Commentary
The conflict is exposing the deep energy vulnerabilities of Korea’s chip industry.
Darcie Draudt-Véjares, Tim Sahay
{
"authors": [
"Akio Kawato"
],
"type": "commentary",
"centerAffiliationAll": "",
"centers": [
"Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
"Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center"
],
"collections": [],
"englishNewsletterAll": "",
"nonEnglishNewsletterAll": "",
"primaryCenter": "Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center",
"programAffiliation": "",
"programs": [],
"projects": [
"Eurasia in Transition"
],
"regions": [
"North America",
"United States",
"South Asia",
"Afghanistan",
"East Asia",
"China",
"Russia"
],
"topics": [
"Economy",
"Security",
"Military",
"Foreign Policy"
]
}
Source: Getty
Commentary
The China Factor in Afghanistan-2014
After the U.S. troops withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Taliban will most likely regain the power under the auspices of Pakistan and possibly of another neighbor—China.
By Akio Kawato
Published on Oct 25, 2013
The most probable development of the situation in Afghanistan-2014 would be a combination of the two historical cases: the U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam in 1973, in which the local government quickly surrendered to the Vietcongs, and the U.S. evacuation from Iraq-2011, where the local government managed to keep the peace, though heavily reeling toward the neighboring Iran. In the case of Afghanistan-2014 the Taliban (they are not one, by the way) will regain the power under the auspices of Pakistan and possibly of another neighbor—China.
Most pundits in Russia and Central Asia take it for granted that the United States has an “ambition” to expand its influence in Afghanistan and Central Asia. Sure, this region has a unique strategic advantage; by keeping their military presence there the Americans would be able to yield influence on the surrounding big powers: Russia, China, India, and Iran.
But these people forget that the United States is not inherently imperialistic, and that, more importantly, it is almost impossible to safely maintain large armed forces in this land-locked area. Moreover, if the Afghans do not confer immunity for the American military “advisers” after 2014, Obama will not hesitate to thoroughly and quickly withdraw all forces from Afghanistan, as was the case with Iraq in 2011.
The ethnic composition in Afghanistan is even more complex than in Iraq, and some local aqsaqals will resist the foray of the Taliban (who are mostly ethnic Pashtuns), although the former will be eventually neutralized to allow Taliban’s come-back to power. Taliban’s rule this time, however, may be more “civilized” than it was before 2001, because the Afghan society has become more civilized with urbanization and spread of school education. But Taliban’s resurrection may incur a strong involvement of China in Afghan affairs.
Afghanistan is not alien for China. Afghanistan used to be a vital part of the Silk Road and was a conduit to India from where China imported Buddhism. Today Afghanistan has a more imminent meaning for China, because China fears Pakistani and Taliban terrorists attack in Shinjang, because she would hate Afghanistan to be used as a stronghold of the Uyghur separatists, and because she is now deeply involved in the mining of copper, oil, and gas in Afghanistan.
In September 2012, Zhou Yongkang, then Chinese top security official, made an unannounced visit to Kabul, demonstrating where China’s interests are. In his talk with President Karzai, Zhou offered assistance to the Afghan police and asked for privileges for China’s mining interest.
It seems that many Afghans are not fond of the Chinese, so China will not dare to send armed forces into this country (Afghanistan is notoriously a “graveyard of the superpowers”). Nevertheless, China’s growing influence in Afghanistan may induce Russia to resume her collaboration with Afghanistan’s northern tribes; they are mostly Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Turkmens. Incidentally, oil and gas reserves are mostly located in this area, and therefore the interests of China and Russia may collide here. In Afghanistan, too, Russia’s ambition to form a Eurasian Union now hits against today’s Great Wall, the China’s grandiose “New Silk Road” concept. Those who talk bigger tend to prevail.
About the Author
Akio Kawato
Writer
Akio Kawato is a former Japanese diplomat and blogger.
EconomySecurityMilitaryForeign PolicyNorth AmericaUnited StatesSouth AsiaAfghanistanEast AsiaChinaRussia
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
More Work from Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- The Iran War Is Also Now a Semiconductor Problem
- The Other Global Crisis Stemming From the Strait of Hormuz’s BlockageCommentary
Even if the Iran war stops, restarting production and transport for fertilizers and their components could take weeks—at a crucial moment for planting.
Noah Gordon, Lucy Corthell
- Shockwaves Across the GulfCommentary
The countries in the region are managing the fallout from Iranian strikes in a paradoxical way.
Angie Omar
- Taking the Pulse: Is France’s New Nuclear Doctrine Ambitious Enough?Commentary
French President Emmanuel Macron has unveiled his country’s new nuclear doctrine. Are the changes he has made enough to reassure France’s European partners in the current geopolitical context?
Rym Momtaz, ed.
- The Iran War’s Dangerous Fallout for EuropeCommentary
The drone strike on the British air base in Akrotiri brings Europe’s proximity to the conflict in Iran into sharp relief. In the fog of war, old tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean risk being reignited, and regional stakeholders must avoid escalation.
Marc Pierini
