Source: Economic Review
This article is reprinted with permission from the October issue of the Far Eastern Economic Review. All rights reserved.
Pakistan’s mix of military might, Western allegiance and thriving Islamic fundamentalism is often confusing and contradictory to the outside observer. So Husain Haqqani performs a valuable service by analyzing the role of religion, the seemingly omnipotent military and intelligence services that control much of the country’s foreign and domestic policy making, the factors behind failed civilian governments, and the country’s tense but close relationship with the United States. The book delivers a clear and concise account of why Pakistan is still under military rule more than 50 years after gaining independence from the United Kingdom.
Mr. Haqqani highlights three interlinked problems that have affected Pakistan’s internal politics since the country’s birth: the state’s use of religion and religious groups for political gain; the inability of the government to control religious fervor after unleashing it; and the military’s failure to address the cause of this chaos, dealing only with the symptoms. He explains that the relationship between Pakistan’s military and Islamic rulers is not one of opposing forces, but rather of symbiotic shapers of domestic and international policy.
A native of Karachi, Mr. Haqqani is a seasoned journalist and former review correspondent who spent many years reporting on Asia, including covering the war in Afghanistan. He has advised Pakistani prime ministers and served as Islamabad’s ambassador to Sri Lanka in 1992-93. Taking years of first-hand experience of Pakistani politics, his narrative weaves the disparate strands into an informative and authoritative tale.
The author argues that it is not the devotion of ordinary citizens to Islam that has driven the development of Pakistan’s state ideology, but rather “the military’s desire to dominate the political system and define Pakistan’s national security priorities.” The military’s adoption of Islamic ideology by early military leaders such as Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan “conferred legitimacy on its right to rule Pakistan.”
The vision of Pakistan’s first leader, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, was simply to create a homeland for India’s Muslim population. From the outset, then, the country’s early rulers agreed that Islam was the most important unifying force for a country with many ethnic and linguistic differences, and subsequent political crises only accentuated this dependence.
Pakistan’s use of Islam to cement the new nation was tested very early on when it lost the civil war with the East Pakistani, or present-day Bangladesh, in 1971. Aside from cutting the population in half and crippling the economy, the country’s military faced an even bigger crisis: loss of confidence. He argues that Pakistan’s military strength feeds off the country’s national insecurity—something that has plagued the nation from its inception.
With the assumption of power by Gen. Zia ul-Haq, a devout Muslim, in 1977, the military and Islam in Pakistan became even more interlinked. Mr. Haqqani adds that while Gen. Zia’s quest to use Islam as the main governing force in Pakistan may not have had an immediate negative effect on ordinary Pakistani citizens, it “brought the relationship between Pakistani state and Islamic groups to a new level” and sought to create an all-powerful force that civilian governments could not control.
He sympathetically recounts how Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto fought to control the military, intelligence services and presidency. The stories of civilian government failures in Pakistan are an example of what Mr. Haqqani calls a “fault line” within the country. He asserts that military rule has not only deprived the country’s political leaders of opportunities to learn how to govern properly, but the constant threat of a coup disrupts the natural course of politics.
Mr. Haqqani’s step-by-step historical narratives provide the necessary background for understanding Pakistan’s acrimonious relationship with India, the thorny issue of Kashmir, its demand for U.S. support and financial assistance, and the connection between mosque and military. The book also explains how Islamic extremism, now leaking out into the rest of the world, first found its way to Pakistan. Finally, Mr. Haqqani reveals the inside story of how the events of 9/11 forced Gen. Musharraf to balance his relationship with extremist Islamic groups in his own country and Afghanistan with a necessary pledge of allegiance to the U.S. government.
Mr. Haqqani concludes that the unequal partnership with the U.S. will have negative consequences because Washington is seeking short-term gains that only exacerbate problems within Pakistan. He suggests that while Pakistan was created quickly without taking the steps necessary for nation building, “perhaps it is time to rectify that mistake by taking a long-term view. Both Pakistan’s elite and their U.S. benefactors would have to participate in transforming Pakistan into a functional, rather than ideological, state.”
Ms. Geiger is a Hong Kong-based reporter for Dow Jones Newswires.
