Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan put any doubts about his political viability to rest after securing victory in Türkiye’s critical twin elections. On May 14, the coalition of right-wing and conservative parties led by his Justice and Development Party (AKP) obtained a majority in parliament. Two weeks later, on May 28, he defeated his rival, the opposition’s joint candidate Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, in a runoff for the presidency, renewing his mandate for another five years. Now, he is preparing for his next fight, which will be in Türkiye’s local elections in March 2024. This looming political battle will shape Erdoğan’s short-term domestic political considerations, economic policies, and foreign policy priorities.
Erdoğan’s latest electoral success defied the odds, astonishing many pollsters and analysts. More importantly, it showcased the difficulty of defeating illiberal leaders who can infinitely leverage their positions. Observers deemed the elections free but not necessarily fair, given the unjust advantages held by the incumbent, allowing him to almost fully dominate the information space and use government funds while running his campaign effort. As Erdoğan and his supporters bask in their success, the opposition camp finds itself in a state of disillusionment and near despair after their hyped-up expectations of success failed to materialize.
The rise of Erdoğan to political omnipotence can be attributed to many things, including his astute reading of societal emotions and unparalleled ability to connect with the masses. But the real driver behind his success has been his untiring ambition and relentless thirst for power. During his victory speech on the eve of the presidential runoff, he was far from ready to relax and call it a day. Instead, he promptly identified the local elections as his next target and used the opportunity to galvanize his base and party cadres for the challenge.
The local elections will be a special test for Erdoğan because he has a score to settle with the opposition. Erdoğan and his AKP ceded control of Türkiye’s four major cities—including Ankara and Istanbul—to the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) in 2019. Losing Istanbul had been a particular blow for Erdoğan, since he rose to power from the country’s crown jewel: he was its mayor from 1994 to 1998, before being imprisoned on charges of inciting violence. He later founded the AKP and became prime minister in 2003, then president in 2014. If Erdoğan remains in power until the end of his new term in 2028, he will have ruled Türkiye uninterruptedly for a quarter of a century—no small feat, by any measure.
Erdoğan’s longing for control of Istanbul is about more than nostalgia. Erdoğan and his AKP have nurtured a system of patronage within their municipalities through the distribution of in-kind aid, social welfare programs, and favoritism in city tenders. This has enabled them to create a network of support that, in political terms, sustains an ever-loyal base. The AKP has successfully replicated this model countrywide, leading an analyst to contend that it resembles more of a social network than a political party.
Losing the big cities deprived the AKP of the grassroots ability to use this tool, and as far as Erdoğan is concerned, the 2024 local elections mark an opportunity to fix that problem. This is especially salient considering that the opposition fared better in most major cities, including Istanbul, in the latest elections. Moreover, the AKP received its lowest share of the countrywide vote since 2002. Those numbers represent a silver lining for the opposition: amid a significant election victory, the AKP is showing signs of problems, especially among urban voters. But the opposition is currently busy licking its wounds, and whether it can sustain a unified front against the AKP during local elections remains unclear.
Erdoğan will reveal his local election strategy once key issues become more apparent, but his playbook is well-known: a populist mix of polarizing rhetoric with elements of identity politics, nationalism, and conservatism, topped off with a relentless campaign to demonize the opposition. He will resort to more of the same in the future.
But he has another card up his sleeve. At the end of last year, Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, regarded by many as Erdoğan’s political nemesis, was sentenced by a Turkish court to two years and seven months in prison on charges of insulting members of the country’s Supreme Election Council. The conviction, which is currently in the appeals process, came with a political ban, effectively barring İmamoğlu from the latest presidential contest. A conveniently timed upholding of the sentence, thereby eliminating any challenge İmamoğlu may pose in the local elections, would not come as a total surprise—given the politicized nature of the Turkish judiciary. However, Erdoğan may be tempered by his personal experience as mayor of Istanbul: his journey to political stardom began only after being sentenced to prison and slapped with a political ban. He may think twice before affording İmamoğlu a similar blessing in disguise, but he could also conclude that the benefits outweigh the risks.
However, March 2024 is a ways off, and Türkiye’s current economic turmoil will be Erdoğan’s biggest headache in the months to come. Unless the country returns to more orthodox policies, its economy will continue to bleed by depleting borrowed foreign reserves and piling up its debt burden. During the campaign, Erdoğan deflected attention from problems such as inflation and currency depreciation through generous fiscal policies that provided a temporary respite for voters. The summer may be manageable, since it typically entails lower energy consumption, agricultural surpluses, and rising tourism revenues. But unless Türkiye can secure new financial flows from abroad, it could run the risk of a first-ever default on its debt and a total collapse of its economy as the seasons change.
Erdoğan cannot afford such a scenario before local elections, so he will likely do three things. First, he will seek additional funds from his reliable partners, such as Russia, Qatar, and the Gulf states. Second, he will refrain from deliberately confronting the West or acting like a disruptive power in the hopes of luring overseas investment and new lines of credit. Finally, he will concurrently introduce some semblance of normalcy to his economic management, which has failed to address inflation while increasing the country’s risk premiums and scaring away foreign capital. His recent promise to set up a reputable economic team that will focus on curbing inflation is a function of such thinking.
Another issue Erdoğan will have to actively focus on is migration, which has become a fraught, heavily politicized topic in Türkiye, so much so that the opposition’s last-ditch charm offensive before the presidential runoff centered on a promise of returning migrants to their home countries as soon as possible. While this uptick in borderline unpalatable rhetoric failed to seal an election victory for the CHP, it was striking to see a center-left, social democratic party embrace such a narrative. The strategy was also a testament to the importance of migration in the public eye.
The same reality will guide Erdoğan’s actions. This is why, on the foreign policy front, he will prioritize the issue of normalizing ties with the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. His message will be that the restoration of ties will both strengthen Türkiye’s hand in the fight against the terrorist threat it sees as emanating from Syria and pave the way for the speedy return of Syrians to their homeland. This would resonate strongly in Türkiye and bolster Erdoğan’s hand.
As Türkiye slowly moves beyond the recent elections and looks toward 2024, the stakes will be high for both sides, but maybe more so for the opposition. Their control of Türkiye’s major cities, especially Istanbul, represents their last meaningful holdout. And as these recent elections have shown, Türkiye’s nearly institutionalized uneven playing field makes regaining power immensely difficult once it is lost.
Erdoğan sees the local elections as a rematch of 2019 that he must win, and he will almost certainly use every tool at his disposal to do so. But more importantly, he views them as a means of consolidating his recent presidential and parliamentary successes. Unless the opposition is able to snap out of its current state of disarray and strategize a better planned, united approach against the AKP and its alliance of right wing-conservative parties, it could be in for another major disappointment. That, in turn, would further seal Erdoğan’s imprint on Türkiye.
