential use by terrorists poses a challenge to human security. To address such a threat, it is essential that the G8 take the lead in supporting important multilateral efforts such as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, which was announced by Russia and the US in July 2006 and subsequently gained the support of 65 countries. In addition, the G8 should continue to take concerted action to increase support for the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, the amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), and the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1540.
The abovementioned objectives require immediate action by the international community. By sending a clear and unified message specifying appropriate measures to be taken, the G8 should take the lead for strengthening the nonproliferation regime and rally widespread support for realizing a safe and peaceful world free from nuclear dangers.
Taijiro Kimura is a Visiting Scholar with the Nonproliferation Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
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