The Gaza Plan Just Hit a Crucial Juncture. Egypt’s Role Is Critical for Its Success.

On Monday, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 2803, which endorses U.S. President Donald Trump’s peace plan for Gaza. The resolution features a framework that seeks to link a permanent ceasefire with transitional arrangements for governing the Gaza Strip, gradual steps toward an Israeli military withdrawal, and mechanisms to address Hamas’s disarmament. It also contains an important—albeit unclear—reference to the Palestinians’ right to an independent state in the final outcome. This reference provides the resolution with a strategic dimension that calls upon regional actors—chief among them Egypt—to play an active role in moving Gaza along a viable political trajectory, rather than allowing it to dissolve into administrative, security, and service-delivery details.

The resolution treats Trump’s plan as a binding roadmap that would shift Gaza from a state of conflict and humanitarian collapse to an interim phase led by the International Stabilization Force (ISF) and the Board of Peace, a multiparty supervisory body. The text notes that this phase is a transitional, organizational channel for reconstruction and the provision of basic services. The board and ISF would guarantee the flow of humanitarian assistance, manage border crossings, and implement security measures to prevent a relapse into violence.

The danger, however, lies in the possibility that this interim stage could easily evolve into a long-term trusteeship. To avoid this fate, the phase’s mechanisms and components must be designed in a manner that ensures meaningful Palestinian participation in day-to-day governance. It should set clear timeframes for every transitional step—including Israeli military withdrawal without partitioning the Gaza Strip and addressing the weapons of Hamas and other factions. And it must ensure that any necessary extension is not solely an Israeli request or a U.S. decision, but also receives Palestinian and regional consent.

This is where Egypt’s role becomes critical.

Egypt is not merely Gaza’s neighbor. It is a central actor in the region—one that possesses the capacity, expertise, and depth of relationships necessary to ensure that this transitional process in Gaza is part of an effort both to empower Palestinians (not marginalize them) and to lead to a lasting settlement (not perpetual external control). As demonstrated over recent years, Egypt views the stability of Gaza and the restoration of Palestinians’ political and security rights as integral to its own national security and a prerequisite for preventing the fragmentation of the Palestinian cause.

The resolution offers Egypt, along with Arab states and the Palestinians, several opportunities to exert influence—if they manage these chances wisely. Foremost among them is the establishment—for the first time—of a clear international framework for reconstruction. This framework ensures the flow of resources according to defined priorities under international oversight and aims to limit corruption, prevent politicizing aid, and block Israel’s continued criminal use of starvation as a weapon. Egypt must work to ensure formal Arab participation in overseeing the transitional phase through clear Arab representation on the Board of Peace and other supervisory bodies, which will help prevent other international actors from monopolizing decisions affecting Gaza’s future. In addition, Egypt should push for a clearly defined time frame for the international mandate—one extendable only with Palestinian approval and neutral regional and international assessment—to avoid entrenching a long-term external administration.

The resolution also provides a mechanism linking Israeli withdrawal to measurable security steps, such as the permanent decommissioning of weapons from Hamas and other Palestinian factions in Gaza. This is an important development, as it moves the withdrawal process from tactical bargaining to a real-world exercise subject to periodic evaluation. Such a move enables Palestinians, Arab states, and the international community to exert pressure for Israeli compliance—while also allowing for the monitoring of weapons inside Gaza.

Furthermore, the resolution opens a political window for rebuilding Palestinian civilian and security institutions through a phased approach. This approach allows for direct Palestinian administration of security, administrative, and service functions under limited and temporary international supervision and ensures that Palestinian institutions become active partners rather than passive recipients of directives. Egypt can lead an extensive program to build Palestinian capacities in these areas. This would enable Palestinian cadres to manage their affairs effectively from the earliest weeks of the transition and strengthen the shift from international to full Palestinian governance.

At the same time, the resolution presents significant challenges that Egypt and its regional partners can play an active role in managing. One primary area is the decommissioning of weapons from Hamas and other factions, which is not a technical task that can be resolved through top-down decisions. Instead, it’s a complex political and security process requiring a phased vision, guarantees acceptable to Palestinians, and economic and political incentives that give real meaning to the shift from factional authority to institutional governance and from armed resistance to nonviolent tools of negotiation.

Initial containment measures can halt production, smuggling, and the use of heavy weaponry, while subsequent steps may involve weapons storage arrangements under joint international, Arab, and Palestinian oversight. These measures could occur alongside political and societal reconciliation tracks that allow for the integration of armed actors into Palestinian Authority security or service institutions. All of this must unfold within a framework that prevents a security vacuum from devolving into chaos or enabling the rise of new armed groups—making Egypt’s role, given its experience and the trust it commands, central to ensuring coherence and gradual implementation. Egypt can serve as a guarantor-mediator in calibrating the complex balance between gradual Israeli withdrawal and mechanisms for disarmament of Hamas and other factions, ensuring that each step is coordinated, monitored, and matched with concrete incentives for Palestinians and local communities.

The ISF’s makeup is another dilemma: Many states are hesitant to deploy ground troops in such a sensitive environment, resulting in a force that is unable to carry out its mandate. Moreover, the visible international division—evidenced by abstentions from Russia and China in the Security Council resolution vote—could erode the consensus essential for a successful transition. Egypt can work with Middle East countries such as Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Türkiye as well as with the European Union to create a regional and international environment friendly to the formation and deployment of ground troops from Muslim-majority countries.

Finally, rebuilding Palestinian institutions could proceed slowly, inadvertently transforming temporary international authorization into a de facto permanent arrangement. Egypt and Arab states must work to protect Palestinian political legitimacy from erosion during the transitional period. This means ensuring that Palestinian institutions—whether reformed or broadened—are genuine partners in decisionmaking, and that the return of the Palestinian Authority or any unified Palestinian body is a substantive political return, not merely a symbolic cover for international administration. Egypt must also secure international support for internal Palestinian reforms alongside progress on the political track, fostering trust between Palestinians and their renewed or restructured institutions. And it must take care to remind the international community that the ultimate objective is not the management of Gaza, but a just and comprehensive settlement that ensures the establishment of an independent, viable Palestinian state in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem.

Security Council Resolution 2803 represents a political crossroads: one path heads toward a long-term settlement that ends the conflict, rebuilds Gaza, and establishes the foundation for a Palestinian state, while the other marches toward a permanent transitional administration that strips Palestinians of their right to self-determination and plunges Gaza into competing authorities and conflicting security regimes. The resolution offers hope for the first path, and a genuine first step toward a just and comprehensive peace. Egypt’s role will be decisive in guiding all parties in that direction.