On August 19, 2023, the G20 ministers dealing with the digital economy met in Bengaluru. An outcome document was published that evening. The first—and perhaps the most important—section of the document stated:1
“Under the Indian Presidency’s initiative, we recognise that digital public infrastructure, hereinafter referred to as DPI, is described as a set of shared digital systems that should be secure and interoperable, and can be built on open standards and specifications to deliver and provide equitable access to public and / or private services at societal scale and are governed by applicable legal frameworks and enabling rules to drive development, inclusion, innovation, trust, and competition and respect human rights and fundamental freedoms.”
What does this mean?
For the first time, a multilateral grouping of twenty jurisdictions recognized the importance of DPI, provided a working definition for it, and detailed principles and approaches that might be considered in its development and deployment. To those following the DPI journey, this is as big as it gets. For G20 officials who were new to this journey, the import of DPI became clearer following each interaction with negotiators and knowledge partners alike.
This was not so much the case of one aha moment but a crash course in what DPI has done and can do if a consensus were to emerge. Negotiators and their bureaucracies understood the value of DPI in delivering digital services and making direct cash transfers in times of emergencies as well as of getting access to technology features that could verify electronic records and make travel easier. The possibilities, they understood, were countless.
Back in their home countries, the G20 bureaucracies began to reach out to those who worked in the larger DPI ecosystem. While it became apparent to some that DPI offered the quickest route to achieving inclusion in low- or middle-income countries, it dawned on others that this could be the solution that island nations needed to remain digitally, and hence economically, interconnected. Climate solutions built on top of shared technologies were highlighted. The G20 ministers tested DPI experiments on the streets of India, buying fruits and vegetables in seconds by scanning barcodes.
G20 delegates, academics, and technologists in Europe and the United States began conversations with their Indian counterparts. DPIs built on open networks in India and a few other parts of the world,2 including Ghana, piqued the interest of transport authorities and municipalities in London and Paris. Could there be a solution for open mobility and fairer e-commerce? This was the question being asked of those in India who were building these features in real time. In short, the G20 negotiations on DPI were shaped by a much larger set of conversations that had erupted within India and across the globe. DPI, a term that came into existence in its current form only in 2022, swiftly metamorphosed into a global term for digital transformation.
The G20 Digital Economy Working Group
To be clear, the collective effort to mobilize language and actions for DPI was hardly organic. It was the result of four meetings of the Digital Economy Working Group (DEWG), co-chaired by the Indian representative, and a large-scale mobilization on the part of the Indian government and DEWG knowledge partners like the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the World Bank, among others. Formal DEWG negotiations were interspersed with dozens of bilateral meetings between India and G20 member states. The meetings seemed to have been a bit like playing a game of geopolitical wordsmithery. Each word mattered.
Each sentence was negotiated by twenty different jurisdictions. Each party learned something new in each meeting. To be clear, countries that entered joint statements with India with language on DPI found themselves synchronizing one set of grammar (in the tough negotiations that lead to a joint statement being agreed) with the G20 negotiations that went much further on DPI and were often hammered out by a different set of negotiators. The act of finding grammatical clarity within each of these countries seemed to have served as both a challenge—an administrative nightmare in some cases—and an opportunity in that it helped socialize the DPI approach across bureaucracies.
Indeed, seven months ago, following the first DEWG meeting in February 2023, few thought that a consensus on DPI was possible. Even fewer thought that it would be possible to get an agreement on a “voluntary and suggested” framework that includes guidelines on technology, governance, and community and details the development and deployment of DPI.
In April 2023, following the second G20 Sherpas’ meeting in Kerala, conversations with officials and experts suggested that, at best, the DEWG might manage a light and loosely structured paragraph on DPI. Negotiators from different parts of the world had a difficult time understanding it. This was and is, in many respects, a fairly new theory of change. The DEWG co-chair, negotiators, and knowledge partners were, in fact, creating and generating new grammar on what has come to be understood as a “whole-of-society approach” toward “digitalisation.” This is key.
Prior to India’s presidency, little effort had been made to attain global consensus on DPI. Further, different iterations of the same focused mostly on technology features or what are called digital public goods. India’s presidency, drawing from the country’s own successful experience with India Stack, its homegrown DPI framework, made clear the importance of governance and the role of community. The annexure to the outcome document details this. Though it is only a “suggested” framework for DPI, it underscores what donors, builders, and adopters need to account for in creating or recreating DPI ecosystems.
In the language of DPI, the technology of shared, “interoperable” digital systems that include software, codes, and standards is best understood as “building blocks.” These ought to be “reusable,” in that they can be remodeled depending on the challenge of the day and “can be open source and/or proprietary solutions” or a combination of both. Ideally, DPI enthusiasts would argue, this should be open-source. Yet, and understandably, as far as the outcome document is concerned, proprietary models needed to be clearly mentioned as part and parcel of the DPI offer. After all, for many countries, private sector interests are critical when negotiating new language on the future of digital systems.
In June 2023, following the third DEWG meeting in Pune, a consensus began to emerge among nineteen out of the twenty G20 negotiating teams. Between June and August, a nuanced document emerged. There are clear disclaimers peppered throughout the outcome document that allow enough room for flexibility in approaches to DPI. That DPI is an “evolving concept,” that it offers only a “promising approach” to digital transformation, and that it can be tailored differently “to specific country contexts” was seemingly negotiated. Without doubt, there is much conceptual rigor that is still required in further defining DPI.
Yet, and in short, the outcome document serves as the only multilaterally agreed language and detail on DPI. This is more than significant. It is, in many respects, the framework to further build a global DPI agenda. Some will argue that a G20 outcome document cannot be enforced. This is true. But a framework does not need enforcement. More importantly, DPI needed global recognition, internationally agreed vocabulary, a broad definition to start with, and an outline of principles that in effect distinguish between a good DPI and a not-so-good one.
This has been achieved under India’s presidency.
It is a feat that is deeply appreciated by countries and donors around the world that are preparing to invest more in the global deployment of DPI. The DEWG process has astonishingly, in less than seven months, achieved an outcome that will no doubt serve as a centerpiece of India’s G20 presidency. This in itself deserves a moment of reflection and celebration. To be sure, the DEWG process that swiftly built a charter for global DPI also served as an outline for taking this language outside the G20 framework.
DPI mobilization beyond the G20
With the view to mobilize the essence and potential of DPI across borders, the Government of India negotiated language on DPI into a range of joint statements. To the surprise of many, following Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s state visit to Washington, DC, in June 2023, the joint statement highlighted that both countries “recognize the potential of Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) approaches for enabling open and inclusive digital economies.” The stakeholders from the industry in both countries were shocked. While some quarters in the private sector in the United States welcomed this development, others remained cautious.
Yet, the two governments were on a roll. The G20 push on DPI was translating outcomes far beyond the G20. The joint statement, in fact, went further. “Prime Minister Modi and President Biden,” it stated, “intend to work together to provide global leadership for the implementation of DPI.” It specifically mentioned the intent to create a “Global Digital Development Partnership” that would focus on enabling the “development and deployment of DPIs.” The DPI agenda was fixed in the U.S.-India policy charter. It detailed language on DPI that was only lightly mentioned, for instance, in a Quad statement following the Leaders’ Meeting in Japan a few weeks before.
Europe was not far behind. Following the first meeting of the European Union-India Trade and Technology Council in May 2023, their statement went even further. Both jurisdictions, it stated, “have agreed to collaborate on enhancing the interoperability of their respective Digital Public Infrastructures and on this basis jointly promote secure, privacy-preserving solutions to the benefit of Developing Countries.” Yet again, officials and experts were taken aback. Privately, they wondered where this focus on DPI was coming from.
The Indian strategy of running parallel negotiations through the G20 process and then bilaterally with top trading partners was paying off. Both sets of discussions complemented and supported each other. A global language and support for what is often referred to as the DPI approach was gaining traction. This was not just about technology features being deployed and adopted. It was a “mind-shift,” a term DPI entrepreneurs use to outline this holistic advance, which includes three components—technology, governance, and community (a broader ecosystem of academics, researchers, builders, and digital architects) and markets. The value proposition of DPI is the combination of these elements to achieve sustainable and robust digital transformation. It is not about one-off technology solutions but about incorporating a wider theory of change that was given global grammar in the G20 negotiations and outside of them.
Following the Indian prime minister’s state visit to France, a document called Horizon 2047 outlining areas of deep cooperation between the two countries was released. It included an expansive section on DPI. Crucially, the statement outlined what India and France could do together “in the areas of mobility, commerce, and culture, as initial focus areas to showcase the significant benefits of interconnectedness between platforms accomplished by leveraging open protocols.” It also highlighted the intent to work together to “take this [DPI] approach to other countries in the Indo-Pacific, Africa and beyond.” The momentum continued in Europe beyond France and the European Union. In London, officials brainstormed the centrality of DPI and how this could be molded into the United Kingdom’s new International Technology Strategy.
Conclusion: The global future of DPI
“The lack of adequate safeguards, sustained financing, and technical assistance,” the outcome document underlines in a carefully worded paragraph, “can result in poorly developed DPI.” This could, in turn, lead to “data breaches and privacy violations, improper and unlimited access to personal data, violation of intellectual property rights and security risks.” How does one minimize these risks? This is a question that all G20 negotiators, no matter which jurisdiction they represent, keep asking. It requires an answer. It will, in some ways, determine the future of the global DPI initiative.
Seemingly with this in mind, the Indian presidency has proposed the creation of the One Future Alliance (OFA)—“a voluntary initiative that aims to bring together governments, the private sector, academic and research institutions, donor agencies, civil society organisations and other relevant stakeholders and existing mechanisms to synergize global efforts in the DPI ecosystem.”
Notwithstanding which direction the OFA takes, beyond India’s presidency of the G20, there is a need to seriously consider the creation of a global DPI institute. It is noteworthy that India’s presidency has mobilized the language and reality of DPI and that several nations and the European Union have formally committed to working with India to take the DPI approach to the Indo-Pacific and beyond. Countries like France have expressly committed themselves to building interoperable DPI frameworks with India. Donors and philanthropists are carefully considering the future of investments and partnerships in a journey that started well before India’s presidency but one that has attained global recognition because of and during the same.
How will all of this come together?
First, the proposed OFA or another avatar of a global DPI institution is key. It could serve as a concrete institutional outcome of a presidency that has done so much to socialize the import of DPI. This could, in time, serve as a multilateral that is based in India. Given India’s own deep investments in DPI and the fact that it has been tested at a population scale like nowhere else in the world, the country could invest in the creation of a multistakeholder institution to start with, set it up for India to permanently appoint a chair, invest funds to create an organization, and do so necessarily alongside partners, incumbent multilaterals, the private sector, academic institutions, the rich global DPI ecosystem, and donors and knowledge partners alike.
The creation of such an organization can help synchronize funding strategies, avoiding the duplication of funding efforts in another country. In time, it might also be able to house a fund to support capacity building and DPI deployment. Further, it could provide the necessary capacity and technical support to countries where there is a DPI demand. At the very least, it could provide a single window to coordinate capacity support from enquiries to deployment. Lastly, it could serve as a repository on global DPI, providing stakeholders with a single space to discover global DPI deployments, innovations, and market practices. The outcome document mentions that India will build a Global Digital Public Infrastructure Repository. The repository can be folded into the organizational structure of the DPI institution.
To be clear, many countries—including India—and donors would want to invest in DPI on their own or through new and emerging partnerships outside the institutional structure outlined above. This is only natural. Countries invest in development on their own and through multilaterals and other relationships. The same will be true for DPI. One set of actions (working through a global DPI institution) does not and should not take away from independent endeavors (working outside of the global DPI institution).
Second, as countries and donors consider partnerships, in whichever form or shape, there is an urgent need to consider common deployment models for DPI. Taking the DPI approach to a hundred or more countries or readapting existing digital infrastructure to the DPI approach will require radical thinking. Traditional approaches to infrastructure buildouts following well-tuned requests for proposal, procurements, and investments in large data centers to support a DPI framework will take time. It is essential to think of quicker DPI deployment in consonance with technology, governance, and the role of the markets and community—one without the other will leave countries with half-baked, single-use, and noninteroperable technology solutions.
A true digital transformation will require accepting that a change in mindset is necessary and then working for the same. For this to translate into the holistic and interconnected outcomes that the outcome document highlights, there is a need to have a global discussion on deployment. This will require countries, donors, builders, government, civil society representatives (especially from countries with a demand for DPI), consulting firms, system integrators, cloud providers, and the private sector to come together under one roof to whiteboard the future of global DPI.
Third, as far as India is concerned, there is an increasingly urgent need to act on the DPI intents outlined clearly in a range of joint statements signed with partner countries. There is perhaps a need to create working groups on DPI for both strategizing and deployment. The creation of a single point of contact within the Indian system to coordinate these activities might be worth considering. It might also help to work out the most effective way to deal with multiple stakeholders that are seemingly charged with realizing the global DPI initiative that India has electrified within and outside the G20 framework.
Lastly, there is another detailed outcome document on DPI expected to be released shortly by the Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion (GPFI), a “platform for G20 countries.” It focuses on financial inclusion. Once this document is published, it may make a lot of sense for India and perhaps other G20 countries to synchronize, to whatever extent possible, the road map for DPI outlined in the GPFI and DEWG outcome documents. Further, the conclusions from these outcome documents could serve as a framework for discussion at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in the middle of September 2023. On the sides of which the UNDP is organizing high-impact interactions on the future of global DPI.
In sum, as much as different tracks within the G20 framework and outside of it are investing in DPI-related outcomes, it will be crucial to synchronize such efforts. This will avoid unnecessary fragmentation. It may add necessary layers of efficiency to the use of and access to DPI funding. Perhaps most importantly, even the act of achieving analytical and administrative synchronicity in the global approach, deployment, and adoption of DPI will help sustain the need for new ideas and markets to develop around this still-nascent theory of change.
Endnotes
1 Other two sections detail agreed language on (i) Building Safety, Security, Resilience and Trust in the Digital Economy (ii) Digital Skilling for Building a Global Future Ready Workforce. See: https://www.g20.org/content/dam/gtwenty/gtwenty_new/document/G20_Digital_Economy_Outcome_Document%20_and_Chair%27s_Summary_19082023.pdf
2 Note: For more on Open Networks for Digital Commerce, a DPI built in India, see: https://ondc.org/learn-about-ondc/
