How South Korea’s New President Can Steady His Country’s Wavering Foreign Policy

Lee Jae-myung’s victory in South Korea’s presidential snap election on June 3 came at a pivotal moment for the country’s foreign policy. Amid a rapidly realigning global order, intensifying regional tensions, and faltering norms and institutions, Lee has promised to pursue a more pragmatic strategy—one that emphasizes diversified partnerships and a sharpened strategic focus over traditional alliance dependency and inter-Korean engagement.

Skepticism persists both at home and abroad about whether this strategic pragmatism is tactical or transformational. But to deliver on his agenda, Lee should center Korea’s strategic shift around a coherent middle-power strategy that leverages Korea’s comparative strengths in industry and innovation. This means continuing to anchor security in the U.S. alliance while expanding and deepening partnerships across Southeast Asia, Japan, and Europe, as well as collaborating with regional countries in coalition-building, economic innovation, and diplomatic leadership.

A Middle Power at a Crossroads 

Traditionally caught between deference to great powers and ambitions for regional leadership, South Korea now faces a strategic imperative: to harness its strengths in diplomacy, industry, and governance to shape, not just react to, international dynamics. This middle-power strategy, if wielded thoughtfully, could offer Korea a path to leverage its deep global networks without the military heft of a great power.

But Korea enters this next chapter amid deep polarization. The aftermath of president Yoon Suk-yeol’s impeachment revealed a society united in its defense of democratic institutions yet fractured in its political culture. The Constitutional Court’s decisive ruling against Yoon’s martial law attempt reaffirmed Korea’s constitutional guardrails but also spotlighted entrenched mistrust across ideological and regional lines. This was reflected in the candidates’ emphasis on economic revitalization and personality politics, not foreign policy, as dominant themes of the election.

In addition, for the past twenty years, South Korea has vacillated between alliance dependency and activist diplomacy. Now, U.S.-China competition has hardened into industrial bloc politics, and U.S. President Donald Trump’s return to the White House has reignited trade pressure and alliance anxieties. As a result, Seoul faces the mounting burden of defining its strategic posture amid growing expectations from both Washington and its regional neighbors. 

Diversify Without Alienating 

Lee’s foreign policy imperative should begin with strategic signaling, both domestically and abroad. He must make clear to his constituency and Washington that a more diversified international posture strengthens, rather than weakens, Korea’s alliance with the United States. That effort starts not with new partnerships but with deepening existing ones. Korea already maintains robust relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the EU, and Japan.

The next step is to double down in areas where Korea holds clear comparative advantages (such as shipbuilding, semiconductors, and batteries manufacturing) as well as critical emerging sectors (such as renewable energy solutions and manufacturing automation) and align those strengths with targeted, issue-based coalitions. The goal is not diplomatic breadth but purposeful engagement that amplifies Korea’s leadership where it is most credible and competitive.

To make that case compelling, Lee must link diversification to tangible national strengths. In today’s geopolitical climate, foreign policy must prioritize securing supply chains, ensuring energy resilience, and directing the terms of technological interdependence. In this light, strategic diversification is not disloyalty—it is sovereignty management by other means.

This approach may be an apt extension of a recalibrated progressive foreign policy no longer defined by idealist engagement with North Korea, but by pragmatic multilateralism and industrial statecraft. As I noted in my recent paper for Carnegie, Lee’s rise is not only about his personal populism or politicking. Rather, his tacking to the center and rhetoric about a more pragmatic or interest-based foreign policy reflects a broader transformation in Korean domestic priorities and strategic environment.

To support this strategy, the Lee administration will also need to communicate its foreign policy ambitions clearly to domestic audiences. South Koreans—particularly younger generations—are increasingly attuned to global dynamics and seek a more outward-facing, respected Korea. A foreign policy that highlights Korea’s role in energy innovation, digital governance, and global partnerships could appeal to these aspirations.

Yet the risks of politicization remain high, and any foreign initiative that appears partisan or elite-driven may trigger backlash. To sustain public support, Lee’s team must emphasize transparency, deliver inclusive economic dividends, and link international strategy to everyday concerns.

An Anchor Amid Regional Drift 

South Korea’s push to forge new partnerships will be especially important in Asia because its ability to work alongside friendly nations and counter competing powers can help determine how the regional order takes shape. Historically, progressive Korean governments have shied away from working closely with Japan because many voters and politicians feel anger over unresolved historical disputes related to Japan’s colonization of Korea. But with U.S.-China tensions rising, South Korea now needs Tokyo as a partner in not only the security domain but also those of economy, energy, and technology.

If Seoul and Tokyo can maintain steady relations, they could jointly spearhead development, infrastructure, and technology projects across Southeast Asia, where countries are eager for more balanced options beyond the United States and China. To succeed, Korea must invest with Japan in long-term cooperation between government and industry on infrastructure, clean energy, public health, and digital development.

Lee could also seek to revive Korea’s convening power. Trilateral groupings with Vietnam or Australia, digital economy frameworks through ASEAN+, and climate finance via the Green Climate Fund all represent avenues to build regional resilience. On peninsular issues, the administration may pursue a steadier tone that could open space for quiet diplomacy with Pyongyang—even if formal breakthroughs remain unlikely.

A Partner, Not a Proxy 

For Washington, Lee’s presidency presents a test: Can the United States work with a Korean leader who embraces the alliance while maintaining strategic flexibility? The test is particularly acute given lingering anxieties in Washington about a potential resurgence of the anti-Americanism that shaped South Korea’s progressive politics in the early 2000s. These fears underscore the importance of clear, consistent alliance signaling and careful diplomatic calibration from the outset.

At the same time, Trump’s return to the White House brings renewed pressure for Seoul to align more explicitly against China—economically, militarily, and ideologically. This transactional approach to alliances could strain bilateral ties if Washington expects compliance without accommodating Korea’s own strategic calculus.

Lee has signaled interest in shared strategic sectors. His campaign promises to cooperate with Washington on shipbuilding and defense could suggest alignment with U.S. priorities, but intentions alone may not guarantee consistent follow-through. The current discussion in Washington that pressures Korea to extend its military commitments beyond the peninsula risks undermining Seoul’s strategic flexibility and domestic legitimacy. While there is a case to be made that a potential conflict between Taiwan and China will have direct implications for Korea’s national interests in regional stability and secure trade, Korea—particularly under Lee—will not want to anger China. A smarter approach would deepen and clarify the emerging technological alliance: developing AI standards, securing critical minerals, and expanding digital infrastructure in the Global South. These are arenas where Korea can amplify U.S. goals without overextending its strategic posture.

Strategic Pragmatism, Not Sentiment

Korea is no longer a spoke to be turned by great-power gears. It is sovereign, capable, and institutionally creative. The real opportunity lies not only in recalibrating policy but in restoring ambition to Korea’s foreign affairs—positioning the country to shape, rather than merely weather, the global transition ahead.

Realizing this potential will not be easy. Lee must navigate a polarized domestic landscape, a wary Washington, and a region hungry for leadership but skeptical of inconsistency. Korea’s ability to embrace this new approach will depend not just on vision, but on sustained political will, institutional coherence, and international credibility. If the Lee administration can align domestic support with diplomatic pragmatism and industrial strategy, it could redefine what middle-power leadership looks like in the Indo-Pacific.