Digital Communication as a Weapon: The Case of Mali

This is part of a series on “The Digital in War: From Innovation to Participation,” co-produced by Carnegie’s Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Program and Swedish Defense University.

 Digital communication is changing patterns of citizen participation in armed conflicts. It is often credited with democratizing political processes, making politics more accessible to a broader population. In the context of war, however, access to connected devices and social media also makes it possible for people to amplify and perpetuate ongoing violence.¹

Researchers are increasingly examining the role that digital technology plays in modern warfare. In what Matthew Ford and Andrew Hoskins call “radical war,” the capacity to produce, publish, and consume media from one device has collapsed the distinctions between different forms of participating in and perceiving war.² Today, everyone with a smartphone can transmit and consume images of war independently of traditional print and broadcast media. In societies affected by war and conflict, these digital representations can additionally serve to justify and normalize further violence. Johan Galtung refers to this as “cultural violence”—the use of words, images, and narratives to legitimize or obscure direct and structural violence.³ Information shared digitally can shape public perception, reinforce divisions, and deepen polarization, making the act of communication itself a potential vehicle for harm.

This article examines the role of digital communication networks in contributing to cultural violence within the ongoing war in Mali, based on results from several research projects conducted in Mali and the Sahel.⁴ It explores different dimensions of the digital landscape within the war, including social media platforms, cross-regional and transnational digital networks, internet and social media shutdowns, and digital propaganda. Digital connectivity has permeated the conflict, enabling Malians to both mitigate and stoke the violence. While digital platforms can provide valuable sites for mutual support and organizing, platforms that rapidly connect large audiences to spread polarized messaging and produce information silos can also heighten and reinforce violent discourse.

Social Media and Digital War

In 2012, a rebellion in Mali’s north triggered violent conflict that spread across the whole country and continues to this day. These insurgent forces, espousing a mix of Islamist, ethnic, nationalist, and traditionalist ideologies, are drawn from various segments of Malian society, including the national army. The UN mission in Mali, the French military, and more recently Russia’s Wagner Group also have played important roles in the conflict.⁵

In 2012, a rebellion in Mali’s north triggered violent conflict that spread across the whole country and continues to this day. At the same time, digital communication has expanded from urban areas to the rural countryside and from northern to central Mali.

These political developments have unfolded as digital communication has expanded from urban areas to the rural countryside and from northern to central Mali. As the war has progressed, the regions affected by the conflict have become increasingly interconnected, both internally and with the outside world. National statistics for Mali show that access to mobile phone communication has risen dramatically; by 2023, 100 percent of the population at least had access to 2G connectivity. The share of individuals using the internet showed similar movement, increasing from 2.8 percent in 2012 to 35 percent by the start of 2024, largely via mobile phones.⁶ By the beginning of 2025, almost 20 percent of Malians over eighteen years old were regularly accessing social media platforms.⁷ As a result, the country’s growing connectivity has transformed patterns of warfare.

Social media is a primary site of communication and connection for Malians. But each platform operates differently, leading Malians to make use of them in distinctive ways. My research teams examined different social media platforms and combined ethnographic research with computational methods, social media analysis, and natural language processing to analyze their uses in the context of Mali’s war.

We started social media analysis, combining computational analysis and ethnography on the social media platform Twitter (now X) in 2021.⁸ Within Mali, X was primarily used by urban, highly educated individuals. Our findings suggest that X served primarily as a platform for disseminating conflict-related news and facts rather than a place for active discussions about the war’s dynamics and stakes.⁹ In contrast, our research on Facebook revealed a higher level of debate about the conflict among communities in the Sahel. In some cases, these discussions contributed to polarization and even incited calls for violence.¹⁰

The audiences also varied across the social media sites. Among the platforms we analyzed, WhatsApp stood out as the most actively used tool for one-to-many broadcasts across war-torn regions.¹¹ One of its important features was the audio function, enabling access for illiterate individuals. WhatsApp also served as a vital communication tool for many Malians living in conflict zones, who used it to share information, discuss the war, and maintain a sense of community. Since the onset of the conflict, the number of ethnically organized WhatsApp groups has surged. One interviewee based in Bamako explained that he belonged to over forty such groups, most uniting members of his community.¹² These channels served not only to circulate real-time information about battlefield developments but also to reinforce ethnic identities. Many messages focused on historical grievances, cultural pride, and religious distinctions—constructing a shared narrative in which ethnic identity was reinforced and ethnic oppositions and ethnic violence were perceived as the conflict’s core, accusing the state and armed groups of the orchestration of such violence.

As a result, these WhatsApp groups often functioned as ethnically defined communication bubbles, deepening social and political polarization. The narratives exchanged in these digital spaces could have real-world consequences—sometimes acting as sites of cultural violence that justified and fueled retaliatory violence by ethnically aligned militias. In this way, private digital communication becomes part of the machinery of conflict.¹³

Importantly, each of these three platforms—WhatsApp, Facebook, and X—were not isolated from one another. Users often participated across all three, with messages and content circulating between them.¹⁴ Posts on X and Facebook would frequently find their way into WhatsApp groups, further blurring the lines between platforms. Since August 2023, TikTok also gained a prominent place in Mali’s mediascape. Its fast-paced, video-driven format has proven especially popular among young people, who are drawn to its mix of dance, music, and short-form messaging.¹⁵

Social media has become a critical space for the circulation of facts and narratives about the war in Mali.

Overall, social media has become a critical space for the circulation of facts and narratives about the war in Mali. Some uses are productive, such as for sharing facts and updates about the conflict to keep Malians informed and prepared. Other uses, however, legitimize the conflict, offering people reasons to be angry and view their opponents as fundamentally wrong—often through selective interpretations of history.¹⁶ Some platforms function as sites of interpersonal conflict, where individuals from differing sides clash over their beliefs. Others more often operate as sites to broadcast messages to a wider audience of like-minded individuals, spreading and exacerbating polarized narratives.

Networked Participation in War

The advent of wireless communication technologies has also significantly transformed how cross-regional and transnational networks operate in Mali, allowing people to remain connected despite their physical displacement in wartime. The number of displaced people in Mali continues to rise daily as individuals flee violence in their home regions. Many seek refuge in self-established camps around Bamako, the capital of Mali, while others resettle in rural areas in the south or cross borders into neighboring countries, such as Burkina Faso and Mauritania. Mobility in the Sahel is not a new phenomenon; it has long been shaped by factors including fluctuating rainfall, labor migration, and recurring conflict. Sahelian societies are inherently networked, with social and familial ties extending across wide geographic areas, including other parts of Africa, Europe, and the United States. But the ongoing conflict in Mali has heightened this dynamic and made digital connectivity even more important.

Since the onset of the conflict, war-related displaced individuals have played a key role in the formation of networks, primarily communicating through phone calls and WhatsApp groups. The connections between refugees, displaced people, those in war zones, and the diaspora have created a space where the realities of war—including its violence—are constantly shared. These networks provide daily updates on the whereabouts and well-being of family and friends, reporting on militia activities, food shortages, and the deaths of loved ones because of inadequate healthcare.¹⁷

This form of popular, networked participation in war is extensive, forming a transnational community through which the local atrocities in Mali become shared experiences for a large and dispersed group. Such digital engagement, for some, may also translate into action. This includes sending financial support to displaced individuals as well as more fraught manifestations, such as individuals indirectly continuing the conflict by providing material support for militia members, enabling them to purchase weapons.¹⁸

In this way, digital networks of dispersed Malians influence the battlefield in direct and tangible ways. As Ford and Hoskins describe, this collapsing of the boundary between the digital and the material reality of the conflict is a core element of radical war. These networks of Malians from both within and outside of Mali are shaped by the flow of information that connects them, drawing them into the war as participants.

Absence of Communication

In a conflict as intrinsically shaped by digital connectivity as the ongoing war in Mali, denying populations online access can become an important tool of warfighting.¹⁹ Fighting that consumed the small town of Boni represents one such example. Boni lies in central Mali, situated in a vast rural savannah area that has been under the control of an armed jihadist group, Kaatiba Macina, since 2017. A few hundred meters from the town lies an army military camp. The Malian army considers the region to be a base for jihadist groups. Kaatiba Macina’s ranks are mainly filled with local residents; it is part of a broader coalition of jihadist groups known as Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM).²⁰

Boni was a victim of the militants’ strategy to cut off cities from the outside world. During three separate periods, jihadist groups blocked roads and prevented the movement of people and goods in response to intensified Malian army operations in the area. The first blockade took place from May to August 2021, the second from February 2022 to August 2022, and the third from August 2023 to March 2025.²¹

The physical blockades were reinforced by digital disconnections instigated by both sides. During the first siege, the government responded by reportedly shutting down Malitel—the state-owned telecommunications provider. Orange, the French telecom, stayed active but only by negotiating with armed groups and likely paying for protection. Over time, relations soured, and in 2023, jihadists destroyed Orange’s communication mast. Subsequently, the Malian government ordered a complete internet shutdown in Boni, hoping to disrupt jihadist communications. But the armed groups had their own secure channels, possibly satellite-based, and were unaffected. Civilians, however, were cut off entirely; they were unable to call, message on WhatsApp, or access the internet for months at a time. A partial digital lifeline returned in the summer of 2024, when Starlink satellites began providing service, but access remained limited to those who could afford it, and neither Malitel nor Orange has returned as of this writing.

The blockades were disastrous for Boni. With no one able to enter or leave the city—and with Boni already overwhelmed by displaced populations—the local market collapsed, and people were confronted with famine. Periods of silence and disconnection obscured the suffering caused by the blockade. Citizens were only sporadically able to reach the outside world through digital connections or via those who physically evacuated the area. The Malian government may have hoped that such isolation would turn residents against the jihadist groups controlling the area. However, the blockades may have had the opposite effect, driving people to seek protection with the jihadists, despite the violence the militants were inflicting.

While communications were disrupted, people still collected digital representations of their suffering, notwithstanding the risks. This footage now shapes the memories and narratives of Boni’s citizens who share their experiences in community-based WhatsApp groups and other (closed) digital networks across Malian society. The nature of modern digital technology means that representations of suffering endure long after they occur and can be shared even when they take place in closed-off spaces behind digital blockades. The digital evidence from Boni residents continues to play a dual role in the war: highlighting civilian suffering while also fueling cultural violence by becoming polarized symbols that justify continued fighting.

Propaganda and Polarization

Both the Malian army and jihadist groups are not just trying to control information by shutting down the internet—they are actively using digital tools to spread their own messages and win supporters. DIRPA, the communication department of the Malian army, has played a key role in shaping the war’s narrative, and disinformation is an essential part of the strategy. On public platforms like TikTok and X, DIRPA’s strategy has proven effective in convincing the majority of the population about the Malian army’s strength and progress.²² Videos featuring women dancing in military attire while praising the army have garnered many likes and shares.²³ However, in more private digital spaces—such as WhatsApp groups and certain Facebook pages—skepticism about this propaganda is evident. These encrypted platforms provide a safe space for people to express their doubts and discuss alternative perspectives.

Both the Malian army and jihadist groups are not just trying to control information by shutting down the internet—they are actively using digital tools to spread their own messages and win supporters.

This skepticism has also been compounded by online jihadist communications. JNIM’s media production company, Al-Zallaqa, disseminates news and messages about its victories and offers select interpretations about its attacks that are then shared on channels reserved for jihadist messaging, such as on Telegram. From there, the information migrates to other social media platforms, such as WhatsApp. During Muslim holidays, these channels disseminate carefully curated images of armed fighters gathered in remote locations sharing communal meals and prayers. This imagery is designed to showcase jihadist unity and attract recruits to their movement.²⁴

Broader Implications

This article has outlined how digital telecommunications networks are shaping patterns of violence in Mali. One-to-many digital communication platforms have the capacity to connect large audiences quickly and at scale—far beyond what one-to-one communication tools can achieve. This dynamic has significant implications not only within Mali but across international borders, particularly among the Malian diaspora. In many cases, digital connection provides an important tool for civilians to negotiate the complexities and harms of war, providing sites for information sharing, mutual aid, and connection across forcefully dispersed communities. At the same time, social media platforms and digital tools can legitimize violence, or they can become tools within the warfighting effort itself.

Digital connection provides an important tool for civilians to negotiate the complexities and harms of war. At the same time, it can legitimize violence or become a tool within the warfighting effort itself.

As discussed, platforms such as WhatsApp tend to foster closed communication silos that normalize violent discourse. Across networks of dispersed Malians, digital connectivity provides forums where polarization is fomented and that can enable access to weapons. And digital communication has been co-opted by the warring sides, who leverage internet shutdowns and digital propaganda for advantages. While discursive warfare clearly reinforces conflict dynamics and deepens social divisions, establishing a direct causal link to physical violence remains a complex and ongoing challenge that will require further investigation.