Article
In this moment of geopolitical fluidity, Türkiye and Iraq have been drawn to each other. Economic and security agreements can help solidify the relationship.
Derya Göçer, Meliha Altunışık
Source: Getty
Article
Has Fereydoun Abbasi Been Called to Order?
The latest statements made by the head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization regarding the country's willingness to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency do not bode well for the success of the recent Russian initiative to reinvigorate multilateral nuclear talks.
Published on Sep 9, 2011
At the end of August it was reported1 that Fereydoun Abbasi, the head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organisation, had suggested that “Iran is ready for increased cooperation with the IAEA on the condition the U.N. watchdog limit the number of points it wants clarified,” adding “As long as we don’t receive these questions in an official manner, we cannot respond.”
On September 5 Dr. Abbasi told the semi-official ISNA news agency, “We propose that the agency [IAEA] keep Iran’s nuclear program and activities under full supervision for five years provided that sanctions against Iran are lifted.”2 However, he didn’t explain what he meant by “full supervision.”
The day after ISNA published a short and little noticed message3 quoting Fereydoun Abbasi as saying “Iran has fully cooperated with the IAEA so far and would accept no more obligations” and “our cooperation is limited to the regulations and standards of the IAEA, providing that it respects Iran’s rights and does not include the implementation of additional protocol cooperation.”
The change of tone in a week’s time is quite remarkable. First Dr. Abbasi suggests that Iran’s cooperation with the IAEA could be increased (admitting thereby that it is far from perfect) and that he would be prepared to clarify a number of points raised by the IAEA as long as they are limited and in writing. A week later he declares that Iran has fully cooperated with the IAEA so far, and would accept no more obligations, likely meaning not even answering the questions raised by the IAEA concerning “possible military dimensions” of Iran’s nuclear activities.
Dr. Abbasi suggested on September 5 that Iran would accept full IAEA supervision of its nuclear activities during five years provided sanctions against Iran are lifted. This again acknowledges that Iran is not fully cooperating with the IAEA and doesn’t meet the repeated requests of the IAEA Board of Governors that Iran “implement transparency measures which extend beyond the formal requirements of the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol, and include access to individuals, documentation relating to procurement, dual use equipment, certain military owned workshops and research and development locations.”4
The day after, the same Dr. Abbasi rejects the idea of accepting more obligations and the implementation of the Additional Protocol.
What has happened internally in the meantime will likely remain a mystery, but it doesn’t bode well for the future and the chances of success of the recent Russian initiative.
1. “Iran atomic chief says fuel swap talks finished, will deal with IAEA”, The Daily Star of Lebanon, 30 August 2011. http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2011/Aug-30/147546-iran-atomic-chief-says-fuel-swap-talks-finished-will-deal-with-iaea.ashx#axzz1XRpS5zru
2. “Iran proposes full IAEA supervision of its nuclear program for 5 years if sanctions lifted”, AP, 5 September 2011. http://ca.news.yahoo.com/iran-proposes-full-iaea-supervision-nuclear-program-5-194212521.html
3. “Iran’s cooperation with the IAEA has exceeded the standards limit : Abbasi », ISNA, 6 September 2006.
4. IAEA Board Resolution adopted on 24 September 2005, GOV/2005/77. http://isna.ir/isna/NewsView.aspx?ID=News1841312&Lang=E
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
More Work from Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- The Evolving Middle Eastern Regional Order: Türkiye-Iraq Relations in Context
- Escalation Dynamics Under the Nuclear Shadow—India’s ApproachPaper
An exploration into how India and Pakistan have perceived each other’s manipulations, or lack thereof, of their nuclear arsenals.
Rakesh Sood
- For Putin, Increasing Russia’s Nuclear Threat Matters More Than the Triad’s ModernizationCommentary
For Putin, upgrading Russia’s nuclear forces was a secondary goal. The main aim was to gain an advantage over the West, including by strengthening the nuclear threat on all fronts. That made growth in missile arsenals and a new arms race inevitable.
Maxim Starchak
- A Quarter Century of Nuclear South Asia: Nuclear Noise, Signalling, and the Risk of Escalation in India-Pakistan CrisesPaper
A close study of five crises makes clear that Cold War logic doesn’t apply to the South Asia nuclear powers.
Moeed Yusuf, Rizwan Zeb
- The United States Should Apply the Arab Spring’s Lessons to Its Iran ResponseCommentary
The uprisings showed that foreign military intervention rarely produced democratic breakthroughs.
Amr Hamzawy, Sarah Yerkes
