2019 Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference

Keynote:

Andrea Thompson, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security

Moderator:

Mark Fitzgerald. International Institute for Strategic Studies

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Keynote:

Stephen Biegun, Special Representative for North Korea

Moderator:

Helene Cooper, New York Times

For all the attention paid to the growing threats to nuclear forces, it may be their command-and-control systems that are more vulnerable. How serious are the threats posed by advanced nonnuclear capabilities, such as cyber, anti-satellite, and high-precision conventional weapons. How are these threats likely to evolve in the coming decades? Could unilateral strategies to reduce vulnerabilities, such as technical enhancements or attempts to deter nonnuclear attacks on command-and-control assets by threatening a nuclear response, be misinterpreted by potential adversaries as aggressive rather than defensive? Are there any plausible ways to manage these risks cooperatively?

Moderator:

Erin Simpson, Northrop Grumman

Panelists:

Lyu Jinghua, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Sergey Rogov, Russian Academy of Science

Heather Williams, King's College London

On May 7, 2018, President Trump announced the withdrawal of the United States from the Iran Nuclear Deal, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Although he expressed skepticism that Iran’s nuclear program was exclusively peaceful, and cited as evidence documents about Iranian weaponization activities revealed by Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu a few days earlier, he did not accuse Iran of violating the agreement. The JCPOA’s other signatories, meanwhile, have continued to implement it, and the U.S. intelligence community judges Iran to be in compliance. What does this experience suggest about the viability of future agreements to resolve proliferation crises? Are there lessons for such deals—with Iran, North Korea, or any other state—that would enhance their viability? And, what implications does withdrawal have for the United States’ credibility to strike future nonproliferation agreements, including a “better deal” with Iran?

Moderator:

Corey Hinderstein, Nuclear Threat Initiative

Panelists:

Suzanne DiMaggio, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Ariel (Eli) Levite, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Caroline Hurndall, Head of the Iran Department at the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Nuclear deterrence arguably has prevented the outbreak of major conflict in South Asia. Yet, conflict escalation during militarized crises in 2016 and 2019, which featured Indian cross-border strikes and in the 2019 case a Pakistani reprisal, raise fears that a future crisis might turn nuclear. What are the implications of Indian and Pakistani use of airpower during the 2019 crisis for the existence of thresholds at which escalation can be halted? Is there a shared understanding among Indian and Pakistani security professionals about crisis redlines and when nuclear weapons might come into play? Do experts outside the region exaggerate the risks of nuclear escalation, or are South Asian experts too sanguine about them? And how are advances in military technology changing this equation?

Moderator

Scott Sagan, Stanford University

Panelists

Vipin Narang, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Aparna Pande, Hudson Institute

Saima Sial, Center for International Strategic Studies

In spite of the considerable strains on the nuclear order, there may be reason for optimism about nonproliferation: if Iran continues to adhere to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, there is no obvious next proliferator. Is such a benign assessment actually justified? If Iran does not acquire nuclear weapons, do any other states pose a significant proliferation threat in the next decade or so? If so, which countries and under what circumstances? What about in the longer term? Conversely, if Iran does cross the nuclear weapons threshold, what are the implications for further proliferation? In particular, are fears of a proliferation cascade in the Middle East well-founded or overhyped? 

Moderator: 

Matthew Bunn, Harvard Kennedy School

Panelists:

Sarah Bidgood, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies

Malfrid Braut-Hegghammer, University of Oslo

Etel Solingen, University of California, Irvine

All nuclear-armed states, apart from China, explicitly reserve the right to use nuclear weapons in response to various nonnuclear threats, yet they are often vague about which ones. What specific nonnuclear threats do nuclear-armed states seek to counter with nuclear weapons? Are there means, other than nuclear weapons, for deterring or otherwise managing these threats? And, given the scale of the damage that nuclear weapons could cause—including to states not involved in the conflict—could their use in response to nonnuclear threats be proportionate and morally justifiable, and create more strategic benefits than risks?

Moderator:

Matthew Harries, House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee

Panelists:

Austin Long, Joint Staff J5

Lu Yin, PLA National Defense University

Harald Müller, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt

The remarkable diplomacy around the Korean Peninsula in 2018 has created the possibility for transformation of the security order in East Asia. Several different stable outcomes may be possible, depending on how “denuclearization” is defined in Beijing, Seoul, Pyongyang, and Washington. Where are Chinese, South Korean, North Korean, and American interests aligned and where do they diverge in these plausible endgames? How much remaining latent or actual North Korean nuclear capability would the other states accept? And what do these end-states imply for the U.S.-South Korea alliance and stationing of U.S. troops on the peninsula?

Moderator:

Toby Dalton, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Panelists:

Kelsey Davenport, Arms Control Association

Chung Min Lee, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Kathleen Stephens, Korean Economic Institute of America

Zhang Yan, China Arms Control and Disarmament Association

Bilateral arms control is in crisis. The existing architecture is crumbling even as technological advances are complicating efforts to develop new approaches to cooperative risk mitigation. In the immediate future, is it possible—or even desirable—to save existing treaties? Specifically, can the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty be preserved and the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty be extended? Should they? And, over the long term, are there viable approaches to managing new and emerging technologies—including cyber, anti-satellite, and high-precision conventional weapons as well as ballistic missile defenses—that might threaten nuclear forces and their command-and-control capabilities? 

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Moderator

Olga Oliker, International Crisis Group

Panelists

Anatoly Antonov, Russian Ambassador to the United States

James Miller, Adaptive Strategies LLC

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Keynote: 

Adam Smith, Representative of the Eighth District of Washington State and Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee

Moderator:

Jen Psaki, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

The UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is now open for signature, but what real-world effects will it have on nuclear disarmament and international security more generally between now and 2030? Will the treaty succeed in mobilizing popular opposition to nuclear weapons in nuclear-armed states and their allies, as its proponents hope and its opponents fear? If so, which states will feel this impact and what will the consequences be? Conversely, is it possible that the treaty will actually backfire by causing the friends and allies of nuclear-armed states to reject the ban, as Switzerland has done? Alternatively, might the treaty end up having little impact either way?

Moderator

Steven Miller, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs

Panelists

Rebecca Johnson, Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy

George Perkovich, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Nicolas Roche, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs

María Antonieta Jáquez, Mission of Mexico to the United Nations

This regular session pits expert judgment against the wisdom of crowds to forecast the global nuclear future—a notoriously difficult but necessary part of policymaking. Before the conference, the panelists were asked to estimate the likelihood of various nuclear-related events taking place within the next two years, that is, prior to the 2021 Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference. During the panel, audience members can make their own predictions using the conference smartphone app. The panelists will discuss both the audiences’ answers as well as their own.

Moderator

Jeffrey Lewis, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies

Panelists

Laura Holgate, Nuclear Threat Initiative

Togzhan Kassenova, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Yasuyoshi Komizo, Hiroshima Peace Culture Foundation

Manpreet Sethi, Center for Air Power Studies

Results

Before the session, the panelists responded to six forecasting questions about nuclear events over the next two years. During the session, the audience responded to the same questions using the conference app. Here are all the forecasts, which we will compare to reality at the 2019 conference:

What is the likelihood that, by March 12, 2021, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons will have entered into force?

Panelists’ responses

Holgate: 0%
Kassenova: 55%
Komizo: 98%
Sethi: 50%

Panelists’ average: 51%
Panelists’ standard deviation: 40%

Audience responses

Audience average: 30%
Audience standard deviation: 28%
Number of respondents: 299

What is the likelihood that, by March 12, 2021, Iran will have withdrawn from, or announced the suspension of some or all of its obligations under, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action?

Panelists’ responses

Holgate:  40%
Kassenova: 20%
Komizo: 50%
Sethi: 25%

Panelists’ average: 34%
Panelists’ standard deviation: 14%

Audience responses

Audience average: 48%
Audience standard deviation: 25%
Number of respondents: 322

What is the likelihood that, by March 12, 2021, North Korea will have resumed the testing of nuclear weapons and/or ballistic missiles capable of reaching intercontinental distances?¹

Panelists’ responses

Holgate: 80%
Kassenova: 50%
Komizo: 40%
Sethi: 20%

Panelists’ average: 48%
Panelists’ standard deviation: 25%

Audience responses

Audience average: 59%
Audience standard deviation: 25%
Number of respondents: 322

¹ Tests of “ballistic missiles capable of reaching intercontinental distances” include tests of ICBMs that travel less than intercontinental distances because they are fired on lofted trajectories.

What is the likelihood that, by March 12, 2021, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) will have been extended for any length of time?

Panelists’ responses

Holgate: 50%
Kassenova: 60%
Komizo: 50%
Sethi: 60%

Panelists’ average: 55%
Panelists’ standard deviation: 6%

Audience responses

Audience average: 41%
Audience standard deviation: 42%
Number of respondents: 303

What is the likelihood that, by March 12, 2021, the United States will have withdrawn from, or given formal notice of its intention to withdraw from, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)?

Panelists’ responses

Holgate: 20%
Kassenova: 10%
Komizo: 5%
Sethi: 0%

Panelists’ average: 9%
Panelists’ standard deviation: 9%

Audience responses

Audience average: 14%
Audience standard deviation: 17%
Number of respondents: 290

What is the likelihood that, by March 12, 2021, the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors will have made at least one new determination that a state is in noncompliance with its safeguards obligations?

Panelists’ responses

Holgate: 20%
Kassenova: 20%
Komizo: 20%
Sethi: 10%

Panelists’ average: 18%
Panelists’ standard deviation: 5%

Audience responses

Audience average: 32%
Audience standard deviation: 24%
Number of respondents: 282

The uncertain outlook for nuclear power among both developed and developing countries raises questions about the value and importance of the peaceful uses pillar of the “grand bargain” enshrined in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). How important is nuclear technology today for economic development and for implementing climate commitments? How does the desirability of the technology influence how much states will invest—diplomatically, strategically, and financially—in the NPT? What would be the consequences for the treaty if peaceful nuclear applications lose relevance? And, as the 2020 NPT Review Conference approaches, can renewed focus on peaceful uses remind states of the overall value of the regime?

Moderator: 

Joyce Connery, Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board

Panelists:

Rafael Mariano Grossi, Ambassador of Argentina and Permanent Representative to International Organizations in Geneva

Rumina Velshi, President and CEO of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission

Djarot Wisnubroto, National Nuclear Energy Agency - Batan

The past twenty years have seen repeated violations of nonproliferation, arms control, and disarmament agreements. North Korea and Iran both developed clandestine nuclear programs in contravention of their nonproliferation obligations. While the former ultimately developed nuclear weapons, the latter agreed to curtail its activities under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action—which the United States then violated. At the same time, Washington and Moscow are trading mutual accusations of noncompliance with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. Meanwhile, they and the other nuclear-weapon states are accused by many non-nuclear-weapon states of failing to fulfil their disarmament obligations. Looking forward, what are the prospects for the rules-based nuclear order and how can they be improved? What is the likelihood of cooperation between China, Russia, and the United States on enforcement and the consequences if it is not forthcoming? Finally, what roles can and should other states be prepared to play? 

Moderator:

James Acton, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Panelists:

Susanne Baumann, German Federal Government Commissioner for Disarmament and Arms Control

Christopher Ford, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation

Elayne Whyte Gómez, Permanent Representative of Costa Rica to the United Nations in Geneva

Almost all—if not all— nuclear-armed states have developed plans and capabilities for a range of nuclear response options —to include limited nuclear strikes—in the hope of managing and terminating a nuclear crisis short of all out nuclear war. Can a nuclear war be limited in scope or is escalation inevitable once the first salvo is launched? What limits or thresholds might exist and be understood by the belligerents? Would new nuclear capabilities be useful in managing escalation? What effects would significant reductions in arsenal sizes have? Is preparing for limited nuclear strikes a sensible precaution to ensure decision-makers have credible options in a range of scenarios or does it breed false confidence in the controllability of escalation?

Moderator:

Rebecca Hersman, Center for Strategic and International Studies

Panelists:

Elbridge Colby, Center for a New American Security

Jessica Cox, Director of the Nuclear Policy Directorate, NATO International Staff

Li Bin, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Polina Sinovets, Odessa I.I. Mechnikov National University

At this post–Cold War low in bilateral relations, the traditional guardrails that help stabilize the U.S.-Russian relationship are weakening, and nuclear risks are growing. What nuclear risks are most acute? What steps should be taken to stabilize and manage them? And what can be done to reduce the possibility that incidents outside the nuclear domain—involving cyber operations or general purpose forces, for example—could escalate into a nuclear crisis?

Moderator

Ernest Moniz, Nuclear Threat Initiative

Panelists

Emily Haber, German Ambassador to the United States

Igor Ivanov, Russian International Affairs Council

Sam Nunn, Nuclear Threat Initiative

The 2019 Thérèse Delpech Memorial Award was awarded to Professor Harald Müller.

The award is offered, every other year, to an individual who has rendered exceptional service to the nongovernmental nuclear policy community. While exceptional service includes major intellectual contributions to critical debates, it also encompasses the time-consuming and often unrecognized work needed to sustain and strengthen our community: mentoring young women and men, constructively critiquing the work of others, creating fora for discussion, and building networks. Such activities benefit the community as a whole in its efforts to reduce nuclear dangers. Importantly, the award is also intended to recognize individuals who, through friendship, collegiality, and respect, help mold a collection of individual researchers into a community worthy of the name.

In short, the award recognizes exceptional creativity, integrity, humanity, and amity—four qualities embodied by Thérèse Delpech, a long-time strategic adviser to the French Atomic Energy Commission, an author, and a distinguished public intellectual. Thérèse passed away in January 2012; as we planned our 2013 conference we realized that she would be sorely missed, and that one way to celebrate her life would be to establish an award in her name.

Previous winners of the award are Catherine McArdle Kelleher (2017), Michael Krepon (2015), and Amb. Linton F. Brooks (2013).

The 2019 award was decided by an adjudication panel consisting of two Carnegie staff members and three external experts. Except for members of this panel and current employees of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, anyone involved in nuclear policy anywhere in the world is eligible for the award. 

The award was presented at the 2019 Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference.