{
"authors": [
"Thomas de Waal"
],
"type": "commentary",
"centerAffiliationAll": "",
"centers": [
"Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
"Carnegie Europe",
"Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center"
],
"collections": [],
"englishNewsletterAll": "",
"nonEnglishNewsletterAll": "",
"primaryCenter": "Carnegie Europe",
"programAffiliation": "",
"programs": [],
"projects": [],
"regions": [
"Caucasus",
"Russia",
"Georgia",
"Western Europe"
],
"topics": [
"Security",
"Foreign Policy"
]
}
Source: Getty
Philippe Lefort is stepping down as the EU’s special representative for the South Caucasus. Now a new representative will have to start again from zero in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and the worry is that in the meantime the Caucasus conflicts will slip down the EU agenda.
It is not a good moment to be announcing a change in Caucasus policy.
The turmoil in Ukraine and the Sochi Olympics are making Georgians feel nervous vis-à-vis Russia. Yet the announcement has come that French diplomat Philippe Lefort is stepping down as the European Union's special representative for the South Caucasus, a post he combines with that of co-chair of the Geneva talks on the Abkhazia and South Ossetia conflicts.
Officially, it will be business as usual and Lefort's successor will be named soon. But there are persistent rumors that he has fallen foul of parts of the Brussels bureaucracy and that his departure signals yet another structural overhaul of EU policy toward the South Caucasus.
His is not an easy job. The Geneva talks, convened in 2008 after the August war over South Ossetia, are a painful process. Currently, their value is in providing a venue for Abkhaz, Ossetians, Georgians, and Russians to meet and discuss not very much, hoping that when the time comes for serious talks the format for them is already there. As the only co-chair which represents an organization that does not count Russia as a member (the other two co-chairs are the OSCE and UN), the EU has the leading role.
Both Lefort and his two predecessors have had to fight to maintain a niche in the EU policy hierarchy. Currently, he is not responsible for EU foreign policy toward the region as a whole (that is the job of the European External Action Service), EU neighborhood policy (the brief of commissioner Stefan Füle), the Nagorny Karabakh conflict (France and the Minsk Group) or the border monitoring mission (the Georgia-based European Union Monitoring Mission).
That means the major responsibility of the special representative is to be EU envoy to Abkhazia and South Ossetia. And Lefort indeed kept up important channels of communication with the Abkhaz (the South Ossetians are less cooperative), when almost no one else except the Russians is talking to them.
Lefort's immediate predecessor Peter Semneby faced similar challenges. He devised a strategy of "non-recognition and engagement" for Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which provided a useful road-map for active EU involvement in those two territories without recognizing them as sovereign states. Unfortunately, despite Lefort's efforts, that strategy has made little headway and the EU presence in Abkhazia is still minimal.
Now a new special representative, perhaps with a different role and different mandate, will have to start again from zero in Abkhazia. The worry is that in the meantime the institutional memory in Brussels of where Abkhazia is and why the Geneva talks matter will decline even further and the Caucasus conflicts will slip down the EU agenda.
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
For Putin, upgrading Russia’s nuclear forces was a secondary goal. The main aim was to gain an advantage over the West, including by strengthening the nuclear threat on all fronts. That made growth in missile arsenals and a new arms race inevitable.
Maxim Starchak
A prophetic Romanian novel about a town at the mouth of the Danube carries a warning: Europe decays when it stops looking outward. In a world of increasing insularity, the EU should heed its warning.
Thomas de Waal
For a real example of political forces engaged in the militarization of society, the Russian leadership might consider looking closer to home.
James D.J. Brown
The risk posed by Lukashenko today looks very different to how it did in 2022. The threat of the Belarusian army entering the war appears increasingly illusory, while Ukraine’s ability to attack any point in Belarus with drones gives Kyiv confidence.
Artyom Shraibman
Washington and New Delhi should be proud of their putative deal. But international politics isn’t the domain of unicorns and leprechauns, and collateral damage can’t simply be wished away.
Evan A. Feigenbaum